Abstract
The Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices of power in a yes-no voting system are presented and their concepts are compared. A unified self-checking method of computing both indices in one setting is introduced. The question of when a given yes-no voting system can be represented by weights and a quota is addressed and the relevant theorem of Taylor and Zwicker is partially proven and their novel example of the magic square voting system is presented. The elementary concepts in combinatorics, needed to understand the material, is presented.
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El-Helaly, S. (2019). Yes-No Voting. In: The Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment. Compact Textbooks in Mathematics. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14768-6_2
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Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Cham
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