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Law as Fact and Norm. Georg Jellinek and the Dual Nature of Law

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The Normative Force of the Factual

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 130))

Abstract

The history of legal scholarship is full of one-sided views that undervalue either the factual or the normative dimension of the law. This article develops a well-balanced account of law’s relation to both fact and norm by discussing two elements of Georg Jellinek’s theory of law. First, it discusses his thesis of the ‘normative force of the factual’, in the light of Kelsen’s critique and the problem of an Is-Ought-Fallacy. This article argues that we should better label this thesis the ‘regarded-as-normative force of the factual’. Second, the article focuses on Jellinek’s two-sided theory of the state and its modern variant, the dual nature thesis. It identifies the bridge problem as the main challenge to these accounts, and answers this problem by pointing to the dual nature of legal argumentation and to a dynamic theory of legal discourse.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is clear from the first sentence in the 11th chapter of his Allgemeine Staatslehre, see Jellinek (1966, p. 332).

  2. 2.

    Quoting Searle (1969, p. 182), italics by von Wright.

  3. 3.

    ‘Alles Recht hat als notwendiges Merkmal das der Gültigkeit’. Jellinek (1966, p. 333).

  4. 4.

    I follow legal non-positivism’s connection thesis here, cf. Alexy (2002, p. 4); Klatt (2012, pp. 11–14, 22–23).

  5. 5.

    On the two levels of psychological effectiveness of the law, see Jellinek (1966, p. 334).

  6. 6.

    This point has been misunderstood by many scholars, including Stolleis (1992, p. 452): ‘question of the validity of law’.

  7. 7.

    In the context of the Is-Ought-Fallacy, there is a second argument Kelsen brings forward against Jellinek, namely that the distinct methods of Kausalwissenschaft and Normwissenschaft created two distinct objects of inquiry, and that it was a mistake to refer to them by the same predicate. I do not consider this argument here, but see Klatt (2015, pp. 493–494).

  8. 8.

    Weinberger, however, has challenged the explanatory strength of Jellinek’s thesis even in this regard by pointing to the freedom humans have in creating institutions and forms of life and thereby making changes to what ought to happen. Weinberger (1991, p. 27).

  9. 9.

    I have addressed this criticism previously in Klatt (2019).

  10. 10.

    See Sect. 3.2 above.

  11. 11.

    I explore the idea of balancing Is and Ought in legal argumentation in Klatt (2016, pp. 37–41).

  12. 12.

    On the two requirements for an appropriate bridge theory, see Sect. 4.3 above.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Graz, Graz, Austria

    Matthias Klatt

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  1. Matthias Klatt
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Thémis Institute, Genève, Switzerland

    Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac

  2. Institute of Public Law and Political Science, University of Graz, Graz, Austria

    Christoph Bezemek

  3. School of Law, University of Virgina, Virgina, VA, USA

    Frederick Schauer

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Klatt, M. (2019). Law as Fact and Norm. Georg Jellinek and the Dual Nature of Law. In: Bersier Ladavac, N., Bezemek, C., Schauer, F. (eds) The Normative Force of the Factual. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18929-7_4

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