Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Value of the Theoretical Concept

Three Levels of Value and Five Case Studies to Determine the Value of the Theoretical Concept of a Juridical Act as Developed

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Juridical Act

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 129))

Abstract

In Chap. 2 the theoretical concept of the juridical act was delineated and in Chap. 3 it was further explored. A working knowledge of the theoretical concept has now been presented. In the first chapter it was argued that the creation of such a concept is not merely an academic exercise but that such a concept can be valuable and useful. In this chapter I will discuss in depth why such a theoretical concept can be valuable, and I will illustrate the arguments with some practical applications of the concept.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This is a loose translation and paraphrasion of his words: ‘Dat rechtsbegrippen in de door mij aan deze term gehechte beteekenis hun nut hebben behoeft niet veel betoog. Wie zal veel woorden verspillen om de waarde der druiven voor den wijn, van het graan voor het brood aan te toonen?’ Meijers (1903), pp. 27–28.

  2. 2.

    See Chap. 1, and a.o.: Hage (2004) and Frändberg (2009).

  3. 3.

    Hage (2004).

  4. 4.

    Ross (1957).

  5. 5.

    This can roughly be translated as ‘ridiculous or absurd contracts’, the author, Becker, classifies contracts concerning e.g. the prediction of the future or protection against aliens as being ridiculous or absurd.

  6. 6.

    Becker (2013).

  7. 7.

    See also the work of Ross on intermediate legal concepts: Ross (1957).

  8. 8.

    Meijers (1903), pp. 1–18; Smits (2012), pp. 17–18.

  9. 9.

    Meijers (1903), p. 20, my own translation from Dutch: ‘De systematiseering behoef ik niet in een afzonderlijke afdeling te behandelen. Immers dat steeds het systematiseren van het recht een logische bewerking van een gegeven rechtsmaterie is alsmede dat systematische studieën van het grootste nut zijn, behoeft geen nader betoog’.

  10. 10.

    A.o.: Meijers (1903), p. 19; Hage (2004); Hage (2007), pp. 6–9; Von der Pfordten (2009).

  11. 11.

    Hage (2007), p. 6; Brouwer and Hage (2007).

  12. 12.

    Von der Pfordten (2009).

  13. 13.

    For some of the discussion see e.g. Jansen (2006), pp. 305–338; de Groot and Schneider (1994), pp. 53–68; Oderkerk (1999), pp. 15–88; Constantinesco (1972), pp. 277–325; van Hoecke (2004), pp. 165–196.

  14. 14.

    Oderkerk (1999), pp. 61–99.

  15. 15.

    Zweigert and Kötz (1998), p. 146.

  16. 16.

    Ranieri (2009), p. 150.

  17. 17.

    Schmidt (2012).

  18. 18.

    Schmidt (2012).

  19. 19.

    Schmidt (2012).

  20. 20.

    Schmidt (2012).

  21. 21.

    Hage (2007), pp. 24–31.

  22. 22.

    Although, since it originates with Von Savigny, and does not come from Roman times, it can be argued to be relatively new.

  23. 23.

    See a.o.: Dennett (1987), Libet (1999), Wegner (2002), Morse (2008), Swaab (2010), Lamme (2010) and Verplaetse (2011).

  24. 24.

    Hage (2004).

  25. 25.

    There are of course many theories that fall either between these categories or just outside of them, such as for example Bakkers theory on good faith: Bakker (2012), or specifically for contract Smits theory on reciprocity: Smits (1995). However, I believe that these are the three main distinctive categories that can be distinguished. For a short overview, see also: Asser-Hartkamp and Sieburgh (2014), pp. 108–110; van Cassel-van Zeeland (2014) nr. 1-2.

  26. 26.

    Hijma (1988), pp. 7–14.

  27. 27.

    A.o.: Asser-Hartkamp and Sieburg (2014), pp. 105–117; Asser-Rutten (1982), pp. 70–72; von Savigny (1840), a.o. pp. 258, 264; Fried (1981); Feenstra and Ahsmann (1980).

  28. 28.

    Meijers (1954), pp. 182–185 (Articles 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).

  29. 29.

    Van Dunné (1971).

  30. 30.

    Duk and Nicolaï (1993); van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 115–116, 656–657.

  31. 31.

    Duk and Nicolaï (1993).

  32. 32.

    ABRvS, 7 februari 1997, AB 1997,154 m.nt. PvB.

  33. 33.

    1:3(2) Awb.

  34. 34.

    van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 566–574.

  35. 35.

    a.o. Hart (1983), pp. 88–120, 265–277.

  36. 36.

    Halpin (1996) and MacCormick and Raz (1972).

  37. 37.

    There are some exceptions, such as a ‘contract for necessaries’ and employment, apprenticeship and training contracts. Smits (2014), pp. 92–93.

  38. 38.

    Schane (2012) and Tiersma (1986). Often the fact that offer and acceptance are speech acts is more or less implied or seen as obvious, as can be seen a.o. in: Klass et al. (2014) and Hogg (2011).

  39. 39.

    I have only quoted one of the articles of the whole act and the enactment, since that suffices for the example. Disability Discrimination Act 1995, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/50/contents> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  40. 40.

    For a more extensive view of statutes as speech acts see Kurzon (1986), pp. 5–24.

  41. 41.

    van Vliet (2010).

  42. 42.

    Kurzon (1986), pp. 57–70; Charnock (2009).

  43. 43.

    Golding (2001), pp. 1–11, 44–49, 97–143.

  44. 44.

    DCFR (2009), pp. 7–30.

  45. 45.

    DCFR (2009), pp. 7–18.

  46. 46.

    For a more extensive analysis see: Rijgersberg and van der Kaaij (2013).

  47. 47.

    For a more extensive analysis see: Brouwer (2007).

  48. 48.

    Even though this might not seem problematic, it can give rise to problems such as the one encountered in the case of Lindeboom/Gemeente Amsterdam (HR 19-12-1969, NJ 1970,154). See for a good analysis: Brouwer (2007). For an analysis that includes the DCFR see: Rijgersberg and van der Kaaij (2013).

  49. 49.

    In Dutch: ‘1:3 (1) Onder besluit wordt verstaan: een schriftelijke beslissing van een bestuursorgaan, inhoudende een publiekrechtelijke rechtshandeling. (2) Onder beschikking wordt verstaan: een besluit dat niet van algemene strekking is, met inbegrip van de afwijzing van een aanvraag daarvan.’ Translation courtesy of the Dutch Government: <https://archief06.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20180224072222/https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/besluiten/2009/10/01/general-administrative-law-act-text-per-1-october-2009/gala18-11-09.pdf> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  50. 50.

    In German: ‘§35 Begriff des Verwaltungsaktes. Verwaltungsakt ist hede Verfügung, Entscheidung oder andere hoheitliche Maßnahme, die eine Behörde zur Regelung eines Einzelfalls auf dem Gebiet des öffentlichen Rechts trifft unde die auf unmittelbare Rechtswirkung nach außen gerichtet ist.[…]’. Translation courtesy of Comparative Law Society German law archive: <http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=289> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  51. 51.

    Flume (1979), pp. 41–44; Forsthoff (1973), pp. 205–207.

  52. 52.

    Van Hoecke (2004).

  53. 53.

    For more information on these delineators see Chap. 2.

  54. 54.

    See the section ‘Personal Competence’ in Chap. 2.

  55. 55.

    See the section ‘Functional Competence’ in Chap. 2.

  56. 56.

    For the definition of a public law legal person see art. 2:1 BW. For more information about the connection between bestuursorganen and the concept of a public law legal person, see: Scheltema and Scheltema (2013), pp. 41–140.

  57. 57.

    2:1 jo. 2:5 jo. 3:32 BW.

  58. 58.

    Goorden (1990), pp. 19–52, 159–211; Scheltema and Scheltema (2013), pp. 41–44.

  59. 59.

    ‘Attributed by law’ should be taken in the wide sense of the word, meaning that those decisions that in the Netherlands are classified as being based of an extralegal competence (buitenwettelijke bevoegdheid) still fall under the scope of attribution by law in this sense. The reason for this lies in the fact that even though these competences are not based on a specific written law, they are based on legal rules, in the sense that it is legally accepted that policy rules, the public task of the agent and legal principles can also give rise to competences. Van Wijk, Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 119–122.

  60. 60.

    van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 146–154.

  61. 61.

    van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 146–154, 193–199.

  62. 62.

    van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 296–300.

  63. 63.

    Goorden (1990), pp. 107–158; van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 263–376.

  64. 64.

    §1 (4) Behörde im Sinne diese gesetzes ist jede Stelle, die Aufgaben der öffentlichen Verwaltung wahrnimmt.

  65. 65.

    Erichsen and Ehlers (2010), pp. 677–679.

  66. 66.

    Forsthoff (1973), pp. 205–207.

  67. 67.

    Maurer (2011), p. 256; Erichsen and Ehlers (2010), pp. 709–710.

  68. 68.

    Maurer (2011), p. 259; Erichsen and Ehlers (2010), pp. 707–711.

  69. 69.

    Schwarze (2006), p. 218.

  70. 70.

    For an introduction to this part of Sartre’s work see: Cottingham (2008), pp. 320–326.

  71. 71.

    I have chosen to discuss a form of responsibility that matches closely with the notion of liability, since for a discussion rooted in law this seems the most relevant form of responsibility. For other conceptions of responsibility, especially in relation to computers, see also: Noorman (2014).

  72. 72.

    I do not only mean legally, for example, if the lamp is owned by the person who broke it he would not be held legally liable for breaking it, but he would be liable in the sense that the consequences (a broken lamp, no light etcetera) are his to bear.

  73. 73.

    For more on responsibility and liability for actions in law see a.o.: Loth (1988).

  74. 74.

    Hijma et al. (2013), pp. 95, 134–135.

References

  • Bakker PS (2012) Redelijkheid en billijkheid als gedragsnorm (diss. Amsterdam VU). Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker M (2013) Absurde Verträge (diss. Siegen). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer B (2007) Fundamentele rechtsbegrippen. De theorie van Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld. In: Janse R et al (eds) Rechtsfilosofische annotaties. Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen, pp 22–26

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer B, Hage JC (2007) Basic concepts of European private law. Eur Rev Priv Law 1:3–26

    Google Scholar 

  • van Cassel-van Zeeland FM (2014) Groene Serie Vermogensrecht, art. 3:33 BW. Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Charnock R (2009) Overruling as a speech act: performativity and normative discourse. J Pragmat 41:401–426

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Constantinesco L-J (1972) Rechtsvergleichung, Band II, Die Rechtsvergleichende Methode. Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottingham J (ed) (2008) Western philosophy, an anthology. Blackwell Publishing, Malden

    Google Scholar 

  • de Groot G-R, Schneider H (1994) Das Werturteil in der Rechtsvergleichung. Die Suche nach dem besseren Recht. In: Boele-Woelki K et al (eds) Comparability and evaluation. Essays on comparative law, private international law and international commercial arbitration, in honour of Dimitra Kokkini-Iatridou. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 53–86

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett DC (1987) The intentional stance. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Duk W, Nicolaï P (1993) Nulliteiten in het bestuursrecht. Rechtsgeleerd magazijn THEMIS 1:3–31

    Google Scholar 

  • Erichsen H-U, Ehlers (eds) (2010) Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 14th edn. De Gruyter, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Feenstra R, Ahsmann M (1980) Contract. Aspecten van de begrippen contract en contractsvrijheid in historisch perspectief (rechtshistorische Cahiers 2). Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Flume W (1979) Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, das Rechtsgeschäft, II - das Rechtsgeschäft. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Forsthoff E (1973) Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrecht, Erster band, Algemeiner Teil, 10th edn. C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Frändberg Ã… (2009) An essay on legal concept formation. In: Hage JC, van der Pfordten D (eds) Concepts in law. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 1–16

    Google Scholar 

  • Fried C (1981) Contract as promise, a theory of contractual obligation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Golding MP (2001) Legal reasoning. Broadview Press, Ontario

    Google Scholar 

  • Goorden CPJ (1990) Rechtsbevoegdheid in het bestuursrecht (diss. Tilburg). W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle

    Google Scholar 

  • Hage JC (2004) Vermogensrechten en hun objecten. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht. 67:355–362

    Google Scholar 

  • Hage JC (2007) De wondere wereld van het recht (oratie Maastricht). Universiteit Maastricht, Maastricht

    Google Scholar 

  • Halpin A (1996) The concept of a legal power. Oxf J Leg Stud 16:129–152

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart HLA (1983) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hartkamp AS, Sieburgh CH (2014) Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. 6. Verbintenissenrecht. Deel III. Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht. Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Hijma J (1988) Nietigheid en vernietigbaarheid van rechtshandelingen (diss. Leiden). Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Hijma J, van Dam CC, van Schendel WAM, Valk WL (2013) Rechtshandeling en Overeenkomst. Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Hogg M (2011) Promises and contract law, comparative perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jansen N (2006) Comparative law and comparative knowledge. In: Reimann M, Zimmermann R (eds) The Oxford handbook of comparative law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 305–338

    Google Scholar 

  • Klass G, Letsas G, Saprai P (eds) (2014) Philosophical foundations of contract law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Konijnenbelt W, van Male R (2014) van Wijk/Konijnebelt & van Male, Hoofdstukken van het bestuursrecht. Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Kurzon D (1986) It is hereby performed… explorations in legal speech acts. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lamme V (2010) De vrije wil bestaat niet. Bert Bakker, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Libet B (1999) Do we have free will? J Conscious Stud 6:47–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Loth MA (1988) Handeling en aansprakelijkheid in het recht (diss. Leiden). Gouda Quint, Arnhem

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCormick N, Raz J (1972) Voluntary obligations and normative powers. Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 46:59–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maurer H (2011) Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 18th edn. Verlag C.H. Beck, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Meijers EM (1903) Dogmatische rechtswetenschap (diss. Amsterdam UvA). Zuid-Hollandsche Boek- en Handelsdrukkerij, Den Haag

    Google Scholar 

  • Meijers EM (1954) Ontwerp voor een nieuw burgerlijk wetboek. Toelichting eerste gedeelte (boek 1-4). Staatsdrukkerij en Uitgeverijbedrijf, ’s-Gravenhage

    Google Scholar 

  • Morse SJ (2008) Determinism and the death of folk psychology: two challenges to responsibility from neuroscience. Minn J Law Sci Technol 9(1):1–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Noorman M (2014) Computing and moral responsibility. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/computing-responsibility/> (last checked 20-08-2018)

  • Oderkerk AE (1999) De Preliminaire Fase van het Rechtsvergelijkend Onderzoek (diss. Amsterdam UvA). Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen

    Google Scholar 

  • Ranieri F (2009) Europäisches Obligationenrecht, 3rd edn. Springer, Wien

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rijgersberg R, van der Kaaij HDS (2013) A plea for rigorous conceptual analysis as central method in transnational law design - offer and acceptance as juridical acts in the draft common frame of reference as case in point. Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 1:48–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross A (1957) Tû-Tû. Harv Law Rev 70:812–825

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rutten LEH (1982) Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht. 4. Verbintenissenrecht, deel II Algemene leer der overeenkomsten. W.E.J. Tjeenk-Willink, Zwolle

    Google Scholar 

  • Schane S (2012) Contract formation as a speech act. In: Tiersma PM, Solan LM (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 100–113

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheltema M, Scheltema MW (2013) Gemeenschappelijk recht, wisselwerking tussen publiek- en privaatrecht. Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt JP (2012) Juridical act. In: Basedow J et al (eds) The Max Planck encyclopedia of European private law, vol II. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1016–1020

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwarze J (2006) European administrative law. Sweet & Maxwell, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Smits JM (1995) Het vertrouwensbeginsel en de contractuele gebondenheid: beschouwingen omtrent de dogmatiek van het overeenkomstenrecht (diss. Leiden). Gouda Quint BV, Arnhem

    Google Scholar 

  • Smits JM (2012) The mind and method of the legal academic. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smits JM (2014) Contract law, a comparative introduction. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Swaab D (2010) Wij zijn ons Brein. Uitgeverij Contact, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Tiersma P (1986) The language of offer and acceptance: speech acts and the question of intent. Calif Law Rev 74:189–232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Dunné JM (1971) Normatieve uitleg van rechtshandelingen, een onderzoek naar de grondslagen van het geldende verbintenissenrecht (diss. Leiden). Kluwer, Deventer

    Google Scholar 

  • van Hoecke M (2004) Deep level comparative law. In: van Hoecke M (ed) Epistemology and methodology of comparative law. Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp 165–196

    Google Scholar 

  • van Vliet L (2010) Transfer of movables as a legal act. Edinb Law Rev 14:498–512

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verplaetse J (2011) Zonder vrije wil. Uitgeverij Nieuwezijds, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Bar C, Clive E, Schulte-Nölke H (2009) Principles, definitions and model rules of European private law. Draft common frame of reference. Sellier, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • von der Pfordten D (2009) About concepts in law. In: Hage JC, van der Pfordten D (eds) Concepts in law. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 17–34

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • von Savigny FC (1840) System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, bandes III. Veit und Comp, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wegner DM (2002) The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Zweigert K, Kötz H (1998) Introduction to comparative law (trans: Weir T). Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    H. D. S. van der Kaaij

Authors
  1. H. D. S. van der Kaaij
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

van der Kaaij, H.D.S. (2019). The Value of the Theoretical Concept. In: The Juridical Act. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15592-6_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15592-6_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-15591-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-15592-6

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation