Abstract
In this chapter, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.
This chapter is based on a research article published in Philosophy & Technology: “The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace” (Taddeo 2017c).
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For the purposes of this chapter, I will use the expression ‘traditional deterrence theory’ to refer to any theory of deterrence relying on kinetic military forces, whether they be conventional or nuclear.
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Attribution may not be necessary in all instances of deterrence, for example for deterrence by defence. Some argue that when the exact source of an attack is unknown, attribution and, hence, responsibility for an attack, can be shifted to the particular state in which the attack originated (Morgan 2010; Goodman 2010). However, clear attribution remains necessary for deterrence by retaliation.
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Taddeo, M. (2019). The Challenges of Cyber Deterrence. In: Öhman, C., Watson, D. (eds) The 2018 Yearbook of the Digital Ethics Lab. Digital Ethics Lab Yearbook. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17152-0_7
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