Abstract
Fundamental rights and Private law can collide in private-to-private relationships (horizontal situations) where the rights of two or more parties are compromised. In contractual cases, both Private law and Fundamental rights courts tend to solve their respective conflicts between private interests or Fundamental rights using the same tool: party autonomy, which is exercised through consent. Consent is also key to regulate the exercise of both private rights and Fundamental rights. However, Fundamental rights do not behave in the same way private rights do, so unlike contracts concerning private rights where the consent is enforceable and irrevocable, in contracts that waive Fundamental rights, consent needs to remain revocable. This chapter draws the following question: what correct tool should be applied by ordinary courts and Fundamental right courts in those cases where there is not only a friction between private interests and Fundamental rights, but also the original consent is revoked, and there is a multi-party relationship? The decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court 117/1994, where the Fundamental right to image and reputation is at stake and multiple parties are involved, provides useful insights in this regard. In our view, in pursuit of the correct solution in such a complex case the basic elements of personality rights had not been taken into consideration. For that reason, we propose a different approach than that followed by the Court, where (1) the Private law logic where Fundamental rights can be inserted should be applied, because of the fact that it could helped Courts examine the original agreement between the parties, and analyse the actual position of a third-party assignee from a different perspective; (2) the importance of ascertaining whether there is a clash between two private interests, or a clash between a Fundamental right and a third-party’s contractual right; and (3) in cases where there are interferences with Fundamental rights, the third party’s good faith status should not prevail over the holder’s Fundamental right to image and reputation.
David Ramos Muñoz is a member of Proyecto DER2016-78572-P, Infraestructuras e instituciones de Derecho Privado, nacional e internacional, en mercados en red: entre la regulación y la competencia. Solución arbitral de conflictos, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.
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Notes
- 1.
Pinker (2011), pp. 378–382.
- 2.
Ramos (2017), pp. 1051–1053.
- 3.
Collins (2012), pp. 25–32.
- 4.
- 5.
See the classical case of Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198; 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 January 1958, where the issue of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, but also the conflict between them, was more prominently raised.
- 6.
Ramos (2017), pp. 1051–1055, and the sources cited therein.
- 7.
Ibid pp. 1055–1060.
- 8.
Applications 10588/83, 10589/83, and 10590/83 Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, 6 Dec. 1988, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:0613JUD001058883; Application 11662/85 Oberschlink v. Austria, 23 May 1991, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1991:0523JUD001166285; Application 12151/86 FCB v. Italy, 28 August 1991, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1991:0828JUD001215186; Application 18954/91 Zana v. Turkey, 25 November 1997, ECLI:CE: ECHR:1997:1125JUD001895491; Application 1603/06 Suda v. Czech Republic, 28 October 2010, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:1028JUD000160306.
- 9.
Application 57325/00 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, 13 November 2007, ECLI:CE: ECHR:2007:1113JUD005732500 at 203 (where the ECtHR rejected the validity of consent by Roma parents to put their children in schools conceived for the mentally handicapped children). See, in contrast, see Applications 6903/75 Deweer v. Belgium, 27 March 1980; 31737/96 Osmo Suovaniemi v. Finland 23 February 1999, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0223JUD000031737; or STC 136/2010, of 2 December, Fundamento Jurídico (FJ) 2, all of which examined (and validated) consent for arbitration clauses.
- 10.
On physical integrity, see Art. 5 para. 3 Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. On privacy, see Art. 2 (3) Organic Act 1/82 on the Right of Honor.
- 11.
- 12.
See e.g. Application 57325/00 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, 13 November 2007, ECLI:CE: ECHR:2007:1113JUD005732500 (systematic discrimination by a State).
- 13.
See, e.g. Art. 35 (2) of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
- 14.
SSTC 204/1997, of 25 November, and 1/1998, of 12 January, or 192/2003, of 27 October all of which discuss the worker’s fundamental rights in the context of his/her duties arising from good faith, loyalty, and compliance with employer’s instructions.
- 15.
See, e.g. Section 241 of the German Civil Code, or Arts. 1096, 1098 and 1124 of the Spanish Civil Code.
- 16.
See, e.g. Art. 74 of the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
- 17.
See, e.g. Arts. 46 (2) and (3) of the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, or Art. 7.2.2. of the UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts.
- 18.
Application 57325/00 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, 13 November 2007, ECLI:CE: ECHR:2007:1113JUD005732500; Application 30078/00 Konstantin Markin v. Russia, 22 March 2012, ECLI:CE: ECHR:2012:0322JUD003007800.
- 19.
Applications 6903/75 Deweer v. Belgium, 27 March 1980; 31737/96 Osmo Suovaniemi v. Finland 23 February 1999, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0223JUD000031737; or STC 136/2010, of 2 December, FJ 2.
- 20.
BVerfG 19 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, p. 214 (Bürgschaft).
- 21.
See e.g. Art. 59 (1) (d) of Royal Decree 2816/1982, applicable to all establishments open to the public, Art. 21 (d) of the Act 4/1995 of the Basque Country, on Public Spectacles, or Art. 24 of Act 17/1997 of the Region of Madrid, on the same subject. In contrast, see decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court STC 73/1985, of 14 June, where the Court held that refusing to grant access to a casino to a person based on his potential to cause trouble was not discriminatory.
- 22.
Ramos (2017), pp. 1080–1081.
- 23.
The right to reputation laid down in Art. 18 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, along with the rights to honour and privacy. In this regard, the right to reputation is also recognised as a subjective right, that is a situation of power granted by the legal system to any person, who will be able to make her own decisions and defend herself from any illegitimate interference. Thus, when an illegitimate infringement of the fundamental right has been established, Art. 9.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982 provides, that harm will be presumed, and that compensation will include moral damages.
- 24.
See STC 81/2001, of 26 March, where the TC rules that the right to reputation is
susceptible to special legal basis insofar as it is the subject of a fundamental right that attributes to its holder the power to determine the graphic information generated by their physical features personal and, in its negative dimension, to prevent the capture, reproduction and publication of their image.
- 25.
The Spanish Constitution protects the right to avoid any interference with the personality rights with the aim to protect the person’s dignity. STC 139/2001, of 18 June, FJ 5: the right to reputation permits that individuals can decide what aspects of their personality want to preserve from dissemination so that individuals can ensure a private develop their own personality outside of external interferences. Art. 2.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982 singles out the inexistence of illegitimate interference when it is expressly authorised by law or when the holder of the right has granted express consent for the interference.
- 26.
Currently, the possibility of exploiting one’s image rights is beyond doubt. See e.g. Palacios and Placer (2014), p. 3.
- 27.
The actress and a photographer (‘beneficiary’) had initially signed a non-remunerated agreement in January 1985. According to such agreement, the actress granted to the beneficiary the full right to distribute worldwide, for journalistic purposes, certain nude pictures that have previously been selected and approved by her. Subsequently, the actress revoked her consent right after the beneficiary had transferred the pictures to Playboy magazine, but before Playboy magazine released the pictures. In return, the beneficiary received the amount of 1,000,000 pesetas. Finally, the nude pictures were published together with some captions, which motivated the appeal filed by the holder.
- 28.
STC 117/1994, of 25 April, FJ 7-9.
- 29.
Baines and Rubio-Marín (2010), pp. 274–275.
- 30.
In the decision by the TS (hereinafter: STS) 1212/2007 the Court understood that the players transferred the right to exploitation on the litigious images to the claimant, so they were not entitled to claim the improper commercial use of those images, but their claim fell outside of the scope of their right. See e.g. Salvador (1990), pp. 380–382.
- 31.
The ruling in STS 281/2001, ECLI: ES:TS:2001:2325, FJ 1 held that ‘the right to privacy and own image were unwaiveable rights, but they were subject to certain conditions’; in STS 400/2001, ECLI: ES:TS:2001:3256, FJ 2, the TS ruled that ‘inalienability entails the unavailability of these rights, by the holder thereof, although the holder has the faculty to dispose on certain aspects of the recognised right;’ the TS’s holding in STS 1120/2008, ECLI: ES:TS:2008:5992, FJ 2, established that ‘the law provides the holder with the right to dispose of their rights in certain cases by authorising the dissemination of one’s image for the purposes the holder deems appropriate’.
- 32.
Art. 18 of the Spanish Constitution provides that ‘the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image are guaranteed’. The civil protection of a person’s image rights comprises a list of acts that are considered illegitimate infringements of this right, such as, pursuant to Art. 7.5 of the Organic Act 1/1982, ‘the taking, reproduction, or publication, by photography, film, or any other process, of a person’s image captured in places or moments of her private life or outside of those settings…,’ and under Art. 7.6 of the Organic Act ‘the use of the name, voice, or picture of a person for purposes of advertising, business, or of a similar nature’. See e.g. STC 81/2001, of 26 March, where the TC rules that the right to reputation is the right to avoid that others different from the holder can reproduce the crucial element of one’s image right without the specific authorisation. Consequently, the capture, reproduction, or publication of any person’s image will be considered as a violation of the fundamental right to reputation.
- 33.
See e.g. Palacios and Placer (2014), p. 46, where the authors argue that the right to reputation does not have an absolute character given the limitations foreseen in Art. 8 of the Organic Act 1/1982 of 5 May for the civil protection of Honour, Privacy and Own Image. Other Spanish scholars asserts that personality rights protect the person and her personality by granting absolute subjective rights which are established in Art. 1.1 of the Organic Act 1/1982. According to the latter line of though, on the one hand, Arts. 9.1 and 9.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982 provides the individual with the possibility of claiming remedies to recover the injured subjective right and, on the other hand, Arts. 1.3, 2.2 and 2.3 determine the scope and, more importantly, the limits to party autonomy. See e.g. Vendrell (2014), Chap. I, p. 4.
- 34.
Some scholars argue that despite one person can permit that a third party publish or use her image, the holder of the right to reputation will be the assignor of the exploitation rights. In short, only partial assignments are permitted. See e.g. Vendrell (2014), Chap. II, pp. 36ff.
- 35.
This principle ‘cuts out across very different fundamental rights,’ see Ramos (2017), pp. 1051–1053. In addition, some scholars argue that private autonomy is a fundamental right that derives from the right to liberty (Art. 5 ECHR), and others from the right to property (Art. 1 First Protocol to the ECHR). Under Spanish legal system, party autonomy is recognised as a general principle applicable to private relationship pursuant to Art. 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1989 (hereinafter: Civil Code), but also is connected to human dignity and the free development of the personality, fundamental rights set out in Art. 10 of the Spanish Constitution.
- 36.
STC 117/1994, of 25 April, FJ 3. The TC considered that both the patrimonial aspect of the right to reputation and the constitutional aspect fall under Art. 18 of the Spanish Constitution.
- 37.
Unlike Spanish legal system, the approach governing the French law is strongly dualistic; it is expressed through a clear separation of patrimonial and extra-patrimonial aspects of a person’s image, rather than establishing an exclusive autonomous right to reputation comprising both dignity and patrimonial interests. The legal regime of the right to reputation under the Spanish law also differs from the American right of publicity, which is conceived as an independent right not linked to the right of privacy. The prior right protects the patrimonial dimension of one’s person (i.e., publication of pictures) whilst the right of privacy is connected to the more personal aspects of a person (i.e., intimacy, privacy, dignity). See also Moskalenko (2015), pp. 113–120.
- 38.
STC 17/1994, of 17 February, where the TC declares that the protection of economic values, patrimonial or commercial, despite worthy of protection, falls out the scope of fundamental rights…through the holder’s authorisation, one’s image can turn into an autonomous patrimonial right which is incorporated into the economic traffic.
- 39.
This approach differs from the right of publicity, a right created in the United States (common law jurisdiction) whose scope, although varies widely between States, comprises the protection of unpermitted commercial uses of one’s image. The term ‘commercial’ is defined narrowly, referring to promotion or advertising. See e.g. Barnett (1999), pp. 555–571; Vendrell (2014), Chap. I, pp. 37– 39. See also Moskalenko (2015), pp. 113–120, where the author cites that according to North American jurisprudence and scholars ‘the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity’ is called right of publicity. In other civil law traditions, personality rights are conceived as rights that ‘concern the various aspects of the human personality’ and seek to safeguard the ‘dignity’ aspect of a person’s image, see e.g. Mak (2007), p. 57.
- 40.
- 41.
In STS 400/2001, ECLI: ES:TS:2001:3256, the holder assigned to a beneficiary some pictures in exchange for economic compensation. The beneficiary used the pictures overreaching the terms included in the assignment agreement. The TS ruled that the reproduction, transfer or disclosure of the pictures contravening the agreement did not undermine the holder’s image, and thus constituted a case of breach of contract, a conclusion drawn from the holder’s express consent. However, the existence of a contract would automatically not to lead to conclude that there is no violation of fundamental rights. It will depend on the activities consented by the holder.
- 42.
Clavería (1994), pp. 40–44, the author argues that, where there is contractual consent to permits illegitimate interferences with the holder’s image rights, rather than the revocation of consent provided for in Art. 2.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982, the laws and rules that govern contracts must be applied so that, so in case of overreach the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the rules of breach of contract. This line of reasoning posits that the commercial use of the right to reputation does not disrupt the ‘moral dimension’ of the right, since the values involved in a contract are different from those when there is a mere tolerance, so in case of overreach the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the rules of breach of contract. The Spanish TS tends to link the existence of a contract for the commercial use of one’s image to the application of the termination of contracts and remedies stated in the Civil Code. See also STS 830/2008, ECLI: ES:TS:2008:4866; STS 152/2009, ECLI: ES:TS:2009:613.
- 43.
Art. 2.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982. From a contractual perspective, the revocation of consent stated in the Organic Act 1/1982 may be understood as an exception to Art. 1256 of the Civil Code, which provides that: ‘the validity and the fulfilment of the contracts cannot be left to the discretion of one of the contracting parties’.
- 44.
STS 266/2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1779, FJ 9, where the TS rules that the revocation of consent not only impinges on the right to reputation as a patrimonial right, but also as a fundamental right.
- 45.
Palacios and Placer (2014), p. 11. See e.g. Oliveira (2017), p. 264:
[t]he right to personal development aims both at the protection of personality, since this free development of one’s personality is an essential part of one’s individuality, and also at the protection of freedom, in the sense that every human being should be able to decide how to act. Therefore, the right to personal development should also be protected within the relations between private persons; in order to guarantee that, the right to personal development is now also recognised as a personality right, which benefits from the protection and remedies stipulated in Civil law.
- 46.
STC 117/1994, of 25 April, FJ 4.
- 47.
Alternatively, both the moral and economic dimensions of the right of own image must be subject to Art. 18 of the Spanish Constitution. The validity of the revocation of consent in cases where the parties have signed a contract for the commercial use and exploitation of the holder’s image right has been a controversial issue. On the one hand, some scholars advocate for the exclusion of the revocation of consent provided for in Art. 2.3 of the Organic Law when the parties signed a contract based on the idea that such contract should be subject to the rules of the Contract law. On the other hand, other scholars argue that the mere organisation of the holder-authoriser’s interests and of the authorised by means of a contract cannot mean the automatic exclusion of the right to revocation of the consent in Art. 2.3 of the Organic Act 1/1982. A different matter may be ascertaining the specific legal nature that covers the exercise of this power when the consent is given in a long-term contract. See Santos (2004), pp. 2–10.
- 48.
STS 400/2001, ECLI: ES:TS:2001:3256, where a first assignee transferred the holder’s image to a second assignee that published the pictures without the holder’s consent. It is noteworthy that the second assignee was not responsible according to the TS on the grounds that, when the picture was published, it had already been disclosed previously and the holder had permitted such publication. Thus, when the second magazine published the picture, it had ‘lost the connection with the holder.
- 49.
Vendrell (2014), Chap. II, p. 72.
- 50.
STC 117/1994, of 25 April, FJ 9.
- 51.
See STC 117/1994, of 25 April, narrative of the facts, para. 2, where the Court indicates that the court of first instance, the appellate court, and the Supreme Court had all three discussed the ‘good faith third party’ nature of Playboy magazine, and the substantial sums disbursed by it.
- 52.
Díez-Picazo (1996), p. 77, the author distinguishes contract and agreement depending on the interests of the parties; so, if the parties’ interests are conflicting, there is a contract (i.e., a contract for the sale of a house); if the parties’ interests share the same objective, there is an agreement (i.e., in STC 117/1994, of 25 April, the actress and the photographer wanted, at the time when the agreement was concluded, to promote the nude pictures of the actress to gain benefits).
- 53.
Díez-Picazo (1996), pp. 82–84. The objective theory argues that what is important to ascertain whether an agreement is onerous or gratuitous is the economic structure of the act, without considering the special interests of each party (animus donandi), which are legally irrelevant, and it will be also important detect if there are patrimonial advantages for both parties or only for one of them, although when those advantages could sometimes be indirect. The subjective theory is followed by French scholars. According to this theory, an agreement will be onerous only where there is a generosity intention. See e.g. Díez-Picazo (1996), p. 84.
- 54.
Arts. 619 and 622 of the Civil Code.
- 55.
Actually, he received the payment of 1,000,000 of pesetas in return when he transferred the pictures to Playboy magazine.
- 56.
Díez-Picazo (1996), pp. 80–84.
- 57.
Cañizares et al. (2014), p. 55 et. seq.; Díez Picazo and Gullón (2015), p. 83; Lasarte (2016), pp. 172–174; Gitrama (1962), pp. 301–375. The author argues that the revocation of consent was appropriate in those cases where third parties are entitled to interfere the personal sphere of the holder as a result of the mere tolerance of the holder. On the other hand, for ‘contractual cases’, the author accepts the revocation of consent in contracts where the parties did not agree on a specific duration and/or where the parties have agreed that the holder could revoke his consent.
- 58.
The ruling in STS 900/2007, ECLI: ES:TS:2007:5413, the donor revoked his donation of some plots to the Ministry of Defence (recipient) of Spain because the recipient had breached the ‘conditions’ imposed by the donor when the Ministry transferred the plots to a company for housing construction. The two critical aspects examined by the TS were the following: (1) the donor’s will, and (2) the consequences of the revocation of the donation when the recipient does not satisfy the ‘mode or condition’ imposed by the donor. In relation to the first issue, the TS ruled in favour of the donor alleging that the donation was a modal (onerous) donation because the recipient accepted the destination imposed by the donor: the plot would be used as a military camp. The ‘conditions’ were unfulfilled by the Ministry since the plots were sold to a third party, regardless the Ministry’s will to use the economic benefit received in return to achieve Ministry’s interests. If the property donated is immoveable property, Art. 34 of Ley Hipotecaria will be applicable. In addition, the TS stressed that the argument alleged by recipient that the economic benefit received for the sale would be destined for the interests of the Ministry of Defence, must be rejected because the donation purpose (modo) was never intended for that destination, but for military use. See STS 900/2007, ECLI: ES:TS:2007:5413, FJ 3.
- 59.
- 60.
STS 900/2007, ECLI: ES:TS:2007:5413. The TS rules that the breach of the conditions by the recipient opens the door to terminate the contract and bring the immoveable property back to the donor, although the donated property had been acquired by a third person (i.e., ex tunc enforceability).
- 61.
Cañizares et al. (2014), pp. 55ff.
- 62.
Some scholars argue the revocation of consent provision avoids the possibility that the recipient could continue to enjoy the property donated by the donor after the former had breached the ‘conditions’ imposed by the donor (enriquecimiento sin causa). See e.g. in Cañizares et al. (2014), pp. 55 et. seq. The right to revoke the donation avoids the situation where the recipient has breached the condition required by the donor, but such recipient still enjoys the ownership of the property donated, what is namely unjust enrichment under the Spanish Civil law.
- 63.
Palacios and Placer (2014), p. 20. In those agreements where there is not a contract period included, the construction of consent should be narrow. In STS 266/2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1779, the TS rules in a case where the assignment of a model’s right to reputation was signed for one year with the possibility of renewal, that the faculty to exercise the revocation of consent ‘at any time’ necessarily excludes not only ‘agreements in perpetuity’, but also ‘a period of subjection to the agreement’, even if in the latter situation the holder must pay damages to the other contracting party.
- 64.
STS 490/2002, ECLI: ES:TS:2002:2935 and STS 754/2008, ECLI: ES:TS:2008:4310, where the TS respectively held that the authorisation for the publication of a picture in a magazine does not entail subsequent publications by other magazines; and the consent to use a picture for the promotion of a product by a company does not include the permission to use the picture in a different promotion of a similar product by other company. In this vein, see e.g. Martínez (2011).
- 65.
STS 490/2002, ECLI: ES:TS:2002:2935. The TS held that despite the constitutional dimension of the right to reputation had not been undermined, authorisation gave to a magazine for the publication of pictures does not entail further authorisation to transfer the right to a third person. Accordingly, the consent to use a photo for a promotion does not include its use for the advertising campaign of a third-party.
- 66.
Art. 464 of the Civil Code. There are two different theories that defend the position of third parties acting in good faith: (1) when those parties possess ‘proper title’ (traditional theory), or (2) non-revocability principle should apply to the extent that the third party acted in good faith, except when the real owner has illegally been deprived of his property.
- 67.
See STS 37/2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:332, which, in case of doubt, classified the transaction as an assignment of contract.
- 68.
Pantaleón (1988), p. 1053.
- 69.
Paz-Ares (1995), pp. 81–106.
- 70.
Art. 14 6°, of the Spanish Intellectual Property Act.
- 71.
STC 14/2003, of 19 February, ascertains that the purpose of the right is to safeguard a personal space to freely decide the development of one’s personality and, ultimately, a necessary environment to maintain a minimum quality of human life. This right is preserved by recognising the faculty of avoiding the illegitimate dissemination of one’s physical aspect, since it constitutes the first element that shapes the privacy of any person. Thus, the fundamental value of human dignity is also preserved. In this vein, STC 72/2007; of 16 April.
- 72.
STS 266/2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1779, FJ 9, ‘the revocation of consent also affects the right to reputation as a fundamental right, that is, not exclusively in its purely patrimonial aspect or dimension, since the Organic Act 1/1982 grants an essential attribute’.
- 73.
See STS 1500/2016; ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1500.
- 74.
STS 754/2008, ECLI: ES:TS:2008:4310, an appeal was filed by a model alleging that a photographer had transferred the rights to exploit her image to REVLON, and this company had used her image without her consent. The TS focused on two points: (1) the consent given, and (2) the exploitation of the model’s right by the REVLON.
- 75.
STS 754/2008, ECLI: ES:TS:2008:4310, the TS did not find that REVLON was responsible for the damages suffered by the model. In addition, the TS found that REVLON was not responsible given that, when REVLON acquired the pictures from the photographer, the express assignment seemed to be done by the owner of the pictures (the model), so that this situation created an appearance in which REVLON could trust.
- 76.
In similar terms STS 152/2009, ECLI: ES:TS:2009:613, where the Court’s ruling established that the assignment of a football player’s image to a company that published an advertisement that focused on the sport skills of the football player was not an illegitimate interference with the football player’s fundamental right to reputation. In this vein, the assignee who makes an assignment that exceeds the powers assigned by contract, is convicted in accordance with Art. 1101 of the Civil Code, provided that the claimant proves the effective existence of the damage. It does not play, therefore, the provision of Art. 9.3 of the Organic Law 1/1982 in virtue of which the existence of the damage is presumed whenever the existence of the interference is proven.
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Muñoz, D.R., García, E.C. (2019). The Fundamental Right to Image, Contract and Third Parties in Spain: A Roadmap for Pluralist Private Relations?. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L., Hutchison, A. (eds) More Constitutional Dimensions of Contract Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15107-2_3
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