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Complexity-Theoretic Barriers in Economics

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Book cover The Future of Economic Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

We survey several unexpected connections between computational complexity and fundamental economic questions that appear unrelated to computation.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Tim Roughgarden

Authors
  1. Tim Roughgarden
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tim Roughgarden .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS - Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Hervé Moulin

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France

    M. Remzi Sanver

  4. Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA

    William S. Zwicker

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Roughgarden, T. (2019). Complexity-Theoretic Barriers in Economics. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_22

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