Abstract
We survey several unexpected connections between computational complexity and fundamental economic questions that appear unrelated to computation.
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Roughgarden, T. (2019). Complexity-Theoretic Barriers in Economics. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_22
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