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Hardware/Software Co-designed Security Extensions for Embedded Devices

  • Maja MalenkoEmail author
  • Marcel Baunach
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11479)

Abstract

The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has dramatically increased the number of low-cost embedded devices. Being introduced into today’s connected cyber-physical world, these devices now become vulnerable, especially if they offer no protection mechanisms. In this work we present a hardware/software co-designed memory protection approach that provides efficient, cheap, and effective isolation of tasks. The security extensions are implemented into a RISC-V-based MCU and a microkernel-based operating system. Our FPGA prototype shows that the hardware extensions use less than 5.5% of its area in terms of LUTs, and 24.7% in terms of FFs. They impose an extra 28% of context switch time, while providing protection of shared on-chip peripherals and authenticated communication via shared memory.

Keywords

Memory protection Resource protection Inter-task communication RISC-V MPU 

Notes

Acknowledgment

This work was conducted within the Lead-Project “Dependable Internet of Things in Adverse Environments”, subproject “Dependable Computing” (funded by TU Graz).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Technical InformaticsGraz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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