Abstract
The needless proliferation of virtues is a possible pitfall of the explosion of work in virtue ethics. I discuss two positions on proliferation and offer my own. Russell (Practical intelligence and the virtues. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) takes the first approach, arguing that virtue ethical right action is impossible unless we adopt a finite and specifiable list of the virtues. I argue against this. Hursthouse (Working virtue: virtue ethics and contemporary moral problems. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) offers a second perspective, looking first to standard Aristotelian virtues, and adding virtues only when the standard list fails to capture something of moral importance. Like Hursthouse (Working virtue: virtue ethics and contemporary moral problems. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007), I believe that questions arising from applied ethics present the real challenge to the adequacy of traditional lists of virtues. These challenges are becoming increasingly urgent. Technologies are not only shaping our conceptions of ourselves, the human good, and virtues, but also, through germline gene editing, have the potential to change human nature. My position takes its cue from Hursthouse (Working virtue: virtue ethics and contemporary moral problems. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) but goes beyond her by arguing for an “anthropological turn” in virtue ethics. The anthropological turn examines forms of life, especially those influenced by technology and science, and how they affect articulations of the human good and the virtues needed to attain it. Any new virtues, I argue, should be identified through study of how dispositions conducive to human good arise organically within forms of life. In this way, virtues remain grounded in what is good for humans, yet the anthropological turn recognizes that what counts as human good is now in flux because of science and technology.
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Notes
- 1.
My discussion of Russell draws on Snow (2018).
- 2.
Russell (2014, 217, n. 26) seems to recognize this point, but is skeptical of its force: «It is likely that Aristotle thought the virtues should cover all of the “key areas” of life (e.g., one’s finances, emotions like fear and confidence, etc.), but it is far from obvious either that Aristotle’s catalog does cover all such areas or that he thought it did. It is even less obvious how to identify such “key areas,” how to individuate them, and how to know when they have all been identified.» I think that Aristotle’s virtues give us more guidance about identifying key areas of life than Russell allows, and that, with sufficient reflection, we can amplify Aristotle’s account and identify key areas and the virtues that pertain to them. For example, Kamtekar (2004, 481) offers the following in connection with the situationism debate: «It seems open, then, to an Aristotelian to admit as new domains for practical attention those features of situations that social psychology identifies as particularly consequential for action: in the domain of group effects, there might be a virtue of taking appropriate account of the judgments of others; in the domain of time, a virtue of appropriate punctuality, and so on.» Kamtekar does not here accede to the situationist critique of virtue ethics, but instead, suggests using social psychological studies as tools for the identification of new virtues that arise in various domains—group effects and time—that can cross situation-types. For example, if I have the virtue of taking appropriate account of the judgments of others, I might resist acquiescing in the judgment of my child’s friends that he should be allowed to stay out until midnight on a school night, but assent to the judgment of his teachers that he should improve in his science classes.
- 3.
I think it is quite probable that many ordinary people know many of the virtues on Aristotle’s list, though not under the description of Aristotelian virtue. (For Aristotle’s list of the virtues, see the Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV.) For example, many people who have religious upbringings are aware of the vice of gluttony, which is opposed to temperance. Considerations of temperance also come into play in connection with health and well-being. An interesting question is whether a person can be considered virtuous if she performs a temperate action though not understanding it as an Aristotelian virtue. As suggested in the text, I believe she can be. See also Snow (2018, forthcoming).
- 4.
I am grateful to Candace Vogler for this example.
- 5.
How important and how long-term the relationship had to be for a text break-up to count as seriously disrespectful was left unspecified.
- 6.
Vallor (2016, 210–211) seems to agree. See her condemnation of a human subculture that has a habit of torturing robots—deriving pleasure from the robots’ screams, writhing, and pleas for mercy. Vallor concludes that it is clearly unethical for humans to be cruel in this way, and to derive pleasure from sounds and other physical signs mimicking human reactions to torture, even if no actual pain is caused.
- 7.
In interesting comments on another version of this essay, Nick Austin, S. J., attributes a new virtue, “studiositas,” to Aquinas. Austin contends that studiositas is a form of disciplined attentiveness, which is the positive correlate of Augustine’s “vain curiosity” or “lust of the eyes,” and is needed for the monastic life of study and prayer. Austin remarks that this virtue has relevance for our uses of technologies of connectivity. See Austin (2017).
- 8.
- 9.
See also Robertson (Forthcoming).
- 10.
I hope it is clear from the text that I am not proposing a situationist approach to the articulation of new virtues or the reconceptualization of familiar ones. The manner of developing virtues here proposed does not identify virtues as mere behavioral regularities that are indexed to objectively describable features of situations. Instead, my argument is that reflection on variegated experiences occurring in interactions with technology and other spheres of life can enable us to recognize and develop specific articulations of virtues that take root within those domains. The issue of the generality or specificity of virtue is key to avoiding the situationist trap. Unlike Badhwar (1996) and Adams (2006), I believe that virtues can evolve within specific domains, yet be general enough to be meaningfully relevant across domains. So, for example, I believe there is a single virtue of courage—overcoming fear in the face of a threat—that can be exercised in different physical contexts, such as on the battlefield, or facing cancer treatments, as well as in moral contexts, such as standing up to bullies. Similarly, the virtue of “techcheck” is a single virtue, as described in the text, which can range over various domains of life in which technological interactions of different kinds are salient. In his comments Austin (2017) argues that what I am calling “techcheck” is not really a new virtue, but instead, a new form of temperance—the regulation of our appetites in order to find the right balance or use of technologies of connectivity.
- 11.
I owe this example to a student in the class I mentioned earlier.
- 12.
The twelve technomoral virtues are: honesty, self-control, humility, justice, courage, empathy, care, civility, flexibility, perspective, magnanimity, and technomoral wisdom.
- 13.
A longer version of this essay was presented as the Inaugural Research Series Lecture at the Margaret Beaufort Institute, Cambridge University, October 27, 2017. I am grateful to the audience for their questions and to Nick Austin, S. J., for helpful commentary. Work on this essay was supported by the John Templeton Foundation. The views expressed are my own.
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Snow, N.E. (2019). Proliferating Virtues: A Clear and Present Danger?. In: Grimi, E. (eds) Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_13
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