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Framing and Blaming

  • Sandra L. ResodihardjoEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

The first of two theoretical chapters, this chapter addresses the phenomenon of blame games in detail. Starting with the way in which perceptions and framing play a role in the blame game, issues such as who is going to be blamed and how much blame that actor is going to receive are discussed. Various ways to deal with blame are then presented: policy strategies, agency strategies, and presentational strategies. Possible downsides of these strategies are also addressed. The chapter concludes with the logic of selecting a proper blame response—a selection which is influenced by actors’ staged retreat approach and the theoretical assumption that high levels of blame will only decrease if a more accommodative response is used.

Keywords

Perceptions Framing Blame games Blame attribution Blame responses 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Management ResearchRadboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands

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