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Introduction

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South Africa’s Energy Transition

Part of the book series: Progressive Energy Policy ((PEP))

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Abstract

South Africa is typical among major fossil fuel producers for having failed to substantially transition toward renewable energy (RE) sources. Like many other countries, it shows a marked discrepancy between official government policies and commitments on decarbonisation, and actual progress in reducing reliance on coal. Several factors suggest nonetheless that South Africa (like many fossil fuel-dependent Global South countries) would benefit from a more rapid transition to RE sources: these include (1) the unreliability of coal, its fossil fuel-based power supply, constituting a major brake on economic development, particularly for rural areas where the infrastructure is lacking; (2) this supply’s associated pollution, which has a serious impact on local and regional health and well-being; (3) South Africa’s superior clean-energy endowments; and, not least; and (4) “resource curse” effects of coal (and the broader mining economy). For many years, price has not been a plausible explanation for the relative tardiness of South Africa’s energy transition, nor the exclusive determining factor. Rather, explanations need to refer to the country’s broader political (including international and global) contexts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    World Bank (2018c).

  2. 2.

    IRP (2018: 58–60).

  3. 3.

    Nakumuryango and Inglesi-Lotz (2016).

  4. 4.

    OEC (2018).

  5. 5.

    Solomons (2017).

  6. 6.

    Walwyn and Brent (2015).

  7. 7.

    From 2011 to 2015, South Africa’s LCOE (i.e., levelised cost of energy—averaging costs over the source’s life cycle) per kWh of solar-derived electricity fell from R3.65 to R0.62; and for wind, from R1.51 to R0.62. The cost of “new coal” from the two independent coal producers has been bid at R1.03. The projected costs of the new giant coal-powered stations, Medupi and Kusile, are R1.70 and R1.91 respectively. Mudavanhu and Rudin (2018).

  8. 8.

    IRENA (2018: 49).

  9. 9.

    Lazard’s (2018) estimates for South Africa include price advantages of wind power over combined cycle gas generation of 20–30%; of solar PV over peaking gas generation of 40–75%. It now estimates that even average capital costs for all forms of solar PV and wind (previously higher than average fossil fuel capital costs; PV and wind already enjoyed lower operation and maintenance costs), as well as fuel cell storage, are lower than those for coal, let alone nuclear power. These estimates do not incorporate environmental regulation costs or potential social and environmental externalities; doing so would make RE generation even more competitive. See Lazard (2018).

  10. 10.

    IRP (2010).

  11. 11.

    ANC Presidency (2011).

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    SARVA (2018).

  14. 14.

    Midgley et al. (2007).

  15. 15.

    WHO (2017).

  16. 16.

    Smith (2018).

  17. 17.

    EMG, n.d.

  18. 18.

    Discussed further in Chapter 2.

  19. 19.

    IPCC (2018).

  20. 20.

    Nace (2018).

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    These projects include 9.5GW wind, 6.8GW solar, 8.1GW gas, 6.7GW coal (including more than 5GW of already-contracted capacity from 2019–2022, and another 1GW of new coal capacity in 2023–2024) and 2.5GW hydropower. IRP (2018).

  23. 23.

    DEA (2018: 11).

  24. 24.

    Climate Action Tracker (2018).

  25. 25.

    Eberhard (2011) and DEA (2014).

  26. 26.

    The 2010 IRP, for example, forecast electricity demand growth of 2.8% per year from 2010–2030, amounting to a near-doubling of aggregate demand from 250 TWh to 454 TWh over this period. It also increased its target for RE electricity production to 17.8GW, an increase of almost 50% from the 11.4GW put forward in the IRP prior to the public consultation process, the first in the country’s history (prior to the 2010 IRP, planning was done internally by Eskom).

  27. 27.

    IRP (2018: 5).

  28. 28.

    IRP (2018, Figure 11).

  29. 29.

    Bloom (2018).

  30. 30.

    Arent et al. (2017: 10–11).

  31. 31.

    Coady et al. (2017).

  32. 32.

    South Africa’s top imports are Crude Petroleum ($6.54B), Unspecified ($6B), Cars ($3.34B), Refined Petroleum ($2.55B) and Broadcasting Equipment ($1.87B). See OEC (2018).

  33. 33.

    Cotterill (2018).

  34. 34.

    Fin24 (2014) and Hofstatter (2018: 94).

  35. 35.

    Styan (2015: 109–110).

  36. 36.

    Leger (1991).

  37. 37.

    Stoddard (2017).

  38. 38.

    Holland (2017) estimates impacts in terms of early death, chronic bronchitis, hospital admissions for respiratory and cardiovascular disease, and other factors including lost productivity, at over 10,000 lives and $2.4 billion each year.

  39. 39.

    Styan (2015: 113).

  40. 40.

    Meth (2018).

  41. 41.

    As discussed further in Chapter 2, this is one part of a much bigger problem of water systems management. See, e.g., Bond and Dugard (2008).

  42. 42.

    Auty (1993).

  43. 43.

    Sachs and Warner (1995: 2) and Davis (1995).

  44. 44.

    Humphreys et al. (2007).

  45. 45.

    The 2012 Marikana massacre occurred when police responded to a wildcat strike by Platinum miners with overwhelming force, killing three dozen and injuring at least 78 strikers, making it the worst act of state-sponsored violence since the 1976 Soweto Uprising. Marinovich (2016).

  46. 46.

    This stipulation applies even more to the post-global economic crisis context of the past decade.

  47. 47.

    Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 248).

  48. 48.

    E.g., Mearsheimer (1994).

  49. 49.

    The oil and gas parastatal, Sasol, has operations even further afield, including oil and gas exploration and production in Mozambique, Gabon, Australia, and Canada; gas to liquids ventures in Qatar, Nigeria and Uzbekistan; and a US$11 billion ethane cracker and derivatives plant in Lake Charles, Louisiana (Sasol 2017).

  50. 50.

    Wu et al. (2017).

  51. 51.

    Jiborn et al. (2018).

  52. 52.

    Newell and Bumpus (2012).

  53. 53.

    As Newell and Mulvany argue, “Issues of justice will be intrinsic to whichever energy trajectory is pursued within and beyond the fossil fuel economy and they need to be better understood and anticipated by future efforts to secure a ‘just transition’ around questions of extraction, labour and the distribution of benefits.” Newell and Mulvaney (2013: 6).

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Lawrence, A. (2020). Introduction. In: South Africa’s Energy Transition. Progressive Energy Policy. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18903-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18903-7_1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18902-0

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