Abstract
The search for mechanisms has been a common practice in scientific research. However, since the empiricist critique of causality, and especially during the second third of the twentieth century, other non-mechanistic perspectives—especially deductivism—gained predominance. But the sustained effort of authors such as Michael Scriven, Mario Bunge and especially Wesley Salmon contributed to restoring the respectability of causality and mechanisms in philosophy of science. Some members of the causal family, usually lumped under the name of “new mechanistic philosophy”, emphasize the description of mechanisms, especially causal ones, as a central aspect of explanation and other research practices in several areas of science. This approach offers viable solutions to the various ontological and methodological objections that are opposed to the two traditional approaches (the purely deductive and the purely causal). In this work the basic characteristics of three philosophies that highlight the description of mechanisms as a central element to explanation and their suitability for the science of ecology are discussed.
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Notes
- 1.
We use the adjective ‘mechanistic’ when referring strictly to new mechanical philosophy’s projects; ‘mechanismic’ for those in the more comprehensive contemporary mechanismic philosophy.
- 2.
Originally, Glennan (1996, p. 55) recurred to a Goodmanian notion of a causal law, i.e., a generalization that provides counterfactual support. Later, he borrowed the idea of direct, invariant generalizations from J. Woodward’s counterfactual, manipulative account of causation.
- 3.
Bunge (1998a) distinguishes between laws1—objective patterns of becoming—and laws2, scientific descriptions of those patterns.
- 4.
That is, ecological interactions that benefit all (mutualism) or one type (commensalism) of the organisms involved, while not damaging any of them.
- 5.
A transitional zone between two adjacent plant communities (Ricklefs 2008).
- 6.
A light-induced depression of photosynthetic rate produced by an absorption of PAR higher than that the plant can effectively use, whose effect is increased by low temperatures (Germino and Smith 2000).
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González del Solar, R., Marone, L., Lopez de Casenave, J. (2019). Mechanismic Approaches to Explanation in Ecology. In: Matthews, M.R. (eds) Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16673-1_31
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