Abstract
Though no theory about reflection is advanced, some things are said about philosophical reflection and how one should pursue philosophical investigation. I think that the most important clash in philosophy is the conflict between skeptics and dogmatists. First, I recall some of their mutual criticisms. This sets the criterion according to which we shall decide their dispute. Then, I describe philosophical investigation as a kind of reflection which has two complementary sides: on the one hand, philosophers reflect on ordinary thinking, trying to produce a better view of the world; on the other, they reflect on the philosophical results of this first reflection. I suggest that while skeptics and dogmatists pursue truth in philosophical investigation, they do it using different sorts of abilities and under different conditions. Accordingly, there is a skeptical reflection and a dogmatic reflection both on ordinary and on philosophical beliefs. In the final section, I argue for the superiority of the skeptical stance, which may be called neo-Pyrrhonism. In my view, the neo-Pyrrhonist is more truthful to the philosophical criterion of impartiality and rationality, whereas dogmatists move away from it at some point. I also explain why skeptics can suspend judgment and investigate the truth at the same time, while they accuse dogmatists of rashness, interrupting their investigation too soon. The basic point is to realize that, in the case of the Pyrrhonian skeptic, tranquility is no longer a product of philosophical investigation, but one of its conditions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
I will explain below what I mean by a sceptic and a dogmatist. As we shall see, I will distinguish between kinds of dogmatism and between kinds of skepticism. When I talk approvingly of skeptics, one must understand that I am referring to what I call “suspensive skeptics”, like ancient urbane Pyrrhonians, mitigated Humean skeptics, and contemporary Neo-Pyrrhonians, such as Robert J. Fogelin and Oswaldo Porchat.
- 2.
Another example is The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud (Bridges et al. 2011).
- 3.
See Smith (2016).
- 4.
References
Bacon, Francis. 1999 (NO). Novum Organum. In: Selected philosophical works. Edited, with an Introduction by Rose-Mary Sargent. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Bayle, Pierre. 2005 (DHC). Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de Pierre Bayle, Elibron Classics (A reprint of Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Paris: Desoer, 1820).
Bett, Richard. 1997. Sextus empiricus: Against the ethicists. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by Richard Bett. Oxford: Clarendon.
Bridges, Jason, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong, eds. 2011. The possibility of philosophical understanding: Reflections on the thoughts of Barry Stroud. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2014. The possibility of inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fogelin, Robert J. 1994. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2003. Walking the tightrope of reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2004. The skeptics are coming! The skeptcis are coming! In Pyrrhonian skepticism, ed. Wlater Sinnott-Armstring. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011. Stroud and Pyrrhonism. In The possibility of philosophical understanding, ed. Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frede, Michael. 1998. The sceptic’s beliefs. In The original sceptics: A controversy, ed. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Friedman, Jane. 2013. Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies 162: 165–181.
———. 2017. Why suspend judging? Nous 51: 302–326.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2010. Belief in the face of controversy. In Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2013. Is philosophical knowledge possible? In Disagreement and skepticism, ed. Diego E. Machuca. Oxford: Routledge.
Lennon, Thomas. 1999. Reading Bayle. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Machuca, Diego E. 2013. A neo-Pyrrhonian approach to the epistemology of disagreement. In Disagreement and skepticism, ed. Diego E. Machuca. Oxford: Routledge.
Maia Neto, José Raimundo. 1996. O ceticismo de Bayle. Kriterion 93: 77–88.
Mates, Benson. 1996. The skeptic way: Sextus Empiricus’ outlines of Pyrrhonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morison, Benjamin. 2011. The logical structure of the sceptic’s opposition. In Essays in memory of Michael Frede, ed. James Allen, E. Emilson, and W. Mann, vol. 40, 265–295. New York: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.
Palmer, John. 2000. Skeptical investigation. Ancient Philosophy 20: 351–373.
Perin, Casey. 2010. The demands of reason: An essay on Pyrrhonian scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plato. 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato. Trans. M. J. Levett, Edited Myles Burnyeat. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Porchat, Oswaldo. 2007. Rumo ao ceticismo. São Paulo: Editora da UNESP.
Ryan, Todd. 2012. Ceticismo e cartesianismo em Pierre Bayle. In As consequências do ceticismo, eds Waldomiro José da Silva Filho and Plínio J. Smith. São Paulo: Alameda Editorial.
Sextus Empiricus. 1993, 1983, 1987. Works in four volumes. Translated with an introduction by R. G. Bury. London: William Heinemann, Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press.
Sextus Empiricus (M 11). 1997. Against the ethicists. Translated with an introduction by Richard Bett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sextus Empiricus (M 7-8). 2005. Against the logicians. Translated with an introduction by Richard Bett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sextus Empiricus (M 9-10). 2015. Against the physicists. Translated with an introduction by Richard Bett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sextus Empiricus (PH). 2000. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translated with an introduction by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; The Skeptic Way. Translated with an introduction by Benson Mates. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996.
Smith, Plínio J. 1996. Sobre a tranquilidade da alma e a moderação das afecções. Kriterion 93: 22–56.
———. 2011. Bayle and Pyrrhonism: Antinomy, method, and history. In Scepticism in the eighteenth century: Enlightenment, lumières, aufklärung. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2016. Stroud’s neo-Pyrrhonism and the human condition. Sképsis 14: 156–187.
Striker, Gisela. 2001. Skepticism as a kind of philosophy. Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 83: 113–129.
Stroud, Barry. 1984. The significance of philosophical skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2000a. The quest for reality: Subjectivism and the metaphysics of colour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2000b. Understanding human knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011a. Engagement and metaphysical dissatisfaction: Modality and value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011b. Contemporary Pyrrhonism. In Philosophers past and present. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. Culture and value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Smith, P.J. (2019). Philosophical Reflection and Rashness. In: Silva-Filho, W., Tateo, L. (eds) Thinking About Oneself. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18265-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18266-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)