The Fluid View

Abstract

In chapter four we saw that Brueckner’s and Buford’s solution solves the factivity problem but regrettably saddles contextualism with a statability problem: the anti-sceptical argument of the theory, in fact, turns out to be unknowable and unassertable. In this chapter we will analyse a solution to the above-mentioned statability problem that consists of denying the fluid view—the thesis that the mere mention of an error possibility is enough to raise the standard in place in the context. After a brief introduction of the fluid view we will first evaluate those arguments that favour an alternative stance about how the epistemic standard in place in a context can change; then, we will consider which epistemic standard should be in place in a sceptical context. In the last section of this chapter we will claim that the loss of even-handedness, an alleged valuable feature of the contextualist treatment of scepticism, does not represent a real problem for the contextualist anti-sceptical argument.