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Kosovo’s Strategy for Recognition and Engagement

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The Politics of Recognition and Engagement

Part of the book series: New Perspectives on South-East Europe ((NPSE))

Abstract

After the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo embarked on the difficult task of obtaining international recognition. This chapter explores the role of Kosovar diplomacy in this process and analyses the challenges Kosovo faced. A decade on, new recognitions have slowed and lobbying efforts by international partners have declined. As a result, Kosovo will have to rely on its own diplomatic capabilities to secure further recognitions. This requires an innovative and comprehensive plan for greater formal diplomatic engagement with non-recognisers that should also be complemented with a creative approach to public diplomacy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The issue of exact number of recognitions is rather ambiguous, with different sources citing different figures. While MFA uses the figure of 116, it is not clear whether Uganda and Nigeria have recognised Kosovo. Also, recently some media have announced that Suriname has withdrawn its recognition. Sources from Serbia have hinted that Liberia and Egypt are considering withdrawing their recognition. However, such acts have not been confirmed.

  2. 2.

    Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999.

  3. 3.

    United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/1999/672, 12 June 1999.

  4. 4.

    ‘Rambouille Accords,’ Koha Ditore, Prishtina, 2 March 1999, p. 3.

  5. 5.

    ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status’, United Nations Security Council, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007.

  6. 6.

    Oisín Tansey, ‘Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage,’ Journal of Democracy, 20(2), April 2009, p. 159.

  7. 7.

    The current Minister Behgjet Pacolli is the leader of New Kosovo Alliance (AKR).

  8. 8.

    The ten charge d’affaires were: Avni Spahiu in Washington; Muhamet Hamiti in London; Muhamedin Kullashi in Paris; Vilson Mirdita in Berlin; Albert Prenkaj in Rome; Ilir Dugolli in Brussels; Bekim Sejdiu in Ankara; Sabri Kicmari in Vienna; Naim Mala in Bern; and Gazmend Pula in Tirana. See ‘Kosovo Sends First “Ambassadors”,’ Balkan Insight, 20 October 2008.

  9. 9.

    ‘Diplomatic Missions of Kosovo,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo. http://www.mfa-ks.net.

  10. 10.

    ‘Foreign Policy Strategic Objectives,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, Prishtina, 2008.

  11. 11.

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/3, 8 October 2008. The precise question put to the ICJ was, ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’

  12. 12.

    Pierre Bonifassi, ‘International Court of Justice—Kosovo: a legal independence for a total dependence,’ The New Federalist, 8 September 2010.

  13. 13.

    International Court of Justice, ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo,’ Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

  14. 14.

    ‘Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, H.E. Mr Skender Hyseni, on the ICJ Opinion of 22 July 2010,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prishtina, 22 July 2010.

  15. 15.

    Although an additional 18 countries recognised the independence of Kosovo by 25 April 2012, this still represents a lower number of recognitions then initially expected after the ICJ ruling; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, ‘Shtetet që e kanë njohur Republikën e Kosovës’ [Countries that have recognised the Republic of Kosovo], http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1,33.

  16. 16.

    Marta Szpala, ‘Regional impact of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo’ (Warsaw: Center for Eastern Studies), 4 August 2010. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2010-08-04/regional-impact-icj-s-advisory-opinion-kosovo.

  17. 17.

    See ‘Note Verbale,’ No. HOND.ESP.177/2010, The Embassy of Honduras in Spain, Madrid, 9 September 2010; and ‘Decision of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an Independent and Sovereign,’ Cairo, 23 June 2013.

  18. 18.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, May 2017.

  19. 19.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017.

  20. 20.

    Kosovo MFA official, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017 and Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, May 2017.

  21. 21.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, September 2017.

  22. 22.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, May 2017.

  23. 23.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, August 2017.

  24. 24.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, September 2017.

  25. 25.

    These actors include the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of European Affairs, the Ministry of Dialogue, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and at certain point even a Deputy Prime Minister exclusively in charge of lobbying for recognition. See Gezim Visoka, Acting like a State: Kosovo and the Everyday Making of the Statehood (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 79–81.

  26. 26.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, August 2017.

  27. 27.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017.

  28. 28.

    For a detailed explanation of this approach, see James Ker-Lindsay, “Engagement without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic Interaction with Contested States.” International Affairs 91, 2015: 267–285.

  29. 29.

    ‘A Three-Party Project for Improving Kosovo’s Public Diplomacy,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, 24 June 2011. Retrieved from http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,217,824.

  30. 30.

    ‘This Is How We Do Soft Power: A Practical Guidebook in Public and Digital Diplomacy of a Small Republic,’ British Council Kosovo and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, Prishtina, 2014.

  31. 31.

    ‘Digital Diplomacy for Kosovo,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, June 2012, p. 2.

  32. 32.

    ‘This Is How We Do Soft Power,’ 2014.

  33. 33.

    Among others, the examples of such institutional cooperation included recognition of the Kosovo passport, opening the liaison offices in Kosovo, providing military and civilian personnel in Kosovo, undertaking concrete steps for economic cooperation as well as voting in favour of Kosovo’s integration in the European Union and its membership in regional and international organisations. See Edward Newman and Gezim Visoka, ‘The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join International Society,’ Foreign Policy Analysis, May 2016, p. 12.

  34. 34.

    For a detailed explanation on such activities, see ‘This Is How We Do Soft Power,’ 2014.

  35. 35.

    “List of Recognitions,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kosovo. http://www.mfa-ks.net.

  36. 36.

    Official from the British Council in Kosovo, comments to author, Prishtina, October 2017.

  37. 37.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, May 2017.

  38. 38.

    UN Doc. A/RES/64/298, 9 September 2010.

  39. 39.

    Fatmir Curri and Mimika Loshi, ‘Monitoring Regional Cooperation in South East Europe: Country Report—Kosovo,’ in Stefan Dehnert and Dane Taleski (eds.) Monitoring Regional Cooperation in South East Europe (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013), p. 74.

  40. 40.

    According to this agreement, ‘Kosovo∗’ will be the only denomination to be used within the framework of regional cooperation. The footnote to be applied to the asterisk will read ‘This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.’ See ‘Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation,’ Brussels, Rev10 RC 23/02/2012.

  41. 41.

    See Bojana Barlovac, ‘Dacic and Thaçi Meet in Brussels, Make History,’ Balkan Insight, 19 October 2012.

  42. 42.

    The agreement is also referred to as the Brussels Agreement. Among others things, it specifies ‘that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in the respective EU paths.’ See ‘Information Session: First Agreement Between Serbia and Kosovo of Principles Governing Normalization of Relations’, Wilson Center, 24 April 2013; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/information-session-first-agreement-between-serbia-and-kosovo-principles-governing.

  43. 43.

    For a detailed explanation on the Brussels Agreement, see Miruna Troncotă, ‘The Association that Dissociates’: Narratives of Local Political Resistance in Kosovo and the Delayed Implementation of the Brussels Agreement,’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 18 (2), 2018, pp. 219–238. See also Cemaliye Beysoylu, ‘Implementing Brussels Agreements: the EU’s facilitating strategy and contrasting local perceptions of peace in Kosovo’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 18 (2), 2018, pp. 203–218.

  44. 44.

    ‘Association/Community/of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo—General Principles, Main Elements,’ http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements/eeas/docs/150825_02_association-community-of-serb-majority-municipalities-in-kosovo-general-principles-main-elements_en.pdf.

  45. 45.

    See, for instance, Adrian Zeqiri, Pieter Troch and Trim Kabashi, ‘The Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities: Breaking the Impasse,’ European Centre for Minority Issues, Kosovo, June 2016. See also Branislav Nešović, and Riccardo Celeghin, ‘Community/Association of Serbian Municipalities: The Sum of All Fears,’ Mitrovica: NGO AKTIV, June 2015.

  46. 46.

    Agron Bajrami, ‘Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo (Association Impasse),’ Policy Note 01/2017, Prishtina: Group for Legal and Political Studies, April 2017.

  47. 47.

    Maja Zivanovic and Die Morina, ‘Murder Puts Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue in Doubt,’ Balkan Insight, 18 January 2018.

  48. 48.

    Gëzim Visoka, Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 189.

  49. 49.

    Matteo Pugliese, ‘The Uncertain Future of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo,’ Nationalia, 9 March 2016. http://www.nationalia.info/new/10733/the-uncertain-future-of-the-association-of-serb-majority-municipalities-in-kosovo.

  50. 50.

    Visoka, Shaping Peace in Kosovo, p. 190.

  51. 51.

    For a detailed explanation of the position of Serbs in the north of Kosovo see Miruna Troncotă, ‘Four Years of EU Mediation Efforts in the ‘Brussels Dialogue of the Deaf’: Analysing the Negotiations for the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo,’ in Ioannis Armakolas et al. eds. State-building in Post-Independence Kosovo: Policy Challenges and Societal Considerations (Prishtina: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, 2017), pp. 229–232.

  52. 52.

    Edward Newman and Gëzim Visoka, ‘The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join International Society,’ 14 (3), July 2018, p. 384.

  53. 53.

    ‘Enver Hoxhaj: Dialogue with Belgrade Is Useless if it Does Not Lead to Mutual Recognition,’ Euinside, 5 May 2017.

  54. 54.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, September 2017.

  55. 55.

    For more details, see Visoka, Shaping Peace in Kosovo, pp. 185–189.

  56. 56.

    Dimitris A. Moschopoulos, ‘Searching for a Historic Agreement between Serbs & Albanians on Kosovo: From Ambiguities to Clarity,’ Working Paper No.89/2018, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, 2018, p. 9.

  57. 57.

    Fatos Bytyci, ‘Serbia must accept Kosovo independence to join EU: German foreign minister,’ Reuters, 14 February 2018.

  58. 58.

    Agon Demjaha, ‘The Impact of Brussels Dialogue on Kosovo’s Sovereignty,’ in David Philips and Lulzim Peci (eds.) Threats and Challenges to Kosovo’s Sovereignty, Program on Peace-building and Rights, Institute for the study of Human Rights, Columbia University and Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, New York and Prishtina, October 2018, 20.

  59. 59.

    ‘Alpbach 2018 Forum: Thaçi and Vučić discuss border correction with the panel,’ European Western Balkans, 25 August 2018.

  60. 60.

    For a detailed analysis on the idea of partition or exchange of territories as well as arguments in favour and against such proposal, see Robert Muharremi, ‘Implications of Partition and Exchange of Territory for Kosovo,’ in David Philips and Lulzim Peci (eds.), Threats and Challenges to Kosovo’s Sovereignty, Program on Peace-building and Rights, Institute for the study of Human Rights, Columbia University and Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, New York and Prishtina, October 2018.

  61. 61.

    See ‘Presidenti e nxjerr në pazar territorin e Kosovës,’ Gazetaexpress, 2 August 2018; See also ‘Rreth 80 deputetë shqiptarë kundër Thaçit, pro tij PDK’ja dhe Lista Serbe,’ Gazetaexpress, 28 August 2018.

  62. 62.

    Serbia has an important military base near Bujanovac, while the Pan-European Corridor X also passes through Presevo Valley.

  63. 63.

    ‘Serwer godet Thaçin: Idetë për shkëmbim territoresh fundi i shtetit të Kosovës,’ Gazetaexpress, 2 August 2018.

    https://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/serwer-godet-thacin-idete-per-shkembim-territoresh-fundi-i-shtetesise-se-kosoves-564076/.

  64. 64.

    Muharremi, ‘Implications of Partition and Exchange of Territory for Kosovo,’ p. 38.

  65. 65.

    Foreign policy strategic objectives, 2008.

  66. 66.

    Apart from the IMF and World Bank, the only other major international institution Kosovo has managed to join is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). While membership to International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) undoubtedly represents a great symbolic success, failure to join the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) represents a reality of a grave concern.

  67. 67.

    Visoka, Acting like a State, p. 7.

  68. 68.

    The EU Council has one day after Kosovo declared independence stated that ‘Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo.’ See Newman and Visoka, ‘The Foreign Policy of State Recognition,’ p. 376.

  69. 69.

    Kosovo MFA official, comments to author, Prishtina, October 2017 and Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017.

  70. 70.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017.

  71. 71.

    Kosovo diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, September 2017.

  72. 72.

    Kosovo former diplomat, comments to author, Prishtina, June 2017.

  73. 73.

    Visoka, Acting like a State, p. 82.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tetova, Tetovo, North Macedonia

    Agon Demjaha

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Ioannis Armakolas

  2. European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

    James Ker-Lindsay

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Demjaha, A. (2020). Kosovo’s Strategy for Recognition and Engagement. In: Armakolas, I., Ker-Lindsay, J. (eds) The Politics of Recognition and Engagement. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17945-8_2

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