Abstract
A moral obligation to understand the social realty of the other requires a normative ground. This ground can be found by considering the concept of reasonableness, which appeals to norms in much broader and open-ended ways than methodological accounts of reason. To be reasonable is to apply the skills and formal elements of rationality in real life contexts—and to do so from a variety of perspectives instead of just one privileged perspective. With such a change in emphasis, impartiality becomes linked with open-mindedness and a willingness to correct for prejudice when considering the credibility of others. Being reasonable, then, is a contextually determined virtue that guides us toward the overcoming of ignorance and a genuine understanding of others.
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Notes
- 1.
I have, for example, a dog that loves to roll in every nasty smell he finds in the woods. I truly do not understand the attractiveness of such an activity, although I recognize that he thoroughly enjoys it. My concept of smells-it-would-be-good-to-roll-in is much, much smaller than my dog’s.
- 2.
See Spelman (2007, 123).
- 3.
Elsewhere I have argued in defense of reason, albeit a reason decidedly different from the modern variety. See Heikes (2010).
- 4.
This march occurred on Earth Day, April 22, 2017.
Of course, as feminist philosophers of science will point out, scientists have probably overplayed their authoritative hand. Science is a lot less objective and a lot more culpable in oppressive practices than many in the field have liked to think.
- 5.
For example, see Lynch (2012).
- 6.
- 7.
Quoted in Mills (1997, 25).
- 8.
The question is how to signal this shift. One way of doing this is to simply alter the terms of the discussion, and philosophers who have done this include: Burbules, Kitcher, Rawls, Siegel, and Toulmin. These philosophers downplay “reason” in favor of discussions of “reasonableness.”
- 9.
See Toulmin (2001, 24–28).
- 10.
See Siegel (1997, 104–110).
- 11.
For a critical take on Rawls’ use of the reasonable, see (Heikes 2018).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
As Friedman notes, “no overt or covert gender bias is built into his [Rawls’] conception” (2000, 26).
- 15.
See Friedman (2000, 22–23).
- 16.
- 17.
Of course, not all calls for change are ones that need to be embraced. But they should at least be given a genuinely fair hearing.
- 18.
As we look beyond what it is we actually do, we must consider more than just the axes of power relations. Reasonableness cuts across moral axes as well. These moral axes are identified by Charles Taylor as “our sense of respect for an obligation to others, … our understanding of what makes a life full… [and] the range of notions concerned with dignity” (Taylor 1989, 15). I address this point elsewhere, but sensitivity on each of these points is something we expect from the reasonable person. In other words, the person who is reasonable cannot be insensitive to the moral dimension of our lives.
- 19.
Cf. Tanesini.
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Heikes, D.K. (2019). Reasonable Grounds. In: Towards a Liberatory Epistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16485-0_4
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