Abstract
For Murdoch the importance of the fact–value dichotomy is not to suggest that value is not real. Rather this separation is required in order to keep value pure and untainted with empirical facts. Here Murdoch focuses Kant and Wittgenstein, notably the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. For both, value appears as an intimation of ‘something higher’. And it is here that Murdoch sees the deeper problem with various forms of the fact–value dichotomy: that in our explanations of human life the essential thing, value, must be built into our model or picture from the start if it is to be ultimately integrated into it at all, but that in doing so we may be accused of what Murdoch calls an unwarranted act of faith or intuition.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Crary, A. 2007. Beyond moral judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Crary, A. 2016. Inside ethics: On the demands of moral thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Diamond, C. 1995. The realistic spirit: Wittgenstein, philosophy and the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Diamond, C. 1996. ‘We are perpetually moralists’: Iris Murdoch, fact, and value. In Iris Murdoch and the search for human goodness, ed. Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gaita, R. 2004. Good and evil: An absolute conception, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Garner, E., and R. Joyce, eds. 2019. The end of morality: Taking moral abolitionism seriously. London: Routledge.
Hooker, B. (ed.). 1996. Truth in ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kant, I. 1964. Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, trans. H.J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row.
Murdoch, I. 1956. Vision and choice in morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 30: 32–58.
Murdoch, I. 1985. The sovereignty of good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Murdoch, I. 1992. Metaphysics as a guide to morals (Abbreviated MGM). London: Chatto & Windus.
Schopenhauer, A. 1965. On the basis of morality, trans. E.F.J. Payne. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merill.
Waismann, F. 1979. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1961. Tractatus logico-philosopicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. 1968. Philosophical investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1979. Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe and ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Taylor, C. (2019). Fact and Value (MGM Chapter 2). In: Hämäläinen, N., Dooley, G. (eds) Reading Iris Murdoch's Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18967-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18967-9_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18966-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18967-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)