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Romania: Kosovo’s Cautious Non-recogniser

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Part of the book series: New Perspectives on South-East Europe ((NPSE))

Abstract

Romania’s rejection of Kosovo’s independence was motivated by a combination of legal concerns, worries over regional peace and security in the Black Sea region, its desire for good relations with neighbouring Serbia and fears regarding its own territorial integrity. Nevertheless, as this chapter explains, Bucharest has adapted its positions in response to developments. It has at times showed a pragmatic attitude and has worked with its EU partners on practical solutions on Kosovo. Looking ahead, Bucharest can be expected to continue to follow relations between Belgrade and Pristina closely and respond accordingly.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    At the same time, Romania maintained good relations with Israel, being the only Communist country not to break diplomatic relations with the country after the 1967 Six-Day War, a decision which complicated its relations with the Arab world. Romania supported the Middle East peace process and the establishment of a Palestinian state and was seen by both sides as a neutral mediator. In the last two decades, Romania-Israel relations developed significantly, the government announcing in the spring of 2018 its intention to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. However, President Iohannis opposed the move as it would go against Romania’s international commitments.

  2. 2.

    Interview with Romanian diplomat, cited in Paul Ivan, “Romania” chapter in EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans, European Policy Centre Issue Paper No. 79, July 2015. Available at http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=2&pub_id=5832.

  3. 3.

    Transcript of the Joint sitting of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of October 14, 1998, Dezbaterea şi adoptarea Hotărârii privind aprobarea de către Parlament a accesului în spaţiul aerian al României, Available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?idm=4&ids=3381&idl=2.

  4. 4.

    Sorin Bogdan, Target (Jurnal de Razboi) (Target (War Journal)), p. 207. Available at http://www.sorinbogdan.ro/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/target.pdf.

  5. 5.

    Declaraţia Parlamentului României adoptată în şedinţa plenară din data de 30 martie 1999 (Statement of the Romanian Parliament adopted in the plenary session from 30 March 1999), Available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=33399.

  6. 6.

    ‘Romania ia astazi pozitie fata de razboi’ (‘Romania takes position regarding the war’), Ziarul de Iasi, 30 March 1999.

  7. 7.

    ‘Kosovarii albanezi de la Sarata Monteoru pornesc astazi spre casa’ (‘The Albanian Kosovars from Sarata Monteoru are leaving today for their homes’), Ziua, 26 July 1999.

  8. 8.

    Oana Popescu, ‘The Current State of Relations Between Romania and Kosovo and Prospects For Evolution’, in ‘Kosovo Calling: International Conference to Launch Position Papers on Kosovo’s Relation with EU and Regional Non-Recognising Countries’, October 2011, Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/upoads/2012/04/Kosovo-Calling-ENG.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Both of these first detachments were repatriated in 2003.

  10. 10.

    Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO, NATO Operations—Western Balkans—KFOR, Available at https://nato.mae.ro/en/node/372 [26.07.2018].

  11. 11.

    U.S. Embassy in Romania, ‘Romania on CFE Entitlement Transfers’, WikiLeaks Cable: 06BUCHAREST1576_a, Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BUCHAREST1576_a.html.

  12. 12.

    The British and French foreign ministers also participated.

  13. 13.

    Bogdana Boga, ‘Basescu: Un Kosovo independent nu are acoperire juridica’ (‘Basescu: An independent Kosovo doesn’t have legal cover’), Ziare.com , 3 September 2007.

  14. 14.

    Alexandru Sandu, ‘Tariceanu: Nu vom recunoaste un Kosovo independent’ (‘Tariceanu: We will not recognize and independent Kosovo’), Ziare.com , 14 December 2007.

  15. 15.

    ‘Romania won’t recognize unilateral Kosovo moves’, Romania New Watch, December 2007. Available at http://www.romanianewswatch.com/2007/12/romania-wont-recognize-unilateral.html.

  16. 16.

    Ministry of National Defence of Romania, Minister Meleşcanu in Belgrade, 11 December 2007. Available at http://english.mapn.ro/cpresa/1783_Minister-Melescanu-in-Belgrade.

  17. 17.

    Parliamentary Debates. Joint sitting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of 20 December 2007. Available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6420&idm=9&idl=1.

  18. 18.

    ‘Doi deputati UDMR participa la festivitatile independentei Kosovo’, Ziare.com , 17 February 2008. Two UDMR members travelled to Kosovo to witness the declaration of independence. UDMR continued to advocate Romania’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in the years that followed, seeing in it a positive example of self-determination that helped their case for regional autonomy.

  19. 19.

    Declaration no. 1 of 18 February 2008 of the Romanian Parliament on the unilateral proclamation of the independence of Kosovo, Available at http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/declaratie-nr-1-din-18-februarie-2008-parlamentului-romaniei-privind-proclamarea-unilaterala-a-independentei-provinciei-kosovo-emitent-parlamentul-publicat-n-89703.html.

  20. 20.

    Chamber of Deputies, Transcript of the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of 19 February 2008. Available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6438&idl=1.

  21. 21.

    U.S. Embassy in Romania, ‘Romanian President, Prime Minister, And Parliament Agree: No to Recognizing Kosovo Independence’, Wikileaks Cable: 08BUCHAREST130_a, 19 February 2008.

  22. 22.

    ‘100% impotriva independentei Kosovo’ (‘100% against Kosovo’s independence’), 9am.ro, 20 February 2008.

  23. 23.

    U.S. Embassy in Romania, ‘Basescu Tells Sen. Lugar Romania Facing Hard Choices in Wake of Georgia Conflict’, WikiLeaks Cable: 08BUCHAREST687_a, Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BUCHAREST687_a.html [06.08.2018].

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    The president’s decision to transfer the troops to EULEX was criticised by some members of parliament, who argued that Romania should participate with troops only in KFOR. Later, the Romanian contribution to EULEX grew to around 193 people, with only two liaison officers remaining in UNMIK.

  26. 26.

    Government of Romania, Comunicat de Presă (Press release). Available at http://arhiva.gov.ro/comunicat-de-presa__l1a31543.html.

  27. 27.

    U.S. Embassy to Romania, ‘Romania: Kosovo Independence Demarche Delivered’, WikiLeaks Cable: 08BUCHAREST141_a, 21 February 2008. Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BUCHAREST141_a.html

  28. 28.

    The International Monetary Fund, Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Parties with reservations, declarations and objections, Romania 13-08-2009, Available at https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/006615_b#Romania.

  29. 29.

    Shpend Kursani, Violeta Haxholli, and Gent Gjikolli, Kosovo in Regional Context: Bilateral Political Relations, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy paper, May 2014, Available at http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Kosovo_in_Regional_Context_Bilateral_Political_Relations_225564.pdf [15.01.2018].

  30. 30.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Exposé oral par la Roumanie, Prononcé par Cosmin Dinescu, directeur général des affaires juridiques, 10 December 2009.

  31. 31.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Oral statement by Romania, delivered by Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State, 10 December 2009.

  32. 32.

    Madalina Mitan, “Va recunoaste Romania independenta Kosovo?” (Will Romania recognize the independence of Kosovo?), Ziare.com, 22 July 2010.

  33. 33.

    The position of the Romanian MFA regarding the Advisory Opinion concerning the “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government from Kosovo” of the International Court of Justice, Available at http://mae.ro/node/2730 [02.08.2018].

  34. 34.

    Miruna Troncotă, Dragoș Ioniță, “Between Domestic Politics and International Law. Assessing Romania’s Non-Recognition Policy of Kosovo’s Declaration of independence” in Dušan Proroković (ed.), Kosovo: Sui Generis or Precedent in International Relations, Belgrade, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade 2018, p. 222.

  35. 35.

    The designation ‘Kosovo∗’, linked to the footnote ‘∗ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence’, is part of an agreement on regional representation of Kosovo, reached on 24 February 2012, in Brussels, during a round of the Belgrade-Priština dialogue mediated by the European Union.

  36. 36.

    For instance, those of the South-East European Cooperation Process.

  37. 37.

    Cătălina Mihai, ‘Kosovo face primul pas spre UE. România își menține poziția de a nu recunoaște fosta provincie sârbă’, EurActiv.ro, 28 October 2015. Romania abstained in the EU Council vote and formulated a declaration according to which the EU signing of the Agreement does not influence its position on Kosovo’s independence and does not mean its recognition as a state.

  38. 38.

    ‘Parlamentul European ne cere sa recunoastem Kosovo. Ce spune Ponta’ (‘The European Parliament asks us to recognize Kosovo. What Ponta says’), Ziare.com , 19 April 2013, Available at http://www.ziare.com/international/kosovo/parlamentul-european-ne-cere-sa-recunoastem-kosovo-ce-spune-ponta-1230969.

  39. 39.

    ‘Victor Ponta, la RTV, din SUA: Mesajul lui Joe Biden a fost “Contati pe SUA, dar fiti puternici voi insiva, in primul rand economic” / Nu am discutat despre Basescu’ (‘Victor Ponta at the RTV, from the US: Joe Biden’s message was “You can count on the US, but be strong yourselves, first of all economically.” / We did not talk about Basescu’), Hotnews.ro, 22 October 2013.

  40. 40.

    ‘Rumania do ta shqyrtoje njohjen e Kosoves’, Klan Kosova, 26 May 2015; and Iulia Marin, ‘Cum a deschis Victor Ponta “dosarul Kosovo”. Surse: premierul nu a discutat subiectul cu preşedintele Iohannis’ (‘How Victor Ponta opened the “Kosovo file”. Sources: The Premier did not discuss the issue with President Iohannis’), Adevarul, 28 May 2015.

  41. 41.

    Interview with former high-level Romanian official, May 2017.

  42. 42.

    ‘Poziţia României în privinţa independenţei Cataloniei. Meleşcanu: Este ilegală fragmentarea unei ţări fără negociere cu statul respective’ (‘Romania’s position regarding the independence of Catalonia. Meleşcanu: It is illegal to fragment a country without negotiation with that state’), Mediafax, 7 October 2017.

  43. 43.

    Interview with EU official, May 2018. Romania was also less than enthusiastic about the Berlin Process given that it was excluded from it and that it prefers the EU enlargement process to be managed in the EU Council and not elsewhere.

  44. 44.

    Interview, Romanian official, May 2018.

  45. 45.

    ‘Kosovo turns down Romania’s offer, asks Bucharest to recognise independence’, Gazeta Express, 9 March 2018.

  46. 46.

    Oana Popescu, op.cit., p. 58.

  47. 47.

    Adrian Mogos, Lindita Çela, Kreshnik Gashi, Jovana Georgievski, ‘Shut-out Balkan migrants find Romanian backdoor to EU’, EUObserver, 11 May 2018.

  48. 48.

    Own calculations based on Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS) data, International Trade Statistics, March 2018, Available at http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-news/international-trade-statistics-march-2018.

  49. 49.

    Embassy of Romania in Serbia, Comerțul bilateral România-Serbia (Romania-Serbia bilateral trade). Available at http://belgrad.mae.ro/node/932.

  50. 50.

    The fact that Transnistria’s leaders tried to use to their advantage both Kosovo’s declaration of independence and, later, the ICJ advisory opinion, further strengthened this argument.

  51. 51.

    U.S. Embassy in Romania, ‘Romania: Leaders Tell Former Secretary Albright They Want Strategic Partnership to Continue’, WikiLeaks Cable: 08BUCHAREST422_a, 30 May 2008. Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BUCHAREST422_a.html.

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Ivan, P. (2020). Romania: Kosovo’s Cautious Non-recogniser. In: Armakolas, I., Ker-Lindsay, J. (eds) The Politics of Recognition and Engagement. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17945-8_9

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