Abstract
This chapter determines the centrepiece of the book since it contains the main assessment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—as based on the stringent application of the set of indicators forming the new concept of Economic Corridors (ECs) developed in Chap. 2. Furthermore, the analysis is guided by the overarching notion that only when an EC initiative addresses these indicators will the corridor develop the characteristics necessary for success. More concretely, only when an EC initiative adequately addresses these characteristics will an ‘EC initiative’ lead to the establishment of not only an EC but of a sustainable EC—meaning an EC able to realise its full potential and offer maximum benefits for all participating actors.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For a more detailed description of the ‘sub-zones’, see Sect. 6.2.
- 2.
- 3.
The LTP speaks just about ‘parts of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan’.
- 4.
KPK and the FATA got merged in 2018.
- 5.
The Haier Group entered the Pakistani market in February 2001 by jointly establishing a facility with Pakistan-based Panapak Electronic Company and opened the Haier (Pakistan) Industrial Park at Lahore (Haq, 2015, April 12). The joint venture focuses on the production of household goods such as air conditioners, high-powered refrigerators and freezers, washing machines, TVs, among others.
- 6.
China experimented years ago with a variety of overseas industrial and trade zones. For example in 1999 China made an agreement with Egypt so as to offer assistance in the establishment of an industrial zone in the Suez economic area (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2011, pp. 71–72).
- 7.
At that time, the MOFCOM was running two programmes. The ‘Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone Development Fund’ provided subsidies meant to cover costs of zone development for preconstruction and actual implementation. The second programme was the Special Fund for Economic and Technical Cooperation (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2011, pp. 82).
- 8.
- 9.
The BoI reported that it has identified a total of 41 sites in the four provinces for SEZs to be connected with the CPEC (Khan, 2017f, March 13).
- 10.
(1) The Rashakai Economic Zone, M-1, Nowshera; (2) the China Special Economic Zone Dhabeji; (3) the Bostan Industrial Zone; (4) the Allama Iqbal Industrial City (M3), Faisalabad; (5) the ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad; (6) the Development of Industrial Park on Pakistan Steel Mills Land at Port Qasim near Karachi; (7) the Special Economic Zone at Mirpur, AJK; (8) the Mohmand Marble City; and (9) the Moqpondass SEZ Gilgit-Baltistan. For more details, see: http://cpec.gov.pk/special-economic-zones-projects
- 11.
Thar (coal), Larkana (coal), Salt Range (antimony), Chiniot (iron ore), Dargai (chromite), North Waziristan (chromite), Kurram (antimony), Waziristan (copper), Chitral (antimony), Beham (iron ore, lead), Nizampur (iron ore), Mohmand (marble), Khuzdar (chromite, antimony), Chaghi (chromite), Qila Sifullah (antimony, chromite), Saindak (gold, silver), RekoDiq (gold), Kalat (iron ore), Lasbela (manganese), Gwadar (oil refinery), Muslim Bagh (chromite) (Malik, 2018a, p. 82; News, 2015b, July 26).
- 12.
‘Tax holidays are understood here as sales tax and income tax exemptions for a limited timeframe. Other offered incentives offered to those willing to invest in Pakistani SEZs include ‘duty-free access to import of capital goods’, or ‘one-window facilities’ (Khawar, 2017, December 5).
- 13.
‘One Window’ Facilities are understood as certain administrative services offered by state agencies so as to support and facilitate foreign investments—especially to act as an interlocutor between foreign investors and the state of Pakistan and ease certain regulations (BOI, 2012a, pp. 24–26).
- 14.
Many of the envisaged SEZ initiatives are either hampered or totally blocked because of problems in land acquisition.
- 15.
Besides the fact that many of the attempts to set up effective SEZs failed, there are some successful examples such as industrial clusters and estates in Sialkot (surgical goods cluster), or the ceramic/pottery industrial cluster in Gujarat, or the readymade garments manufacturing cluster in Faisalabad—among others (Raza, 2018, August 7).
- 16.
- 17.
The Board of Approvals (BOA) is the highest approving body. It is headed by the Prime Minister with membership from Economic Ministries, Provincial Governments, and Public and Private Sectors. The Approvals Committee is headed by the BOI Chairman and has memberships from Economic Ministries, Provincial Governments, Public and Private Sectors, and SEZ Authorities (at the provincial level including Gilgit-Baltistan) who work under the leadership of the Chief Ministers. For more details, see Board of Investments (BOI) at http://boi.gov.pk/InvestmentGuide/SEZ.aspx
- 18.
For example, the eastern route will include Lahore, Faisalabad, Rahimyar Khan, Bahawalpur and Multan.
- 19.
More concretely, the western route will go from Islamabad trough Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan district, Balochistan’s Zhob, Qilla Saifullah, Quetta, as well as Panjgur and Turbat districts before reaching Gwadar (ICG, 2018, June 29).
- 20.
Some of the envisaged projects include an area road link between Pakistan-administered Kashmir (AJK) and the city of Chitral in KPK—which borders also the Gilgit-Baltistan region. A further goal is to incorporate the seaport Keti Bunder into the CPEC road network. According to Arif Rafiq, China is willing to finance these projects.
- 21.
For example, the construction of the Chitral-Garam-Chashma-Doraha Pass Road covering 82.5 km (PSDP, 2018).
- 22.
See also Sect. 6.5.
- 23.
The KKH is prone to natural calamities, especially landslides. In January 2010, a mountainside near the KKH was affected by an earthquake leading to a massive landslip. These blocked parts of the road and dammed the Hunza river, which resulted in the creation of the Attabad Lake. This new inland water inundated 27 sq. kilometres of the KKH (Hodge, 2013, July 30).
- 24.
For example, the Faisalabad-Multan Motorway 4 is co-financed by the ADB, the AIIB, the Islamic Development Bank, and the UK’s department for International Development (Rafiq, 2017, p. 13).
- 25.
According to Hassan Khawar (2018a, March 6), Pakistani Railways currently have 95 locomotives in use for freight operations (including 55 newly purchased engines). The author estimates that they will need about 380 additional locomotives and approximately 15,000 wagons (40 wagons per locomotive).
- 26.
Besides the ongoing project in Gwadar, a second international airport project, the New Islamabad International Airport (NIIA), was finally inaugurated in Islamabad. Besides not being part of the CEC scheme, the new airport is perceived as crucial for the success of the CPEC in general and connectivity in particular. The airport project was hampered by numerous delays and other hurdles but wast apparently pushed through in the context of the corridor. Furthermore, some of the projects (especially roads) meant to increase infrastructure connectivity of the airport are CPEC-related projects.
- 27.
Regarding current planning, Gwadar’s integration into the CPEC road and railway ground connectivity should be realised by the construction of the Gwadar Eastbay Express (a six-lane highway) which will be linked to the Makran Coastal Highway. Additionally, there are two new railway lines discussed: (1) A 1328 km-long line from Gwadar to Jacobad and Quetta (Mastung) via Besima New Railway line; and (2) a railway line between Gwadar and Karachi (Gwadar Port Passage).
- 28.
For more information on Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), see http://www.pof.gov.pk/
- 29.
- 30.
Measures could also include the reopening of additional trade routes (Rajasthan-Sindh) so as to complement the Wagah-Attari route (Punjab) and/or the revival of the old Grand Trunk Road. A smooth functioning, land-based trade and transport would but also help solve the problem of time-consuming and expensive sea trade. Furthermore, it would diminish financial losses incurred through smuggling and informal economic networks.
- 31.
Representatives of 60 countries, including the United States and Japan, took part in the largest dialogue platform on the China’s Belt and Road (BRI) initiative—President Xi Jinping’s signature project—which took place in Beijing on May 14–15 (Miglani, 2017, May 21).
- 32.
Considering the significance of nuclear weapons for South Asian states’ military capabilities as well as self-perception and identity, the importance attached to Beijing’s essential role in the nuclear programme can hardly be overstated (see also Andrew Small cited in Domínguez, 2015b, January 15).
- 33.
More concretely, this component covers the finance of ‘the detailed design, construction and supervision of the proposed four-lane PTEX [Peshawar Torkham Expressway] and associated road-user and administrative infrastructure facilities, the laying of fibre optic cables in trenches along PTEX, land acquisition and resettlement, afforestation along PTEX, and technical and independent reviews and studies for the preparation of new projects’ (World Bank, 2018, May 25).
- 34.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
- 35.
For a detailed assessment of the inclusion of Afghanistan into the CPEC framework, see Chap. 8.
- 36.
Andrew Small quoted in Domínguez (2015b, January 15).
- 37.
Andrew Small quoted in Domínguez (2015b, January 15).
- 38.
On February 3, the US administration enacted new sanctions on Iran. The sanctions list includes three separate networks linked to supporting Iran’s ballistic missile development program and those providing support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Force. The measures are partly a response to Tehran’s test of a medium-range missile on 29 January 2016 as well as Tehran’s support for foreign armed groups like the Yemeni Shia Houthi rebels or the Lebanese Hezbollah among others (Borger & Smith, 2017, February 3; Jin, 2017, February 7).
- 39.
The differentiation between ‘Iranian led Shia camp’ and ‘Saudi Arabia guided Sunni camp’ must be understood as ideal types. There are several cases in which a clear cut distinction between both types are nor possible because they are intervening. Iran’s military intervention in Syria, and its collaboration with Sunni as well as with Shia groups can be seen as a proof therefore. Another example is Iranian support for (Sunni) Taliban in Afghanistan, or the use of Shia communities by Pakistani governments ‘settlement policies’ to change the social-religious demography of restive areas in Pakistan.
- 40.
For example, in the territorial dispute with India over Gilgit-Baltistan or the case of Indian and US attempts to designate Pakistan based-militants on the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee list of terrorists (Dawn, 2017f, February 7).
- 41.
Although China’s officials refute allegations that cultural entities such as the Confucius institutes are part of a political agenda, they ‘indirectly or inadvertently provide an outlet for public diplomacy’ (Zhao, 2015, p. 15). According to experts, all Chinese cultural institutions engaged in public diplomacy so as to enhance Chinese soft power and export China’s culture are under tight control of foreign affairs circles (Zhao, 2017, p. 14).
- 42.
For more information on the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, see http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/index.html
- 43.
Construction of collective identities is influenced or shaped by codes. There are different basic types of codes which serve (usually as a set codes) as building blocks or components for identity constructions (Eisenstadt, 1998).
- 44.
- 45.
This is limiting Beijing’s influence over ethnic Chinese who are not citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). There is the risk that these ‘Chinese’ who are citizens of host countries are losing ‘citizenship, rights, or significant political or social capital’ if they support the PRC cause (Chang, 2013, June, p. 25). Furthermore, the Chinese diaspora consists of many heterogeneous groups with ‘diverse views, values, and identities’ (Heath, 2018, March 1), which determines an additional challenge for Beijing to instrumentalize them via cultural and soft power tools.
- 46.
These cultural measures (understood as soft power tools) are efforts aiming at the promotion of traditional Chinese culture and benign views of the country through investments in movies, advertising, exhibits, and activities related to the Confucius Institutes (Heath, 2018, March 1).
- 47.
An interesting assessment on the phenomenon is offered by Ian Talbot (2002a).
- 48.
The most prominent symbol of this movement is the ‘Pashteen hat’.
- 49.
Tianjin consists of several industrial zones.
- 50.
The LTP emphasises agricultural modernisation with the goal of strengthening agricultural production (LTP, 2017, p. 18). Islamabad obviously hopes that an increased cooperation between China and Pakistan in the agricultural sector will lead to more exports of Pakistani food products and help to reduce the trade deficit with China.
- 51.
As a country with ‘Medium Human Development’, Pakistan’s Human Development Index (HDI) improved from 147 (out of 188) in 2016 to 150 (out of 189) in 2017. For more information, see http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PAK
- 52.
Water scarcity in these areas affects particularly women and children. The Baloch Nutrition Cell reports that 52% of Balochi children suffered from undernourishment due to droughts. Compared to other provinces, child mortality in Baluchistan is also very high. Another survey by the National Nutrition Cell states that 49% of women in Baluchistan suffer from malnutrition (Shah, 2018c, September 27).
- 53.
For example, China provided aid for the construction of a facility for fresh water treatment and supply, a public hospital, and technical and vocational institutes (Rafiq, 2017, p. 16). However, these ‘goodwill measures’ are limited in number and seem to be chosen rather on a strategic basis rather than according to purely altruistic considerations. Gwadar is supposed to be the CPEC’s flagship project.
- 54.
The Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) provides unconditional cash transfers to the poorest sectors of society, as well as conditional cash transfers to support primary school attendance. In 2017, in 5.4 million beneficiaries were supported by the BISP. Other welfare programmes include the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), Bait-ul Mal, and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF).
- 55.
Critics argue that the subsidiaries are unable to lift impoverished families above the poverty line. Furthermore, it is reported that the BISP is flawed by financial mismanagement, corruption and political favouritism (Ghumman, 2014, January 12).
- 56.
For more details on this ‘clash of culture’ between Chinese and conservative Muslims in Pakistan, see Sect. 6.15.
- 57.
The Chinese embassy in Pakistan warned all ‘Chinese-invested organizations and Chinese citizens to increase security awareness, strengthen internal precautions, reduce trips outside as much as possible, and avoid crowded public spaces’ (Reuters, 2017, December 8).
- 58.
For more information on the UN SDGs, see: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
- 59.
Regarding Pakistan’s constitution (Article: 78 Federal Consolidated Fund and Public Account): (1) All revenues received by the Federal Government, all loans raised by that Government and all money received in repayment of any loan shall form part of a consolidated fund, to be known as the Federal Consolidated Fund. (2) All other money either (a) received by or on behalf of the Federal Government; or (b) received by or deposited with the Supreme Court or any other court established under the authority of the Federation shall be credited to the Public Account of the Federation. For more information, see: https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/article-78-federal-consolidated-fund-and-public-account/
- 60.
Here, in order to improve trade relations, the so-called Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA) was signed in 1995 between Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In 2017, Tajikistan expressed an interest to join this transit deal (Bhutta, 2017, February 24).
- 61.
This is gaining momentum since the rapid pavement deterioration due to overloaded vehicles is a severe problem in Pakistan—which has in the past caused tremendous ‘economic loss to the country and increases the rehabilitation and maintenance costs while decreasing the pavement service life’ (Hanif, 2014, p. 15).
- 62.
In agreement with the National Highway Authority (NHA).
- 63.
Concretely, the toll rate in Pakistan for a 40 feet articulated truck between Peshawar and Islamabad is Rs. 1745 which means $3 for 100 km. In contrast, in some African countries, the toll rate is around $10 for the same distance (Idrees et al., 2018, p. 221).
- 64.
For more details on Sinosure, see Sect. 6.13, Section: (2.3) Sinosure: Chinese international project insurance.
- 65.
See also Sect. 6.5.
- 66.
In South Asia, especially in India, the he ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ came to be known as Panchasheela (or Panch Shila), a term which has its origin in Buddhism. Panchasheela was utilised by the administration of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru so as to describe the notion of the ‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’ from an Indian perspective. This process led to the formulation of the so called ‘panchasheela doctrine’ which was supposed to determine the foundation for the relationship between China and India. A 1954 treaty signed between the two countries encapsulated the five principles as: (1) mutual respect for each others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality of standing and equal benefits; and (4) peaceful co-existence (Mitra et al., 2006, pp. 326–327).
- 67.
See for more details on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Yuan and Song (2015).
- 68.
For more details on the significance of western China’s development for the BRI, see Chap. 3.
- 69.
The Indus Super Highway by the US Army Corps of Engineers was part of a military aid programme to Pakistan. A successfully established project within this scheme was the Kharian Cantonment in the late 1950s, which is until today one of the largest army bases in Pakistan located near Kharian city, in Punjab’s Gujrat district.
- 70.
Regarding Dawn journalist Khurram Husain (2017b, June 21), this original draft ‘is an astonishingly detailed roadmap of the pitfalls and opportunities that Chinese enterprises can expect as they venture into every area of economy and society. It contains specifics of what is going to be built by the Chinese over the next decade and a half; its detailed description of Pakistan’s economy and attendant risks shows clearly that the Chinese are fully aware of what they are getting involved in (Husain, 2017b, June 21).
- 71.
For more information on the ‘Vision 2025’ and its significance for CPEC, see Chap. 4.
- 72.
For more information regarding the phases of CPEC, see Chap. 1.
- 73.
See also, Sect. 6.2.
- 74.
As Ahsan Iqbal, Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reform points out, ‘CPEC has 75pc of investment in IPP mode. All energy investment is private investment; not a single dollar of loan to Pakistan’ (Iqbal, 2018a, May 30).
- 75.
One of the most prominent examples is the $230 million Chinese government grant to build an international airport.
- 76.
This tendency is much more prevalent in infrastructure projects of CPEC which receives most of the concessional loans.
- 77.
For example, the Faisalabad-Multan Motorway 4 is co-financed by ADB, AIIB, Islamic Development Bank, and the British government, segments of the N-25 highway was funded by the USAID (Rafiq, 2017, p. 13).
- 78.
Out of the 41 PSDP funding schemes for the CPEC 20 were approved, 18 are currently unapproved, 3 have their approval under process or no clear information available. Approved projects include: KKH Phase-II Havelian-Thakot (118.057 km); Karachi-Lahore Motorway (Land Acquisition) Sukkur-Hyderabad, Land Acquisition and Resettlement for the CPEC; the Islamabad-Raikot Section (Phase-I), the Havelian-Thakot (120.12 km), the Improvement and widening of Chitral-Booni-Mastuj-Shandur; the Construction/Black Topping of Access Road from Makran Coastal Highway to New Gwadar International Airport (PSDP, 2018).
- 79.
For example, necessary Facilities of Fresh Water Treatment, Water Supply and Distribution in Gwadar; Gwadar Smart Environmental and Sanitation System and Landfill; Pak-China Technical & Vocational Institute at Gwadar (co-financed; foreign assistance) (PSDP, 2018).
- 80.
For example, the provision for CPEC-Related Security Projects (2000.000 Million in Rupees); the construction of Offices for Intelligence Bureau along with the CPEC (473.556 Million in Rupees). The scheme for the Construction/Development of the fifth Pakistan Coast Guards Battalion Omara for the CPEC (954.935 Million Rupees) is unapproved for 2018–19 (PSDP, 2018).
- 81.
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) is a project financing and operating model or structure wherein a private entity receives a concession from either the private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate an infrastructure component of facilities stated in the concession contract—which varies usually from 20 to 30 years (PCQ, n.n.).
- 82.
‘Developing Asia will need to invest $26 trillion from 2016 to 2030, or $1.7 trillion per year, if the region is to maintain its growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change (climate-adjusted estimate). Without climate change mitigation and adaptation costs, $22.6 trillion will be needed, or $1.5 trillion per year (baseline estimate)’ (ADB, 2017b, p. xi).
- 83.
For example, President Xi announced that the CDB and the EXIM will set up special lending schemes, respectively worth RMB 250 billion (about US$36.2 billion) and RMB 130 billion (US$ 18.8), so as to support Belt and Road cooperation on infrastructure, industrial capacity and financing (Lei, 2017a, May 14).
- 84.
Cooperation specially regarding the modernisation of Pakistan’s agricultural sector and the development of ‘future growth strategy for livestock, dairy & crops and value chain financing plans’ (ZBTL, 2017, October 26).
- 85.
For more information on Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited, see: https://www.ztbl.com.pk/
- 86.
Several BRI related projects financed by the EXIM were located in Pakistan: the 2016 Karot Hydropower Station Project (together with the SRF); the Havelian-Thakot section of the Karakoram Highway/KKH; the Port Qasim Coal-fired Power Project, or the 900 MW Photovoltaic Power Station in Punjab (Carrai. 2017, p. 8). For more information on The Export-Import Bank of China, see http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/en/
- 87.
In this backdrop, the bank aims ‘to promote international exchange and cooperation, actively take part in international economic and financial governance, and promote win-win cooperation and common development, showcasing the strengths of Chinese financial institutions on the international stage’. For more information on the CDP, see: http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/
- 88.
For example, the CDB led a consortium along with the EXIM bank to finance a US$1.5 billion power plant and wharf deal in the city of Hub in Balochistan (Gopalan & Ren, 2017, November 27).
- 89.
CDB contributed US$62.6 million to the US$160 total investment volume.
- 90.
Also known as the Silk Road Infrastructure Fund or Silk Road Development Fund.
- 91.
The Bretton Woods system of monetary management established for the first time the rules for commercial and financial relations among independent states. The 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement was signed by 44 countries including the United States, Canada, Western European states, Australia, and Japan Although the original arrangements were not sustainable (the system was based on a fixed exchange rate which collapsed in the 1970s), the Bretton Woods system set-up the core institutional framework (foremost the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund/IMF) supposed to help western states provide a new regulatory framework to the global economy after the second world war. Most contemporary international financial institutions, regimes, and contracts can be traced back to the Bretton Woods agreement (Carrai, 2017, pp. 11–12).
- 92.
For example, AIIB president Jin Liqun announced that the bank plans to invest $3 to $5 billion in infrastructure in 2017 and $10 billion in 2018, a large part of which will be earmarked for BRI-related projects (Rogers, 2017, February 7).
- 93.
For more information on the Silk Road Fund, see: http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23775/23767/index.html
- 94.
The NDB is a BRICS-led multilateral initiative. The BRICS is a collaborative platform made up of the five major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. According to the ‘Fortaleza Declaration’ of 2014 in Brazil, ‘The Bank shall have an initial authorized capital of US$100 billion. The initial subscribed capital shall be US$50 billion, equally shared among founding members’. For more information on the New Development Bank, see: https://www.ndb.int/
- 95.
New Development Bank: https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/history/
- 96.
For more information on Sinosure, see: http://www.sinosure.com.cn/en/
- 97.
- 98.
For more information, see the detailed case study by Miller (2017, June 5).
- 99.
Generally, the international norm for debt-related interest rates might be at maximum 5.5% (Miller, 2017, June 5, p. 26). Yet according to Dawn, Sinosure is charging a fee of 7% for debt servicing, which will be added to the capital cost of a project. For instance, the capital cost of a 660 MW project at Port Qasim is US$767.9 million, yet it goes up to $956.1 million by adding Sinosure’s fee of US$63.9 million, its financing fee and charges of US$21 million, and interests during construction of US$72.8 million (Siddiqui 2015, July 13).
- 100.
Euler Hermes describes itself as the World’s leading provider of trade-related credit insurance solutions and is backed by Allianz, one of the leading financial services providers worldwide. For more information, see: http://www.eulerhermes.com/Pages/default.aspx
- 101.
Which means the firms working in IPP mode cover debts from they own earnings and are not supposed to be paid by the Pakistani state (2018, June 6; Husain, 2017a, February 11).
- 102.
The 2011 CSA was of 10 billion Chinese yuan ($1.58 billion) or 140 billion Pakistani rupees ($1.57 billion) (Reuters, 2011, December 11). The latest CSA has increased currency swap amounts from the initial 10 billion CNY to 20 billion CNY and from Rs165 billion to Rs351 billion (Siddiqui, 2018b, May 25).
- 103.
It is interesting to note that the only country so far known which accepted the Yuan as legal tender is Zimbabwe, which took the decision after experiencing a hyperinflation and the abandonment of its own currency (Zimbabwean dollar) in 2009. Beijing’s offer to cancel a $40 million debt was a strong incentive for the introduction of the Yuan (AFP, 2015, December 22).
- 104.
Actually most of these instruments were already introduced several years earlier (SBP, 2013, May 7; 2012, September 4), but Chinese as well as Pakistani entrepreneurs did not made use of them.
- 105.
The NAB is the country’s main body dedicated to investigating corruption allegations. However, since its formation in 1999, there are claims (a very outspoken actor was former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) that the institution is ‘using its powers selectively to settle political scores, taking directives from other power centers’ (BTI Pakistan, 2018, pp. 34, 40).
- 106.
For more information on the CPEC Portal, see: http://www.cpecinfo.com/home; for the CPEC secretariat (Pakistan), see: http://cpec.gov.pk/
- 107.
In its report on the ‘14th National Assembly’s Contributions to Foreign Affairs, Anti-Terrorism and CPEC’, the FAFEN points out that the National Assembly’s document included only one CAN (Calling Attention Notices) and 116 questions—which accounts for roughly 1% of the total questions (13,912) asked during the Assembly’s 5-year term concluded on May 31, 2018 (FAFEN, 2018, June, pp. 3, 15).
- 108.
Experts point out that there is no clear data available from China on the actual size of its aid and international development programs. China’s aid system is run by various government entities; there is there is no clear distinction between aid, trade and investment (De Haan, 2010). Beijing started to publish so-called ‘White Papers on Aid’, yet like in Pakistan there was no disclosure of official documents pertaining to contractual details or formal evaluations of projects undertaken with Chinese financial assistance (Ali, 2017, p. 7; Li et al., 2014, p. 28).
- 109.
Critics argue that ‘all prior development and economic investment documents in Pakistan, such as national 5-year plans and IMF agreements have remained open for public viewing’, and CPEC projects cannot be an exception (Ijiaz, 2018, June 13).
- 110.
For example, in February 2018, the National Highway Authority (NHA) admitted to irregularities in the award of a US$2.9-billion contract to a Chinese company for the construction of a motorway under CPEC’ (Rana, 2018c, February 28). See also the complaint by Transparency International Pakistan towards NHA on severe irregularities in contracting road infrastructure projects, worth of US$4 billion (TI, 2017, October 20).
- 111.
Later it was stated by the Chinese that the hold on payments was due to the introduction of ‘new guidelines’ and a ‘new modus operandi’ for the release of funds. Earlier procedures for funding were meant for the management of the Early Harvest Projects (EHP) only—future projects will be under new regulations (Sweet, 2017, December 6). Furthermore, the hold on funding was also caused by a restructuring of foreign aid and international development systems. For more details, see Sect. 6.14.
- 112.
For more details on the likelihood of a balance of payment crisis and Pakistan’s potential need for IMF support, see Rana (2018b, June 5).
- 113.
Pakistan and China are negotiating the CPFTA’s second phase since 2011; yet due to differing views on bilateral trade relations the talks were either delayed or temporarily halted (Muhammad 2016, June 26).
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
For example: the Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (no 105, 1957), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973), the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004).
- 117.
The ‘Great Decade’ is associated with the rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. During his tenure there was a strong focus on Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure. For example, the Karakorum Highway (KKH) was constructed—after he initiated a closer relationship with China—and the industrialisation of the country as well as free-market policies were promoted, producing a GNP growth by 45%. However, Khan’s military adventurism and later socialist trends led not only to his ousting but also deeply affected the country’s economy (Pillalamarri, 2015a, May 1).
- 118.
Including a $6.7 billion 3-year loan programme in 2013 (Reuters, 2018a, July 30).
- 119.
The Paris Club’s claim towards Pakistan as of 31 December 2017 (excluding late interests) was in USD million: 11.252. As such, Islamabad is the eighth largest debtor to this organisation (Paris Club, 2018, June 21). The Paris Club is a group of creditor countries (currently 22 permanent members) whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. For more information, see: http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/page/permanent-members
- 120.
Besides unfavourable conditions for Pakistan’s entrepreneurs, few sectors benefit from the CPEC’s implementation. For example, steel factories and chemical manufacturers produce for Chinese companies since these use local materials instead of importing them (Jamal, 2017a, October 30).
- 121.
It is reported that senior Pakistani finance officials were drawing up options for PM Khan to seek an IMF bailout of up to $12 billion (Reuters, 2018a, July 30).
- 122.
Pakistan’s Gross Savings Rate between from June 2000 to June 2018 had an average rate of 10% of GDP. These low saving rates constitute an important reason for low investment levels reducing Pakistan’s growth potential tremendously, a phenomenon which is also known as ‘low-savings-low-investment trap’ (Waheed & Armas, 2015, June 11). For further information regarding the Gross Savings Rate, see CEIC database: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/pakistan/gross-savings-rate
- 123.
These tax incentives were intended to support exporting industries, agriculture and private investments (SBP, 2017a, p. 1).
- 124.
Non-tax revenues are generated from Mark-up (PSEs & others), dividends, State Bank of Pakistan profits, defense (including CSF/Coalition Support Fund), Profits from post office/PTA (3G), Royalties on gas & oil, Passport & other fees, discounts retained on crude oil, windfall levies against crude oil, etc. (SBP, 2017a, p. 54).
- 125.
In a Working Paper published by the World Bank, it is stated that in Pakistan, the administrative burden of tax compliance is hardest in South Asia (and harder than in many other states worldwide) ‘where firms have to make 47 payments and spend 594 hours or vs. 12 payments and 175 hours in high income OECD countries (Reva, 2015, p. 20).
- 126.
‘Exempting agriculture’ from taxation imposes a heavy burden on the rest of the economy, especially the industrial sector those manufactural firms which are registered and easy to tax. However, ‘exempting’ is partly a misnomer, since the option of income taxation in the agricultural sector does exist but wasn’t implemented yet. In theory, all provinces in Pakistan tax agricultural income. Yet in practice the implementation of income taxes actually functions as a land tax paid by large landholders based on the acreage of owned land (Reva, 2015, p. 6). The land tax is levied at fixed rates per acre—unchanged since 2002–2003. This is a major reason why the agricultural sector is one of the most undertaxed sectors of Pakistan’s economy (Azhar, 2015, July 21).
- 127.
Marina Rudyak emphasises this lack of qualified aid specialists in China and gives the example that in 2014 the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA), responsible for aid within MOFCOM, had consisted of around 100 staff, only 70 of which were aid specialists. In comparison, in that same year the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany, with more than 1000 staff, managed an aid budget of around US$8 billion (Rudyak, 2018, April 20).
- 128.
AidData, a US-based institution seeking to make development finance more transparent, accountable, and effective—and which tracks contributions to more than 5000 projects in 140 countries—found that Beijing gave almost US$354.4 billion in aid and other forms of support between 2000 and 2014 (Washington spent US$394.6 billion). However, only in 2009 has Chinese aid started to take off, transforming the country form an aid recipient into a donor. It is interesting to note that still in 2008 China received US$2.5 billion in foreign aid from Japan (around 50%), Germany, France and Britain (Lo, 2018, March 13).
- 129.
Sri Lanka handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease. Colombo made the decision to forgo control of its strategically important port in exchange for debt relief after it failed to fulfil its payment obligations towards China (Aamir, 2017, December 31; McDowell, 2018, August 14).
- 130.
7 meetings were held so far: The first JCC meeting of the CPEC in Islamabad, Pakistan on 27th August 2013; second JCC meeting of the CPEC in Beijing, China on 19th February, 2014; third JCC meeting of the CPEC in Beijing, China on 27th August 2014; fourth JCC meeting of the CPEC in Beijing, China on 25th March 2015; fifth JCC meeting of the CPEC in Karachi, Pakistan on 12th November, 2015; sixth JCC Meeting of the CPEC in Beijing, China on 29th December 2016; and the seventh JCC Meeting of the CPEC in Islamabad, Pakistan on 21st November 2017.
- 131.
For more information on the role of the Pakistani military within the CPEC, see Chap. 9.
- 132.
For more information on the role of the Pakistani military within the CPEC, see Chap. 9.
- 133.
- 134.
This drop refers to the whole tenure of Trump’s administration so far. Interestingly, the number of granted VISA for Indian nationals in March and April increased by 28% (Economic Times, 2017, May 29).
- 135.
For example, the US administration plans to modify the H-1B visa, the legal option for US universities to hire international staff so as to fill tenure track positions. Concretely, a special regulation was removed which granted depended spouses of H-1B visa holders the eligibility to work in the US (Vijayakumar, 2018, July 15). All this makes the US academic job market less attractive for foreigners.
- 136.
IMET cancellations were valued at $2.41 million so far. According to a Reuters report, apart from the IMET two other programs are affected.
- 137.
In 2016 alone 3500 Pakistani students were sponsored by Chinese government scholarships so as to study in China, making Pakistan the country with the largest number of students learning in China with Chinese scholarships. Pakistani students of 2016 rose to the total number in China to over 18,000 (Embassy of PR China, Pakistan, 2017, May 12).
- 138.
By mid-2017, China sponsored at least five China-related Research Centers in Pakistani Universities and Think-tanks. It also established four Confucius Institutes in Pakistan (Embassy of PR China, Pakistan, 2017, May 12).
- 139.
For instance, it is reported that 190 Pakistani engineers trained in China are now employed in the Sahiwal power plant (Pakistan Today, 2017b, May 28) and 104 on the Port Qasim power plants. All these engineers received a 5-month training programme in China. For more information, see: http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=MTYxOA
- 140.
For example, ‘that delays in various projects related to Gwadar had increased their costs from Rs8 billion (around $79 million) to Rs 100 billion (around $992 million) in 6 years. He specifically mentioned lack of progress on the construction of a power grid, the failure of Pakistan Railways to acquire land for the railway lines, and the failure by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to acquire land for connecting roads to the airport (CFI 2015, April 21; Khan, 2014, June).
- 141.
During the last couple of years Pakistan started to invest in its security apparatus and created several new armed forces within the military as well as police domains. Two of these new forces are most remarkable: The Special Security Division (SSD) and the Task Force-88’ (TF-88). The SSD is responsible for the protection of the CPEC’s Pakistani alignments, especially sections that cross Balochistan. The SSD is to consist of 9000 army soldiers and 6000 paramilitary forces personnel—organised in nine army battalions and six wings of ‘Civil Armed Forces’ (CAF) commanded by a major general. The CAF are federal paramilitary forces within the Ministry of Interior. They are composed of Rangers and Frontier Corps (FC) units. The Pakistani Rangers are usually deployed in the Sindh and Punjab provinces so as to perform border security duties at the borders shared with India They are also engaged in internal security missions wherein they provide assistance to the local police. The Frontier Corps (FC) operate in the border areas of North and West-Pakistan, namely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), KPK, and Baluchistan. With approximately 80,000 in personnel, the FC is responsible for assisting local law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, they are deployed so as to protect the borders as well as combat criminals, insurgents and militants/terrorists in Baluchistan, FATA and KPK (Abbas, 2007, March 29). Islamabad also raised 28 new CAF units in accordance with the National Action Plan/NAP (Usman, 2016, September 3). Besides the army, also the Pakistani Navy has assembled new forces for the CPEC’s protection—the ‘Task Force-88’ (TF-88) for the seaward security of the Gwadar port and protection of associated sea lanes against both conventional and non-traditional threats. The navy also raised a Coastal Security and Harbour Defence Force to tackle security threats along the coast and stationed a Force Protection Battalion at Gwadar for the protection of Chinese companies and workers.” (Dawn, 2016a, December 12).
- 142.
Since its inception, Pakistan’s police have been working under the colonial Police Act of 1861. This imperial-era piece of legislation was primarily designed so as to keep subjects under control rather than making the police a politically neutral body. Under President Pervez Musharraf, the military government promulgated the Police Ordinance (2002) with the objective of improving professionalism in police services, making them operationally neutral, functionally cohesive and organisationally responsible. However police forces remain to this day in the orbit of politically motivated partisan interests (Mitra et al., 2006, p. 301).
- 143.
Furthermore, the effectivity of the country’s police forces was severely diminished by numerous factors such as intra- and inter organisational rivalries, difficult working conditions, a lack of forensic services, inadequate training, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere. Grossly insufficient remuneration is also cited as a main cause of poor performance (Mitra et al., 2006, p. 301). Communication and coordination gaps between the multitude of Pakistan’s policing and intelligence organisations are additional challenges making a ‘collective strategizing’ and respective action difficult, even impossible (Abbas, 2011, February, p. 1).
- 144.
For example, the Government of Punjab created on 23 November 2014 the Special Protection Unit (SPU) (GoPu, 2017) responsible for the security of foreigners working on different projects of national importance in the Punjab Province (GoPu, 2017)—especially Chinese workers. According to official statistical data from February 2017, the SPU consists of 3794 personnel. Besides the fact that most policy forces are civil personal (3543), a significant amount of staff (244) are retired army personnel. Furthermore, many among these former soldiers hold leading positions in the SPU—giving the military tremendous leverage within the civil sphere of Pakistan’s security. In order to protect the CPEC, the roughly 3800 forces (officers and rank and files) employed by the government of Punjab are supported by around 2550 security personnel from the districts (GoPu, 2017). This ‘regular’ police force receives further assistance from private security contractors employed by the companies involved in the projects. This means that each of the around 7500 Chinese workers in the Punjab province are protected (‘full-proof security day and night’) by at least one to two security personal on average. Also all other provinces decided (or were ‘persuaded’) to build-up additional security forces for the protection of CPEC-related Chinese workers and companies. The KPK deployed 4200 and Sindh 2000 new additional police forces. Sindh also decided to create a new ‘anti-riot force’ (Usman, 2016, September 3). In the Islamabad Capital Territory, a proposed 1000-strong Rapid Response Force (RRF) will be created (APP, 2017b, October 15; Niaz, 2016, November 26; Usman, 2016, September 3). The RRF focuses exclusively on counter-terrorism and maintenance of law and order in the capital—especially to safeguard public places, important installations, schools, and workplaces (Niaz, 2016, November 26). As such, the RRF aims to support the Islamabad Capital Territory Police (ICT). Furthermore, the main coordinating agencies at both federal and provincial levels were strengthened, especially the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) or the provincial Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) and Counter Terrorism Cells (CTCs).
- 145.
Beijing is reportedly planning to deploy Marines in Gwadar so as to protect its interests and ensure safety for its assets (MAREX, 2017, March 17).
- 146.
For example, the Human Development Organization, a human rights organisation working against custodial abuses and rehabilitation of victims of torture in the KPK province, stated that there were 73 reported cases of police excesses from Hazara—including at least three cases of custodial deaths—in six districts of the Hazara division in 2016 (Sadaqat, 2017b, January 1).
- 147.
- 148.
For more information on the National Action Plan (NAP), see https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/
- 149.
For more details on the legislation transferring special powers towards security forces in Pakistan see Chap. 9.
- 150.
For example, the government of Sindh authorized the Rangers ‘to arrest a suspect and keep him in custody for 90 days investigation purposes’ and ‘shoot criminals on resistance’ (DN, 2013, November 10).
- 151.
Not only the Pakistani military but also paramilitary federal police forces received special powers (at least temporarily) so as to deal with emergency situations, especially after major terrorist attacks (Dawn, 2015c, March 1), or to conduct special operations. An example concerns the special powers conceded to the Sind Rangers in the context of Operation Nisar. Here, the Government of Sind authorised Rangers to arrest a suspect (keeping him in custody for 90 days for investigation) and to shoot criminals on resistance (DN, 2013, November 10).
- 152.
It is reported that the Zarb-e-Azb operation, which has launched in 2014 and included more than 30,000 security personnel, led to the displacement of around one million people belonging to roughly 80,000 families (Express Tribune, 2014, July 14).
- 153.
Especially local human rights organisations from Balochistan and Sindh provinces.
- 154.
According to Baloch human rights activists, more than 2500 families were forcefully displaced so as to make way for CPEC.
- 155.
China pledged USD129 billion so as to ensure a successful repatriation of those displaced back to their homes in FATA and to build up facilities so as to improve social and economic conditions (NAS, 2016, September); however the money was not used efficiently.
- 156.
One of the most noteworthy case was the shut-down of Geo TV (Zahra-Malik, 2018, April 23).
- 157.
For example, Tharparkar is one of the few regions in Pakistan with a Hindu majority. It borders India.
- 158.
For example, these fronts include two newly formed Islamist groups, the Barelvi Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLY or Labaik) and the Milli Muslim League, a political front for the anti-India Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa; both contested 2017 by-elections in Peshawar and Lahore (Hussain, 2017, October 29).
- 159.
For more details, see Sect. 5.2.4.
- 160.
Major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
- 161.
This is important due to increasing numbers of Chinese nationals living and working in Pakistan. There are estimations that around 30,000 Chinese are currently in the country. Of these approximately 10,000 are working in CPEC projects and 9000 are deployed in other projects (Economist, 2017, September 8; Jorgic & Goh; 2017, August 28; ICG, 2018, June 29, p. 7). According to Mushahid Hussain Syed, chairman of Pakistan-China Institute, about 19,581 Chinese experts were working on CPEC projects and 20,000 on non-CPEC projects (Ghori, & Hasan, 2018, April 24); however, concrete and confirmed data on Chinese work force in Pakistan is not publicly available.
- 162.
There are reports about Chinese involved in fighting, fraud, ATM skimming rackets, forgery, falsification of documents, over-drinking and related public misbehaviour (especially towards security forces), among other minor offences (Asghar, 2017, December 12; Yasir, 2018).
- 163.
For instance as regards ‘overtime pay’ the Chinese rate is 150% of the normal wage rate, while in Pakistan it is 200% (Ahmad, 2017, September 18).
- 164.
For more information, see Chap. 3.
- 165.
This nation branding campaign consists of a three-stage communication and image building strategy which will work on branding Pakistan (i.e., image building), ‘Made in Pakistan and Make in Pakistan’ (investment) (APP, 2017, January 21).
- 166.
As earlier indicated, the available information on CPEC arrangements is very rudimentary. However, the official website of the Ministry of Planning Development and Reforms (MoPDR) provides basic deals on the status of various CPEC projects. For more, see: https://www.pc.gov.pk/web/cpec
- 167.
- 168.
Gilgit-Baltistan is not only home to three out of seven of the world’s largest glaciers, but also to approximately 5218 smaller glaciers—spread over an area of about 15,040 km2 and determining an ice reserves of 2738 km3(Gilany & Iqbal, 2016).
- 169.
According to experts, noise seems to be one of the biggest challenges related to road construction (Khwaja, 2018, March 29). As the second phase of the CPEC implementation (focus on industrialization and establishment of SEZs) advances one must expect an additional, exponential deterioration of noise levels since a drastic increase increased industrial activity and vehicular traffic are expected (Sadaqat, 2017a, May 4).
- 170.
There are few examples of clean energy projects within CPEC schemes—for example the Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park in Punjab, which is the world’s largest solar park, or the windmills projects in Sindh (Ebrahim, 2015, September 8; Ramay, 2018, January 15). It is estimated that within the CPEC renewable energy portfolio, 20% will by hydro, 7% solar, and 3% wind (Oh, 2018, June 29).
- 171.
Pakistan has a huge amount of untapped coal reserves. Most remarkable are the lignite deposits in the Thar region of Sindh (Khan, 2018, January 1; Rafiq, 2017, p. 20).
- 172.
Ash handling and disposal problems will also exacerbate negative impacts on the local environment (Ahmed, 2018, February 4).
- 173.
For instance, there is a technology for flue gas cleaning systems that eliminates dangerous pollutants, mechanisms for optimised combustion for safe re-usability of ash, and water treatment systems for zero waste discharge in water (Zaheer, 2017, January 8).
- 174.
For more details, see the debate on subcritical, supercritical, and ultra-supercritical technologies (Myllyvirta, 2017, June 28).
- 175.
Kaiser Bengali in an interview with Shahzada Irfan Ahmed (2017c, September 3).
- 176.
Another problem is that energy firms in Pakistan are importing crushed coal instead of broken coal, especially from Indonesia and Australia. This creates specific problems regarding the transportation to their final destinations. Crushed coal produces more coal ashes (than broken coal) during its transport, which can be a source for several diseases after mixing with the air, affecting the health of the population living on the transit routes to the power plants, particularly during the monsoon seasons (Siddiqui, 2017, July 5) in form of acid rain. Due to the issue that Pakistan does not possess an effective railway system, much of the coal will be transferred via environmental harmful road haulage through technically outmoded trucks (Baloch, 2018b, April 18). However, both, cargo trains and trucks, transporting the coal (including processes of loading and unloading) via open wagons leading to dust emission—especially at sunny dry and windy conditions—and deterioration of coal through combustion causing even more health risks (Baruya, 2012, pp. 43–44). Here, the experts are also stressing that due to the outdated transport capacities and the weather conditions in Pakistan leading to a remarkable loss of coal (imported and own coal) during its domestic transit (Baruya, 2012, pp. 43–44). Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s own coal deposits might have the potential to satisfy the country’s coal consumption, but adequate information are not publicly available.
- 177.
In order to execute the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, to implement the notion of an ecological civilisation in the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, promote green development, strengthen environmental protection, and jointly build a green silk road, four Chinese ministries (including the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) jointly formulated guidelines for the ‘Green Belt and Road’. For more information, see https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201705/201705161104041.pdf
- 178.
- 179.
For example, one of China’s international developmental financing institutions, the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM), formulated the ‘2016 White Paper on Green Finance’ and issued ‘green bonds’ to push the notion for balanced and sustainable development through the mechanism of ‘finance’—which links the provision of finances with environmental standards in projects and the improvement of environmental risk management (Carrai, 2017, pp. 7–8). For more details on the ‘2016 White Paper on Green Finance’, see: http://cms.eximbank.gov.cn/upload/accessory/20172/20172201624516937087.pdf
- 180.
Michael Kugelman said in an interview that people in Pakistan usually don’t have to pay for water. Furthermore, water is underpriced and untaxed, especially in the agricultural sector. In consequence, there are no incentives and little awareness for the need for water conservation (Domínguez, 2015a, July 2).
- 181.
The surface-water and groundwater interact with each other in numerous ways: the former gains water and solutes from the latter and vice versa (Winter et al., 1998, p. iii). Pakistan is facing a threat of surface-water scarcity, but is also confronted with the groundwater depletion (Domínguez, 2015a, July 2).
- 182.
For example, there are reports by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) alerting that Pakistan will reach absolute water scarcity by 2025 (Baloch, 2018a, June 7).
- 183.
For more information on mining in Pakistan, see Geological Survey of Pakistan.
- 184.
A ‘Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation Project’ was launched in 2014 by the KPK government as a response to global warming (Hutt, 2018, July 2). The programme can help mitigate negative impacts of deforestation. Similar measures include the ‘Pakistan Navy Mangroves Plantation Campaign 2018’ aiming at the afforestation of two million mangroves, raising environmental awareness and supporting ‘Green Pakistan’ (APP, 2018, May 4).
- 185.
Kaiser Bengali in an interview with Shahzada Irfan Ahmed (2017c, September 3) even states that no EIA was done so as to assess the environmental costs of CPEC projects.
- 186.
The Section 12 of the Environmental Protection Act 1997 demands an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Khalid, 2017, December 26). In 2005, the National Environmental Policy (NEP) was finalised as a kind of overarching strategy to achieve the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). In order to support the NEP, the Pakistani government also formulated a Natural Disaster Management Ordinance (2006) supposed to provide the necessary structures for the country’s administration to implement policies formulated under the National Disaster Management Framework (EEAS, 2007, p. 13). Additional environment-related policy measures include the Drinking Water Policy (2009), National Climate Change Policy (2012), Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014), National Forest Policy (2016). For more information, see the Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan: http://www.mocc.gov.pk/policiesDetails.aspx
- 187.
For more details on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Act, see Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Act No. XXXVIII of 2014: http://www.pakp.gov.pk/2013/acts/the-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-environmental-protection-act-2014/
- 188.
The ‘public trust doctrine’ refers to the ‘principle that certain natural and cultural resources are preserved for public use, and that the government owns and must protect and maintain these resources for the public use’ (Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute). For more information, see LII: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/public_trust_doctrine
- 189.
For example, the construction of Hazara Expressway was temporally stopped due to local protest linking several cities from Punjab province with cities in KPK (Khan, 2017d, June 27).
- 190.
For more details on the status of the civil-military relations in Pakistan, see Chap. 9.
- 191.
For more information, see Frontier Works Organization: https://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/overview
- 192.
For more information, see Special Communications Organization: https://www.sco.gov.pk/aboutus
- 193.
For more information, see National Logistic Cell: http://www.nlc.com.pk/
- 194.
For example, it is reported that cargo business from the Sost dry port in G-B will be shifted to Haveli in the Hazara district of KPK (Khan, 2017e, December 12) due to partisan interests by national elites. Sost has been a historical hub of trade and transit activities because of its close proximity to Kilik Mintaka Pass, Misgar and Chuparsan valley, serving as a gateway to China. This move will adversely affect established local businesses since economic interaction is moved out of the area—leading to the (Khan, 2017e, December 12) loss of at least 10,000 jobs in underdeveloped G.B (Muhammad, 2015a, November 16).
- 195.
See also Competition Commission of Pakistan (2011, May 12). Enquiry Report. In the matter of Cartelization between Electric Power Equipment Manufacturers. Pakistan Government of Pakistan. http://www.cc.gov.pk/images/Downloads/pel_et_al_enquiry_report_20_sept_2011.pdf
- 196.
The power generating companies were able to force the NEPRA to enact a clause which allows to pass certain costs of the CPEC energy projects on the electricity price. Latter is contradicting the mission of NEPRA to protect the interests of the consumers. See for more information, Sect. 6.13.
Bibliography
Aamir, A. (2017, December 31). The Baloch’s concerns. The News International.
Aamir, A. (2018a, August 17). ISIS threatens China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China-US Focus. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/isis-threatens-china-pakistan-economic-corridor
Aamir, A. (2018b, July 25). Religious violence jeopardises China’s investment in Pakistan. Financial Times.
Abbas, H. (2007, March 29). Transforming Pakistan’s frontier corps. Terrorism Monitor, 5(6).
Abbas, H. (2011, February). Reforming Pakistan’s police and law enforcement infrastructure is it too flawed to fix? (USIP Special Report, No. 266). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
Abbasi, A. (2017, April 13). CPEC sect without project director, key specialists. The News International.
Abbasi, S. K. (2018, May 24). A prototype for prosperity. Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
Abrar, M. (2012, December 6). China–Pakistan Economic Corridor – A new vista of development in South Asia. Pakistan Today.
Abrar, M. (2017, November 20). CPEC long term plan to get a nod as JCC meets today. Pakistan Today.
Abrar, M. (2018, August 7). CPEC projects financed through composite financing package: Official. Pakistan Today.
ADB. (2017b). Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. Special report. Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Adeney, K. (2007). Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in Pakistan and India. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
AFP. (2015, December 22). Zimbabwe to make Chinese Yuan legal currency after Beijing cancels debts. The Guardian.
Aftab, M. (2014, August 18). Economy in jeopardy. Khaleej Times. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20140818/ARTICLE/308189981/1036
Ahmad, I. (2017a, September 18). Questions to ask about workers’ rights under CPEC. Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1358444
Ahmad, D. (2018a). The China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Review and analysis. In BIPP (Ed.), The state of the economy. China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Review and analysis (pp. 50–63). Lahore: Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy (BIPP).
Ahmad, D. (2018b). Belt Road initiative—China’s new global undertaking—Review and analysis. In BIPP (Ed.), The state of the economy. China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Review and analysis (pp. 38–46). Lahore: Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy (BIPP).
Ahmad, M. (2018c). China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Trade and agriculture. In BIPP (Ed.), The state of the economy. China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Review and analysis (pp. 86–101). Lahore: Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy (BIPP).
Ahmed, M. (1980, Spring–Summer). Import substitution as a strategy of industrialization in Pakistan – A review. Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 18(1/2), 56–64.
Ahmed, A. (2013, July 21). Xinjiang-Gwadar: Economic Corridor task force formed. Dawn.
Ahmed, S. I. (2017c, September 3). CPEC is not a game-changer, it’s game over. The News.
Ahmed, A. (2018, February 4). CPEC coal-based power plants to damage environment: ADB. Dawn.
Ahmed, S. I., & Gillani, W. (2018, October 28). National finance omissions. The News International.
Aleem, Z. (2017, February 6). Trump’s new sanctions targeted Iran. So why is China angry about them. Vox News.
Ali, K. (2017a, September 20). Senators suspicious of military role in Fata’s future. Dawn.
Ali, F. (2018a, April 26). Army’s telecom wing allowed 3G, 4G services trial run in GB. Dawn.
Ali, G. (2018b, August 15). What next for China–Pakistan relations? The Interpreter. Sydney: Lowy Institute. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-next-for-china%E2%80%93pakistan-relations
Ali, K. (2018c, September 8). Drought alert issued for Sindh and Balochistan. Dawn.
Ali, I., & Stewart, P. (2018, August 10). Exclusive: As Trump cracks down on Pakistan, U.S. cuts military training programs. Reuters.
Allen-Ebrahimian, B. (2015, April 22). China loves Pakistan … but most Chinese don’t. Foreign Policy (FP).
Amin, T. (2018, August 8). Pak-China FTA: Incoming government to give mandate for next round of Phase-II. Business Recorder. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://fp.brecorder.com/2018/08/20180808397669/
Andy, R. (2018, February 9). China agrees to accommodate Pakistan’s concerns on trade agreement. Geo News.
ANI. (2017, December 17). CPEC resulting in vulnerable ecological consequences, warns environmentalist. Business Standard. Asian News International (ANI).
APP. (2015, December 28). Bin Qasim power plant: PM orders completion of project by Dec 2017. The Express Tribune. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP).
APP. (2017a, November 3). Eco-friendly technology used in coal power plants: Chinese envoy. Pakistan Today. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP).
APP. (2017b, October 15). 370 personnel of rapid response force in final stage of training. The Express Tribune. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP).
APP. (2017c, January 21). Branding Pakistan internationally campaign being designed to promote exports. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP).
APP. (2018, May 4). Pakistan Navy launches mangroves plantation campaign. Dawn. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP).
Arshad, U. (2018, April 21). FATA traders seek compensation for Operation Zarb-e-Azb-affected properties. Daily Pakistan.
Ary News. (2018, August 11). Three special economic zones become operational. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://arynews.tv/en/three-special-economic-zones-operational/
Ashraf, S. (2015a, June 25). The China – Pakistan Economic Corridor: India’s dual dilemma. China US Focus. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-indias-dual-dilemma/
Ashraf, S. (2015b, April 9). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (ISAS Brief, No. 364). Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore.
Awan, Z. A. (2018, July 10). CPEC: Opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs in mining industry of Pakistan. China Daily.
Azhar, A. S. (2015, July 21). Punjab’s regressive tax policy. Dawn.
Baijie, A. (2018, June 13). Overseas Chinese can help build Belt, Road. China Daily.
Baloch, K. (2015, September 28). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor challenges. The Diplomat.
Baloch, S. (2016, February 13). China-Pakistan corridor: Tightening noose around Baloch aspirations. South Asia Monitor. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sl&nid=15628
Baloch, S. M. (2018a, June 7). Water crisis: Why is Pakistan running dry? Deutsche Welle.
Baloch, S. M. (2018b, April 18). CPEC’s environmental toll. The Diplomat.
Barber, C. E. (2014, February 27). The Pakistan-China Corridor: A new project will give Pakistan the tools of globalization. Will it use them? The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-pakistan-china-corridor/
Barbosa, R. C. (2018, July 9). Long March 2C launches two satellites for Pakistan. NASA Spaceflight. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2018/07/long-march-2c-satellites-pakistan/
Baruya, P. (2012). Losses in the coal supply chain. London: IEA Clean Coal Centre.
BBC. (2015a, December 28). China passes controversial new anti-terror laws.
BBC. (2015b, April 22). Is China-Pakistan ‘Silk Road’ a game-changer?
BBC. (2015c, April 10). BBC, Yemen conflict: Pakistan rebuffs Saudi coalition call.
Bengali, K. (2015, May). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The route controversy. Chief Minister’s Policy Reform Unit Government of Balochistan. Karachi: The Times Press.
Bengali, K. (2018). A cry for justice. Empirical insights from Balochistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Bhattacharjee, D. (2015). China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Indian Council of World Affairs, Issue Brief. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/CPECIB12052015.pdf
Bhatti, H. (2018, January 9). SC warns missing persons commission over slow progress on pending cases. Dawn.
Bhutta, Z. (2017, February 24). Tajikistan to join Pakistan Road link bypassing Afghanistan. The Express Tribune.
Bhutta, Z. (2018, July 13). Optic fibre cable connecting Pakistan, China to be inaugurated today. The Express Tribune.
Bloomberg. (2018, August 31). Pak, Saudi Arabia silent as China cracks down on Uighur Muslims. Times of India.
BOI. (2012a). Foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy, 2013-17. Islamabad: Pakistan Board of Investment (BOI), Office of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://boi.gov.pk/UploadedDocs/Downloads/InvestmentStrategy.pdf
BOI. (2012b). Special economic zones rules 2013. Islamabad: Pakistan Board of Investment (BOI), Office of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://boi.gov.pk/UploadedDocs/Downloads/SEZ_RULES.pdf
Bokhari, J. (2018, September 17). A ray of hope for new NFC award. Dawn.
Bolch, T., Kulkarni, A., Kääb, A., Huggel, C., Paul, F., Cogley, J. G., et al. (2012). The state and fate of Himalayan glaciers. Science, 336(6079), 310–314.
Borger, J., & Smith, D. (2017, February 3). Trump administration imposes new sanctions on Iran. The Guardian.
Bovingdon, G. (2010). The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bräutigam, D., & Xiaoyang, T. (2011). China’s investment in special economic zones in Africa. In T. Farole & G. Akinci (Eds.), Special economic zones: Progress, emerging challenges, and future directions (pp. 69–100). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Brewster, D. (2018, January 30). China’s new network of Indian Ocean bases. The Interpreter. Sydney: Lowy Institute. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases
Brown, M. E. (Ed.). (1996). The international dimensions of internal conflict. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
BTI China. (2016). BTI 2016 | China Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
BTI China. (2018). BTI 2018 | China Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
BTI Pakistan. (2016). BTI 2016 | Pakistan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
BTI Pakistan. (2018). BTI 2018 | Pakistan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
Buckley, P. J., Cross, A. R., Tan, H., Xin, L., & Voss, H. (2008). Historic and emergent trends in Chinese outward direct investment. Management International Review, 48(6), 715–748.
Business Recorder. (2017a, December 18). CPEC-related projects: China explains concessional loans. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://fp.brecorder.com/2017/12/20171218328158/
Business Recorder. (2017b, May 21). UBL signs MoU with Sinosure in Beijing. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://fp.brecorder.com/2017/05/20170519180193/
Cai, P. (2017). Understanding China’s Belt and Road initiative. Analysis. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative
Carrai, M. A. (2017). It is not the end of history: The financing institutions of the Belt and Road initiative and the Bretton Woods System. Transnational Dispute Management. TDM 3. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-advance-publication-article.asp?key=1674
CDB. (2015). Annual report 2015. Beijing: China Development Bank (CDB). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/gykh_512/ndbg_jx/ndbg2015/
CDB. (2016). Annual report 2016. Beijing: China Development Bank (CDB). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/gykh_512/ndbg_jx/2016_jx/
CFI. (2015, April 21). Proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor: With a price tag of $46 billion. Capital Finance International (CFI). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://cfi.co/asia-pacific/2015/04/proposed-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-with-a-price-tag-of-46-billion/
Chan, M. (2018, August 28). China is helping Afghanistan set up mountain brigade to fight terrorism. South China Morning Post.
Chang, A. (2013, June). Beijing and the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia. To serve the people (NBR Special Report, No. 43). Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR).
Chang, G. G. (2014, December 10). China’s big plans for Pakistan. The National Interest.
Chansoria, M. (2015, April 27). China makes its presence felt in Pak occupied Kashmir. The Sunday Guardian.
Chaudhry, I. S., & Munir, F. (2010). Determinants of low tax revenue in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS), 30(2), 439–452.
Chaudhury, D. R. (2018, August 21). As part of CPEC, ‘Chinese only’ colony coming up in Pakistan. Economic Times.
Clover, C. (2018, April 12). IMF’s Lagarde warns China on Belt and Road debt. Financial Times.
Competition Commission of Pakistan. (2011, May 12). Enquiry Report. In the matter of Cartelization between Electric Power Equipment Manufacturers. Pakistan Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.cc.gov.pk/images/Downloads/pel_et_al_enquiry_report_20_sept_2011.pdf
Dada, S. (2018, June 13). Cashing in on the Renminbi. Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit. 23 & 24 April 2018. CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
Daily Messenger. (2018, September 7). NHA awards toll collection contract on three motorways to FWO against small amounts. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.pressreader.com/pakistan/daily-messenger/20180907/281724090437899
Daily Times. (2015a, April 21). Pakistan, China launch Economic Corridor.
Daily Times. (2016, September 4). CPEC and unequal distribution of projects.
Daily Times. (2017, November 9). CPEC and the environment.
Darby, M. (2017, May 15). China’s Xi promises green ‘Belt and Road’ investment strategy. Climate Change News. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/05/15/chinas-xi-promises-green-belt-road-investment-strategy/
Dasgupta, S., & Pasricha, A. (2017, December 4). Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar Back away from Chinese projects. Voice of America.
Dawn. (2012, November 4). Does feudalism exist in Sindh?
Dawn. (2015a, October 16). Jamaat declares Kalabagh dam ‘very dangerous’.
Dawn. (2015b, May 16). CPEC: more transparency needed.
Dawn. (2015c, March 1). Police powers for FC extended.
Dawn. (2015f, July 26). Raheel vows to complete CPEC at all costs.
Dawn. (2016a, December 12). Special force set up to guard Gwadar port’s sea lanes. Dawn.
Dawn. (2016b, November 13). ‘Today marks dawn of new era’: CPEC dreams come true as Gwadar port goes operational.
Dawn. (2016f, June 16). Orange Line to gobble up Punjab’s budget, says Pervaiz.
Dawn. (2017a, November 30). Make job creation a cornerstone of CPEC. Pakistan Business Council.
Dawn. (2017b, August 8). Missing in Sindh.
Dawn. (2017c, July 21). CPEC should be ‘smuggling-free corridor’.
Dawn. (2017e, March 27). Almond export can yield billions of rupees for Gilgit-Baltistan.
Dawn. (2017f, February 7). China blocks US move to designate Jaish chief Masood Azhar a terrorist at UN.
Dawn. (2018a, June 28). Pakistan placed on FATF ‘grey list’ despite diplomatic efforts to avert decision.
Dawn. (2018b, May 1). Ministry justifies defence budget hike.
Dawn. (2018c, April 28). Budget 2018-19: Standout features and key talking points.
De Haan, A. (2010). Will China change international development as we know it? Journal of International Development, 23(7), 881–908.
Deloitte. (2018). Embracing the BRI ecosystem in 2018. Navigating pitfalls and seizing opportunities. Deloitte Insights. Zaventem: Deloitte. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4406_Belt-and-road-initiative/4406_Embracing-the-BRI-ecosystem.pdf
Denyer, S. (2018, August 5). Congressional leaders urge U.S. to press China over reports of mass Uighur detentions. The Washington Post.
Detsch, J. (2015, April 21). China’s grand plan for Pakistan’s infrastructure. President Xi Jinping has inked a deal with Islamabad that could provide Beijing with direct access to the Indian Ocean. The Diplomat.
Devasher, T. (2017, February 5). CPEC: A game changer or debt enhancer for Pakistan? Analysis. South Asia Monitor. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.eurasiareview.com/05022017-cpec-a-game-changer-or-debt-enhancer-for-pakistan-analysis/
DN. (2013, November 10). Rangers get special powers in Karachi. Dunya News (DN). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/200219%2D%2DRangers-get-special-powers-in-Karachi
Doan, X. L. (2018, August 1). US’s Indo-Pacific plan unveiled with China as key target. Asia Times.
Domínguez, G. (2015a, July 2). Water scarcity ‘is Pakistan’s worst nightmare’. Interview with Michael Kugelman. Deutsche Welle.
Domínguez, G. (2015b, January 15). Author Interview with Andrew Small: “Bilateral relations: The Sino-Pakistani axis: Asia’s ‘little understood’ relationship”. Deutsche Welle.
Dorsey, J. M. (2018, July 19). Double-edged sword: China and Pakistan link up with fiber-optic cable – Analysis. Eurasia Review. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.eurasiareview.com/19072018-double-edged-sword-china-and-pakistan-link-up-with-fiber-optic-cable-analysis/
DRF. (2018). The right to privacy in Pakistan’s digital spaces. Report for the Human Rights Council – Civil Society Submission by the Digital Rights Foundations (DRF).
Ebrahim, Z. T. (2015, September 8). World’s largest solar park to light up Pakistan’s future. Dawn.
Ebrahim, Z. T. (2016a, July 5). Seven year old sues Pakistan government over climate change. The Third Pole. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2016/07/05/seven-year-old-sues-pakistan-government-over-climate-change/
Ebrahim, Z. T. (2016b, May 12). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A boon for the economy, a bane for locals. Dawn.
Ebrahim, Z. T. (2017, June 23). CPEC and the environment: good, bad or ugly? The Third Pole Net. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/06/23/cpec-and-the-environment-good-bad-or-ugly/
Economic Times. (2017, May 29). 40 per cent decline in US visas for Pakistan; 28 per cent increase for India.
Economist. (2015b, April 20). China and Pakistan. Corridor of power.
Economist. (2017, September 9). Massive Chinese investment is a boon for Pakistan.
EEAS. (2007). Country strategy paper for 2007–2013. Pakistan-European Community (PEC).
Eisenstadt, N. S. (1998). The construction of collective identities: Some analytical and comparative indications. European Journal of Social Theory, 1(2), 229–254.
Embassy of PR China, Pakistan. (2017, May 12). Remarks by Chinese Charge D’affaires Zhao Lijian at the Opening Session of the International Conference on “CPEC: Corridor of Prosperity through Education and Business”. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t1460950.htm
Express Tribune. (2014, July 14). Air raids flatten 5 militant hideouts. https://tribune.com.pk/story/735366/air-raids-flatten-5-militant-hideouts/
Express Tribune. (2015b, May 28). All parties have assured their support for Economic Corridor: PM Nawaz. The Express Tribune.
Express Tribune. (2017a, May 2). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: ‘Long-term plan’ to be inked soon.https://tribune.com.pk/story/1398662/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-long-term-plan-inked-soon/
Express Tribune. (2017b, March 12). Pakistan will be paying China $90b against CPEC-related projects. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1352995/pakistan-will-paying-china-90b-cpec-related-projects/
FAFEN. (2018, June). A report on 14th National Assembly’s Contributions to Foreign Affairs, Anti-Terrorism and CPEC. Islamabad: Free & Fair Election Network (FAFEN). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://fafen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FAFEN-Report-on-Foreign-Affairs-CPEC-Issues-14th-National-Assembly.pdf
Fazil, M. D. (2016, February 15). Pakistan: What stands in CPEC’s Way? The Diplomat.
Fazl-e-Haider, S. (2014, May 9). Insurgency stunts Gwadar progress. Asia Times.
Fei, J. (2017, December 22). China’s overseas military base in Djibouti: Features, motivations, and policy implications. China Brief, 17(17).
Feldmann, H. (1972). From crisis to crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
FH. (2017c). Freedom on the net. Pakistan report. New York: Freedom House (FH).
FH. (2018). Freedom on the Net 2018 – Pakistan. New York: Freedom House (FH).
Firstpost. (2018, January 2). Day after Donald Trump tirade, Pakistan cozies up to Beijing and allows use of Chinese Yuan for foreign currency transactions.
GAoP. (2012, September 12). Act No XX of 2012. An Act to provide for setting up and operating of special economic zones in Pakistan, [SEZ Act 2012]. The Gazette of Pakistan (GAoP). Islamabad: Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://boi.gov.pk/UploadedDocs/Downloads/GazetteNotificationSEZAct.pdf
GAoP. (2015, December 7). Ordinance No. XVIII of 2015. An Ordinance further to amend the Special Economic Zones Act, 2012 (XX of 2012) [Special Economic Zones (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015]. The Gazette of Pakistan (GAoP). Islamabad: Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1450432085_611.pdf
GAoP. (2016, October 26). Act No XLV of 2016. An Act further to Amend Act No XX of 2012. The Gazette of Pakistan (GAoP). Islamabad: Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1478675180_870.pdf
GCR. (2018, July 25). Pakistan’s Chinese ‘corridor’ stalls amid payment problems. Global Construction Review (GCR). Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/pakistans-chinese-corridor-stalls-amid-payment-pro/
Ghori, H. K., & Hasan, S. (2018, April 24). PM hails CPEC as springboard for development. Dawn.
Ghumman, K. (2009, July 6). Govt offers special incentives for Balochistan postings. Dawn.
Ghumman, K. (2014, January 12). Corruption cases in BISP to be probed. Dawn.
Ghumman, M. (2018, July 14). CPEC projects: China adopts ‘go slow’ policy. Business Recorder.
Gopalan, N., & Ren, S. (2017, November 27). China needs to make sure Pakistan isn’t Venezuela. Livemint. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/SAgteVOXEmoLhai6ROZYXN/China-needs-to-make-sure-Pakistan-isnt-Venezuela.html
Goh, B., & Ruwitch, J. (2017, October 24). Pressure on as Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ enshrined in Chinese party charter. Reuters.
GoPu. (2017, February 3). Special Protection Unit (SPU), Police Formations. Government of Punjab (GoPu). Accessed August 10, 2018, from https://www.punjabpolice.gov.pk/spu
Grace, A. (2018, October 4). China’s influence operations are pinpointing America’s weaknesses. Foreign Policy (FP).
Grenda, B., Ślachcińska, E., & Majdan, P. (2017). Terrorist threats for the critical infrastructure of the state. Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, 31. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/15140/Terrorist_Threats_for_the_Critical_Infrastructure_of_the_State.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Guidetti, A. (2017, January 19). The end of the liberal world order? Global insight. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Global-insight/2017-The-end-of-the-liberal-world-order
Gupta, J., Hilton, I., Bhushal, R., & Chaudhary, J. (2015, December 12). Paris Agreement gives hope in fight against climate change. China Dialogue. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8459-Paris-Agreement-gives-hope-in-fight-against-climate-change
Guramani, N. (2017, November 24). Reservations regarding CPEC echo in Senate. Dawn.
Haider, I. (2015a, May 28). Parties pledge to take full political ownership of CPEC. Dawn.
Haider, M. (2018a, May 22). China to continue concessional financing under CPEC. The News International.
Haider, M. (2018b, March 7). IMF’s Mirzoev stresses homemade policy to build political consensus on reforms. The News International.
Haider, K., & Dilawar, I. (2017, June 28). Growing trade imbalance leads Pakistan to seek China concessions. Bloomberg Politics.
Hanif, S. (2014). Estimation of pavement damage cost for establishing equitable Road use fee for commercial vehicles an exploratory empirical analysis. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Transportation Engineering. Islamabad: National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST).
Haq, S. (2014, August 15). Political crisis shackles trade and business in Punjab. The Express Tribune.
Haq, R. (2015, April 12). Growth of Pak-China special economic zones. Blog. South Asian Investor. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.southasiainvestor.com/2015/04/growth-of-pak-china-special-economic.html
Haq, S. (2017, August 26). FTA with China: A loss-making deal for Pakistan. The Express Tribune.
Hashim, A. (2017a, February 28). NA panel concerned over the use of Chinese trucks on CPEC routes. Blog. Propakistani. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://propakistani.pk/2017/02/28/na-panel-concerned-use-chinese-trucks-cpec-routes/
Heath, T. (2018, March 1). Beijing’s influence operations target Chinese diaspora. Blog. Texas National Security Network. Austin: University of Texas. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/
Henrikson, A. K. (2006). What can public diplomacy achieve? (Discussion Papers in Diplomacy). The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/publicdiplo.pdf
HF. (2018). 2018 Index of economic freedom. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation (HT).
HIIK. (2018). Conflict Barometer 2017, No. 26. Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en
Hodge, A. (2013, July 30). Karakoram highway: China’s Treacherous Pakistan corridor. The Diplomat.
HRCP. (2016, April 3). Pervasive militarisation undermining democratic system, rights. Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP). Accessed February 12, 2019, from http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/pervasive-militarisation-undermining-democratic-system-rights/
Huang, C. (2017, June 30). Who picks up the trillion-dollar tab for China’s Belt and Road. South China Morning Post.
Huifeng, H. (2018, September 21). Chinese firms start to cut jobs and move overseas as US trade war and rising costs start to bite. South China Morning Post.
Hurley, J., Morris, S., & Portelance, G. (2018). Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road initiative from a policy perspective. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf
Husain, K. (2016, September 29). Hidden costs of CPEC. Dawn.
Husain, I. (2017a, February 11). Financing burden of CPEC. Dawn.
Husain, K. (2017b, June 21). Exclusive: CPEC master plan revealed. Details from original documents laying out the CPEC long term plan are publicly disclosed for the first time. Dawn.
Husain, I. (2018, June 6). Business? Yes. As usual? No! Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
Hussain, M. (2017a, June). China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Challenges and the way forward. Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
Hussain, E. (2018, April 8). Pakistan: A Chinese colony? Daily Times.
Hutt, R. (2018, July 2). Pakistan has planted over a billion trees. World Economic Forum (WEF).
IANS. (2015a, October 10). India needs to be part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Economic Times.
IANS. (2015b, April 21). India should be upfront in voicing opposition to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Business Standard.
ICG. (2018, June 29). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and risks. Asia Report N°297. Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG).
Idress, R. Q., Shapiee, R., & Ahamat, H. (2018). Energy cost saving and economic prospective of China Pakistan Economic Corridor. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 8(6), 217–226.
Ijiaz, M. (2018, June 13). Growth, not development: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Daily Times.
IMF. (2002). Evaluation of prolonged use of IMF resources. Evaluation report 2002. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Imran, M. (2017, November 16). Religious parties protesting in Islamabad advised to end sit-in by court. Dawn.
Imran, M. (2018, September 24). More than 60 per cent of irrigation water is wasted. The News International.
Iqbal, K. (2015a, May 25). CPEC and the Baluchistan factor. The Nation.
Iqbal, A. (2018a, May 30). Pakistan’s third chance. Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
IUCN. (2016, December 14). Mainstreaming environment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is must to protect fragile environment of Pakistan. Gland: The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.iucn.org/news/pakistan/201612/mainstreaming-environment-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-must-protect-fragile-environment-pakistan
Jacob, J. T. (2017, August 22). Deciphering the numbers: Employment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. E-International Relations. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.e-ir.info/2017/08/22/deciphering-the-numbers-employment-in-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/
Jacobs, A., & Perlez, J. (2017, February 25). U.S. wary of its new neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese naval base. The New York Times.
Jamal, N. (2017a, October 30). Local businesses lose big under CPEC. Dawn.
Jamal, N. (2017b, May 22). What is the future of manufacturing? Dawn.
Jamal, U. (2018, January 11). What Pakistan’s decision to pull out of a Mega Dam project tells us about the future of CPEC. The Diplomat.
Janjua, S., Khan, A., & Asif, N. (2017). Sustainable urban development and SEZs considerations for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (Working Paper, No. 014/2017). Islamabad: Centre of Excellence for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Jianxun, S. (2017). Financing China’s “Belt and Road” initiative. In J.-P. Larcon (Ed.), The new Silk Road. China meets Europe in the Baltic Sea region. A business perspective (pp. 157–170). Singapore: World Scientific.
Jin, W. (2017, February 7). US sanctions on Iran: Good or bad news for China? The Diplomat.
Jize, Q. (2006, February 22). Pakistan mulls building trade, energy corridor for China. China Daily.
Jorgic, D., & Goh, B. (2017, August 28). Braving security fears, Chinese seek ‘Silk Road’ riches in Pakistan. Reuters.
Junaidi, I. (2016, July 30). Economic inequality rising in Pakistan. Dawn.
Kaleem, M. (2017, November 13). Reasons behind the increase in missing persons in Sindh. Herald.
Kartha, T. (2018, January 6). Pakistan nearly trades its economic sovereignty in currency swap arrangement with China. Firstpost.
Katada, S. N. (2018, January 1). Can China internationalize the RMB? Lessons from Japan. Foreign Affairs.
Kayani, U. J., & Shah, A. S. (2014). Non tariff barriers and Pakistan regional trade. A legal and economic analysis of non-tariff barriers in Pakistan, India, China and Sri Lanka (ICG Working Paper). Pakistan: Lahore University of Management Sciences, International Growth Centre (ICG). Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Kayani-Shah-2014-Working-Paper.pdf
Kazmi, Z. (2015, April 22). PTI raises transparency concerns in Pak-China projects. ARY News.
Kelkar, K. (2018, August 8). From Silk threads to fiber optics: The rise of China’s digital silk road. Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
Khalid, I. (2017, December 26). The current state of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in Pakistan and the way forward. Islamabad: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://pk.boell.org/2017/12/26/current-state-environmental-impact-assessments-eias-pakistan-and-way-forward
Khaliq, A. (2018, April 16). Is Pakistan falling into China’s debt trap? Liège: Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt. Accessed February 12, 2019, from http://www.cadtm.org/Is-Pakistan-falling-into-China-s
Khan, T. (2014, July 26). China’s interest in Afghanistan could bode well for both countries. The Express Tribune.
Khan, A. U. (2015a, January). Pak-China Economic Corridor: The hopes and reality. IRS Spotlight. Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies (IRS). Accessed February 12, 2019, from http://irs.org.pk/spotlight/spjan15.pdf
Khan, M. (2015b, May 28). CPEC: We will succeed. Pakistan Observer.
Khan, H. Q. (2016c, December 24). CPEC: Challenge to Pak domestic industry. Pakistan Observer.
Khan, M. Z. (2016d, April 18). Northern Pakistan faces worst landslides in history. The Third Pole. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2016/04/08/northern-pakistan-faces-worst-landslides/
Khan, I. A. (2017c, November 25). China to get 91pc Gwadar income, minister tells Senate. Dawn.
Khan, M. Z. (2017d, June 27). CPEC expressway hits roadblock in Himalayas. Thethirdpole.net. Accessed February 12, 2019, from https://www.thethirdpole.net/2017/06/27/cpec-expressway-hits-roadblock-in-himalayas/
Khan, M. A. (2017e, December 12). Challenges for CPEC in G-B. The Express Tribune.
Khan, M. Z. (2017f, March 13). Import substitution. Dawn.
Khan, S. A. (2017g, October 2). The tax problem of Pakistan. The Nation.
Khan, A. B. (2018a, April 27). Heavy subsidies and ignored social funds: Highlights from the last 10 years of Pakistan’s economy. Dawn.
Khan, S. (2018b, March 12). Arrests of Uighur women married to Pakistani men spark anger in Gilgit-Baltistan. Deutsche Welle.
Khan, W. (2018c, January 1). CPEC: An environmental disaster. Blog. Global Village Space. https://www.globalvillagespace.com/cpec-an-environmental-disaster/
Khan, K., & Anwar, S. (2017). Special economic zones (SEZs) and CPEC: Background, challenges and strategies. Paper presented at the 33rd AGM and conference on redefining prosperity paths in changing global economy: Opportunities and challenge for Pakistan. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Development Economics. Accessed February 12, 2019, from http://www.pide.org.pk/psde/pdf/AGM32/papers/Special%20Economic%20Zones.pdf
Khan, J., Dasti, H. A., & Khan, A. R. (2013). Feudalism is a major obstacle in the way of social mobility in Pakistan. Journal of the Research Society (JRSP), 50(1), 135–148.
Khattak, S. (2017, November 17). No K-P-proposed projects land among CPEC. The Express Tribune.
Khawar, H. (2017, December 5). SEZs and industrial estates in CPEC. The Express Tribune.
Khawar, H. (2018a, March 6). CPEC and railways. The Express Tribune.
Khawar, H. (2018b, January 3). CPEC: How to manage our SEZs? The Express Tribune.
Khunshan, A. (2018, July 3). China to offer technical vocational training to 1000 Pakistani students. Blog. Techjuice. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.techjuice.pk/china-offer-technical-vocational-training-1000-pakistani-students/
Khwaja, M. A. (2018, March 29). CPEC-environmental consideration essential to maximize benefits. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://sdpi.org/media/media_details3265-article-2018.html
Klasra, K. (2018, January 20). Feature: CPEC opens job opportunities for unemployed Pakistanis, bringing long-lasting tangible benefits to locals. Xinhua.
Kreft, S., Eckstein, D., & Melchior, I. (2017). Global climate risk index 2017: Who suffers most from extreme weather events? Weather-related loss events in 2015 and 1996 to 2015. Berlin: Germanwatch.
Kristof, N. (2009, August 1). Feudalism in Pakistan. Blog. The New York Times.
Kugelman, M. (2013, March 13). Pakistan’s energy crisis from conundrum to catastrophe? Commentary. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR).
Kumar, S., & Stanzel, A. (2016, October 5). The Balochistan tinderbox. Blog. ECFR Commentary. European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_balochistan_tinderbox7133
Laghari, J. R. (2013). Climate change: Melting glaciers bring energy uncertainty. Nature, 502(7473), 617–618.
Lam, W. (2018, March 12). Xi Jinping steers China back to the days of Mao Zedong. China Brief, XVIII(4).
Legarda, H., & Nouwens, M. (2018). Guardians of the Belt and Road. The internationalization of China’s private security companies. Berlin: Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies (merics).
Lei, W. (2017a, May 14). China promises RMB100 billion extra for Belt and Road. CGTN.
Lei, Z. (2018). The political economy of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
Leng, S., Liu, C., & Huang, K. (2017, July 23). A peek into China’s top ‘bodyguard factories’. South China Morning Post.
Lewis, D. J. (2016, November 7). China-CEE ties on new economic path. China Daily.
Li, X., Banik, D., Tang, L., & Wu, J. (2014). Difference or indifference: China’s development assistance unpacked. IDS Bulletin, 45(4), 22–35. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://folk.uio.no/danbanik/documents/Li_Banik_IDS_Bulletin.pdf
Lo, K. (2018, March 13). China launches mega aid agency in big shift from recipient to donor. South China Morning Post.
LTP. (2017). Long term plan for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (2017–2030) [LTP]. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Islamabad & People’s Republic of China, National Development & Reform Commission, Beijing. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/cpec/LTP.pdf
Malik, A. R. (2015, February 20). Route alignment controversy. The Nation.
Malik, A. R. (2018a). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): A game changer for Pakistan’s Economy. In B. R. Deepak (Ed.), China’s global rebalancing and the New Silk Road (pp. 69–83). Heidelberg: Springer.
Malik, E. (2018b, May 20). Comment, by invitation: Don’t let Chinese imports kill Pakistan’s local industry. Dawn.
Malik, S., & Naseer, E. (2015a, April 30). CPEC politics – Part 1. Spearhead Analysis. Lahore: Spearhead Research. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://spearheadresearch.org/?p=16467
Malik, S., & Naseer, E. (2015b, April 30). CPEC politics – Part 2. Spearhead Analysis. Lahore: Spearhead Research. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://spearheadresearch.org/?p=16518
Mamir. (2018, August 12). 3G, 4G internet services to start soon: AJK PM. The Express Tribune.
Manan, A. (2015, May 14). All-party conference: Consensus on trade route eludes confab. The Express Tribune.
Mangi, F. (2018, July 16). Pakistan lets rupee devalue as finances wobble before election. Bloomberg.
Mardell, J. (2017, October 25). The ‘community of common destiny’ in Xi Jinping’s New Era. The Diplomat.
MAREX. (2017, March 17). China may deploy marines to Gwadar port. Blog. The Maritime Executive Comment. Fort Lauderdale: The Maritime Executive, LLC. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-may-deploy-marines-to-gwadar-port
Marlow, I. (2018, April 18). China’s White elephant: $ 1-bn Sri Lanka port shows what’s wrong with BTI. Business Standard.
Marrian, B. (2001). Towards a general theory of corridor development in South Africa. Paper presented at the 20th South African Transport Congress. South Africa. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8193/5b6.pdf?sequence=1
Martina, M. (2017, September 4). BRICS name Pakistan-based militant groups as regional concern. Reuters.
McDowell, D. (2018, August 14). How debt traps from China’s belt and road initiative could upend the IMF. World Politics Review. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25522/how-debt-traps-from-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-could-upend-the-imf
Mehmood, S. (2017, September 18). Why don’t we pay taxes? Dawn.
Mengsheng, T. (2015, December 10). How to design the layout of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Proceedings of International Conference on CPEC, held at GC University, Lahore. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://ps.gcu.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/111.pdf
Menon, R. (2005). Pakistan: Internal migration and poverty reduction. In: F. Laczko (Ed.), Migration, development and poverty reduction in Asia (pp. 127–147). Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_dev_pov_asia.pdf
Miglani, S. (2017, May 21). India’s ‘new Silk Road’ snub highlights gulf with China. Reuters.
Miller, D. T. (2017, June 5). The China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Indicator of Chinese strategic energy goals and a challenge to the open procurement status quo. Paper prepared for the ISA Conference 2017 in Hong Kong. Miller Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington, Seattle Washington. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/a30ae7f2-83ba-4b48-b15c-3ebbe670d948.pdf
Mingwen, Z. (2018, August 10). Shanghai cooperation organization: A new stage, new challenges, and a new journey. Foreign Affairs Journal. Beijing: China Institute of International Studies. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2018-08/10/content_40456539.htm
Mir, S. (2016a, December 16). Removing CPEC bottlenecks: Tunnels may smoothen trade in winter. The Express Tribune.
Mitra, S. K., Wolf, S. O., & Schöttli, J. (2006). A political and economic dictionary of South Asia. London: Routledge.
MoPDR. (2014). Pakistan 2025. One Nation – One Vision. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning, Development & Research (MoPDR). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://fics.seecs.edu.pk/Vision/Vision-2025/Pakistan-Vision-2025.pdf
Muhammad, P. (2015a, November 16). CPEC to cause unemployment in Gilgit-Baltistan. The Express Tribune.
Muhammad, P. (2015b, November 10). Pakistan to hand over 2,281 acres of Gwadar’s free trade zone to Chinese. The Express Tribune.
Muhammad, P. (2016, June 26). Pakistan has failed when it comes to trade with China. The Express Tribune.
Murphy, D. (2017, September). China’s approach to international terrorism (USIP Peace Brief, No. 235). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
Mustafa, A. (2014, August 21). Pakistan’s fight against feudalism. Aljazeera.
Mustafa, A., Qayyum, D. A., & Noor-e-Hera. (2017). Impact of technical barriers to trade on trade between China and Pakistan. Paper presented at the 33rd AGM and Conference, Redefining Prosperity Paths in Changing Global Economy; Opportunities and Challenges for Pakistan, Pakistan Society of Development Economists (PDE). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://pide.org.pk/psde/pdf/AGM32/papers/Impact%20of%20Technical%20Barriers%20to%20Trade%20on%20Trade%20between%20China%20and%20Pakistan.pdf
Myllyvirta, L. (2017, June 28). How much do ultra-supercritical coal plants really reduce air pollution? Blog. Energypost.eu. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://energypost.eu/how-much-do-ultra-supercritical-coal-plants-really-reduce-air-pollution/
Nabi, G., Ullah, S., Khan, S., Ahmad, S., & Kumar, S. (2018). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): melting glaciers – a potential threat to ecosystem and biodiversity. Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 25(4), 3209–3210.
Naqvi, F. (2018, April 23). CPEC Summit speakers share experiences, stress mutual benefits of Economic Corridor. Dawn.
NAS. (2016, September). Questions for oral answers and their replies. 35th Session, September 2th, National Assembly. National Assembly Secretariat (NAS). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1472799928_543.pdf
Nation. (2016, November 21). Moscow to host Russia-China-Pakistan strategic talks on Afghanistan in December: Kabulov.
Naureen, M. (2009). Development of environmental institutions and laws in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, 30(1), 93–112.
Nawaz, F., Azam, M. F., & Noor, N. (2015). The dilemma of Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development, 6(9), 313–327. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JEDS/article/view/22642
Nazar, S. (2016, March 4). Pakistan’s big threat isn’t terrorism—It’s climate change. Foreign Policy (FP).
NdoT. (1999). Moving South Africa: The action agenda. Pretoria: National Department of Transport (NdoT).
NDRC. (2015, March 28). Vision and actions on jointly building Silk Road economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce Government of Peoples Republic of China. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html
Nebehay, S. (2018, August 30). U.N. calls on China to free Uighurs from alleged re-education camps. Reuters.
New York Times. (2015, April 23). China’s Big Plunge in Pakistan.
News. (2015a, October 5). LHC issues stay order for establishment of coal power project in Sahiwal.
News. (2015b, July 26). Govt proposes 29 industrial parks, 21 mineral zones under CPEC.
News. (2018b, March 10). Senators in shock: CPEC western route doesn’t even exist in Chinese record.
Niaz, T. (2016, November 26). Rapid Response Force all set for launch. The Nation.
Niazi, Z. (2017, June 12). CPEC: Socio-cultural impact. The Nation.
Nigar, N. (2017, March 16). Towards import substitution: Manufacturing of consumer items in special economic zones under CPEC. Islamabad: China Pakistan Study Centre at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Final_IB_Neelum_16-3-2017.pdf
Oh, E. (2018, June 29). Mapping the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s environmental impacts. Reconnecting Asia. CSIS analysis. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).
Otero-Iglesias, M. (2018, July 4). Renminbi internationalisation: stuck in mid-river – for now. ARI 84/2018 – 4/7/2018. Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute.
Page, J. (2016, November 15). China discovers the price of global power: Soldiers returning in caskets. The Washington Post.
Pakistan Today. (2017a, November 16). PTA blocks ‘Freedom on the Net’ report for breaching Pakistan’s cybercrime law.
Pakistan Today. (2017b, May 28). Pictures of ‘Sahiwal Power Plant’ stir controversy on social media.
Pakistan Today. (2017c, May 17). CPEC most transparent project of Pakistan, says Ahsan Iqbal.
Pakistan Today. (2018a, October 4). Development allocation for CPEC projects revised to Rs193 billion.
Pakistan Today. (2018b, March 26). FBR, Commerce division clash over revised China-Pakistan FTA.
Pantucci, R. (2018, August 26). The lesson of the Pakistan suicide attack: China will have to pay a high price for its infrastructure plan. South China Morning Post.
Paracha, N. F. (2018, April 29). Smoker’s corner: Branding Pakistan. Dawn.
Paris Club. (2018, June 21). The Paris Club Press Releases Comprehensive Data on its Claims as of 31 December 2017. Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/press-release/the-paris-club-releases-comprehensive-data-on-its-claims-as-of-31-1
Peng, R., Chang, L., & Liwen, T. (2017, May). China’s involvement in coal fired power projects along the Belt and Road. Beijing: Global Environment Institute (GEI). Accessed February 13, 2019, from http://www.geichina.org/_upload/file/report/China’s_Involvement_in_Coal-fired_Power_Projects_OBOR_EN.pdf
Pillalamarri, A. (2015a, May 1). Pakistan’s 3 greatest leaders of all time. Let the debate begin. The National Interest.
Pillalamarri, A. (2015b, April 24). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is easier said. The Diplomat.
PSDP. (2018). Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) 2018-19. Islamabad: Planning Commission. Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform. Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/archives/PSDP_2018-19_Final.pdf
PTI. (2017b, May 9). CPEC: China violated Pakistan’s laws, social customs, says report. Business Standard. Press Trust of India (PTI).
PTI. (2018, January 3). Pakistan central bank allows yuan-based trade with China. The Economic Times India.
Qazilbash, Z. (2017, March 30). CPEC — moving from discussion to solutions. The Express Tribune.
Rafiq, A. (2017). The China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Barriers and impacts (USIP Peaceworks No. 135). United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
Rafiq, A. (2018, May 4). CPEC: A paucity of planning by Pakistan. Blog. Global Village Space. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://www.globalvillagespace.com/cpec-a-paucity-of-planning-by-pakistan/
Rahman, M. (2012, March 22). Chinese plans in Seychelles revive Indian fears of encirclement. The Guardian.
Ramay, S. A. (2018, January 15). CPEC and the sustainable development it brings to Pakistan. The Express Tribune.
Rana, S. (2015, May 17). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Lines of development – Not lines of divide. The Express Tribune.
Rana, S. (2017, November 15). Pakistan stops bid to include Diamer-Bhasha Dam in CPEC. The Express Tribune.
Rana, S. (2018b, June 5). Pakistan needs IMF support, Mulk warned. The Express Tribune.
Rana, S. (2018c, February 28). CPEC’s transparency: NHA admits irregularities in award of $2.9b contract to Chinese firm. The Express Tribune.
Rana, S. (2018d, February 3). Govt cuts financing for about 400 development projects. The Express Tribune.
Raza, S. I. (2017, December 5). Three CPEC projects hit snags as China mulls new financing rules. Dawn.
Raza, K. (2018, August 7). CPEC ushers Pakistan into new industrialization phase. China Daily.
Rehman, A. (2017a, June 24). How CPEC security will test the ‘all-weather friendship’ of China and Pakistan. The Diplomat.
Rehman, D. (2018, March 4). Chinese company launches most expensive ever campaign to promote Pakistan’s Gwadar in London. Daily Pakistan. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/headline/chinese-company-launches-most-expensive-ever-campaign-to-promote-pakistans-gwadar-in-london/
Reuters. (2011, December 23). Pakistan and China sign currency swap agreement. Dawn.
Reuters. (2013, October 10). China signs second-biggest swap line with ECB.
Reuters. (2014b, November 8). China to establish $40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund.
Reuters. (2017, December 8). China warns of imminent attacks by “terrorists” in Pakistan.
Reuters. (2018a, July 30). U.S.’ Pompeo warns against IMF bailout for Pakistan that aids China. Reuters.
Reuters. (2018b, February 6). Pakistan – The hottest market for South African coal. Dawn.
Reva, A. (2015). Toward a more business friendly tax regime key challenges in South Asia (Policy Research Working Paper, No. 7513). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Reynolds, C., Stout, T., & Wang, X. (2018, April 23). Environmental and economic impacts of the Belt and Road initiative on Pakistan’s energy sector. Master’s Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Environmental Management degree in the Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University. Accessed February 13, 2019, from https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/16605/MP%20CR%20TS%20XW.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
RFE/RL. (2018, August 31). China denies reports it plans to set up base, troops in Afghanistan. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (RFE/RL).
Rizvi, H. A. (2013, July 9). China and Pakistan’s economic recovery. Pakistan Today.
Rizvi, J. (2017, October 5). CPEC toll income to be thrice the budget of Pakistan: BoI. The News International.
Rogers, J. (2017, February 7). China to build “Silk Road” for project finance. Global Finance.
Rudyak, M. (2018, April 20). Will China’s new aid agency be effective? The Interpreter. Sydney: Lowy Institute. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/will-china-new-aid-agency-be-effective
Rumi, R. (2017, November 5). Don’t turn CPEC into another holy cow. Transparency is a must. Daily Times.
Sadaqat, M. (2017a, May 4). Cutting down trees for CPEC. Herald.
Sadaqat, M. (2017b, January 1). Natural disasters, diseases bedevil Hazara’s residents. The Express Tribune.
SADF. (2018, July 11). Persecution of Christian minorities in Pakistan: Roots, development and present-day realities (SADF Policy Brief, No. 7). South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels, Belgium.
Sadiq, B. J. (2018, March 8). Strange bedfellows. China and Pakistan: Friends or not? The American Interest. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/03/08/china-pakistan-friends-not/
Saif, S. (2017a, September 7). Sindh’s mangroves are in danger. The Express Tribune.
Samoon, H. (2017, August 8). Sindh abductions: Three more activists go missing from Thar. Dawn.
Samuel, S. (2018, August 28). China is treating Islam like a mental illness. The Atlantic. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/china-pathologizing-uighur-muslims-mental-illness/568525/
Sandhu, J. (2017, March 20). China’s response to terrorism: An interview with GGF 2027 fellow Yuan Ma. Blog. Global policy. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/03/2017/china’s-response-terrorism-interview-ggf-2027-fellow-yuan-ma
Sarwar, Z. K. (2016, July 20). Environmental impact of CPEC on Gilgit Baltistan. Pamir Times. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://pamirtimes.net/2016/07/20/environmental-impact-of-cpec-on-gilgit-baltistan/
Sayeed, S., & Jorgic, D. (2018, August 19). Promises, promises, Imran Khan raises Pakistani hopes sky high. Reuters.
SBP. (2013, May 7). DMMD Circular No. 09 of 2013. Competitive auctions of Chinese Yuan loan facility. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.sbp.org.pk/dmmd/2013/C9.htm
SBP. (2017a). State of the economy. Annual Report 2016-2017. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY17/Anul-index-eng-17.htm
SBP. (2017b). Annual Report-Statistical Supplement FY 17. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY17/Stats/Eng/Chapter-4.pdf
SBP. (2018, January 2). Use of Chinese Yuan for denominating foreign currency transactions in Pakistan. Press Release ERD/M&PRD/PR/01/2018-01. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.sbp.org.pk/press/2018/Pr-CYN-02-Jan-18.pdf
Schrader, M. (2018, August 10). Domestic criticism may signal Shrunken Belt and Road ambitions. China Brief, 18(14).
SCMP. (2018, January 10). China funding white elephant infrastructure projects in the Pacific, says Australian Minister. South China Morning Post (SCMP).
Sethna, R (2013, June 13). Transparency in Pakistan. The Guardian.
Shabbir, W. (2018, April 24). Can Pakistan’s policymakers respond to much-hailed CPEC? Blog. Global Village Space. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.globalvillagespace.com/can-pakistans-policymakers-respond-to-much-hailed-cpec/
Shah, S. A. (2017, June 9). Abducted Chinese nationals killed, claims IS. Dawn.
Shah, A. R. (2018a, February 14). How does China–Pakistan Economic Corridor show the limitations of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ model. Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies, 5(2), 378–385. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.224
Shah, S. A. (2018b, April 4). Chinese workers thrash policemen in Khanewal. Dawn.
Shah, S. A. (2018c, September 27). Women, children in Balochistan suffering from malnutrition due to drought-like situation. Dawn.
Shahid, J. (2017a, October 25). NA body approves SCO’s proposal for countrywide operation. Dawn.
Shahid, J. (2017b, August 18). Military-run SCO denied permission to operate across country. Dawn.
Shahzad, I. (2015, February 15). CPEC – Moving beyond the route controversy. The News Tribe. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.thenewstribe.com/2015/02/15/cpec-moving-beyond-the-route-controversy/
Shaikh, A. H. (2018, July 2). Is Pakistan ready to make the right choices? Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
Shaikh, S., & Tunio, S. (2017, May 3). Pakistan ramps up coal power with Chinese-backed plants. Reuters.
Shams, S. (2015b, April 20). China expands influence in ‘economic colony’ Pakistan. Deutsche Welle.
Shams, S. (2016a, November 14). Economic Corridor – CPEC could turn Pakistan into China’s ‘client state’. Interview with Siegfried O. Wolf. Deutsche Welle.
Shams, S. (2016b, March 24). Can Iran’s Rouhani win over Pakistan? Deutsche Welle.
Shehzad, A. (2011). The issue of ethnicity in Pakistan: Historical background. Pakistan Vision, 12(2), 124–164.
Shengxia, S., & Sheng, Y. (2017, May 10). China prioritizes a ‘Green Belt and Road’. Global Times.
Sherdil, K. (2018). CPEC scope, status and potential impact. In BIPP (Ed.), The state of the economy. China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Review and analysis (pp. 66–82). Lahore: Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy (BIPP).
Siddiqa, A. (2009). Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s military economy. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Siddique, A. (2018, June 1). Gov’t report highlights scale of enforced disappearances across Pakistan. Gandhara.
Siddiqui, H. A. (2015, July 13). CPEC projects: Status, cost and benefits. Dawn.
Siddiqui, S. (2017, July 5). Pakistan’s first coal import terminal begins operations. The Express Tribune.
Siddiqui, S. (2018b, May 25). Pakistan, China extend currency swap agreement by another 3 years. The Express Tribune
Sikander, S. (2017, January 4). Pakistan to pursue diplomacy on CPEC. The Express Tribune.
Small, A. (2015). The China-Pakistan axis: Asia’s new geopolitics. New York: Oxford University Press.
SMEDA. (2009). 2009-10 SME investment and business guide Balochistan. Small & Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA), Ministry of Industries & Production, Government of Pakistan. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://smeda.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=189
SP. (2007, August 14). China versus the Taliban. Blog. Strategy Page (SP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20070814.aspx
Srivastava, P. (2011, May). Regional corridors development in regional cooperation (ADB Economic Working Paper Series, 258). Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Staiger, R. W. (2012). Non-tariff measures and the WTO (Staff Working Paper ERSD-201201). Economic Research and Statistics Division. World Trade Organisation.
Sternberg, T. (2017, December 12). Manuscript of a presentation at a conference. Royal Asiatic Society, London, organised by the European Foundation for South Asian Studies. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.efsas.org/events/conferences/speech-of-dr.-troy-sternberg-at-royal-asiatic-society-in-london/
Subramanian, N. (2017, May 23), A short history of the relationship: China-Pakistan, bhai-bhai, The Indian Express.
Sweet, R. (2017, December 6). Pakistan “stunned” as China pulls CPEC funding after corruption reports. Blog. Global Construction Review. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/pakistan-stunned-china-pulls-cpec-funding-after-co/
Syed, B. S. (2015, April 21). Pakistan-China ties’ strategic content to be bolstered. Dawn.
Syed, B. S. (2018b, April 28). Budget 2018-19: Rs1.1 trillion proposed for defence. Dawn.
Talbot, I. (2002a). The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or reality? In C. Christophe (Ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (pp. 51–63). New Delhi: Manohar.
Talwar, S. (2015, June 22). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its geopolitical implications. CAPS Infocus. New Delhi: Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)/Forum for National Security Studies (FNSS). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_ST.pdf
Tan, H. (2017, October 24). Meet the new men in charge of China. There’s only one who matters. CNBC.
Tanoli, Q. (2016, September 3). Punjab gets lion’s share in Chinese. The Express Tribune.
Tarin, S. (2018, June 7). Manufacturing – Key to unlocked growth. Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement, reprinted in Dawn.
Tellis, T. (2017b, July 19). Branding Pakistan. Dawn.
Tharoor, I. (2015, April 21). What China’s and Pakistan’s special friendship means. The Washington Post.
TI. (2017, October 20). Letter to the NHA. Sub.: Auditor General Pakistan Reports “Over 400 Billion irregularities found in Road Projects”. Islamabad: Transparency International (TI).
Tiantian, B. (2016, December 27). China, Russia, Pakistan hold trilateral talks on Afghanistan issue. Global Times.
Tiezzi, S. (2015b, April 21). Can China’s investments bring peace to Pakistan? The Diplomat.
Tiezzi, S. (2017, May 16). What Did China Accomplish at the Belt and Road Forum? The Diplomat.
Tiezzi, S. (2018, June 27). How China wins friends and influences people. The Diplomat.
Times of Islamabad. (2018a, July 2). CPEC talent corridor: 1,000 Pakistani students get Chinese scholarships.
Times of Islamabad. (2018b, January 26). How much annual revenue CPEC will generate for Pakistan: Report.
TNN. (2017, November 9). Govt approves Rs 1.16 billion for rehabilitations of FATA traders. Tribal News Network (TNN). Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.tnn.com.pk/govt-approves-rs-1-16-billion-for-rehabilitations-of-fata-traders/
Torwali, Z. (2017, August 22). CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan. The News International.
UN ESCAP. (2017). Review of the developments in Asia and the Pacific 2017. Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP). Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/publications/Review2017_Hires_21Dec2017.pdf
USDS. (2016b). Pakistan 2016. Human Rights report. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, Human Rights and Labor (USDS). Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265758.pdf
Usman, M. (2016, September 3). Up to Rs10b provided for civil armed forces. The Express Tribune.
Vandewalle, L. (2015). Pakistan and China: ‘Iron brothers’ forever? Brussels: Directorate General for External Policies, Policy Department. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549052/EXPO_IDA(2015)549052_EN.pdf
Vijayakumar, P. B. (2018, July 15). Visa change could deter incoming international faculty. University World News. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20180715172816898
VOA. (2018, August 2). Chinese Police Remove Professor During Broadcast of VOA Program. Voice of America (VOA).
Waheed, M., & Armas, E. B. (2015, June 11). Four critical ingredients that Pakistan needs to rev up its economy and realize its potential. Blog. End Poverty in South Asia. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Walker, B. (2016, September 23). China stokes global coal growth. China Dialogue. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9264-China-stokes-global-coal-growth
Waraich, O. (2017, July 28). The corruption conundrum in Pakistan’s democracy. The dark side of Nawaz Sharif’s ouster. The Atlantic. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/pakistan-corruption-nawaz-sharif/535302/
Wazir, A. (2018, April 27). What does the Pashtun Tahafuz movement want? The Diplomat.
Wolf, S. O. (2012a, May 18). The good neighbour: China’s alternative strategy in Afghanistan. The Independent (Bangladesh). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/2826/
Wolf, S. O. (2012c, April 20). Trapped in old patterns? The future of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The Independent (Bangladesh). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/2820/
Wolf, S. O. (2013h, March 24). Gwadar Port – A potential game changer? The Independent (Bangladesh). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/2851/
Wolf, S. O. (2013i, March 22). China’s influence on Pakistan. The Independent (Bangladesh). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/2852/
Wolf, S. O. (2015c, May 14). Formal institutionalization of military rule: The 21st amendment in Pakistan (PSRU Briefing Paper No. 71). Durham: Durham University, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU). Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/3806/
Wolf, S. O. (2016c, September 30). An unequal equation? CPEC development and Pakistan’s political mindset. Blog. Indrastra Global. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://www.indrastra.com/2016/09/OPINION-Unequal-Equation-CPEC-Development-and-Pakistan-s-Political-Mineset-002-09-2016-0044.html
Wolf, S. O. (2016h, March 16). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Feasibility and the need for an assessment of India’s role (SADF Comment, Vol. 19). Brussels: South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF).
Wolf, S. O. (2017a, September 27). Genocide, exodus and exploitation for jihad: The urgent need to address the Rohingya crisis (SADF Working Paper, No. 6). Brussels: South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF).
Wolf, S. O. (2017b, August 23). US President Donald Trump’s new Afghanistan strategy in context (SADF Comment, Vol. 100). Brussels: South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF).
Wolf, S. O. (2017e, January 24). India’s doubts about joining the Chinese New Silk Road Journey. Guest Column (China-India Brief, #88) (January 24–February 14). Singapore: Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
World Bank. (2016, January). Global economic perspectives. Spillovers amid weak growth. A World Bank Group Flagship Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Group (WB).
World Bank. (2018a, May 25). International development association project appraisal document on a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 320.4 million (US$ 460.6 million equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for a Khyber Pass Economic Corridor Project (Document of The World Bank Report No: PAD1936). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
World Bank. (2018d, January 21). Peshawar Torkham Economic Corridor Project Environmental Management Framework (EMF) for Component II-Allied Facilities along Peshawar–Torkham Expressway. Document prepared by Ayaz Asif. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Xinhua. (2012, March 11). Reforms urged to attract overseas Chinese.
Xinhua. (2014, December 2). Khunjerab Pass closes for winter season.
Xinhua. (2015a, April 21). Commentary: Silk Road Fund’s 1st investment makes China’s words into practice.
Xinhua. (2015b, August 19). China’s policy banks CDB, Exim Bank receive USD93 bln injection. Xinhua Finance Agency.
Xinhua. (2016, November 22). Haier-Ruba economic zone: to be model of Chinese companies overseas. Xinhua Finance Agency.
Xinhua. (2017b, May 27). Pakistan allocates 180 billion rupees for CPEC in new budget.
Xinhua. (2018, March 14). Xinhua headlines: China unveils cabinet restructuring plan.
Xuanmin, L. (2016, November 23). Gwadar Port benefits to China limited. Global Times. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1019840.shtml
Yasir, M. (2018). Is crime rate increasing in Pakistan as Chinese immigrants increase? Blog. Propakistani. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://propakistani.pk/problog/welcome-china-crimecorruption-pakistan/
Yu, K. (2017, November). The geopolitics of energy cooperation in China’s Belt and Road initiative. In E. Downs, et al. (Eds.), Asia’s energy security and China’s belt and road initiative (pp. 29–39). NBR Special Report No. 68. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR).
Yuan, Z., & Song, X. (2015). The dissemination of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The Journal of International Studie, 05, 66–81. http://en.iwep.org.cn/papers/papers_papers/201707/W020170727533731773111.pdf
Zafar, M. (2016, November 12). First Chinese trade convoy arrives in Gwadar through CPEC. The Express Tribune.
Zaheer, F. (2017, January 9). Move to tap Thar coal reserves in line with global trend. The Express Tribune.
Zahra-Malik, M. (2018, April 23). Shutdown of Pakistani TV network hints at army’s bid for control. The Guardian.
Zaidi, E. (2016, August 3). Pakistani banks eye expansion in China; overseas markets. Dawn.
Zaidi, S. S. (2018, June 26). Reality versus myth. Text of speech at CPEC 2018 Summit, 23 & 24 April 2018, CPEC 2018: Supplement. Reprinted in Dawn.
Zaman, Q. (2015, May 12). Economic passageway: Senators seek briefing on trade route by PM. The Express Tribune.
ZBTL. (2017, October 26). Visit of (Vice President) Agricultural Development Bank of China. Press Release: Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL). Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.ztbl.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ADB-ChinaPR.pdf
Ze, S. (2014, October 18). One Road & One Belt & new thinking with regard to concepts and practice. Presentation at the 30th Anniversary Conference of the Schiller Institute, Frankfurt. Accessed February 14, 2019, from http://newparadigm.schillerinstitute.com/media/one-road-and-one-belt-and-new-thinking-with-regard-to-concepts-and-practice/
Zhang, R., Andam, F., & Shi, G. (2017). Environmental and social risk evaluation of overseas investment under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 189(6), 253.
Zhao, K. (2015, Summer). The motivation behind China’s public diplomacy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 8(2), 167–196. Accessed February 14, 2019, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276111714_The_Motivation_Behind_China%27s_Public_Diplomacy
Ziauddin, M. (2018, January 10). CPEC brings RMBs to Pakistan. Business Recorder. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://fp.brecorder.com/2018/01/20180110334270/
Zingel, W.-P. (2015). China’s Pakistan option: Economic and social implications of an ‘all-weather relationship’. IIC Quarterly, 42, 2.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Wolf, S.O. (2020). Assessment. In: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16198-9_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16198-9_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16197-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16198-9
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)