Abstract
Belief propagation, or the sum-product algorithm, is a powerful and well known method for inference on probabilistic graphical models, which has been proposed for the specific use in side channel analysis by Veyrat-Charvillon et al. [14].
We define a novel metric to capture the importance of variable nodes in factor graphs, we propose two improvements to the sum-product algorithm for the specific use case in side channel analysis, and we explicitly define and examine different ways of combining information from multiple side channel traces. With these new considerations we systematically investigate a number of graphical models that “naturally” follow from an implementation of AES. Our results are unexpected: neither a larger graph (i.e. more side channel information) nor more connectedness necessarily lead to significantly better attacks. In fact our results demonstrate that in practice the (on balance) best choice is to utilise an acyclic graph in an independent graph combination setting, which gives us provable convergence to the correct key distribution. We provide evidence using both extensive simulations and a final confirmatory analysis on real trace data.
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Notes
- 1.
A factor graph can also be constructed for non-iterative functions but this is not necessary for our work.
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Acknowledgements
Joey Green has been funded by an NCSC studentship. Arnab Roy and Elisabeth Oswald were funded in part by EPSRC under grant agreement EP/N011635/1 (LADA) and the ERC via the grant SEAL (Project Reference 725042).
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Green, J., Roy, A., Oswald, E. (2019). A Systematic Study of the Impact of Graphical Models on Inference-Based Attacks on AES. In: Bilgin, B., Fischer, JB. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11389. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15462-2_2
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