Mid-twentieth-century “consumer engineering” in the United States was a vision of marketing experts on how to establish and manage a capitalist consumer society with steady economic growth and a rising level of wealth for the broad majority of the population. 1 Targeting the “citizen consumer,” it promoted the promise that everyone could earn a good living and that the “American dream” could be realized by a large portion of society. At the same time, consumer engineering was a professionalization strategy, “an enticing expression to one who wishes to dignify his calling with a professional label.” 2 The consumerist gospel of these experts was informed by the American system of manufacturing, consumer goods that were standardized, as well as an efficient and rationalized organization of distribution and sales. 3 The growing U.S. wealth and consumer goods output garnered intense interest among European businesspeople, politicians, and experts before World War I, during the 1920s, and after the Allied victory in World War II. This article will focus on a particular group of these intermediaries led by the German publisher and entrepreneur Victor Vogt. A representative of the German standardization movement and driven by his assessment of Germany’s defeat in World War I, he and a larger group of business practitioners and consultants tried to inform German businesspeople about American principles of business, marketing, and consumer goods sales—and to formulate a suitable “German” response.

As a platform of information and interaction for practitioners in production, the wholesale trade, and retailing, Vogt established the monthly journal Verkaufspraxis (roughly: Sales Practices) in 1925. The trade journal was, at least until the Great Depression, a clear advocate of American business and sales methods. At the same time, however, it tried to merge these with a pronounced German understanding of entrepreneurship and business culture. 4 Published from 1925 until 1943 and again from 1949 until 1964, it held a leading position in the German market for business advice literature during two periods of intense “Americanization.” 5

Victor Vogt and the Journal Verkaufspraxis

Neither Vogt nor Verkaufspraxis have found recognition in historical research. 6 Not even a Wikipedia article offers any biographical or institutional basics. This lacuna, however, says nothing about the significance of Vogt, his group of experts, or his journal. Instead, it reflects the one-sidedness of marketing and consumption historiography, which focuses predominantly on advertising journals and the gurus of consumer engineering, while neglecting the practical work of entrepreneurs in the consumer goods industries. 7 In addition, the tradition of German business studies has been neglected, as have American-German knowledge transfers, and interwar business practices (Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1
figure 1

Source: Verkaufspraxis, no. 3 (1925/26): 2.

Victor Vogt, 1925.

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Victor Vogt was born on April 16, 1887, in the Silesian middle town of Frankenstein as the son of the banker Richard Vogt. 8 After studying economics, he completed a commercial apprenticeship at his father’s bank, before starting work for the Deutsche Bank in Paris and London. 9 His interest in organizational studies and journalism developed in the United Kingdom, not in the United States. 10 He returned to Germany in 1912, where he worked two years for the Berlin Bankhaus S. Bleichröder, before taking over the editorial office of the journal Organisation: Zeitschrift für praktische Geschäftsführung, Reklame und Plakatkunst (Organization: Journal for Practical Business Management, Advertising, and Poster Art) in April 1914 and becoming proxy director (Prokura) of its Charlottenburg-based publishing house in June 1914. 11 From 1915 to 1919, he served as an officer of the German Army and was severely wounded in late 1916. 12 Discharged from active service, he additionally took over the editorial office of the Deutsche Büro-Zeitung (German Office Newspaper) and worked as a consultant to banks and merchant houses. Vogt was surely one of the representatives of the early rationalization movement, which started already before the war and was deeply influenced by American ideas of scientific management and corresponding German traditions. 13 In 1920, the publisher and consultant also started his first business, co-founding an injection molding firm in the town of Birkenwerder. 14 The combination of theoretical knowledge and practical experience that had marked his career to this point would become his hallmark in the following decades.

In the early 1920s, Vogt published his first advice books, which were intended to help rationalize the daily routines of managing manufacturing and marketing. He taught the use of filing cards and registries, and he co-authored an impressive 644-page overview of office machines available in Germany and the United States. 15 This last book was discussed (and used) on both sides of the Atlantic. 16 Indeed, despite the common notion of Europe being “Americanized,” there was never just a one-way flow of traffic in ideas and practices in business organization and rationalization.

Vogt wrote his books at the same time he was consulting for many firms. In the early 1920s, he developed office organization systems and new types of “rational” office furniture intended to embody his ideas about efficient business management. Vogt produced and promoted his innovations through the Büro-Einrichtungsfabrik Fortschritt (Progress Office Furnishings Factory) in Freiburg i. B., which was founded in 1901 by Otto Skrebba and employed up to several hundred people. 17 From 1925 until his death in 1960, Vogt acted as a director of this important producer of office equipment. 18

Vogt’s business activities can help to broaden our perspective to include Germany’s prosperous and industrious Southwest. After the hyperinflation of 1923, Victor Vogt started another long-lasting collaboration, this time with Julius Hans Forkel. Beginning in 1914, Forkel had published regularly updated maps of the war situation and founded (with the financial support of the publisher and bookseller Franckh’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung) an eponymous publishing house for business in Stuttgart in 1919. 19 Since 1991 part of Hüthig Publishers, this small firm would not only publish Vogt’s books and Verkaufspraxis but also become one of the most successful purveyors of business advice literature during the Weimar and especially the Nazi periods. Although most of Forkel’s books on marketing, sales, advertising, and business practices were written by German business experts, translations of core books from the American debate were an important element of its portfolio. 20

Vogt was Forkel’s most successful author. In 1926, he published Taschenbuch der Geschäftstechnik, a compendium of business techniques, which combined his own business experience with a detailed analysis of U.S. and British literature. 21 Already in 1926, Vogt added a new book on sales psychology for salesmen and shop assistants, co-authored with the American specialist Frederick A. Russell. 22 Vogt’s largest and most important book Absatzprobleme (Marketing Problems) appeared in 1929. 23 Based on the detailed expertise of the U.S. literature, this detailed guide was intended for executives and salesmen in the consumer goods industries. Revised several times, it was used in (West) Germany until the 1980s. Vogt also published several smaller pamphlets on branding and distribution techniques during the early Nazi period. 24 By then, however, he was first and foremost active as editor, columnist, and author of the journal Verkaufspraxis.

The journal’s mission was clear-cut and ambitious:

This new monthly reveals how the successful American and Englishman achieve their great sales revenues. It treats the many interesting American and English books and journals on selling in which practitioners reveal their business secrets without hesitation. The material suited for increasing sales in the German context is offered in a beautifully produced journal . 25

Verkaufspraxis was established in 1925 as an interface between business theories and business practices, between the Anglo-Saxon world and Germany. Consequently, the target audience was not academics or even advertisers but instead entrepreneurs, executives, managers, and salespeople in the consumer goods industries. Whereas advertising agencies played an increasingly dominant role in the United States and the United Kingdom, in Germany their functions were partially discharged by expert intermediaries working for trade journals like Verkaufspraxis.

Circulation figures are always a tricky business, but Verkaufspraxis was certainly the most widely read journal in the field of business administration, business practices, and advertising. In 1929, the journal had some 12,000 subscribers and a total print run of 14,000. 26 Even in 1930, after the start of the world economic crisis, the print run was still 11,480. 27 In April 1929, Vogt and the Verlag für Wirtschaft und Verkehr also established a supplement to Verkaufspraxis called Bausteine: Blätter zur Förderung des geschäftlichen und persönlichen Erfolgs (Building Blocks: Newspaper for the Promotion of Managerial and Personal Success). Its perforated pages could be torn in two and collected in a business card file. The supplement was included until 1932. All in all, Verkaufspraxis was a commercial success. Its economic foundations were sounder than those of most of its more specialized competitors. 28

Working for Recovery, Fighting for National Strength: Partial Adoption of U.S. Consumer Engineering Techniques in the 1920s

Although the term “consumer engineering” was not coined until 1932, the idea behind it was already common in the 1920s, in both the United States and Germany. The American advertising executive Ernest Elmo Calkins (1868–1964), whose work was deeply influenced by his European experiences, promoted similar ideas a few years before he wrote the preface to “Consumer Engineering .” 29 He defined the term as “a latent dynamic force, inherent in things [that] occasionally manifested strange phenomena.” 30 To some degree, it had already shaped the 1920s, even without the catchphrase, which functions as a simple marker for historians, who often ignore the manifold related publications and activities before the Great Depression and their lure of hope and change in the marketplace. The phrase “consumer engineering” was a commercial narrative from the early 1930s. It was used by successful marketing moneymakers during the 1940s and 1950s to promote their own work. Nonetheless, a simple retrospective of the term’s usage hides more than it uncovers.

Consumer engineering was based on the idea that experts, courageous leaders in their specific fields of expertise, should and could rationalize and improve the commercial sphere for the public good. Similar to the older idea of “social engineering,” which aimed to pacify class struggles already before World War I, consumer engineering sought to harmonize conflicting interests in an authoritative way, that is, through the use of expert knowledge. 31 In the United States, such ideas were deeply shaped by the transformative experience of economic planning during World War I and by the moral crusade of the fair trade movement during the interwar years, which pushed for retail protection from chain stores through price maintenance. Both stood in deep contrast to a free market society and demanded modesty, integrity, and respect for all actors in the spheres of production, trade, and consumption. 32 It was more than coincidence that Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World was written in this period (Fig. 7.2). 33

Fig. 7.2
figure 2

This image of the same man as both a lawyer and a businessman was supposed to promote völkisch self-restraint among business’s consumer experts. Source: Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 192.

“You are your customer’s advocate.”

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A project of business and knowledge elites, consumer engineering stood in strict opposition to cooperative ideals of modern consumer societies and to the “consumerism” advocated, for instance, by U.S. economist Sidney A. Reeve or, in the German case, Franz Staudinger. 34 These two men had already offered dreamworlds of a steady and affordable supply of standardized consumer goods in which everyone got a square deal. Matters were further complicated by a plethora of “bright modernity,” including new colors, new printing technologies, new media, and new materials. 35

As the director of the Fortschritt office furnishings factory, Victor Vogt encountered such visions of modern consumption and produced modern and aesthetic durables—furniture, filling cabinets, office stationeries, and organizational forms. Vogt’s growing interest in marketing and rationalization was also deeply rooted in his war experiences, however. “Organization” was not just a key slogan of the 1910s but was also crucial to the war effort. Soldiers, material, and foodstuffs had to be “organized.” For many patriotic Germans, like Vogt, Germany’s defeat resulted from a lack of organization in the civil sector. The adoption of U.S. and British business models and consumer engineering techniques by Victor Vogt and his Verkaufspraxis represented a tribute to victorious enemies in war and superior competitors in peace. Advanced efficiency in business and the consumer sphere were supposed to help Germany rebuild by recapturing important domestic and foreign markets. New knowledge and improved methods also had an important social impact for bourgeois experts like Vogt and his staff. Such expertise would help sustain and improve the position of honest and diligent businessmen facing the rigid measures mandated by the Treaty of Versailles, which severely undermined the competitiveness both of German exports and of goods made in Germany for the domestic market. 36

Vogt, Forkel, and many of the hand-picked authors of Verkaufspraxis were deeply shaped by the experiences of World War I, not to mention Germany’s relatively weak position in business after the Revolution of 1918–1919 and the emergence of the Weimar welfare state. For these authors, business rationalization represented a continuation of the war in an honourable, fair, and individual way. Vogt saw himself as a kind of general training officers for a larger battle. He and his collaborators understood rationalization and the adoption of consumer engineering as crucial elements in the reconfiguration of Germany’s intellectual and material life. 37 They wanted to form a new army of business experts and consumer engineers that could compete with those in the United States and Great Britain. 38 Vogt captured the guiding principle behind their understanding of business practices in the final sentence of his business handbook: “Bees do not obey; the spirit of discipline guides them.” 39

Consequently, the U.S.–German knowledge transfer was only partial. Vogt was particularly interested in the fair trade movement and American crusades to purify business and improve morality. Less interesting were the management techniques of leading corporations. 40 Although the German experts were impressed by U.S. growth rates and wealth, they perceived the United States predominantly as a young, enthusiastic nation, eager to innovate and to learn quickly. These were the attributes that could help Germany to rebuild its earlier leading position in international business, innovation, and service.

In other words, we face the apparently paradoxical situation that Vogt and Verkaufspraxis were not interested in “Americanizing” German business at all, not if we understand “Americanization” as a monolithic, unidirectional knowledge transfer. 41 On the contrary, Vogt and his associates saw American (and British) business methods not as worthy of outright adoption but rather as tools that could help repair and improve German business. 42 In contrast to the dominant ideas of American rationalization and in accordance with the U.S. fair trade movement, Vogt and his colleagues advocated cooperative “German” business ethics of “live and let live” and a particular understanding of functional differentiation in business. 43 Specifically, they believed that producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers performed specific functions for both their own benefit and for the common good. Competition was accepted but limited by mutual respect for other actors in the market sphere. They were convinced of the higher quality and uniqueness of German goods and services, even if scarce economic resources and a smaller domestic market got in the way. Consequently, Victor Vogt and Verkaufspraxis offered only a partial adoption of U.S. consumer engineering techniques based on the staff’s business expertise, social position, national pride, and market-liberal convictions. 44

This partial adoption of American (and British) ideas about rationalization and consumer engineering techniques still offered a broad range of new ideas and information for German business executives in production, the wholesale trade, and retailing. Vogt believed that an inventive nation like Germany had no substantial problems in production, although more efficiency was necessary. Instead, he saw increasing sales as the core challenge. Moreover, accomplishing this “feat” would require “a broad range of qualities, skills, and knowledge.” 45 Selling, however, was not a material interaction between two parties but the establishment of long-lasting business relations. 46 In accordance with ideas developed by the Canadian-British author and editor Herbert N. Casson, Verkaufspraxis authors understood selling as a “service” delivered for the satisfaction of the customer, who was often another business, namely, a retailer or a wholesaler. 47 Vogt advocated scientific and psychological sales methods, based on general rules and as expressions of personality and individuality. 48

It is possible to identify efforts of knowledge transfers in at least eight areas:

First, the journal informed readers about ongoing efforts in rationalization and the broad field of applied Taylorism. Punch cards, developed and propagated by the German-American immigrant entrepreneur Herman Hollerith, were presented and discussed as well as U.S. cost accounting equipment. 49 The authors introduced workflow studies that evinced a specific interest in standardization methods and in eliminating inefficient routines in business administration and the promotion and sale of consumer goods. 50

Second, Verkaufspraxis had a strong focus on market and consumer analysis. 51 Contributing authors presented American and British examples that emphasized clearly defined categorizations and predominantly quantitative methods. At the same time, however, the journal covered quite different qualitative approaches. 52 Consumer typologies, for instance, were discussed, mostly based on a combination of psychological research and practical knowledge. 53

Third, the staff wanted to take King or Queen Consumer seriously. 54 Victor Vogt, who wrote an introduction to every issue, constantly emphasized the crucial role of service for economic success. The authors presented many illustrated proposals to improve sales organization and to treat consumers with respect and courtesy. 55

Forth, consumers were understood as the vanishing point of any economic (and social) reform. Although Vogt and his practitioners were entrepreneurs and managers, they turned their perspective toward the economic interests of all—which meant the ubiquity of consumers and consumer interests. At the same time, however, consumers had to learn to fulfill their role in society. This included education and guidance by experts, by business leaders, who would accomplish their noble mission, if need be, by fighting “consumer torpor.” 56

Fifth, the staff of Verkaufspraxis was particularly interested in rationalizing points of sale. 57 They offered a lot of advice about the statistical acquisition of empirical data on sales volumes and rhythms, and they evaluated the growing number of formulas and methods for forming such knowledge. 58 At the same time, the journal’s experts were attracted to the “modern” psychology of shopping, discussing its consequences for organizing salesrooms and arranging consumer goods in them. 59

Sixth, the authors understood selling as a profession whose requisite knowledge, ethos, and skill set could be learned and improved on. The rationalization of selling was linked to the systematic training and education of shops assistants and salesmen. 60 The German journal was fascinated by quite simple American teaching tools, questionnaires for shop assistants and shop owners, and their hidden idea of programing people with the superior knowledge of sales experts. 61

Seventh, Verkaufspraxis had a specific interest in analyzing American and British advertising, as it was practiced by advertising agencies both abroad and in Germany. New trends were presented, and examples of appealing aesthetics were offered. 62 Of particular interest were the advertising campaigns by Anglo-Saxon multinationals, which became both competitors of and models for midsize German firms. 63

Eighth, many articles dealt with purchasing motives and how to create consumer desire with new goods, better service, and more effective communication. 64 Although mostly resulting from business practice and everyday psychology, the journal offered early forms of motivational research long before this method was developed in more detail by Austrian-German immigrants in the United States . 65

Vogt and Verkaufspraxis were convinced that this partial adoption of American (and British) consumer engineering techniques would help German business gain ground in domestic and foreign markets and likewise enable German consumers to afford cheaper goods and an increased material standard of living. At the same time, the journal’s large readership not only indicated relevant resonance among readers but also underlined a core difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the German markets. Although the number of marketing and advertising consultants and agencies was growing in Germany, the consumer market there was still deeply shaped by individual entrepreneurs and managers. 66 Vogt’s permanent appeal to readers’ individualism, personality, moral and honesty was grounded in the different social structure of Germany’s business community.

The Great Depression, however, undermined this agenda of partial adoption. On the one hand, the economic slump hit the United States hard: “The American ‘Economic Miracle’ has come to an end” was one telling reaction in Verkaufspraxis. 67 On the other hand, the establishment of a presidential dictatorship in Germany led to intensified market interventions by the state. As with the national-liberal economists of the so-called Freiburg School, who developed the guiding principles of the West German social market economy and neoliberalism in the early 1930s, 68 this development eventually led to a reinterpretation of the role of the state—and then of the racial state—by Vogt and Verkaufspraxis’ authors.

The Crisis of National-Liberalism and the Emergence of the Interventionist (Racial) State

Vogt and Verkaufspraxis exemplify the intellectual and conceptual consequences of German liberalism’s decline. Organized in the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the national-liberal German People’s Party (DVP), liberalism manifested itself in the former as a guardian of German republican and constitutional traditions, whereas its representatives in the latter were generally perceived as aligned with heavy industry. The DDP represented the self-employed bourgeoisie and most German Jews, while the DVP represented national and nationalist entrepreneurs, managers, and the propertied. Both liberal parties had a stronghold in the German Southwest. 69 We do not know Vogt’s party preferences, but his lead articles combined ideas of a free market economy with a basically peaceful policy of revising the postwar order.

Typical for Vogt was a puzzling national-liberal mix of economic self-help, an elitist code of ethics, and resolute nationalism. 70 Vogt envisioned a corporatist state, where everybody would work efficiently in his position and act voluntarily for the common good of the German Volk or people. 71 From May 1929, Vogt became more political in his columns. As an entrepreneur, he strenuously opposed the Weimar Republic’s welfare state, which he believed was undermining morality and self-reliance. 72 He complained about the heavy tax burden, which he perceived as a hefty penalty for private initiative. Still some months away from the Wall Street Crash of 1929, he was remained convinced that the emerging economic crisis could be handled by rekindling the entrepreneurial spirit. He welcomed the new authoritarian direction of German politics after the collapse of the great coalition in March 1930. State and individuals had to restrain themselves in order to overcome the economic and psychological crisis. 73 But he still believed in self-help and the entrepreneurial spirit, which would serve the common good. 74 Therefore he strenuously rejected the Federal emergency Act of June 27, 1930, paving the road to a planned economy and to serfdom. 75

Vogt was convinced that business did not exist for politics, but reasonable politics were a precondition for prosperous business. 76 At the same time, he argued that political opinions should not interfere with the conduct of business. 77 In contrast to most representatives of the Mittelstand , the large group of midsize and smaller entrepreneurs, craftsmen, and retailers, he defended corporations and large-scale firms, department and chain stores, as long as they were founded on sound economic principles. 78 But he also believed in an economy with a large number of small and middle-sized firms and shops run by independent entrepreneurs. 79 This was similar to the ideas of the United States fair trade movement. Vogt, however, warned that their trust in state-help was a dangerous illusion. 80 He attributed the economic crisis to excessive state activity. He instead wanted to see a “new democracy” in business life, based on the cooperation of entrepreneurs, experts, and firms. 81 Voluntary chains, which were on the rise in the United States, could be one answer, purchasing cooperation and local and regional communities of interest another. 82 Cooperation could combine the spirit of free entrepreneurs and independent managers with the efficiency and lower costs of large business organizations. Vogt’s ideas were typical for the early 1930s, when the search was on for a third way between capitalism and communism. Another author expressed the mood soon after the economic crisis began:

From the New World comes intoxication over the reign of machines and numbers. The dollar as ultimate authority. Business is everything. Every man only worth what he earns. From the East reverberates the gospel of the masses. Equal rights for all. Everybody worth the same as the next person. No independent individualized existence, only the collective (Allgemeinheit). Caught in the middle: the German. 83

A different economic order seemed necessary to achieve an overarching sense of accomplishing prosperity and defending independent business. Vogt himself anticipated an end of marketing as consumer engineering before it had even been put into practice: “It is not possible to develop a larger demand for the people and afterwards expect partial relinquishments.” 84 He argued for an extension of public relief works to create additional income and facilitate higher rates of consumption—before the National Labor Service was founded in June 1931. But the focus of Verkaufspraxis articles shifted from the consumer to the internal workings of the consumer goods and retailing industries. 85 Consumer engineering efforts did not match the realities of high levels of debt, declining rates of production and consumption, or mass impoverishment.

During the crisis, Victor Vogt and Verkaufspraxis maintained their course. Editor and staff complained about the ongoing economic slump, the fatalism of most German people, and the growing levels of state intervention. Vogt criticized the leading political parties, especially the Social Democrats and the Nazi party for economic ideas involving more state planning and regulation: “Economic-interventionist experiments won’t pave the way for recovery. Only a return to character [Persönlichkeit] and individual achievement will.” 86 He recommended fundamental optimism and a noble attitude, praising Henry Ford as a role model. 87 In contrast to many representatives of heavy industry, he argued courageously against autarky. 88

Vogt expected the Great Depression to be a moral watershed. The enticement of foreign capital and the promise of more efficient production methods had led to neglect limitations in German business after the heavy losses caused by World War I and then hyperinflation. 89 Steady reconstruction work was necessary. Believing the economic crisis to have been the result of widespread corruption in business and state affairs, moreover, he saw need for fresh entrepreneurial integrity. 90 Vogt used harsh arguments against white-collar crime and its only modest punishment, a stance he shared with National Socialists. 91 Vogt advocated a public pillory and other rigid changes in the treatment of corrupt business leaders. “Weaklings, washouts, profiteers, and notorious fraudsters” should be expelled from the community of honest businessmen. 92 This should still be an internal affair of the professionals, but the state could support such efforts. But Vogt did not stop there. He also directed his furor against those consumers who had been corrupted by bargains and consumer credit. If they had supported honest businesses, the crisis would be less deep. Consumer engineering was based on the short-term perspective of economic men and women. 93 A true consumer would reflect on the long-term consequences of his purchases for local communities, the social order, and the well-being of all Germans. Vogt argued for a culture of mutual respect, which paradoxically he found from 1933 in National Socialist governmental measures and in the actions of other business representatives. 94

Cooperation and Community: Consumption Engineering and the “Rational” Nazi State

Germany’s turn from a presidential to a National Socialist dictatorship in 1933 did not change the format of Verkaufspraxis . In clear ignorance of the significance of the historical changes, Vogt welcomed “the great purge” and applauded the recovery of “free entrepreneurship.” 95 And he welcomed other state interventions, for instance, advertising regulations, as markers of a new, fair order. 96 Although the Hitler cabinet intensified its regulatory and intervention efforts, most entrepreneurs understood this turn as part of a renewal and as unavoidable exceptional measures for recovery. 97

Vogt and Verkaufspraxis continued their work under National Socialism, although they were critical of the “social” agenda of the Nazi party and government. The journal maintained its core agenda, supplying information and advice for businesses. Self-help and improvement remained the core topics, although advertising and internal business organization became more important from the mid-1930s. In his lead articles, Vogt supported the new National Socialist government and Germany’s successful revision of the Versailles treaty. The national perspective was strong, but Verkaufspraxis was neither explicitly racist nor anti-Semitic. 98 Meanwhile, the journal’s strong market position played an integral role in the Forkel publishing house’s becoming a major player in the fields of business and law during the Third Reich.

Important gradual changes occurred in the journal’s content during the 1930s, however. U.S. consumer expertise was still relevant, but the number of articles on the subject declined from the beginning of the Great Depression. The United States was no longer the unchallenged model of modern business, whereas Germany’s economic star was on the rise again after 1933–1934. Verkaufspraxis still presented and discussed U.S. innovations and improvements, but these became additions to the stories of growing performance by German firms and experts. 99 This changing flow of ideas reflected Vogt’s conviction that Germany was no longer dependent on U.S. consumer engineering techniques because it had established a more advanced form of self-reflective consumption engineering. This point is crucial for understanding varieties of consumerism. Here, the consumer was understood in a more noble position of self-constraint. Consumption engineering was a German alternative to the U.S. (or Western or capitalist) way of consumer engineering. In contrast to Calkin’s use of this term in 1930, which was very similar to “consumer engineering” in 1932, this consumption engineering was a manifestation of the anticipated needs of the (German) people’s community. At least six main characteristics of consumption engineering were perceived by the authors of pieces in Verkaufspraxis and many other specialist publications as crucial during the Nazi period. 100

First, as with neoliberal ideas emerging in the early 1930s, they thought a strong state should establish a legal and economic framework for the consumption sphere and guarantee security and order there. 101 This caused limitations and hardships because the state was now seen as an expression of the racial, material, and cultural foundation of the German people. 102 Such state activity, however, was necessary in a world of competing states, empires, and races.

Second, the authors understood the economy as an organic entity with functional differentiation. Production, wholesaling, retailing, and consumption each represented distinct rationales and followed different logics. Their internal relations were based on honor, service, and mutual respect. This facilitated further “rationalization,” guided by experts but accepted and specified by the different segments of the supply chain. 103

Third, the articles portrayed competition as the law of life. The experiences of other national communities could be included and transfers of knowledge from outside Germany remained important, but economic performance could no longer be restricted to individual profit or well-being. The dominant goal of business was to strengthen the German community. 104 Advertising was still necessary, but simply to maintain continuity in the consumption of relevant and proven products, not to create need or stimulate desire, not to spawn new markets. 105 Vogt’s credo in 1933 was simply: “Be critical toward new desires!” 106

Fourth, consumption was understood both as a necessity and as an expression of the individuality and creativity of the German people. While consumer engineering was understood as a general toolbox for Western capitalist societies, consumption engineering should express the spirit and the economic needs of individual nations. Mass and bulk production would not fit for Germans as a nation of high and tasteful culture. Consumption engineering would foster batch and customer production and support a world of goods and services in accordance with Germany’s traditions (Fig. 7.3).

Fig. 7.3
figure 3

Source: Uhu 5, no. 10 (1928/29): 86.

Expanding evidence and adding value: Man in the focus of experts, 1929.

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Fifth, the individual consumer should and could trust in the services of production and trade. 107 His or her personal desires had to be directed to the priorities and needs of the German community 108 : “Previously, business beheld its great mission in fulfilling the public’s wishes, in following its ideas. Business was the public’s true servant. Its purpose in life was the will and the command of the customers…. Today another will directs business—the will of the state.” 109 Thus, experts had to reinterpret consumers’ desires. Appeals to their “subconscious” became exhortations to a racially inflected national or völkisch mission instead of invocations of the promise goods held for increasing individual pleasure. 110

Finally, consumption should serve the German community first. 111 Domestic aliens to the German community and foreign members of other communities had to take a back seat to the racially defined German people’s needs, even if this meant the demise of such groups.

It cannot be the task of this article to analyze Vogt’s and his journal’s transition under National Socialism in detail. Eventually, Vogt made his arguments as a party member and so wrote about “our National Socialist Weltanschauung” or worldview. 112 Further, he declared his support not only for Germany as a (racial) state but also for Adolf Hitler’s “Weltanschauung.” 113 His transformation into an eager supporter of the National Socialist government was typical for the large majority of formerly national-liberal entrepreneurs. 114 They still had adequate breathing room and were able to make independent business decisions. 115 Even during the war, they were still talking about the synthesis of an economy obliged to the needs of the Volk and the “creative” (schöpferisch) private initiative and self-reliance of businessmen. 116 By now, Vogt was obviously arguing in large measure against his convictions of the early 1930s. His reversals included going against his earlier preference for small and midsize firms, and against his strong emphasis on state intervention as an efficient, necessary, and sometimes superior mode of business practice. 117 Now, only the state and responsible consumption engineers could guide the majority of consumers toward fulfilling their true role in the economy.

For Vogt and Verkaufspraxis, World War II became a proving ground for this model of consumption engineering, which entailed a voluntary commitment to offering leadership in identifying improved sales methods and to communicating to consumers improved ways of consumption. The task was challenging, but the journal’s experts now had to prove their mettle as “home front soldiers.” 118 They saw their attitude, conduct, forbearance, and ability to think in terms of the common German good as legitimations for their leadership role in the German community. 119 Consumers had to do their part too. Their role in national community was different, but their values needed to be the same as those of the business and consumption experts.

Although he constantly expressed his desire for peace and the undisturbed conduct of business, Vogt was a willing supporter of Nazi Germany’s war effort. 120 He accused “England” as the driving force behind the war and praised his own government for its wise preventive efforts. 121 After Germany’s defeat of France, he welcomed the opportunities that a new Europe and a new colonial empire governed by Germany promised. 122 He favored large-scale planning in Europe’s East and West. 123 The United States no longer represented a model for Germany, whereas the closer connections with Germany’s European neighbors he supported were eventually conducive to European cooperation after Germany’s defeat in 1945.

The limits and, of course, the failure of consumption engineering during the Nazi period were obvious. 124 In the context of this book, however, it is more important to realize that German experts—and probably those of other nations and empires too—developed models for economic improvement that were meant to function as alternatives to Anglo-Saxon approaches to consumer engineering. 125 The development of such alternatives also conditioned German experts’ attitudes toward ostensibly Western models in the early postwar period.

Reluctant Acceptance: New Ways of Selling and Advertising in 1949–1950

By the time Verkaufspraxis had been relaunched in December 1949, Victor Vogt had been replaced as editor by Gottlieb Friedrich “Fritz” Seitz (1890–1966), who had worked as advertising director at Robert Bosch GmbH since 1940. Previously an officer in the German Army, he had managed a furniture factory in occupied France from 1916 and was responsible for several popular journals—published by the Franckh’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung in Stuttgart, including Kosmos (Cosmos), Amerika und Wir (America and Us), and Basteln und Bauen (Making and Building). During the 1920s, he acted in multiple capacities as publisher, advertising consultant, lobbyist for executive employees, and promoter of German culture in the Southwest. Like Vogt, he had been both nationalist and liberal, playing an active role for the DDP in the early 1920s. 126 He later joined the SA and was a committed National Socialist. 127

Seitz, Vogt, and Forkel signed the first postwar editorial of Verkaufspraxis but offered no explanation for Vogt’s replacement. 128 During the war, Vogt’s Fortschritt office furniture company had converted its production over to military needs, for instance, by developing organization tables for commando posts, and it used forced labor. 129 From 1944, the Freiburg firm built tail units and aircraft fuselages for Messerschmitt. 130 Although Freiburg endured several heavy bombings (the British Operation Tigerfish destroyed large parts of the historic center as well as some midsize industrial firms, killing some 2800 people in November 1944) Fortschritt remained relatively unscathed. 131 By late 1949, Vogt’s dedicated support of the National Socialist government no longer presented an obstacle to continuing his business career in the French occupation zone. 132 Still, Vogt did not contribute additional articles to the first postwar volume. Nonetheless, Seitz’ reprinting of two volumes of valuable articles from earlier issues of Verkaufspraxis emphasized continuity with Vogt’s direction. 133

In principle, the relaunched Verkaufspraxis faced quite similar circumstances as the journal had at its beginning in 1925. Rationalization and transfers of business expertise were seen as necessary for recovery from the war. “It is proper to again seek success in free competition and in foreign markets.” 134 Former models of market research and consumer analysis had to be reinstituted after the end of rationing and with the reestablishment of a market society. The hardships of war and especially of the postwar period made efficient basic provisioning of goods a necessity of the time, although the eventual seller’s market of the postwar years slowed down this process. Self-service concepts had been already discussed in the 1920s and were implemented from the late 1930s, but now the U.S. example seemed to offer new methods namely for the cheap and efficient distribution of goods. 135 The United States became a model once again. Its advanced advertising methods and techniques were of particular interest. 136

In 1949–1950, however, it was not yet necessary to discuss and implement the newest U.S. methods in consumer engineering. Instead, Verkaufspraxis offered adaptations and refinements of German and U.S. models from the late 1920s. 137 The adoption of U.S. expertise was again only partial, but Germany’s total defeat and West Germany’s role in the Cold War led to an intensified orientation toward the Western superpower. In addition, it was necessary to earn foreign currency, U.S. dollars, on the world market. Partial adoption of U.S. methods also enabled closer cooperation with Western and Southern European neighbors, who had to solve similar economic problems after the war. Nevertheless, it is striking how Verkaufspraxis continued to follow wartime thinking. As already mentioned, Europe, dominated by Germany, had been the focus of many editorials after 1941. In fact, it was common to talk about “us Europeans.” 138 During the war, the journal had also analyzed the situation in European states conquered by Germany. 139 Verkaufspraxis has supported the creation of a new European order, especially a greater economic zone under German supremacy. 140 In the immediate postwar period, the journal, run predominantly by former National Socialist supporters and party members, developed close ties to France, Italy, Switzerland, and Britain, even if U.S. examples became dominant. 141

There was no immediate transfer of U.S. consumer engineering in the early postwar period—although consumers received renewed attention. 142 The rationale for such distance to U.S. influences was threefold. First, Verkaufspraxis was still promoting the idea of severe cultural and economic differences between both countries. Second, its authors took for granted that German graphic design still offered superior aesthetic quality in advertising and even product design. Third, postwar experts also remained skeptical of the overcommercialized advertising methods prominent in the United States. 143 In addition, the severe differences in purchasing power and in the basic needs of most consumers shaped the transfer of commercial models from the United States. Consumer engineering was not perceived as a model for overcoming the economic obstacles of the postwar era, but as a bundle of measures typical for a buyer’s market. It would take years, they thought, before Germany’s economic situation brought about such circumstances.

Adoption and Alienness: Some Conclusions

The example of Victor Vogt and Verkaufspraxis adds important perspectives to our understanding of the interrupted career of consumer engineering techniques in Germany from the 1920s to the 1950s. First, while common narratives about German marketing are based on branded consumer goods and fancy print advertisements, the consultants and practitioners of the Verkaufspraxis group represented not only a different business sector, closer to business practice, but also different consumer goods, most notably durables. Their outreach to producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers alike allows a more nuanced understanding of German business and sales culture in the mid-twentieth century.

Second, although U.S. consumer engineering techniques were discussed and adopted even before the term was coined in 1932, their transfer to Germany was never an affair of the heart. It was triggered by the promise of economic reconstruction and a rising standard of living, but it was embedded in a culture of global competition, not in a culture of universal acceptance of the American model of manufacturing, selling, advertising, and consumption.

Third, the adoption of U.S. consumer engineering techniques and ideas in Germany was restrained by external shocks, like the Great Depression and World War II. National traditions, nationalistic desires, and the rise of National Socialism led to the alternative German concept of consumption (not consumer) engineering during the 1930s and early 1940s. This idea comprised an amalgam of an organic understanding of society, faith in the merits of free and creative entrepreneurship, the values of the so-called Mittelstand, and ideas about social hierarchies and the appropriateness of modern consumerism. Although such consumption engineering—especially in its racialized version—was no longer propagated after World War II, adherence to it severely slowed the adoption of U.S. consumer engineering models in the 1950s and 1960s. The historical experiences of the Great Depression and National Socialist rule helped the national-liberal establishment in Germany to make peace with the idea of a social market economy (with a strong welfare state and wide-ranging regulation) and to accept the need to cooperate with European neighbors to the West and the South.

Finally, the partial adoption of U.S.—or Western—ideas of consumer engineering by Victor Vogt and the Verkaufspraxis group calls into question the common scholarly use of “Americanization” as a unidirectional flow of expertise and the expression of a superior, more promising model for the future. Vogt’s study of U.S. business practices captured a broad variety of ideas, often contradictory to the perspective of consumer engineering. America offered a broad variety of business models; the fair trade movement, oligopolistic cooperation, and the widespread reception of economic planning should not be marginalized in analyses of America’s influence on Germany. German experts like Vogt treated U.S. ideas as implements in a well-appointed toolbox, deciding on their own which to use or not use in response to the challenges Germany faced as a modern consumer society.

Notes

  1. 1.

    The concept is usually traced back to the Great Depression, when experts like Roy Sheldon and Egmont Arens pushed for “a totalized approach,” in Consumer Engineering: A New Technique for Prosperity (New York, 1932), one “that advocated psychological and behavioural study to learn consumer preferences and the retooling of business to meet them.” See Charles F. McGovern, Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), 228. For a broader perspective, see Lutz Raphael, ed., Theorien and Experimente der Moderne: Europas Gesellschaften im 20. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 2012); and Thomas Etzemüller, ed., Die Ordnung der Moderne: Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Thomas Etzemüller (Bielefeld, 2009).

  2. 2.

    George D. Olds, Jr., “Review of Sheldon and Arens, Consumer Engineering,” Management Review 21, no. 5 (1932): 157–58, here 157.

  3. 3.

    David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800–1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore, MD, 1985); Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940 (Berkeley, CA, 1985); and Gary Cross, An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America (New York, 2000).

  4. 4.

    Verkaufspraxis was advertised as “the journal of psychological sales methods, of seeing into the buyer’s soul, of ‘customer service.’ Wherever businessmen reveal their secrets of success in trade journals, Verkaufspraxis evaluates [those methods]. Imitating the foreign—that awful German custom—is not promoted, but whoever does it better is [this journal’s] teacher.” W. H. Wolff, Jugend: Wege zu einer neuen Käuferschaft (Stuttgart, 1928), 238.

  5. 5.

    See Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010 (Cambridge, UK, 2012), esp. Chaps. 3–4; Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: ‘Amerikanisierung’ in Deutschland und Frankreich (1900–1933) (Stuttgart, 2003); Volker R. Berghahn, “The Debate on ‘Americanisation’ Among Economic and Cultural Historians,” Cold War History 10 (2010): 107–30; and Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA, 2005), predominantly offers one-dimensional and one-sided stories instead of a history of transatlantic entanglements.

  6. 6.

    Stefan Bauernschmidt, Fahrzeuge auf Zelluloid: Fernsehwerbung für Automobile in der Bundesrepublik des Wirtschaftswunders: Ein kultursoziologischer Versuch (Bielefeld, 2011), 135, mentions Vogt’s definition of market research but does not provide additional information. Alexander Schug, “Werbung und die Kultur des Kapitalismus,” in Die Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland 1890–1990: Ein Handbuch, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Claudius Torp (Frankfurt a.M., 2009), 355–69, here 359, n23, only uses Vogt’s book Absatzprobleme to back his conclusions about general developments in advertising. Marius Lange, Zwischen Demoskopie und Diktatur: Unternehmerische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in Deutschland, 1929–1936 (Frankfurt a.M., 2010), examines the articles of eight Verkaufspraxis volumes on public relations.

  7. 7.

    A good example of this tendency: Gerulf Hirt, Verkannte Propheten? Zur ‘Expertenkultur’ (west-)deutscher Werbekommunikatoren bis zur Rezession 1966/67 (Leipzig, 2013). Although it offers a good number of biographical sketches, it does not question standard narratives about German market research.

  8. 8.

    The private banking house Richard Vogt & Co. was established in 1887 in Frankenstein, Silesia; Berliner Börsenzeitung, September 20, 1887, 16. In 1891, Vogt and the Schlesische Bankverein formed a limited partnership; “A Forgotten Predecessor Established 150 Years Ago: Schlesischer Bankverein,” Bank and History, no. 11 (2006): 1–3, here 2; Berliner Börsenzeitung May 1, 1891, 13; and Berliner Börsenzeitung, March 11, 1904, 2.

  9. 9.

    Richard Vogt & Co. cooperated closely with Deutsche Bank; see Volkszeitung [Berlin], August 29, 1897, 2.

  10. 10.

    Johann Joseph Kaindl, Werbefachleute (Wien, 1921), n.p.

  11. 11.

    Berliner Börsenzeitung, June 16, 1914, 29. In 1922, the journal was renamed Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Verwaltungspraxis und Wirtschaftspolitik (Journal of Business Management, Administrative Practice and Economic Policies). In a parallel development, the Organisatoren-Verband (Federation of Organizers) was founded in Berlin, and it still exists today, having been renamed Gesellschaft für Organisation (Society for Organization) in 1926.

  12. 12.

    During the first half of 1917, he was replaced by the retiree Karl Wolit as managing director of the Organisation Verlagsgesellschaft mbH; Berliner Börsenzeitung, December 29, 1916, 14.

  13. 13.

    See Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (New York, 1999); and Wolfgang König, Geschichte der Konsumgesellschaft (Stuttgart, 2000), 47–72.

  14. 14.

    Berliner Börsenzeitung, November 12, 1920, 29.

  15. 15.

    Victor Vogt, Die Karthothek, ihre Anlage und Führung (Berlin, 1920); Victor Vogt, Die Kartei, ihre Anlage und Führung, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1922); and Victor Vogt and Ludwig Brauner, Illustriertes Orga-Handbuch erprobter Büro-Maschinen (Berlin, 1921). Historical research predominantly focuses on the rationalization of blue-collar work, whereas the intense debates on white-collar work are often ignored. See Timo Luks, Der Betrieb als Ort der Moderne: Zur Geschichte von Industriearbeit, Ordnungsdenken und Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert (Bielefeld, 2010).

  16. 16.

    “Hand-Book of Approved Office Machines,” Business Equipment Magazine 52 (1922): 382.

  17. 17.

    Carola Schark, “Wo früher in Haslach Büromöbel hergestellt wurden, steht heute das Gutleutviertel,” Badische Zeitung, April 7, 2015. The firm’s product range can be gleaned from Victor Vogt, Taschenbuch der Geschäftstechnik, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 1927), 2, 872–73; and Verkaufspraxis 4, no. 2 (1928/29): cover and iii.

  18. 18.

    See Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Abt. Freiburg, W 134, Nr. 047363g Bild 1 at http://www.landesarchiv-bw.de/plink/?f=5-1966505-1, for a series of images from Vogt’s 70th birthday, including of his wife Odette Vogt, neé Crespy; “Direktor Victor Vogt 70 Jahre alt,” Baden-Württemberg (1957): 46; and “Direktor Victor Vogt †,” Baden-Württemberg (1960): 72.

  19. 19.

    “50 Jahre Forkel-Verlag,” Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel 24 (1968): 3335.

  20. 20.

    See, for instance, Werrett Wallace Charters and Max Eichler, Verkaufspsychologie für den Einzelhandel: Erfahrungen über die Kunst erfolgreicher Kundenbehandlung (Stuttgart, 1926); Natalie Kneeland, Psychologisch falsche und richtige Ladenverkaufsgespräche: 135 Fälle aus dem Einzelhandel (Stuttgart, 1927); and Claude C. Hopkins, Propaganda: Meine Lebensarbeit (Stuttgart, 1928).

  21. 21.

    Victor Vogt, Taschenbuch der Geschäftstechnik, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1926).

  22. 22.

    Frederick A. Russell and Victor Vogt, Verkaufspsychologie für reisende Kaufleute: Erfahrungen über die Kunst erfolgreicher Kundenbehandlung (Stuttgart, 1926), which was based on Russell’s 1924 Textbook of Salesmanship. The sixth edition of this book was revised and republished as Victor Vogt and Ernst Dülken, Technik des Reise-Verkaufs: Tausend Erfahrungen über bessere Abschlüsse für den reisenden Geschäftsmann und seine Firma, in ein System gebracht und kritisch beleuchtet (Stuttgart, [ca. 1930]).

  23. 23.

    Victor Vogt, Absatzprobleme: Das Handbuch der Verkaufsleitung für Erzeuger, Groß- und Einzelhändler, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1929).

  24. 24.

    Victor Vogt, Der neue Artikel: Praktische Überlegungen vor, während und nach seiner Einführung (Stuttgart, 1933); and Victor Vogt, Vertriebstechnik: Wie der Fabrikant und der Groß-Händler durch richtigen Kräfte-Einsatz zum Erfolg kommen (Stuttgart, 1934).

  25. 25.

    Victor Vogt, Taschenbuch der Geschäftstechnik, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 1927), 2, 878.

  26. 26.

    Vogt, Absatzprobleme (1929), 2, 896.

  27. 27.

    Vogt and Dülken, Technik des Reise-Verkaufs (1930), 561.

  28. 28.

    In the field of business administration, there was the Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung, Betriebswirtschaft, Annalen der Betriebswirtschaft, and the Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft. Business practices were discussed in the Zeitschrift für Organisation, Betriebsführung, and Wirtschaftlichkeit. Best known to historians are the leading advertising journals of the period such as Die Anzeige, Gebrauchsgraphik, Die Reklame, Seidels Reklame, and Wirtschaftswerbung. See Kurt Schmalz, “The Business Periodicals of Germany,” Accounting Review 5 (1930): 231–34.

  29. 29.

    Ernest Elmo Calkins, The Business of Advertising (New York, 1915); Ernest Elmo Calkins, “The New Consumption Engineer and the Artist,” in A Philosophy of Production: A Symposium, ed. J. George Frederick (New York, 1930), 126–28; Ernest Elmo Calkins, “The Job of the Consumption Engineer,” Merchandising and Selling 15, no. 28 (1930): 60–62; and “Urges Advertising to Push Prohibition,” New York Times, May 20, 1930, 23. See also Fred Beard, “Forgotten Classics: The Business of Advertising, by Earnest Elmo Calkins (1915),” Journal of Historical Research in Marketing 7 (2015): 573–83; and Regina Lee Blaszczyk, Imagining Consumers: Design and Innovation from Wedgwood to Corning (Baltimore, MD, 2000), 137–38.

  30. 30.

    Earnest Elmo Calkins, ‘Louder Please!’ The Autobiography of a Deaf Man (Boston, 1924), 4–5, who used this sentence to describe the beginnings of modern advertising in the late nineteenth century.

  31. 31.

    “New Profession Appears: Promoters of ‘Social Engineering’ Find a Fruitful Field,” New York Times, October 15, 1899, 8; and William H. Tolman, Social Engineering, with intro. by Andrew Carnegie (New York, 1909).

  32. 32.

    This did not mean backwardness; see Susan V. Spellman, Cornering the Market: Independent Grocers and Innovation in American Small Business (New York, 2016).

  33. 33.

    Aldous Huxley, Brave New Work (New York, 1932).

  34. 34.

    Sidney A. Reeve, Modern Economic Tendencies: An Economic History of the United States (New York, 1921). See also Lawrence B. Glickman, “Rethinking Politics: Consumers and the Public Good during the ‘Jazz Age,’” OAH Magazine of History 21, no. 3 (2007): 16–20; and Lawrence B. Glickman, Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America (Chicago, IL, 2009), 202. On Staudinger, see Uwe Spiekermann, “Medium der Solidarität: Die Werbung der Konsumgenossenschaften 1903–1933,” in Bilderwelt des Alltags: Werbung in der Konsumgesellschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Peter Borscheid and Clemens Wischermann (Stuttgart, 1995), 150–89.

  35. 35.

    See Regina Lee Blaszczyk and Uwe Spiekermann, “Bright Modernity: Color, Commerce, and Consumer Culture,” in Bright Modernity: Color, Commerce, and Consumer Culture, ed. Blaszczyk and Spiekermann (New York, 2017), 1–34; and Regina Lee Blaszczyk, The Color Revolution (Cambridge, 2012).

  36. 36.

    Verkaufspraxis was launched in October 1925, when the German economy was hit by a recession. Vogt emphasized the “floods of our need” and talked about Germany’s “miserable situation.” In this context, rationalization appeared as a kind of necessary economic purification requiring ruthless implementation; Victor Vogt, “Aussichten und Einsichten,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 3 (1925/26): 3–4. A similar assessment: Paul Gunkel, “Nachdenkliches zum Jahresbeginn,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 4 (1925/26): 3–4.

  37. 37.

    Such ideas were also discussed and implemented by the German Mittelstand movement, which was dominated by mid-sized retailers. On their moral and partial adoption of “modern” sales methods, see Uwe Spiekermann, “‘Der Mittelstand stirbt!’ Der Kampf zwischen mittelständischem Einzelhandel und Warenhäusern in Deutschland 1896–1938,” in Das Berliner Warenhaus: Geschichte und Diskurse, ed. Godela Weiss-Sussex and Ulrike Zitzlsperger (Frankfurt a.M., 2013), 33–52, esp. 44–51.

  38. 38.

    The USA was explicitly perceived as a “superior opponent”; “Deutschland und die Wirtschaftserfolge Amerikas,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 6 (1925/26): 19–21, hier 19.

  39. 39.

    Vogt, Taschenbuch der Geschäftstechnik, 2: 853.

  40. 40.

    “Edward A. Filene, amerikanischer Warenhausbesitzer,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 4 (1925/26): 32–34.

  41. 41.

    This is the dominant perspective in Harm Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Influence in Europe Since the 1880s (Dordrecht, 2005).

  42. 42.

    “Was wir von den Amerikanern lernen können,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 2 (1925/26): 36–37.

  43. 43.

    Victor Vogt, “Kaufmännischer Ehrenkodex,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 6 (1925/26): 3–6.

  44. 44.

    On the history of marketing in the Weimar Republic, see Uwe Spiekermann, “‘Der Verbraucher muß erobert werden!’ Marketing in Landwirtschaft und Einzelhandel in Deutschland in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren,” in Marketinggeschichte: Die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik, ed. Hartmut Berghoff (Frankfurt a.M., 2007), 123–47.

  45. 45.

    Victor Vogt, “Verkaufspraxis,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 1 (1925/26): 3–5, here 3. Vogt’s analysis accorded with that of American experts, who criticized that in Germany “the art of sales practice is still in its infancy”; Günther Stein, “Mängel der deutschen Exportmethoden: Amerikanische Kritik deutscher Reklame,” Berliner Tageblatt, May 11, 1928, 8.

  46. 46.

    “Kunden sind Kapital,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 1 (1925/26): 6.

  47. 47.

    Casson, one of the most productive authors on business and technology in the first half of the twentieth century, and from 1915 editor of The Efficiency Magazine, had probably impressed Vogt, who referred to him several times. See, for instance, Victor Vogt, “Der Einzelwille in der Geschäftsleitung,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 2 (1925/26): 33; and “Ich verstehe den Verkauf von A bis Z!,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 7 (1926/27): 2.

  48. 48.

    Vogt’s emphasis on the virtue of personality was also based on private experiences. In his hometown of Frankenstein, a local grocer was able to compete with a Berlin-based chain store because of his compassion for his customers; Victor Vogt, “Persönlichkeit,” Die Uhrmacherkunst 7 (1927): 15–16, here 15.

  49. 49.

    Georg Lang, “Die Lochkarte als Hilfsmittel bei der Kundenwerbung,” Verkaufspraxis 3 (1927/28): 99–106; and F. Grüner, “Eine mechanisierte Kundenkartei,” Verkaufspraxis 2 (1926/27): 626–32. At the same time, the magazine propagated more common ways of data mining. See “Die Verkaufskartothek,” Verkaufspraxis 1 (1925/26): 21–23. For the USA, see Josh Lauer, “Making the Ledgers Talk: Customer Control and the Origins of Retail Data Mining, 1920–1940,” in The Rise of Marketing and Market Research, ed. Hartmut Berghoff, Phillip Scranton, and Uwe Spiekermann (New York, 2012), 153–69.

  50. 50.

    Fritz Heinrichs, “Ingenieur und Vertrieb,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 736–38.

  51. 51.

    I[rene] M. Witte, “Marktanalyse,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 8 (1925/26): 27–30; Max Eichler, “Terra incognita,” Verkaufspraxis 3 (1927/28): 403–8; P. H. Crodel, “Lernt eure Kunden kennen!,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 293–95; and J. Kurt Herzfeld, “Marktanalyse auf statistischer Grundlage,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 750–52.

  52. 52.

    W. H. Wolff, “Wandlungen in der Kundschaft,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 74–76; and “Ein Verkaufslaboratorium,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 490–92.

  53. 53.

    “Sechs Kundentypen,” Verkaufspraxis 3 (1927/28): 83–85.

  54. 54.

    “Der König im Reiche des Handels,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 1 (1925/26): 20; and “Der Verbraucher ist König,” Verkaufspraxis 2 (1926/27): 220.

  55. 55.

    Theodor Lach, “Werbet um die Frauen!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 245–47; and Paul Wandslebe, “‘Service’ … wie ihn der Kunde sieht,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 291–93.

  56. 56.

    Victor Vogt, “Der Jungbrunnen der Wirtschaft,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 7 (1925/26): 3–7, hier 5.

  57. 57.

    See “Neue amerikanische Verkaufsmethoden, die den Umsatz steigern,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 5 (1925/26): 32–33, which also evinced a positive understanding of self-service, a sales method that had not yet been introduced in Germany; I[rene] M. Witte, “Chain Stores,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 7 (1925/26): 36–39; “Ladenbau,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 10 (1925/26): 9–12; and Karl Berg, “Selbstbedienungssystem,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 248–50.

  58. 58.

    Victor Vogt “Verkaufs-‘Wissenschaft’?,” Verkaufspraxis 2 (1926/27): 323–29; and Richard Brauns, “Der Lagerumschlag im Einzelhandel,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 46–48.

  59. 59.

    “Wie sollen unsere Verkaufsräume eingerichtet sein?,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 540–42.

  60. 60.

    “Verhandlungstechnik,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 1 (1925/26): 26–30; P. M[ax] Grempe, “Verkaufsschulen,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 8 (1925/26): 36–40; “Was sollen wir unsere Verkäufer lehren?,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 10 (1925/26): 36–39; Bruno Birnbaum, “Eine Hochschule der Verkaufskunst,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 12 (1925/26): 20–23, which deals with Lucinda Prince; “100 Regeln für das Verkaufspersonal,” Verkaufspraxis 2 (1926/27): 603–8, 698–703; F. M. Manasse, “Die Verkäuferschule von General Motors in Berlin,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 30–36; and A. Schirmer, “Mehr sprachliche Schulung!,” Bausteine 1 (1929/30): 255–56.

  61. 61.

    Victor Vogt, “Reisender gesucht,” Verkaufspraxis 2 (1925/26): 282–89.

  62. 62.

    “Was sagen uns die beiden amerikanischen Bildanzeigen,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 2 (1925/26): 16–18; Fritz Körner, “Neue Wege der Anzeigen-Reklame?,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 12 (1925/26): 20–24; Helmut Biegel, “Neue Wege für das Inserat im Fachblatt,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 83–88; “Booklets,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 136–39; “Die technische Anzeige!,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 610–14; “Ein Königreich für eine Idee … ,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 11–18; and [Hans] Wündrich-Meissen, “Deutsche Reklame im Lichte der ‘Berliner Illustrirten,’” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 162–69.

  63. 63.

    Pet Hayne, “Das Lichtbild als Werbehelfer,” Verkaufspraxis 3 (1927/28): 225–39.

  64. 64.

    Victor Vogt, “Kauf-Motive: Befruchtung der Praxis durch die Theorie,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 9 (1925/26): 3–7; and Hans Wündrich, “Bedarfsweckung durch positive und negative Momente?,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 234–38.

  65. 65.

    See Mark Tadajewski, “Remembering Motivation Research: Toward an Alternative Genealogy of Interpretive Consumer Research,” Marketing Theory 6 (2006): 429–65; Dirk Schindelbeck, “Vom ‘Mehrwert’ erfolgreicher Produktkommunikation: ‘Einfühlung’ und ‘Leidenschaft’ als ethische Leitlinien bei Ernest Dichter und Hans Domizlaff,” Medien & Zeit 4 (2005): 18–23; and Hartmut Berghoff, Phillip Scranton, and Uwe Spiekermann, “The Origins of Marketing and Market Research: Information, Institutions, and Markets,” in The Rise of Marketing and Market Research, ed. Berghoff, Scranton, and Spiekermann, 1–27, here 6–8.

  66. 66.

    There was, of course, some advice for hiring such experts; see “Was kostet ein Werbeberater?,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 495–96.

  67. 67.

    “Amerika … der Konkurrent,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 749–53.

  68. 68.

    See Ralf Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Stationen des Neoliberalismus in Deutschland (Opladen, 2004).

  69. 69.

    See Bruce B. Frye, Liberal Democrats in the Weimar Republic: The History of the German Democratic Party and the German State Party, 1918–1933 (Carbondale, IL, 1985); and Ludwig Richter, Die Deutsche Volkspartei 1918–1933 (Düsseldorf, 2002).

  70. 70.

    Victor Vogt, “Geschäftsmoral als Erfolgsfaktor!,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 2 (1925/26): 3–4, here 4.

  71. 71.

    Victor Vogt, “Der Jungbrunnen der Wirtschaft,” Verkaufspraxis 1, no. 7 (1925/26): 3–7, here 7. The German term “Volk,” sometimes rendered inadequately as “people” or the similarly pronounced “folk” in English, refers to the nation or the constitutive people, but it also denotes more, namely, a collective entity based not only on legal factors but also a shared history, language, and culture. “Volk” is an oscillating term that can be used in a racist or a progressive manner. See Jörn Retterath, ‘Was ist das Volk?’ Volks- und Gemeinschaftskonzepte der politischen Mitte in Deutschland 1917–1924 (Berlin, 2016).

  72. 72.

    Victor Vogt, “Vater werden ist nicht schwer … ,” Verkaufspraxis 4 (1928/29): 453–57.

  73. 73.

    Victor Vogt, “Der Fluch der bösen Tat,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/31): 581–84.

  74. 74.

    Victor Vogt, “Heraus aus der Sackgasse!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 581–85.

  75. 75.

    Heinrich Gillmann, “Die Preissenkungsaktion der Regierung,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 699–701; and Heinrich Gillmann, “Die Preissenkung marschiert!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 726–28.

  76. 76.

    Victor Vogt, “Und sie bewegt sich doch!!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 709–13.

  77. 77.

    “Politik gehört nicht ins Geschäft!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 25.

  78. 78.

    “Die guten Warenhausanzeigen,” Verkaufspraxis 8 (1932/33): 143–45.

  79. 79.

    “Wo liegt die Stärke des kleinen Betriebes?,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/31): 613–17.

  80. 80.

    Victor Vogt, “Hilf Dir selbst, Einzelhandel!,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 5–10, here 5.

  81. 81.

    Victor Vogt, “Vom Absolutismus zur Demokratie,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 197–201, here 198.

  82. 82.

    Walter Friedrich, “‘Freiwillige’ Kettenläden-Organisation,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/31): 374–75; Victor Vogt, “Diese Erkenntnis fehlt dem Zwischenhandel!,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 323–26; Fritz Kiesler, “Konkurrenten können zusammenarbeiten!,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 583–86; and “Bilden sich Interessengemeinschaften?,” Verkaufspraxis 8 (1932/33): 175–77. The U.S. situation was analyzed by Spellman, Cornering the Market, 117–36.

  83. 83.

    Fr. v. Hüllesheim, “Vom Persönlichen,” Bausteine 2 (1930/31): 447–48, here 447.

  84. 84.

    Victor Vogt, “Das blecherne Zeitalter,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/31), 325–29, here 328.

  85. 85.

    An exception was Pauschek, “Die Kehrseite der Medaille,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 347–49, which argued in favour of a general consumer perspective to overcome the crisis.

  86. 86.

    Victor Vogt, “Der unbekannte Wirtschafts-Soldat,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 579–82, here 580. Similar Victor Vogt, “Wann wird das Geschäft wieder besser?,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 515–18.

  87. 87.

    Victor Vogt, “Gesundung,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/31): 389–93.

  88. 88.

    Victor Vogt, “Kaufleute, wahrt Eure heiligsten Güter!,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 643–47, esp. 646; and Werner Arendt, “Propaganda-Autarkie?,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 693–94.

  89. 89.

    Victor Vogt, “‘Produktionsmittel’?—‘Konsumgüter’??,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 5–8, esp. 5.

  90. 90.

    Victor Vogt, “Gestern noch auf stolzen Rossen … ,” Verkaufspraxis 5 (1929/30): 69–73. See Annika Klein, Korruption und Korruptionsskandale in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 2014), esp. sec. 3.

  91. 91.

    Victor Vogt, “Unser Wunschzettel für Weihnachten,” Verkaufspraxis 7 (1931/32): 131–34, here 131.

  92. 92.

    Victor Vogt, “Vom kommenden Kaufmanns-Denken,” Der Materialist 53, no. 11/12 (1932): 6–7, here 6.

  93. 93.

    “Der Kunde von heute,” Verkaufspraxis 6 (1930/32): 94–95.

  94. 94.

    Although with some distance, practitioners and academics in the fields of business studies supported National Socialism with only few exceptions. See Peter Mantel, Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Nationalsozialismus: Eine institutionen- und personengeschichtliche Studie (Wiesbaden, 2009); Peter Mantel, “‘Eine vollkommen unpolitische Disziplin’: Zur Entwicklung der modernen Betriebswirtschaftslehre im ersten Halbjahr ihres Bestehens,” Die Hochschule 19 (2010): 148–64.

  95. 95.

    Victor Vogt, “Die Wiedergeburt des ‘ollen, ehrlichen’ Kaufmanns,” Verkaufspraxis 8 (1932/33): 387–90, here 387.

  96. 96.

    “Staat—Gesetz—Geschäft,” Verkaufspraxis 9 (1933/34): 369–71.

  97. 97.

    The debate on the position of entrepreneurs in Nazi Germany is still going on. See Peter Hayes, “Corporate Freedom of Action in Nazi Germany,” and Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, “Corporate Freedom of Action in Nazi Germany: A Response to Peter Hayes,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 45 (2009): 29–41 and 43–50, respectively.

  98. 98.

    Despite the economic exclusion of Jewish Germans, a piece entitled “Fight Prejudices” appeared as late as 1939; see “Vorurteile bekämpfen!,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 458.

  99. 99.

    “Gute amerikanische Weihnachtswerbung,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 96–97; and “Verbesserungen gut gezeigt,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 416.

  100. 100.

    The following points are based on Uwe Spiekermann, “From Neighbour to Consumer: The Transformation of Retailer-Consumer Relationships in Twentieth-Century Germany,” in The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford, UK, 2006), 147–74. For a broader perspective, see Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto, eds., Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives (Oxford, UK, 2015).

  101. 101.

    Victor Vogt, “Leben und leben lassen!,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 283–87.

  102. 102.

    This included limits to the growth of individual firms and to the switching of employment; see Victor Vogt, “Die Geschichte vom Hund und seinem Knochen,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 353–57.

  103. 103.

    Victor Vogt, “Concerto grosso,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 139–43, here 142–43.

  104. 104.

    Victor Vogt, “Sieg des Gemeinschaftsgedankens,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 107–10.

  105. 105.

    “Werbung! Der Regulator des Betriebes, nicht der Umsatzmotor,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 75–77.

  106. 106.

    Vogt, Der neue Artikel, 16.

  107. 107.

    “Was muß der Kunde lernen, damit er den vollen Nutzen der gekauften Ware hat?,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 345–46.

  108. 108.

    “Kundenerziehung tut not!,” Verkaufspraxis 16 (1941): 53–55; and “Selbstzucht!,” Verkaufspraxis 16 (1941): 73–76.

  109. 109.

    Victor Vogt, “Die Entthronung des Käufers,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 495–99, here 496.

  110. 110.

    “Alle sind Wettbewerber!,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 251–53, here 252. The German “völkisch” is the adjectival form of “Volk,” but its meaning does not oscillate in the same way. See note 71 above.

  111. 111.

    This included “peace” between worker and employer as the foundation of further rationalization; see Victor Vogt, “Concerto grosso,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 139–43.

  112. 112.

    Victor Vogt, “Leben und leben lassen!,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 283–87, here 285.

  113. 113.

    Victor Vogt, “Freiheit, die ich meine,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 5–8, here 8.

  114. 114.

    For the general debate on Nazi morality, see Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, UK, 2003); Wolfgang Bialas, Moralische Ordnungen des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen, 2014); and Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze, eds., Nazi Ideology and Ethics (Newcastle, 2014), esp. Chap. by Bialas, “Nazi Ethics and Morality …”.

  115. 115.

    “Wo stehen wir? Was gibt uns die Zukunft zu tun auf?,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 23–27.

  116. 116.

    Victor Vogt, “Bauskizzen der Friedenswirtschaft,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 3–6, here 6. The mixed system of state intervention and private initiative was praised as a key element of Germany’s economic success; see Victor Vogt, “Das Geheimnis der Mischung,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 37–40.

  117. 117.

    Victor Vogt, “Um das Los des ‘kleinen Mannes’,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 69–73, here 69–70; and Victor Vogt, “Die Entthronung des Käufers,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 495–99, here 498–99.

  118. 118.

    Victor Vogt, “Die Sendung,” Verkaufspraxis 16 (1941): 369–72.

  119. 119.

    Victor Vogt, “Haltung,” Verkaufspraxis 16 (1941): 403–6; and “Es kommt auch ‘mal wieder anders,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 72–75.

  120. 120.

    Victor Vogt, “Müßiggang ist aller Laster Anfang!,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 605–8; and Victor Vogt, “Freiheit, die ich meine,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1940): 5–8.

  121. 121.

    “Was würde Knigge dazu gesagt haben,” Verkaufspraxis 14 (1939): 641–43.

  122. 122.

    Victor Vogt, “Die Neue Linie,” Verkaufspraxis 15 (1941): 145–48.

  123. 123.

    Victor Vogt, “Führungsaufgabe der Zukunft,” Verkaufspraxis 16 (1941): 297–300. See (not only for the murderous consequences) Isabel Heinemann, Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut. Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Berlin, 2003); and Thomas Müller, Imaginierter Westen. Das Konzept des ‘deutschen Westraums’ zwischen politischer Romantik und Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld, 2009).

  124. 124.

    See Tim Schanetzky, “Kanonen statt Butter”: Wirtschaft und Konsum im Dritten Reich (Munich, 2015), although it ignores relevant Anglo-Saxon historiography and underestimates the ideological dimension of National Socialist consumption.

  125. 125.

    See S. Jonathan Wiesen, Creating the Nazi Marketplace: Commerce and Consumption in the Third Reich (Cambridge, UK, 2011), esp. 24–41, although it underestimates the significant prehistory of these visions of consumption, which were already discussed before World War I.

  126. 126.

    Biographical details: Nachlass Friedrich Seitz, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Abt. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 2/30, https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/HS7RAR5P7GP4AGTYXBZNSGWOEJI4WFFA.

  127. 127.

    Joachim Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch und der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933–1945 (Munich, 1999), 340 and 353.

  128. 128.

    [Julius Hans] Forkel, Victor Vogt and F[ritz] Seitz, “Was zur ‘neuen Verkaufs-Praxis zu sagen ist,” Verkaufs-Praxis 24 (1949/50): 3–4.

  129. 129.

    Bernd Boll, “Zwangsarbeiter während des Zweiten Weltkriegs in Baden,” Zeitschrift des Breisgau-Geschichtsvereins ‘Schau-ins-Land’ 111 (1992): 179–203, here 181. Vogt mentioned the general change: “The present situation already shows that foreigners at a lower cultural level can be used for this purpose. Their achievements are generally good, although their use in large numbers may not seem very desirable for racial reasons” (Victor Vogt, “Probleme des Nachwuchses,” Verkaufspraxis 17 [1942]: 207–10, here 208).

  130. 130.

    Gerd R. Ueberschär, Freiburg im Luftkrieg 1939–1945 (Würzburg, 1990), 201.

  131. 131.

    Ulrich P. Ecker, Freiburg 1944–1994. Zerstörung und Wiederaufbau (Waldkirch, 1994), 31.

  132. 132.

    Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit (Munich, 1996).

  133. 133.

    VP-Auswahl: Die besten Aufsätze aus früheren Jahrgängen der Stuttgarter Verkaufspraxis, Zeitschrift für die Verkaufs-, Absatz- und Geschäftsförderung in Fabriken, im Groß- und im Einzelhandel, comp. Fritz Seitz, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1949). This edition included only articles from the journal’s early years. In October 1949, Forkel also launched VP-Briefe: Monatsblätter zur Verkaufs-Praxis, a journal specialized in the professional needs of sales agents.

  134. 134.

    VP-Auswahl, 1: 3.

  135. 135.

    Gustav Adolf Bischoff, “Ratio auf dem Marsch. Ein Gespräch über den Beispiel-Laden der Fachgruppe Lebens- und Genußmittel,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 125–29.

  136. 136.

    “Gepaarte Anzeigen wieder beliebt,” VP-Auswahl 1: 25–31; “Durch farbige Anzeigen Textilien verkaufen? Von neuartigen amerikanischen Vertriebsmethoden,” VP-Auswahl 1: 52–57; Fritz Wiedemann, “Warum nicht Bequemlichkeit und Entspannung verkaufen?,” VP-Auswahl 2: 107–10; “Der Weihnachtsmann als Verkaufshelfer,” VP-Auswahl 2: 164–68; and “Gefrorener Sonnenschein in Dosen,” Verkaufspraxis 24 (1949/50): 16–23.

  137. 137.

    Fritz Wiedemann, “Verkaufs-Psychotechnik,” Verkaufspraxis 24 (1949/50): 224–26; [Claude C. Hopkins], “Vom Erfolg der Pepsodent-Werbung,” Verkaufspraxis 24 (1949/50): 139–44 (reprint from Hopkins, Propaganda [1928]); Fritz Wiedemann, “Charakter und Erfolg,” VP-Briefe 1, no. 3 (1949/50): 9–13; and Fritz Wiedemann, “Farben helfen verkaufen,” VP-Briefe 1, no. 6 (1949/50): 13–16.

  138. 138.

    Victor Vogt, “Bauskizzen der Friedenswirtschaft,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 3–6, here 3.

  139. 139.

    W. Haas, “Werbung in Frankreich,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 7–16; and “Ein französischer Kalender für deutsche Soldaten,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 45–49.

  140. 140.

    Victor Vogt, “Absatzplanung in der Neuordnung,” Verkaufspraxis 17 (1942): 327–30, 365–68. See Richard Evans, The Third Reich at War, 1939–1945 (New York, 2008), esp. 321–402; and Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York, 2008), esp. 553–75.

  141. 141.

    “Die Stimme seines Herrn,” Verkaufspraxis 24 (1949/50): 41–45; and “Gegen die hutlose Mode,” Verkaufspraxis 24 (1949/50): 88–93.

  142. 142.

    Carl Graeser, “Die Bedeutung des Verbrauchers für die Wirtschaft,” VP-Briefe 1, no. 2 (1949/50): 11–14.

  143. 143.

    “Nach 20 Jahren: Wandlungen von Marken-Anzeigen in amerikanischen Frauen-Zeitschriften,” VP-Auswahl 1: 73–78.