Abstract
In this chapter, Borooah focuses on the reservation of jobs in government and the public sector which is a corollary of the Indian government’s constitutionally mandated duty to favour persons from the “reserved” categories (the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the Other Backward Classes) at the expense of persons from the “non-reserved” or “general” categories, in public sector jobs. Given that India’s experiment with affirmative action has been emulated in other countries (Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka), the purpose of this chapter is to investigate—using unit record data from the latest available National Sample Survey (NSS) round (68th), and an earlier round (55th) pertaining to a decade prior, of Employment—the extent to which jobs reservation has benefited persons from the “reserved categories” by offering them a greater share of regular salaried and wage employment than they might have obtained in its absence.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, converts to Islam from Hindu “unclean occupations” such as halalkhors, helas, lalbegis, dhobis, hajjams, chiks, and faqirs. However, subsequent extensions were made to this list for Mazhabi Sikhs (in 1956) and neo-Buddhists (in 1990).
- 2.
Article 342 of the Indian Constitution empowers the President, after consultation with the Governor, to specify the tribes or tribal communities in a state which will be accorded Scheduled Tribes status.
- 3.
For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India, see Osborne (2001).
- 4.
This Commission was established in 1979 by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai with a mandate to “identify the socially or educationally backward”.
- 5.
Article 340 of the Indian Constitution empowers the government to create such classes, and in 1955, following the report of the Kalelkar Commission, 2339 groups were designated as belonging to the OBC.
- 6.
See Kashyap (2016).
- 7.
For example, as noted earlier, Patels, Jats, and Marathas.
- 8.
- 9.
That is, in government or in publicly funded or publicly assisted organisations.
- 10.
As discussed in Chap. 2, the NSS is an annual survey of households in India; every five years, a large survey covering issues of employment and so on is conducted.
- 11.
See: https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rmlogitpostestimation.pdf (accessed 23 September 2017).
- 12.
It is important to draw a distinction between the estimation sample and the total sample; because the equation can only be estimated for non-missing values on all the variables, the estimation sample will, typically, be smaller than the total sample.
- 13.
Stata’s margin command performs these calculations.
- 14.
Except for the ST in the 55th round.
- 15.
Note that these figures relate to the proportions \( \left({\tilde{p}}^{\mathrm{FC}}-{\tilde{p}}^X\right)/\left({\tilde{p}}^{\mathrm{FC}}-{\tilde{p}}^X\right) \) expressed as a percentage.
- 16.
For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India, see Osborne (2001).
- 17.
- 18.
The Hindu, “9885 Seats Available in 17 IITs: Results on June 23”, 20 June 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/9885-seats-available-in-17-iits-results-on-june-23/article4834329.ece?css=print (accessed 11 April 2016).
- 19.
Times of India, “This Year, IITs Will Admit Students with Even 6 Percent in Entrance Examination”, 14 July 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/entrance-exams/This-year-IITs-will-admit-students-with-even-6-in-entrance-exam/articleshow/48061694.cms (accessed 11 April 2016).
- 20.
First Post, “90% IIT-Roorkee Dropouts Are Backward Caste: A Case against Affirmative Action?”, 6 August 2015, http://www.firstpost.com/india/90-percent-of-iit-roorkee-dropouts-are-backward-caste-a-case-against-affirmative-action-2379964.html (accessed 12 December 2016).
- 21.
Indian Express, “Good JEE Rank, Failing First-year: IIT Roorkee Struggles to Find Out Why”, 5 August 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/good-jee-rank-failing-first-year-iit-struggles-to-find-out-why/ (accessed 6 October 2018).
- 22.
The Indian Supreme Court was told in 2007 by the Solicitor General of India that “there cannot be any time limit imposed for the policy of reservation in admission (to educational institutions) or in employment”. See Hindustan Times, “No Time Limit on Reservations, Apex Court Told”, 26 September 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/no-time-limit-on-reservations-apex-court-told/story-4LX7890NR3urrwau8xarSK.html (accessed 17 December 2016).
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Borooah, V.K. (2019). Discrimination and Job Reservation. In: Disparity and Discrimination in Labour Market Outcomes in India. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16264-1_3
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