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Algorithmically Driven Shared Ownership Economies

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The Future of Economic Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

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Abstract

Resource sharing is a natural, and increasingly common, way to efficiently utilize resources. In many situations today, however, resources are owned by a single agent who has sole control over the usage of the resource. In this article, we examine the feasibility of an alternative model where ownership of resources is shared, and usage schedules are determined algorithmically by a fixed set of rules. We explore several design parameters for shared ownership algorithms, surveying existing work in each area and proposing directions for future research.

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Acknowledgements

Conitzer is thankful for support from NSF under awards IIS-1527434 and CCF-1337215. Freeman is thankful for support from a Facebook PhD Fellowship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft University, Durham, NC, 27708, USA

    Vincent Conitzer

  2. Microsoft Research, New York, NY, 10011, USA

    Rupert Freeman

Authors
  1. Vincent Conitzer
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  2. Rupert Freeman
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Correspondence to Rupert Freeman .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS - Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Hervé Moulin

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France

    M. Remzi Sanver

  4. Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA

    William S. Zwicker

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Conitzer, V., Freeman, R. (2019). Algorithmically Driven Shared Ownership Economies. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_38

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