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Paramilitary Intelligence

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Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya

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Abstract

This chapter considers how the military (Army and Royal Air Force) and the uniformed branch of Malaya’s police service organised themselves and used intelligence to find and apprehend their insurgent foes. It traces the various operational developments designed to increase the flow of intelligence about the insurgents, including the Ferret Force, the Civil Liaison Corps, aerial surveillance, photographic intelligence, deportation, resettlement, food denial and the use of Captured/Surrendered Enemy Personnel. Fundamentally the efforts of the paramilitary forces in Malaya to neutralise the threat posed by the insurgents was a function of the intelligence being provided by Special Branch. Other forms of intelligence and the various tactical initiatives were worthy, but as long as this human intelligence from Special was limited, the paramilitary forces would struggle to restore law and order.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    C. Bayly and T. Harper, Forgotten Wars—The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (2008), p. 429.

  2. 2.

    CO 537/2638, Fortnightly Review of Communism in the Colonies, 2 July 1948.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., Fortnightly Review of Communism in the Colonies, 17 July 1948.

  4. 4.

    Ibid.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., Political Review for the Week Ending 23–31 July 1948.

  6. 6.

    DEFE 11/32, Commissioner General, South East Asia, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 June 1948.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations Malaya, Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957, September 1957.

  9. 9.

    R. Clutterbuck, The Long Long War—The Emergency in Malaya, 1948–60 (London, MA 1966), p. 43; J. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago 2002), p. 63. Sunderland has a higher estimate: he suggests there were some 7784 fighting troops and 5660 administrative troops in Malaya in Malaya. Either way, Wade did not have a surfeit of troops. See R. Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948–1960 (Rand 1964), pp. 24–25.

  10. 10.

    J. Corum and W. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars—Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (London 2003), p. 179.

  11. 11.

    DEFE 11/33—A paper on the dimensions and nature of the security problems confronting the government of the Federation of Malaya, 16 September 1948.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., and AIR 24/1924, AHQ Malaya, Operational Order No. 24/48, 30 June 1948.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    AIR 23/8435, Report on the Royal Air Force Operations in Malaya, June 1948–March 1949.

  16. 16.

    M. Postgate, Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (London 1992), p. 127; Austers were regularly supplemented in this role by Dakota transport aircraft from No. 110 Squadron. See, for instance, AIR 24/1917, Operational Summary for September 1948.

  17. 17.

    AIR 20/8928, Director of Operations, Malaya: Reconnaissance of Cultivated Areas, Appendix A (Spraying Food Crops with Poison from the Air).

  18. 18.

    AIR 25/1925, OPSUM, 11 January 1949. The scale of the visual reconnaissance effort was remarkable—in 1955 it was the equivalent to keeping five Austers permanently over the jungle throughout the hours of daylight on every day of the year. See K. Slater, “Air Operations in Malaya”, RUSI, 102: 607 (1957), p. 380.

  19. 19.

    R. Arditti, “The View from Above: How the Royal Air Force Provided a Strategic Vision for Operational Intelligence During the Malayan Emergency”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 26: 5 (2015), p. 770.

  20. 20.

    J. Chynoweth, Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle (Stroud 2007), p. 88.

  21. 21.

    G. Warner, From Auster to Apache—The History of 656 Squadron RAF / AAC 1942–2012 (Barnsley 2012), p. 70.

  22. 22.

    AIR 23/8435, Report on the Royal Air Force Operations in Malaya, June 1948–March 1949, 9 May 1949, as quoted in Arditti, “The View from Above”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 26: 5 (2015), p. 770.

  23. 23.

    A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (London 1975), p. 114.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    CO 537/4751, Draft Broadcast by Major General Kirkman, Chief of Staff FARLEF, April 1949.

  26. 26.

    M. Sheenan, Our Man in Malaya (2007); F. Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral (Singapore 2015); Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng—My Side of History (Singapore 2007); Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya—Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941–46 (Singapore 2017).

  27. 27.

    Sheenan, Our Man in Malaya, p. 156.

  28. 28.

    T. Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945–1952: A Special Type of Warfare (Oxon 2001), p. 102.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., p. 90. See also R. Thompson, Make for the Hills (London 1989) p. 88; A. Hoe and E. Morris, Re-enter the SAS—The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency (London 1994), pp. 41–45.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 91.

  31. 31.

    AIR 20/8876, Commissioner General South East Asia to Foreign Office, text of the Commissioner General’s broadcast, 7 July 1948.

  32. 32.

    WO 268/647, RHQ The Malay Regiment Quarterly Historical Report for Period Ending, 30 December 48.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., RHQ The Malay Regiment Quarterly Historical Report for Period Ending, 31 December 48.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    The Gurkha Museum (TGM), Winchester, Regimental Records, 2nd Battalion, Documents of Historical Interest, Malaya, 1947–1949, Summary of Situation in Sungei Siput on 28 October 1948.

  36. 36.

    Sheenan, Our Man in Malaya, p. 161.

  37. 37.

    Hoe and Morris, Re-enter the SAS, p. 41.

  38. 38.

    WO 106/5884, Report on Operations in Malaya by General Neil Ritchie, June 1948–July 1948.

  39. 39.

    WO 268/582, Minutes of a COMDs Conference held at HQ Johore Sub District on 12 January 1949.

  40. 40.

    Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 69. For more on Walker see, T. Pocock, Fighting General—The Public and Private Campaigns of General Sir Walter Walker (London 1973).

  41. 41.

    WO 216/116, Half Yearly Training Reports; WO 263/10, Minutes of Part 1 of the Commander’s-in-Chief Commanders’ Conference, 25 April 1949.

  42. 42.

    Intelligence Corp Museum, Acc. No. 576/2—Notes on the Intelligence Corps in South East Asia, undated, believed to be mid-1953.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., Acc. No. 882—A History of the Intelligence Corps in Malaya 1945–70.

  45. 45.

    WO 106/5884, General Sir Neil Ritchie, “Report on Operations in Malaya: June 1948 to July 1949”, 6 September 1949.

  46. 46.

    H. Bennett, ‘‘‘A Very Salutary Effect’: The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949”, Journal of Strategic Studies 32: 3, p. 436.

  47. 47.

    R. Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya 1947–60 (Rand 1964), p. 127.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., p. 133.

  49. 49.

    TGM, Regimental Records, 2/2 GR, Documents of Historical Interest, Malaya, 1947–9, Report on Operation Gargolye, by 2/2nd GRs, 7 February 1949.

  50. 50.

    WO 208/4104, HQ Malaya District, Intelligence Review, 1 July–31 December 1949. Only Operation Constellation, which was aimed against the MRLA’s 3rd Regiment in North West Johore and in Malacca, was deemed a success, with thirty-two insurgents killed, twenty-three captured and fifteen surrendered.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., MacDonald to Creech Jones, 20 April 1949.

  52. 52.

    DEFE 11/35, Sec (50) 7, Appendix to Annex, British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East, The Military situation in Malaya on 29 April 1950, an appreciation by C-in-C, FARELF.

  53. 53.

    For instance, see WO 208/4104. See also K. Hack, “Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents: British and Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation”, Intelligence and National Security, 14: 4 (2008), pp. 211–241.

  54. 54.

    CO 537/4374, A note by CIGS to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 November 1949. See also TGM, 2/2 GRs, Report on Operations Ramilies, Blenheim and Rusa, 26 June 1949.

  55. 55.

    AIR 23/8435, Report on the Royal Air Force Operations in Malaya, April 1949–December 1950, by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Frank Mellersh, 8 January 1951.

  56. 56.

    DEFE 4/39, General Headquarters Far East Land Forces, Land/Air Warfare Quarterly Liaison Letter, No. 6, July–December 1952. For more about photint in the Emergency see, Arditti, “The View from Above”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 26: 5 (2015), pp. 762–786.

  57. 57.

    CO 537/4751, Gurney to Griffiths, 11 April 1951; A. Stockwell, “Policing During the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60: Communism, Communalism, and Decolonisation”, in D. Anderson and D. Killingray eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police (Manchester 1992), pp. 105–126.

  58. 58.

    Bennett, “A Very Salutary Effect”, Journal of Strategic Studies 32: 3 (2009).

  59. 59.

    CO 537/4741, Memorandum by the Colonial Office on the Security Situation in the Federation of Malaya, April 1949.

  60. 60.

    CAB 104/263, Cabinet Malaya Committee, minutes of a meeting held on 19 April 1950.

  61. 61.

    CAB 21/1681, Cabinet Malaya Committee, Malaya—General Background, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 July 1950.

  62. 62.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 174.

  63. 63.

    WO 106/5884, Report on Operations in Malaya by General Neil Ritchie, June 1948–July 1948. See also, CO 537/4374, A note on the visit of the CIGS to South East Asia, November 1949.

  64. 64.

    Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, p. 80.

  65. 65.

    WO 268/647, Administrative Instruction No. 8, Civil Liaison Corps, Action Against Squatter Areas.

  66. 66.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 186.

  67. 67.

    CO 537/4751, Minute by the High Commissioner, 31 May 1949. See also, Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, p. 482; T. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60 (London 1990), pp. 114–115; Short, The Communist Insurrection, pp. 175, 185–186.

  68. 68.

    WO 208/4104, HQ Malaya District Weekly Intelligence Review No. 11, for Week Ending 13 January 1949.

  69. 69.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 181.

  70. 70.

    CO 537/5994, Gurney to Creech Jones, 23 February 1950.

  71. 71.

    AIR 20/7777, The Briggs Plan, p. 6.

  72. 72.

    Ibid. See also CAB 104/263, Cabinet Malaya Committee, Future Anti Policy in Malaya—A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 May 1950. The concept of framework operations in Malaya, was not in fact a new idea. See CO 537/3688, Local Defence Committee, Federation of Malaya, A paper on the strategic and tactical measures required to deal with the internal security problem in the Federation of Malaya, dated 16 September 1948.

  73. 73.

    AIR 20/7777, The Briggs Plan, pp. 4, 10.

  74. 74.

    CAB 21/2884, Cabinet Malaya Committee, Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations, 4 June 1951; Extract from the minutes of COS (51) 107th Meeting held on 29 June 1951.

  75. 75.

    CAB 21/2884, Summary of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 26 February 1951; PREM 8 1406 II, Secretary of State for Defence to the Prime Minister, 28 April 1951; CAB 21/2884, Shinwell to Brownjohn, 3 May 1951; PREM 8/1406 II, Secretary of State for Defence to the Prime Minister, 9 August 1951.

  76. 76.

    PREM 8/1406 Part II, Minutes of a meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room, House of Commons, 12 March 1951.

  77. 77.

    CO 1022/148, Gurney ‘s Political Will, a note by Gurney expressing his frustration with the Chinese community.

  78. 78.

    R. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–60 (Singapore 1989). K. Ramakrishna, “‘Transmogrifying’ Malaya: The Impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952–54)”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 32: 1 (February 2001), pp. 79–92; S. Smith, “General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence and Propaganda”, Intelligence and National Security, 16: 3 (2001), pp. 60–78.

  79. 79.

    B. Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame—Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire (2011), p. 198.

  80. 80.

    Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 96; J. Cloake, Templer—Tiger of Malaya (London 1985), p. 242.

  81. 81.

    WO 291/1723, Operational Research Section Malaya, Memorandum No. 3, Operational Analysis for July and August 1952.

  82. 82.

    WO 291/1725, ORS Malaya, Memorandum No. 5/52—Patrolling in the Malayan Emergency. The report also highlighted the need to improve ‘jungle craft’ and marksmanship.

  83. 83.

    WO 291/1724, ORS Malaya, Memorandum No. 5/52—Ambushes, November 1952.

  84. 84.

    AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations Review of Emergency in Malaya, June 1948–August 1957.

  85. 85.

    WO 291/1724, ORS Malaya, Memorandum No. 4/52—Ambushes, Appendix A.

  86. 86.

    Liddell Hart Archives, Papers of General Stockwell, Operation Hammer. See also WO 216/874, Director of Operations’ Directive, February 1955; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, pp. 98–99; Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, pp. 116–117; R. Clutterbuck, The Emergency in Malaya, 1948–60 (1966), pp. 116–121.

  87. 87.

    DEFE 4/39, Land/Air Warfare Liaison Letter No. 6, July–December 1952.

  88. 88.

    Postgate, Operation Firedog, p. 115.

  89. 89.

    K. Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948–58 (London 2001), p. 158.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., p. 188.

  91. 91.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, p. 447.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., p. 450.

  93. 93.

    AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations Review of Emergency in Malaya, June 1948–August 1957. See also Hoe and Morris, Re-enter the SAS, pp. 163–176.

  94. 94.

    WO 291/1792, Operational Research Section (Psychological Warfare), Memorandum No. 6/55, A Review of Recent Trends in Surrender Behaviour, by F. H. Lakin.

  95. 95.

    For rewards see CO 1022/41. See also CO 1030/22, Rewards to be Paid for the Recovery of Arms—Ammunition and Explosives, released to the press on 1 September 1952.

  96. 96.

    CO 1030/22, Memorandum by the Secretary for Defence—Surrender Policy, 13 August 1952.

  97. 97.

    CO 1022/49, Templer to Lyttelton, 12 May 1952.

  98. 98.

    J. Morgan, a former Lieutenant in a Police Jungle Company provides an interesting first-hand account of turning a captured insurgent in the field. See J. Morgan, Spearhead in Malaya (1959), pp. 78–94.

  99. 99.

    CO 1022/50, Extract from F.M. Saw 995, Defence and Security, Special Operational Volunteer Force, 17 June 1953.

  100. 100.

    WO 208/5356, Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1956 by the Director of Operations, Malaya, Appendix B.

  101. 101.

    Liddell Hart Archives, Papers of General Stockwell, Vade Mecum—The Army in the Cold War (Malaya).

  102. 102.

    Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, pp. 365–367.

  103. 103.

    WO 208/319, Director of Operations, Malaya. Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the end of 1954.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    WO 291/1724, ORS Malaya, Memorandum No. 4/52—Ambushes, Appendix A.

  106. 106.

    AIR 20/10377, Director of Operations Review of Emergency in Malaya, June 1948–August 1957.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

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    Roger C. Arditti

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Arditti, R.C. (2019). Paramilitary Intelligence. In: Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_6

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