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Abstract

Connected and intelligent railway technologies like the Euro-pean Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) introduce new risks in cybersecurity. Threat modeling is a building block in security engineering that identifies potential threats in order to define corresponding mitigation. In this paper, we show how to conduct threat modeling for railway security analysis during a development life cycle based on IECĀ 62443. We propose a practical and efficient approach to threat modeling, extending existing tool support and demonstrating its applicability and feasibility.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    i.e. the section on the tracks which is pre-approved for the train.

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Acknowledgments

This work is partially supported by the ECSEL projects Productive4.0 and SECREDAS (contract no. 737459, 783119) and Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG).

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Correspondence to Christoph Schmittner .

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Schmittner, C. et al. (2019). Threat Modeling in the Railway Domain. In: Collart-Dutilleul, S., Lecomte, T., Romanovsky, A. (eds) Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification. RSSRail 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11495. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18744-6_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18744-6_17

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