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The Big Risk Behind the Explosion of Virtues

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Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect

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Abstract

We have recently witnessed an explosion in the theme of virtues. It is not by chance that in most parts of the world research centers, projects, associations, and foundations on virtues have been founded. But what is behind this phenomenon? The recovery of virtue ethics was initiated by Elizabeth Anscombe, re-launched by Alasdair MacIntyre, and has now been developed by many authors in a contemporary context. Virtue ethics has now become its own distinct subject matter, according to some it is named appropriately, and according to others not. Speaking of virtue is thus a reflection of the historical period we are going through: to be virtuous is “cool”, a part of one’s identity and character. In this light, being virtuous founds its refection in narcissism. Paradoxically becoming virtuous does not involve a progress toward human flourishing, but rather it becomes about fulfilling a realisation which is already in place in the person without any effort, sacrifice, or work. Perhaps a philosophy of humility can recover a horizon of action in which humanity tends towards its flourishing, and thus to a recovery of virtue that must increasingly be as silent as exercised?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hegel (1830), § 516. My translation.

  2. 2.

    Ivi, § 515.

  3. 3.

    Ivi, § 516.

  4. 4.

    See Samek Lodovici (1999).

  5. 5.

    See McDowell (1994).

  6. 6.

    See Rosmini (1990).

  7. 7.

    Scheler (1913).

  8. 8.

    Ibidem. My translation.

  9. 9.

    Ivi, p. 160. My translation.

  10. 10.

    In this regard one can refer to my detailed analysis in Grimi (2017).

  11. 11.

    Colpo (1967), coll. 686–687. My translation.

  12. 12.

    Spinoza (1925, p. 249).

  13. 13.

    See «The worm, if treaded on, curls up. It is a wisdom it has. In this way it reduces the probability of being treaded on again. In the language of morality humility (in der Sprache der Moral: Demut)», Nietzsche (1969), p. 58.

  14. 14.

    Comte-Sponville (1995). My translation. The chapter concerning humility has already been published in Comte-Sponville, 1992.

  15. 15.

    See Ventimiglia (2006), pp. 12172–12176.

  16. 16.

    It is important to consider the sort of Virtue Ethics that gives primacy to character. In fact, in this perspective, basic judgments in ethics will be judgments about character. This basic assumption embodies two main theses: (1) at least some judgements about the value of character traits are independent of judgements about the rightness or wrongness of actions; (2) the concept of virtue is explanatorily prior to that of right conduct (cf. Stateman 1997). The revolutionary point of Virtue Ethics, in comparison to the deontic and utilitarian views, is that virtues are justified in terms of their essential, constitutive role in the agent’s well-being and flourishing. (cf. production of G.E.M. Anscombe—Aristotelian approach—R. Hursthouse).

  17. 17.

    See Baudrillard (1995).

  18. 18.

    See Lévy, Qu'est-ce que le virtuel? (1995).

  19. 19.

    Guardini (1963, p. 18). My translation.

  20. 20.

    MacIntyre (2007, 3, p. 219).

  21. 21.

    Ibidem.

  22. 22.

    Williams (1985).

  23. 23.

    Lobkowicz (1983, p. 14). My translation.

  24. 24.

    Among the more important contributions to the neo-Aristotelian approach to Virtue Ethics are the following major works: Anscombe (1958), von Wright (1963), Foot (1978, 2001), Geach (1977), MacIntyre (1981, 1999), Williams (1985), Nussbaum (1993, 1999); McDowell (1998), Hursthouse (2000), Annas (2006). There are moreover a number of non-Aristotelian approaches to Virtue Ethics that are also important, given the different fields that have been explored in the history of philosophy, and that refer to different classical authors (Hume, Nietzsche, Kant and others). The main examples of the non-Aristotelian approach to Virtue Ethics are: Baier (1985), O’Neill (1996), Sherman (1997), Driver (2001), Swanton (2003).

  25. 25.

    Anscombe's text was fundamental, along with Stuart Hampshire 1950. Moreover see George von Wright, Iris Murdoch, Edmund Pincoff, Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Julia Annas, Rosalind Hursthouse.

  26. 26.

    Bonaventura (1259).

  27. 27.

    Bonaventura (1259), prologo, § 4. My translation.

  28. 28.

    See Haldane (2004, p. 159).

  29. 29.

    Samek Lodovici (1999, p. 44). My translation.

  30. 30.

    McCarthy (1978(2), p. 163).

  31. 31.

    Dt 8, 2–3. 14–16. The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE).

  32. 32.

    Manipulus Florum, c. 1306.

  33. 33.

    Samek Lodovici (1999, p. 49). My translation.

  34. 34.

    Aquinas, Quaestio disputata I. De virtutibus in communi, art. 1, 3. My translation.

  35. 35.

    Anscombe (1989), reprinted with the title Practical Inference, in Hursthouse et al. (1995, p. 34).

  36. 36.

    Samek Lodovici (1999, p. 102). My translation.

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  1. European Society for Moral Philosophy, Milan, Italy

    Elisa Grimi

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    Elisa Grimi

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Grimi, E. (2019). The Big Risk Behind the Explosion of Virtues. In: Grimi, E. (eds) Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_12

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