Abstract
In this chapter, I argue that reflection in the relevant sense is best understood as metacognitive activity, i.e. as thinking about our own beliefs, desires, goals, and other mental states. In short, reflection is best understood as thinking about one’s own thinking. Next, I argue against a prominent account of the value of reflection—that it is required for knowledge. On the contrary, I argue, metacognitive requirements on knowledge are unmotivated, and threaten to make knowledge impossible. Rather, the primary value of metacognitive activity is social. Specifically, thinking about our own thinking underwrites our ability to cooperate intellectually and practically; to plan, coordinate, execute and evaluate cooperative activity.
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Notes
- 1.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines reflection as, “The action or process of thinking carefully or deeply about a particular subject, typically involving influence from one’s past life and experiences; contemplation, deep or serious thought or consideration, esp. of a spiritual nature.”
- 2.
The American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology defines reflective consciousness as, “aspects of consciousness that enable it to refer to its own activities. Also called self-consciousness; self-reflection.” For philosophical accounts that understand reflection as metacognitive thought, see Keith Lehrer, Metamind (Oxford, 1990); Ernest Sosa , Reflective Knowledge (Oxford 2009); Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection (OUP 2012); and Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection: How to Think About What to Think (OUP, 2014).
- 3.
Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue, University of Alberta, 2007; See also Christopher Lepock, “Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue,” in A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library, Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014. In this context, Lepock cites Cary, M., and L. M. Reder (2002) “Metacognition in strategy selection,” in P. Chambres, M. Izaute, & P.-J. Marescaux, eds., Metacognition: Process, function, and use. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 63–77; and Kentridge, R.W., and C.A. Heywood. 2000. “Metacognition and awareness”. Consciousness and Cognition 9: 308–312.
- 4.
For endorsement of this principle and one’s like it see Roderick Chisholm, “Knowing that One Knows,” in The Foundations of Knowing; Carl Ginet, Knowledge, Perception and Memory (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975); and H.A. Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1950). For critical discussion, see James Van Cleve, “Foundationalism , Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,” The Philosophical Review LXXXVIII, 1 (1979); William Alston, “Level Confusions in Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 135–150; and Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, esp. ch 7.
- 5.
Principles like these are endorsed by Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), see esp. pp. 240–241; and Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). For critical discussion, see Greco “Agent Reliabilism,” in Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology , James Tomberlin, ed. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1999).
- 6.
This sort of point is widespread in discussions of perceptual knowledge and testimonial knowledge.
- 7.
See Greco 2000 for extended discussion of skeptical problems associated with worries about circles or regress, esp. ch. 5. For a wide-ranging and useful discussion of problematic regresses issued in by metacognitive requirements, see Kornblith, On Reflection (OUP 2012)
- 8.
Adapted from Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 36. For critical discussion see John Greco, “The Force of Hume’s Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact,” Journal of Philosophical Research xxiii (1998), pp. 289–306; “Agent Reliabilism,” in Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology , James Tomberlin, ed. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1999), pp. 273–296; and Greco 2000, esp. chapter 7.
- 9.
See especially Hume’s Enquiries, Section IV. Hume, David, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals , third edition, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). For discussion see Greco 1998 and 2000, Fumerton 1995.
- 10.
Greco 2000, esp. chapter 1; Kornblith 2012, esp. his Introduction.
- 11.
Kornblith, pp. 2–3.
- 12.
Among others, Kornblith cites Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, “Telling More than we Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231–59.
- 13.
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Prentice-Hall, 1980), ch. 8. Cited by Kornblith at note 27, p. 25.
- 14.
Among others, Kornblith cites Kahneman, et al. (eds.) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (CUP, 1982), part VI; and Gilovich et al. (eds.) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (CUP 2002), part I, sections C and D.
- 15.
On Reflection, pp. 24–5.
- 16.
Wilfred Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, H. Feigl & M. Scriven (eds.), Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1956: 253–329. Reprinted in Wilfred Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.; London, and The Humanities Press: New York, 1963; reissued in 1991 by Ridgeview Publishing Co., Atascadero, CA. For an extended discussion of the social value of giving one’s reasons, see Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, The Enigma of Reason (Harvard, 2017).
- 17.
Cf. Alston, William P. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology ,” Philosophical Topics XIV (1986): 179–221. Reprinted in Alston Epistemic Justification . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
- 18.
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 204.
- 19.
For discussion on earlier drafts, thanks to Hyowon Gweon, Chritopher Lepock, and participants at The VI International Workshop in Epistemology: The Value of Reflection, Salvador, Brazil, September 2017.
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Greco, J. (2019). The Social Value of Reflection. In: Silva-Filho, W., Tateo, L. (eds) Thinking About Oneself. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_4
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