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A Demonstration of an Application of the Bertrand Network: Guessing the Distribution of Buyers Within the Market

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Information Systems for Industry 4.0

Abstract

Bertrand and the Cournot model are one of the most used model for modeling competition between companies. This paper presents a work-in-progress that studies the application of the recently developed Bertrand Network model by using it in a reverse manner: first it is considered that firms are competing in equilibrium, then, after analyzing how companies are choosing prices, it is calculated which distribution of buyers would lead to that equilibrium. An unreal example is presented to help to understand the model. Furthermore, a formula is suggested to expand the networked model to allow a mix of duopolies and oligopolies.

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Correspondence to João Paulo Pereira .

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Ferreira, M.H.P., Pereira, J.P. (2019). A Demonstration of an Application of the Bertrand Network: Guessing the Distribution of Buyers Within the Market. In: Ramos, I., Quaresma, R., Silva, P., Oliveira, T. (eds) Information Systems for Industry 4.0. Lecture Notes in Information Systems and Organisation, vol 31. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14850-8_8

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