Skip to main content

New Zealand and Disarmament: Where National and Global Interests Converge

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 2450 Accesses

Part of the book series: The World of Small States ((WSS,volume 6))

Abstract

Over several decades, New Zealand has built a strong, bipartisan record for constructive disarmament and arms control policies. This contributes significantly to its reputation as a relatively independent, principled international actor. It reflects and reinforces New Zealand’s role as a champion of a rules-based international order, and defender of the rights and interests of small states.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987, sections 5–7, 9–11 and 14(2).

  2. 2.

    New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, preambular para. 1.

  3. 3.

    New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, section 18(1)(a). In 2011, the Key Government disestablished the post but in 2018, the Ardern Government reinstated it.

  4. 4.

    “Banning Weapons,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 31 May 2019, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/disarmament/chemical/banning-weapons/#CCCW.

  5. 5.

    “Banning Weapons.”

  6. 6.

    Borrie (2009), p. 44, 46, 133, 150, 193, 220, 285.

  7. 7.

    “Model Legislation,” Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, accessed 31 May 2019, http://www.clusterconvention.org/documents-and-resources/model-legislation/.

  8. 8.

    Global Partnership Working Group, “GPWG Annual Report 2010: Consolidated Report Data; Annex A,” (2010), 53–55, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/184526.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Until 2004, nuclear propulsion policies were less consistent. Since adopting a ‘nuclear free’ policy before the 1990 election, the National Party has twice sought to remove the propulsion ban to improve relations with the United States. After two pro-nuclear reports in 1992 and 2004 engendered strong public criticism, it did not pursue the issue.

  10. 10.

    Templeton (1999), pp. 69–72; Dewes (1998); Burford (2016), ch. 5, 7.

  11. 11.

    Kane (2014), pp. 2 and v, respectively.

  12. 12.

    The NPT also affirms that state parties have an “inalienable right” to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

  13. 13.

    2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (New York: United Nations, 2000), 14, para. 15(6); 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (New York: United Nations, 2010), 12, para. 79; 19: chapeau to Section I; 19, para. I(A)(ii); 20, Action 1; 20, Action 3.

  14. 14.

    New Zealand also supports the CTBT Organisation by hosting radionuclide, infrasound and seismic monitoring stations as part of the International Monitoring System which can detect nuclear tests anywhere.

  15. 15.

    Russia and the United States each maintain nearly 1000 nuclear missiles on 30-min alert status. In 2009, New Zealand and Switzerland co-funded a seminar with US and Russian nuclear experts to explore options for de-alerting these weapons. See Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Arsenals. (Yverdon-les-Bains: EastWest Institute, 2009).

  16. 16.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “US and New Zealand Expand Partnership to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats,” press release, 31 July 2012.

  17. 17.

    1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) (New York: United Nations, 1995), 10, para. 4(a).

  18. 18.

    Hoadley (2005), ch. 8.

  19. 19.

    On the 1973 case, see Templeton (1999). On the 1995 case, see Mackay (2007), pp. 258–265.

  20. 20.

    Hoadley (2005), p. 112.

  21. 21.

    Dewes (1998).

  22. 22.

    International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,” ICJ Reports 1996 (8 July 1996), 266–267, para. 105(2)(E) and (F), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

  23. 23.

    New Zealand and San Marino were the only Western-aligned countries to support the resolution.

  24. 24.

    Cited in Prior et al. (1998), p. 37.

  25. 25.

    Dell Higgie, “Speech to the Symposium Marking the 20th Anniversary of the 8 July 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice” (Christchurch, 8 July 2016), accessed 31 May 2019, http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/dh-icjsy16.pdf.

  26. 26.

    Goff (2000), p. 7.

  27. 27.

    The NAC also drew inspiration from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Randal (2008), p. 185.

  28. 28.

    Burford (2016), pp. 181–186.

  29. 29.

    2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, 14, para. 15(6).

  30. 30.

    Rebecca Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise,” Disarmament Diplomacy 46 (May 2000), https://web.archive.org/web/20120328141214/http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd46/46npt.htm.

  31. 31.

    2010 Review Conference, 19, para. I(A)(ii).

  32. 32.

    2010 Review Conference, 19, para. I(A)(v).

  33. 33.

    International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, “Working towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” (Geneva, 26 November 2011), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/nuclear-background-document-2011-11-26.htm; International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Working towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: 2018–2021 Action Plan, CD/17/R4 (11 November 2017), http://rcrcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CD-17-R4_clean.pdf.

  34. 34.

    Ritchie (2015).

  35. 35.

    New Zealand testimony to the ICJ, Public sitting, 9 November 1995, 24, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8710.pdf.

  36. 36.

    Switzerland, “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament,” presented to the NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, 2 May 2012.

  37. 37.

    New Zealand, “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,” presented to the UNGA First Committee, New York, 21 October 2013; and “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” presented to the UNGA First Committee. New York, 20 October 2014.

  38. 38.

    “Humanitarian Initiative,” ICAN, accessed 31 May 2019, http://www.icanw.org/campaign/humanitarian-initiative/.

  39. 39.

    Lewis A Dunn, “Some Reflections on Strategic Stability and Its Challenges in Today’s World” (conference paper, Meeting on Strategic Stability Issues, sponsored by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Moscow, 5 October 2017), p. 9, http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/us-russian-dialogue-on-strategic-stability__strategic-stability-lewis-dunn.pdf.

  40. 40.

    See for example, Treasa Dunworth, “Strengthening the NPT: International Law and Effective Measures for Nuclear Disarmament” (Discussion Paper, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, October 2015), http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/NZ-161015.pdf; Treasa Dunworth, “Negotiating Nuclear Disarmament: Clarifying the Law,” (paper presented to the First Committee of the UNGA, New York, October 2016), http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/NZ-161015.pdf.

  41. 41.

    Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland, “De-Alerting,” A/AC.286/WP.18, presented to the Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, Geneva, 2016.

  42. 42.

    United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/258, Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, A/RES/71/258, 23 December 2016.

  43. 43.

    Norwegian Nobel Committee, “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2017,” press release, 6 October 2017, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2017/press.html.

  44. 44.

    “Signature/Ratification Status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” ICAN, accessed 31 May 2019, http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.

  45. 45.

    Winston Peters, “New Zealand to Join New Nuclear Disarmament Treaty,” Government press release, 14 May 2018, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-join-new-nuclear-disarmament-treaty.

  46. 46.

    National Interest Analysis – Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty, shoulder no. A.15A (Wellington: New Zealand Parliament, May 2018), para 13, https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/papers-presented/current-papers/document/PAP_78208/treaty-on-the-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-along-with-the.

  47. 47.

    Maclellan (2017). Regarding the health impacts on these personnel and their families, see Wahab et al. (2008), pp. 79–87.

  48. 48.

    National Interest Analysis – Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty, para. 3.

  49. 49.

    For detailed analysis and debate of the implications of this point, see, Sagan (2010).

  50. 50.

    Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046 (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2017), 15, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53211.

  51. 51.

    For the complete UNGA voting record, see, United Nations General Assembly, official record, 68th Plenary Meeting of the First Committee, A/71/PV.68, 23 December 2016, 17.

  52. 52.

    Wang Qun, “Statement by Ambassador WANG Qun” (First Committee of the 71st session of the UNGA, New York, 10 October 2016), 3, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405391.shtml.

  53. 53.

    Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, “United States and Allies Protest U.N. Talks to Ban Nuclear Weapons.” New York Times, 27 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/americas/un-nuclear-weapons-talks.html.

  54. 54.

    “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” 7 July 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170921004548/https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892.

  55. 55.

    NATO, “North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” press release, 20 September 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/news_146954.htm.

  56. 56.

    United States Mission to NATO, “United States Non-paper: Defense Impacts of Potential United Nations General Assembly Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty” (17 October 2016), http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NATO_OCT2016.pdf.

  57. 57.

    Wang Qun, “Statement by Ambassador Wang Qun,” 5.

  58. 58.

    National Interest Analysis – Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty, para. 16.

  59. 59.

    Dunworth, “Negotiating Nuclear Disarmament,” p. 1, para. 1.2.

  60. 60.

    “Pacific Conference on Conventional Weapons Treaties,” Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, last modified 21 February 2018, http://www.clusterconvention.org/2018/02/21/pacific-conference-on-conventional-weapons-treaties/.

  61. 61.

    UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Report of the Secretary General, A/57/124 (30 August 2002). Dr Kate Dewes served as the New Zealand government’s expert.

  62. 62.

    “Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: National Report Submitted by New Zealand,” NPT/CONF.2015/17, presented at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), New York, 2015, 6–7, paras 23–28.

  63. 63.

    New Zealand Press Association, “NZ Ready to Step up Efforts, Nuclear Summit Told,” New Zealand Herald, 14 April 2010.

  64. 64.

    The votes in favour of New Zealand’s Security Council membership came mainly from other non-nuclear states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, not New Zealand’s traditional partners in the Western European and Others group. O’Brien (2009), p. 56.

  65. 65.

    Similarly, despite the lack of a nuclear export industry, New Zealand is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

  66. 66.

    Audrey Young, “Clinton: ‘NZ Punches Way Above Its Weight,’” New Zealand Herald, 4 November 2010.

  67. 67.

    Kurt M Campbell, “Remarks on the Future of U.S.-New Zealand Relations” (speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 9 September 2010); Audrey Young, “Trade Talks High on Agenda at Key-Biden Meeting,” New Zealand Herald, 13 April 2010; “Why Obama Wants John Key at Summit,” New Zealand Herald, 13 April 2010; Young, “‘NZ Punches Way Above Its Weight.’”

  68. 68.

    Anthony Hubbard, “‘Positive Response’ to Peters’ Anti-Nuke Talks in N Korea,” Sunday Star-Times, 18 November 2007.

  69. 69.

    NBR staff, “North Korea a ‘Genuine Threat’ and NZ Will Play a Role If Asked: Ardern,” National Business Review, 18 November 2017.

  70. 70.

    Winston Peters, “Foreign Minister Attends North Korea Meeting,” Government press release, 15 January 2018, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/foreign-minister-attends-north-korea-meeting.

  71. 71.

    Arbatov (2015).

  72. 72.

    See Ayson (2017).

  73. 73.

    Brady (2017).

  74. 74.

    Choucri (2012), p. 4.

  75. 75.

    Grigsby (2017), p. 109.

  76. 76.

    Robert Scheer, “Former Defense Secretary William Perry on the Nuclear Threat,” Huffington Post, 2 September 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/former-defense-secretary-william-perry-on-the-nuclear_us_59ab04c1e4b0bef3378cd8fc.

  77. 77.

    David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet: How Kaspersky Lab Tracked down the Malware That Stymied Iran’s Nuclear-Fuel Enrichment Program,” IEEE Spectrum, 26 February 2013, https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.

  78. 78.

    Abaimov and Ingram (2017), p. 4.

  79. 79.

    Unal and Lewis (2017), ch. 6.

  80. 80.

    GCSB and NZSIS, Briefing to the Incoming Minister: Minister Responsible for the GCSB and Minister Responsible for the NZSIS, 2017 (September 2017), p. 8, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-12/GCSB%20and%20NZSIS_0.PDF.

  81. 81.

    “GCSB Points to Russian Cyber Attacks on NZ,” Radio New Zealand, 18 April 2018, https://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/audio/2018641184/gcsb-points-to-russian-cyber-attacks-on-nz.

  82. 82.

    Tikk and Kerttunen (2017), p. 16.

  83. 83.

    Hoverd (2017), p. 30.

  84. 84.

    Nicky Hager, “Beans Spilled on US Ties,” Sunday Star Times, 12 December 2010, http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/4449695/US-cables-spill-beans-on-NZ-ties.

  85. 85.

    Ryan Gallagher and Nicky Hager, “New Zealand Spies on Neighbours in Secret ‘Five Eyes’ Global Surveillance,” The Intercept, 5 March 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/; Ryan Gallagher and Nicky Hager, “New Zealand Targets Trade Partners, Hacks Computers in Spy Operations,” The Intercept, 11 March 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/03/10/new-zealand-gcsb-spying-trade-partners-nsa/; Ryan Gallagher and Nicky Hager, “Snowden Revelations / The Price of the Five Eyes Club: Mass Spying on Friendly Nations,” The New Zealand Herald, 5 March 2015.

  86. 86.

    See, for example, the list of activities that justify the issuing of a warrant for electronic surveillance due to their potential to harm New Zealand national security: The Intelligence and Security Act 2017, Section 58 (2).

  87. 87.

    Elias Groll, “Trump Elevates Cyber Command,” Foreign Policy, 18 August 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/18/trump-elevates-cyber-command/.

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Burford, L., Dewes, K. (2019). New Zealand and Disarmament: Where National and Global Interests Converge. In: Brady, AM. (eds) Small States and the Changing Global Order. The World of Small States, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18803-0_19

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18803-0_19

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18802-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18803-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics