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The Delineation of the Theoretical Concept of a Juridical Act

The Characteristics That Separate Juridical Acts from Other Acts

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The Juridical Act

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 129))

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Abstract

To start the research into the working knowledge of the theoretical concept of a juridical act it is important to establish what questions need to be answered. The first question with regard to juridical acts that needs to be asked is a question that concerns the extension of the concept. Of all the acts and events that play a role in the world of law, which acts are juridical acts? The second question that needs to be answered concerns two aspects: (1) what is involved in the proper performance of the act; and (2) what is the connection between the act and its legal consequences? In this chapter I will try to answer the first question by discussing the four characteristics that delineate the theoretical concept of a juridical act. In Chap. 3 I will try to answer the second question and discus some of the issues that are concerned with the performance of the juridical act and its creation of legal consequences. When these questions have been answered, not only will it be known which acts belong to the extension of the theoretical concept of a juridical act, but insight will have been gained into the functioning of the juridical act. Taken together, a working knowledge of the theoretical concept of a juridical act will then have been developed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Chap. 1 for more information on the type of concept, its value and the methodology used.

  2. 2.

    Wetzel (2014).

  3. 3.

    Amerigo is the horse that belongs to Sinterklaas; Black Beauty is the horse from the book ‘Black Beauty’ written by Anna Sewell; Seabiscuit was a famous American race-horse, who is the subject of several books and movies <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seabiscuit> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  4. 4.

    Act here is meant in the general sense of the word; I do not mean ‘play-acting’ or acting in a movie or play, which are sub-types of acting and therefore only underline the argument made.

  5. 5.

    Wetzel (2014).

  6. 6.

    MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), p. 55.

  7. 7.

    This is comparable to Austin’s condition A1, without which there would be a ‘misinvocation’, see Austin (1955) (2009), pp. 14, 26–34.

  8. 8.

    For more on the difference between the type of juridical act and one of its tokens and the confusion between the two that can exist see Ruiter (1992).

  9. 9.

    This can be compared to MacCormicks ideas in: MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), pp. 49–74.

  10. 10.

    Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 27–28.

  11. 11.

    Hart (1961) (2012), p. 32.

  12. 12.

    Harts ‘acts-in-the-law’ seem to be the same as juridical acts. He explicitly equates them with actes juridique and Rechtsgeschäfte. See a.o. Hart (1983), pp. 88–120, 265–277.

  13. 13.

    See a.o. Hart (1982), p. 217; Hart (1983), pp. 94–95, 276.

  14. 14.

    MacCormick and Raz (1972).

  15. 15.

    Spaak (1994), p. 94.

  16. 16.

    MacCormick (2007), pp. 155–159.

  17. 17.

    MacCormick (2007), p. 156.

  18. 18.

    For an overview see a.o. Spaak (1994), pp. 75–101; Lindahl (1977), pp. 193–211.

  19. 19.

    Lindahl (1977), p. 194; Spaak (1994), pp. 1–4.

  20. 20.

    MacCormick (2007), p. 156; Ross (1968), p. 130; Hage (2011, 2013).

  21. 21.

    Spaak was inspired by Lindahl and their work therefore shows a considerable overlap. Spaak (1994), p. 76.

  22. 22.

    The first two divisions (competence as permission and as practical possibility) are quite similar in the work of Spaak and Lindahl, however, their definition of the last option, competence as a legal (Lindahl) or hypothetical (Spaak) possibility differs. Lindahl (1977), pp. 193–211; Spaak (1994), pp. 80–100.

  23. 23.

    Kelsen (1960) (2009), pp. 134–163; von Brinz (1873), pp. 211–213. For a good discussion of Kelsen’s terminology, see Spaak (1994), pp. 11–19, and for a discussion of von Brinz see Lindahl (1977), p. 211.

  24. 24.

    Kurki (2017).

  25. 25.

    Lindahl (1977), pp. 205–207.

  26. 26.

    Lindahl (1977), pp. 203–213.

  27. 27.

    Hohfeld (1913), pp. 44–54.

  28. 28.

    Spaak actually uses the term C-act, a competence exercising act, which is so similar to a juridical act that for current purposes we can equate them.

  29. 29.

    Spaak (1994), p. 89.

  30. 30.

    In his work, Hage is concerned with all acts, including those that are ‘non-legal’. He uses the term legal power for acts where the consequences of the act are at least partially based on legal rules and ‘power’ if this is not the case.

  31. 31.

    Hage (2013).

  32. 32.

    Hohfeld (1913), p. 52. See also Lindahl (1977), pp. 203–213 and Spaak (1994), pp. 87–92.

  33. 33.

    This is usually translated by ‘incapable’, but due to the perils of translating terms from a specific legal system into any other language I have kept the Dutch term.

  34. 34.

    3:32(2) BW.

  35. 35.

    Hage (2011, 2013).

  36. 36.

    For a good overview see e.g.: Spaak (1994).

  37. 37.

    The original quote reads: ‘…das rechtliche Können oder die rechtliche Macht dagegen etwas, was nur zu Rechtsgeschäften im weitesten Sinne des Wortes also nur zu solchen Handlungen vorkommt, welche vom Recht zu Erzielung seiner unsichtbaren, rechtlichen Wirkungen aufgestellt oder recipirt sind. Wo die rechtlichen Macht zum Rechtsgeschäfte besteht, ist zumeist auch die Befugnis zu demselben da; allein zuweilen besteht jene, wo diese fehlt. Von dem physischen Können ist sowohl unseren Dürfen als unser Können verschieden, wiewohl sich weder dieses noch jenes ohne physisches Können bethätigen kann…’ Von Brinz (1873), pp. 211–212. Translation by the author of this book with help from Dr. A.M. Waltermann.

  38. 38.

    Hage (2013).

  39. 39.

    The fact that a competence has a personal scope—(the category) of persons who have the competence—and a substantial scope—the content of the act has to fall within the legally determined boundaries—is similar to ideas from Ross about competence: Ross (1968), p. 130.

  40. 40.

    The fact that the functional competence is given to specific persons and can be dependent on a certain situation can be compared to condition A2 that Austin defined: ‘the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked’ [italics added]. Only the proper persons can perform that act under the right circumstances, otherwise there will be a ‘misinvocation’. For more on this condition see Austin (1955) (2009), pp. 14–15, 34–35.

  41. 41.

    Art 175 jo. 176 Gemeentewet.

  42. 42.

    Kelsen (1960) (2009), pp. 145–150; for a discussion see Spaak (1994), pp. 11–19.

  43. 43.

    Kelsen (1960) (2009), p. 148.

  44. 44.

    The original quote reads: ‘Unter (juristischer) Handlungsfähigkeit versteht man die vom Rechte gewährte Fähigkeit zum Handeln mit rechtlicher Wirkung; auf Rechtsgeschäfte angewandt ist sie Fähigkeit, durch Willenserklärung diejenige rechtliche Wirkung zu erzeugen, auf deren Hervorbringung die Willenserklärung gerichtet ist. Diese Fähigkeit erkennt dasRecht nicht in allen Personen an; anderen gesteht es sie nur in beschränktem Maße zu.’ Windscheid (1906), p. 321. Translation by the author of this book with help from Dr. A.M. Waltermann.

  45. 45.

    Kelsen (1960) (2009), p. 158.

  46. 46.

    Eenzijdige ongerichte rechtshandelingen.

  47. 47.

    3:32 (2) BW.

  48. 48.

    Von Savigny (1840), p. 258; Windscheid (1906), pp. 311–320.

  49. 49.

    See on the fact that it is a protective measure a.o.: Smits (2014a), pp. 91–100; Smits (2014b).

  50. 50.

    Van Dunné (1971), pp. 208–216.

  51. 51.

    Van Wijk/Konijnebelt and van Male (2014), pp. 115–117.

  52. 52.

    Or an organ or body of a legal person.

  53. 53.

    These lines are not as clear as they may seem. One can think of cases in public law where the government can impose duties upon itself (for example the passing of a law that obliges the government to pay out social benefits) and of cases in private law where it is possible to impose duties upon future owners of a piece of land who are not party to the original contract of sale.

  54. 54.

    That this clarity is necessary can be seen in the commentary Kurki has on the work of Hage: Kurki (2017). Apart from the fact that the functional competence is not a requirement in any of the examples given, maybe even more important is the fact that all examples do not concern constitutive speech acts, another delineating factor for the juridical act, as will be argued in Sect. 2.2.3.

  55. 55.

    Hage (2007), pp. 13–17; Hage (2011).

  56. 56.

    Austin (1955) (2009), pp. 1–66.

  57. 57.

    Austin (1955) (2009), pp. 94–164.

  58. 58.

    Austin (1955) (2009), p. 99.

  59. 59.

    In spoken language this can be indicated by raising the pitch of the voice towards the end of the sentence.

  60. 60.

    Obviously a combination of the two is also possible.

  61. 61.

    This however is fairly unlikely, since it is hard to imagine any speech act that does not have any causal effects, such as for example the speaker believing that he has just spoken.

  62. 62.

    Searle (1968).

  63. 63.

    Hereafter in the section ‘Propositional Content’ I will further explain the notion of ‘propositional content’.

  64. 64.

    Searle (1976), pp. 2–3, 10–16.

  65. 65.

    Anscombe (1976), pp. 55–57.

  66. 66.

    These are Searle’s descriptions of the directions of fit. I will change these definitions in the section ‘Direction of Fit’.

  67. 67.

    Searle (1969), pp. 29–33.

  68. 68.

    Schiffer (2008).

  69. 69.

    This notation is based on the work of Searle (Searle 1969, pp. 30–33; Searle 1976), and interpretations of his work by Schiffer (2008) and Peetz (1972). However, both Schiffer and Peetz use ‘that’ in all their notations. I however feel that ‘that’ is only grammatically correct when the propositional content contains a verb, otherwise, the sentence is grammatically correct only without ‘that’. A different solution is to rewrite all propositional contents that do not contain a verb as if they contain the verb ‘is’ (the King (names) that (the ship is the ZKH Tromp)) thereby ensuring that ‘that-clauses’ can be used in all instances. I however feel that this less preferable, since the propositional content is changed solely in order to keep the idea of a ‘that-clause’. By simply accepting that it is not always possible to use a ‘that-clause’ the notation represents the speech act better in my opinion.

  70. 70.

    Searle (1976).

  71. 71.

    I will not explain the null direction of fit and expressives extensively, since both are of little use for a theory on juridical acts.

  72. 72.

    Searle (1976), pp. 10–16.

  73. 73.

    See a.o. Hage (2005), pp. 159–170; Hage (2007), pp. 13–17; Hage (2012).

  74. 74.

    Hage (2012).

  75. 75.

    Hage (2012).

  76. 76.

    This is in line with Searle’s opinion on directives. Hage (2012) and Searle (1976).

  77. 77.

    Hage (2012).

  78. 78.

    It could be argued that the world has changed, after all, advise was given that was not given before. Change seen in this sense would occur with all speech acts, after all, something has been said that was not said before. However, the change that speech acts try to create is a change in the world in accordance with their propositional content. E.g. an engaged couple has not merely said ‘I do’, but they are now in fact married.

  79. 79.

    Orders can be given in two circumstances, those where the ‘orderer’ has a conventionally established authority over the ‘orderee’, and those instances where the ‘orderer’ has not. E.g. a teacher can order a pupil to be silent, in that case the pupil has the duty to be silent. If one of the pupils orders the other pupil to be silent this duty does not exist, since there is no conventionally established hierarchy. The teacher has authority over the pupil, while the other pupil does not. I will use the term order in this example as an order backed up by authority. For more on this difference see the work of Ruiter (1993), pp. 67–73.

  80. 80.

    Searle (1976), pp. 11–12.

  81. 81.

    See also the analysis by Ruiter (1993), pp. 67–70.

  82. 82.

    Searle (1976).

  83. 83.

    The speech acts in the classes of commissives and directives that solely change the world through their perlocutionary consequences could, in my opinion, be seen as having a ‘null direction of fit’ similar to expressives, since they neither describe nor change the world, but merely express a desire to either commit yourself or another to a certain course of action.

  84. 84.

    Searle (1976).

  85. 85.

    If properly performed.

  86. 86.

    N.B. juridical acts are not the only constitutive speech acts. There are other speech acts that have illocutionary consequences that change the world, such as e.g. promises and declarations or commands from an umpire in a sports situation, that are also part of the group of constitutives.

  87. 87.

    Searle (1976).

  88. 88.

    For example: which persons are declared to be elected by a polling station is fully determined by electoral law (Kieswet). See also: van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 146–154, 193–199.

  89. 89.

    This example is very loosely based on the example from Loth, who based it on the example from Goldman (1971); Loth (1988), p. 89.

  90. 90.

    For more on redescribing actions see Davidson (1976). Davidson’s work is part of a broader philosophical discussion on the identity of actions, for an overview see: Loth (1988), pp. 87–120. I will not go into this discussion, since it falls outside the scope of this work.

  91. 91.

    Kelk and Lindeman (2010), p. 56.

  92. 92.

    Some of these consequences are based on physical laws (killing Derk) and some are based on social or legal conventions (murdering Derk, since there are legal rules that specify when killing is murder). While this is an interesting difference, it plays no role in the present discussion. For more on different types of consequences see the section ‘Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Consequences’ on illocutionary and perlocutionary consequences.

  93. 93.

    This confusion exists quite often in the Netherlands, where e.g. the juridical act to contract is called the overeenkomst which leads to the overeenkomst. See also on the confusion of the difference between the juridical act and its consequences: Ruiter (1992).

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    H. D. S. van der Kaaij

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van der Kaaij, H.D.S. (2019). The Delineation of the Theoretical Concept of a Juridical Act. In: The Juridical Act. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15592-6_2

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