Abstract
Greece’s decision not to recognise Kosovo was largely driven by the Cyprus issue and by its historical links to Serbia. However, balanced against this, Athens has a track record of leadership in the Western Balkans through its membership of the European Union and NATO and its economic ties with the region. Greece has therefore always seen a logic to extensive engagement with Pristina. Indeed, at times it seemed as if it was on the verge of recognition. While this was never as likely as it may have seemed, Greece has nevertheless emerged as the most engaged of all the non-recognisers.
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Notes
- 1.
Ioannis Armakolas and Giorgos Triantafyllou, ‘Greece and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: Understanding an Ambivalent Relationship’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 17, Issue 4, 2017.
- 2.
Stavros Dagios, Ελλάδα και Αλβανία. 50 χρόνια αμοιβαίας δυσπιστίας. Οι διμερείς σχέσεις και η εθνική ελληνική μειονότητα της Βορείου Ηπείρου 1945–1991 [Greece and Albania. 50 years of mutual distrust. Bilateral relations and the Greek national minority of Northern Epirus 1945–1991] (Thessaloniki, Literatus, 2015).
- 3.
Stavros Tzimas, Η Κατάρρευση της Γιουγκοσλαβίας και οι Ελληνικές Φαντασιώσεις. Ελλάς—Σερβία—Ορθοδοξία [The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Greek illusions: Greece—Serbia—Orthodoxy] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publications, 2014); Takis Michas, Unholy Alliance. Greece and Milošević’s Serbia (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
- 4.
For details on Greece’s Balkan policies of the time, see Marilena Koppa, “Ελληνική Βαλκανική Πολιτική: Τριάντα Χρόνια Μετά” [Greek foreign policy in the Balkans: thirty years later], in Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa (editors), 30 Χρόνια Ελληνικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής 1974–2004 [30 years of Greek foreign policy], pp. 48–56 (Athens: Livani Publications, 2005); Serbos, Sotiris, “Ελλάδα και Δυτικά Βαλκάνια” [Greece and the Western Balkans], in Yiannis Valinakis (editor), Ελληνική Εξωτερική και Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική 1990–2010 [Greek foreign and European policy 1990–2010], pp. 89–124 (Athens: Sideris Publications, 2010); Wallden, Sotiris, “Η Βαλκανική Πολιτική της Ελλάδας: Κριτικός Απολογισμός της Μεταπολεμικής Περιόδου και Προοπτικές” [Greece’s Balkan policy: critical account of the post-war era and perspectives], in Panagiotis Tsakonas (editor), Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική: Μια Συνολική Προσέγγιση, τόμος II [Contemporary Greek foreign policy: a comprehensive approach, Volume II], pp. 391–464 (Athens: Sideris Publications, 2003).
- 5.
Ioannis Armakolas, ‘The Greek Public Opinion towards Albania and the Albanians’, Research Report, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Athens, 2013); Dimitra Dimitrakopoulou, Panagiotis Paschalidis and Ioannis Armakolas, “Exploring media representations between Greece and Albania—A preliminary study of Greek media”, Unpublished Research Report, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Athens, December 2015); Armakolas, Ioannis and Siakas, George, “Greek Public Opinion and Attitudes towards the ‘Name Dispute’ and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Research Report, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Athens, 2016).
- 6.
See details in Konstantinidis, Iannis and Armakolas, Ioannis, “How Greeks view Kosovo: The findings of a public opinion survey”, in Armakolas, Ioannis, Konstantinidis, Iannis, Maliqi, Shkelzen and Maliqi, Agon, “Being Greek, being Kosovar—A report on mutual perceptions” (Pristina, Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, 2014).
- 7.
For studies on media’s coverage of the war and overall media representations, see Kondopoulou, Margarita, “The Greek media and the Kosovo crisis”, Conflict & Communication Online, 1(2), 2002; Yiallourides, Christodoulos and Kefala, Vivi, “Κόσοβο—Η εικόνα του πολέμου: Όψεις σύγχρονου μιλιταριστικού ανθρωπισμό [Kosovo—The image of the war: Aspects of modern militaristic humanism]” (Athens: Sideris Publications, 2001); Panagiotarea, Anna (editor), “Τα ΜΜΕ και ο πόλεμος στο Κοσσυφοπέδιο” [Mass media and the war in Kosovo] (Athens: Paratiritis, 2000).
- 8.
See, for example, various authors in Dalis, Sotiris (editor), “Η κρίση στο Κόσοβο—Η Ελλάδα, η διεθνής κοινότητα και τα ΜΜΕ [The crisis in Kosovo—Greece, the international community and the media]” (Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1999).
- 9.
Armakolas, Ioannis, and Karabairis, Apostolis, ‘Greece-Kosovo: A Complex Relationship’, in Kosovo Calling: International Conference to Launch Position Papers on Kosovo’s Relation with EU and Regional Non-recognising Countries (Pristina: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society—“Kosovo talks EU” Project, 2012); Dalis, op.cit.
- 10.
For the mood of the day, see the article by the speech writer to Clinton, Paul Glastris, ‘A look back at Clinton’s 1999 visit to Athens’, Kathimerini, 7 November 2016.
- 11.
For the policy dilemmas of the Simitis government during the Kosovo war, see Armakolas and Karabairis, op.cit.; Keridis, Dimitris, Η εξωτερική πολιτική του εκσυγχρονισμού: Από την αντιπαράθεση στην αλληλεξάρτηση, [The foreign policy of modernisation: from confrontation to interdependence], in Tsakonas, Panayotis, Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτικη—Μια συνολική προσέγγιση, τόμος Ι, [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy—a comprehensive approach, volume I] (Athens: Sideris, 2003).
- 12.
Kranidiotis, Yannos, Κοσσυφοπέδιο: Η ελληνική πρόταση για ειρήνη [Kosovo: the Greek proposal for peace], in Dalis, Sotiris (editor), “Η κρίση στο Κόσοβο—Η Ελλάδα, η διεθνής κοινότητα και τα ΜΜΕ [The crisis in Kosovo—Greece, the international community and the media]” (Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1999), p. 81.
- 13.
See Donfried, Karen, ‘Kosovo: International Reactions to NATO Air Strikes’, CRS Report for Congress (21 April 1999); Kostakos, Georgios, “The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, Turkey”, in Albrecht Schnabel, Ramesh Thakur (editors), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2000).
- 14.
Armakolas and Karabairis, op.cit. p. 98.
- 15.
See the text of the plan in https://zpravy.idnes.cz/text-cesko-recke-iniciativy-ke-kosovske-krizi-f43-/zahranicni.aspx?c=990525_202833_zahranicni_itu&fbclid=IwAR3zTXJptmZ4Fy2jEqG6BtIu-AjJPcu61aHsfR8sJ5Bwb6NBpO3FLhBGwiA. See also Simon, Jeffrey, NATO and the Czech & Slovak Republics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
- 16.
Nikos Ziogas, ‘Greek Humanitarian Contribution to the Kosovo Crisis’, A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues, Spring 1999 (http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring99/humanitarian.html); Kostakos, op.cit., Joanne van Selm (editor) Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union (Bloomsbury, 2000); summary in Armakolas and Karabairis, op.cit.
- 17.
‘The Participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in KFOR’, Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Public Affairs Office [No Date]. http://www.geetha.mil.gr/media/pdf-arxeia/kfor/kfor-en.pdf.
- 18.
Wallden, Sotiris, “Τα Βαλκάνια στην Ελληνική Προεδρία της Ευρωπαικής Ένωσης (2003)” [Τhe Balkans in the Greek Presidency of the European Union (2003)], in Yannitsis, Tasos (editor) Η τέταρτη ελληνική προεδρία στην Ευρωπαική Ένωση, [The fourth Greek Presidency in the European Union] (Athens, Kritiki, 2005).
- 19.
Alexandros Mallias, Η άλλη κρίση: Η μαρτυρία ενός Πρέσβη [The Other Crisis: An Ambassador’s Account] (Athens, Infognomon, 2013).
- 20.
See details in Mallias, Η άλλη κρίση, 2013, pp. 192–193.
- 21.
Περιοδεία Καραμανλή στα Βαλκάνια για προώθηση του ελληνικού σχεδίου για το Κόσοβο, [Karamanlis tour in the Balkans to promote the Greek plan for Kosovo], 2 March 2005, https://www.in.gr/2005/03/02/greece/periodeia-karamanli-sta-balkania-gia-prowthisi-toy-ellinikoy-sxedioy-gia-to-kosobo/.
- 22.
WikiLeaks: 05ATHENS830_a, 24 March 2005. According to the same US source, Athens also wanted to be included in the six-member Contact Group for Kosovo, composed of the United States, Russia, Germany, Britain, France and Italy. While Washington was willing to ‘keep Greece in the loop’, it ‘urged the Greeks to continue to be more statesmanlike (rather than pro-Serb) on policy and to focus on concrete measures, such as their Balkans Reconstruction Program’.
- 23.
Speech of Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2006, https://www.mfa.gr/en/speeches/year-2006/speech-of-foreign-minister-ms-dora-bakoyannis-to-the-parliamentary-standing-committee-on-defense-and-foreign-affairs.html.
- 24.
Text of FM Ms. Bakoyannis speech to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs, 20 February 2007, https://www.mfa.gr/en/speeches/year-2007/text-of-fm-ms-bakoyannis-speech-to-the-parliamentary-standing-committee-on-national-defense-and-foreign-affairs.html.
- 25.
FM Bakoyannis on Kosovo, 18 February 2008, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2008a/08-02-18_5.apeen.html.
- 26.
See various WikiLeaks reports from US Embassy telegrams between 2005 and 2009.
- 27.
Dora Bakoyannis, Transforming South-East Europe: A challenge for smart power, in Arvanitopoulos, Constantine and Botsiou, Konstantina E. (editors) The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2009 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 110.
- 28.
FM Bakoyannis on Kosovo, 18 February 2008, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2008a/08-02-18_5.apeen.html.
- 29.
Instead this is a popular theme among marginal and ethno-populist parties; see, for example, the debate between PM Karamanlis and the leader of the minor far right party LAOS only a few days after the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, 22 February 2008. Πρακτικά Συνεδριάσεως της Ολομέλειας της Βουλής, [Proceedings of the Plenary Session of the Parliament], 22 February 2008, https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=98eaf867-ed68-4a77-87ce-ed26bfc3fd55.
- 30.
Πρακτικά Συνεδριάσεως της Ολομέλειας της Βουλής [Proceedings of the Plenary Session of the Parliament], 22 February 2008, https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?sessionRecord=98eaf867-ed68-4a77-87ce-ed26bfc3fd55.
- 31.
Interestingly, Greece’s liaison office in Pristina has been very active in monitoring attempts by Turkish Cypriots to build connections with Kosovo and Greek officials have repeatedly raised the issue to Kosovar officials. Interview with senior Greek diplomat conducted in December 2017.
- 32.
See WikiLeaks reports from US Embassy telegrams between 2005 and 2009.
- 33.
WikiLeaks: April 8, 2009 (09ATHENS523_a).
- 34.
A case in point was a July 2007 legal workshop featuring prominent former MFA officials and other legal experts, in which damning assessments of the Ahtisaari process and the upcoming independence of Kosovo were presented. The overall conclusion was that any move towards independence, whether under the supervision of the internationally community or unilateral, would be in clear in violation of international law. The volume that was later published on the basis of the workshop had the dramatic title ‘The overthrow of international legal order’ to describe the Kosovo problem and its consequences for ethnic secessionism in the twenty-first century. Perrakis, Stelios (editor) Kόσοβο—Ανατρέποντας τη διεθνή δικαιοταξία: Αυτοδιάθεση και απόσχιση εθνοτήτων στον 21ο αιώνα [Kosovo—The overthrow of the international legal order: self-determination and secession of ethnicities in the twenty-first century] (Athens: Sideris, 2008).
- 35.
Interview with senior Greek diplomat, January 2018.
- 36.
Hatzitheofanous,Yorgos, “Βαλκάνια, εθνικισμός και η σύγχρoνη Ελλάδα: Με τα μάτια του Διοικητού της Ελληνικής Δύναμης Κοσόβου” [The Balkans, nationalism and contemporary Greece: Through the eyes of the Commander of the Greek Force in Kosovo] in Alexandros Mallias (editor) Ελλάδα και Αλβανία: Φυγή στο μέλλον ή επιστροφή στο παρελθόν; [Greece and Albania: Escape to the future or return to the past?], pp.227-249 (Athens, Sideris Publications, 2017); Mallias, Η άλλη κρίση, 2013.
- 37.
Although, again, legal officials from the MFA tended to oppose various actions of engagement on the grounds that they may be interpreted as a de facto recognition. Interview with senior Greek diplomat, January 2018.
- 38.
Interview with senior former Kosovar diplomat, February 2017.
- 39.
Alexandros I. Mallias, Οράματα και χίμαιρες [Visions and chimeras] (Athens: Sideris Publications, 2016), p. 249.
- 40.
Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018.
- 41.
Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018; Interview with senior Greek diplomat, February 2018.
- 42.
Interview with senior Kosovar official, February 2017.
- 43.
Interviews with senior Greek diplomats, February 2017 and December 2017; Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018.
- 44.
Interviews with senior Greek diplomat, January 2018 and February 2018.
- 45.
Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018; Interview with senior Greek diplomat, February 2018.
- 46.
Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018.
- 47.
Interview with senior Greek politician, January 2018.
- 48.
A study of a sample of written questions is illustrative. In the period 2010–2017, out of 21 written questions pertaining to the status of Kosovo and Greece’s relations with the country, 17 had negative wording for Kosovo, four had a neutral one, and none were positive. Thirteen questions were submitted by the nationalist parties: Golden Dawn, Orthodox Rally and the Independent Greeks and, to a lesser extent, radical left parties. Only two negative questions were submitted by MPs belonging to mainstream New Democracy and PASOK; both of these were submitted during the tenure of Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias and both enquired whether the government intended to change its stance on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. As one diplomat put it: ‘Why would a government with so many other problems would open a new front for an issue that was not of vital interest?’ Interview with senior Greek diplomat, February 2017.
- 49.
Interviews with senior Greek diplomats, December 2017 and February 2018.
- 50.
See, for example, his talk at the Law School of the University of Belgrade, available at: https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/59310/Omilia-toy-Proedroy-toy-SYRIZA-Aleksh-Tsipra-sto-amfitheatro-ths-Nomikhs-Scholhs-toy-Panepisthmioy-toy-Beligradioy.html#.VrZPgPkrLIV. Also, Maksimovic, Maja ‘“Greece returns to the Balkans”? Assessing Greece’s Western Balkan Policy under SYRIZA-led government’, University of Leipzig Working Paper Series, Number 14, 2016.
- 51.
Foreign Minister Kotzias’ statements following his meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi (Pristina, 14 July 2015), 14 July 2015, https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/foreign-minister-kotzias-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-deputy-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-of-kosovo-hashim-thaci-pristina-14-july-2015.html.
- 52.
Ker-Lindsay, James ‘Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states’, International Affairs, 91(2), 2015, pp. 267–285.
- 53.
Interview with senior Greek diplomat, February 2018.
- 54.
Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Kosovo, Isa Mustafa and Hashim Thaçi (N. York, 28 September 2015), 28 September 2015, https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets-with-the-prime-minister-and-the-foreign-minister-of-kosovo-isa-mustafa-and-hashim-thaci-york-28-september-2015.html
- 55.
Greece’s Bilateral Relations—Kosovo (NO DATE), https://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/pristina/. More recently in the text it was added that Greece voted in favour of Kosovo’s applications ‘in other financial and international organisations’.
- 56.
Interview with a senior Greek diplomat, January 2018; according to the Venice Commission’s website, Kosovo’s membership is without prejudice to the positions of individual Council of Europe member states on the status of Kosovo. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?country=243.
- 57.
Interview with a senior Kosovar official, February 2017.
- 58.
This seems to be confirmed by the information provided in the Greek MFA website where reference is also made to a Greek support also for the Interpol membership, Foreign Minister Kotzias’ statements following his meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi (Pristina, 14 July 2015), 14 July 2015, https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/foreign-minister-kotzias-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-deputy-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-of-kosovo-hashim-thaci-pristina-14-july-2015.html.
- 59.
Interview with a senior Greek diploma, December 2017.
- 60.
Interview with a senior Greek diplomat, February 2017.
- 61.
‘Kosovo∗’, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/pristina/.
- 62.
Interview with a senior Greek diplomat, December 2017; Interview with a senior Kosovar official, December 2017.
- 63.
Interview with senior Greek diplomats, December 2017. Interview with a senior Kosovar official, February 2017. The same sources indicate that there are two schools of thought in the Kosovar MFA: the first school, pointing to the risk of ‘Taiwanisation’, objects to the terms set by the Greeks and opts for a continuation of the present state of affairs until the Greek side would be willing to extend diplomatic status to the Kosovar office; the second school opts for a step-by-step consolidation of Kosovar’s presence in Greece and would be ready to start with the office as outlined in the official Greek terms. The former group continues to win the argument in the Kosovo Foreign Ministry, despite the 2013 agreement of the two sides for opening an office in Greece.
- 64.
Pangalos, Theodoros, “Κατάσταση και προοπτικές των Ελληνοαλβανικών σχέσεων” [The current situation and the prospects in Greek-Albanian relations], in Mallias, Ελλάδα και Αλβανία, 2017.
- 65.
When it comes to the process and aims of recognition, there are two main schools of thought. The first argues that recognition should be part of a far-reaching settlement of disputes with the Albanian state and the building of a comprehensive strategic cooperation with the Albanian nation. Mallias, 2013, op.cit.; 2016, op.cit. The second would rather treat Pristina as an autonomous political factor and argues that Greece should build bilateral relations unburdened by oscillations in Greek-Albanian relations. Interviews with senior Greek diplomats conducted in February 2017 and January 2018. When it comes to timing, typically the first camp would delay recognition until it would achieve the best overall relations with Albania. The second camp believe that recognition should take place sooner rather than later so that Greece can build a strong capital of trust and cooperation with Pristina, independently of Tirana.
- 66.
Interviews with senior Greek diplomats, February 2017; December 2017; January 2018. As was also pointed out, the traditional pro-Serbian sentiment is waning as older officials retire and Greece reassesses its regional relations.
- 67.
PM Tsipras press conference at the 2018 Thessaloniki International Fair, September 2018, https://webtv.ert.gr/politiki_epikairotita/i-synentefxi-typou-tou-prothypourgou-a-tsipra-sti-deth/.
- 68.
‘Σερβία—Κόσοβο: έτοιμοι για αλλαγή συνόρων’ [Kosovo-Serbia: Ready for a Change of Borders], To Vima, 8 September 2018.
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Armakolas, I. (2020). Greece: Kosovo’s Most Engaged Non-recogniser. In: Armakolas, I., Ker-Lindsay, J. (eds) The Politics of Recognition and Engagement. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17945-8_7
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