Abstract
Moving on now, we realize that in any case a nominal and an adjectival presentation suffice for the unity of a judgment. Individual simple-independent meanings are not enough for any actual independent meaning (which is a complete thought-meaning). But, two suffice for this purpose, namely, in the form “N is A”–in the subject position, a nominal meaning, in the “predicate position”, an arbitrary nominal or non-nominal meaning. In this way, we acquire the basic form of a propositionally simple judgment. It is, as far as that goes, the traditional understanding, as actually passed down, to treat the “categorical judgment” as basic form. However, the tradition goes further and immediately puts two basic forms here, “S is P”, “S is not P”. These are forms designated by the class-name “categorical judgments”, which, however, also designates other forms related in terms of general ways of composition, especially the plural judgments to be discussed later. What is characteristic of all categorical judgments is that, grounded in a compound nominal positing or a multifold (pieced together) nominal positing as basic positing, is a positing−single or multifold−built upon that, namely, in such a way that the positings are positive or affirmative or negative. The first component is the subject component. It posits the subject-object, which is conscious noematically as the substrate of the subject-positing. And the predicate-positing is built upon that−whence the break. The noun that functions in the subject function–through which the subject-positing therefore goes as positing-under–functions for precisely that reason differently than the same noun in a different function, for instance, an object function, whereby, the positing performed there is precisely not positing-under. The noun is not “subjectum” (ὑποκείμενον). Do not confuse subject-presentation and subject-object!
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Notes
- 1.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “To be placed at the beginning of the theory of propositions is what is to be shown regarding categorical judgments: all judging is identifying. Compare the unnumbered pages in the theory of existential propositions in connection with Bolzano, before 155”. Compare §40 f-g below. (Editor’s note)
- 2.
Compare Appendix IX, Plain Predicating and Actually Identifying Predicating. (Editor’s note)
- 3.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “For the theory of identity judgments! Cite negation, ‘not-identical’ − origin of the basic concept ‘different’” (Editor’s note)
- 4.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “Compare this to 119, 2nd page <§36a>. One and the same judgment can surely contain terms of universality and particularity, but are these arranged in a similar fashion? Do not the terms of particularity fall under those of universality and perhaps the other way around? That is important and to be studied”. (Editor’s note)
- 5.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “Since plural judgments refer to conjunctive or disjunctive connections of judgments, it would however probably be consistent to deal with them first after judgment-connections or the propositionally complex judgments as ‘concentrations’ made of them”. (Editor’s note)
- 6.
Compare Appendix X, The Conjunction of a Nominal Presentation with What is Negated in Another Nominal Presentation. (Editor’s note)
- 7.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “Mediation forms the form ‘A are generally b′.
The generality relates to the points, to the continuation of the plural”. (Editor’s note).
- 8.
Subsequent note by Husserl in the margin. “1917 the theory of totality with the surrogates explained differently”. (Editor’s note)
- 9.
For the bibliographical information, compare the editor’s introduction to the original German volume (Hua XXX), p. XLVIII. (Editor’s note)
- 10.
A non-genuine <impersonal> would be, for example, the following “What is rustling there in the foliage? It is a bird”.–“It does not burn like the match”.
- 11.
Compare Appendix XII, Logically Incomplete Meanings. (Editor’s note)
- 12.
Compare Appendix XIII, Propositional Function and Proposition. (Editor’s note)
- 13.
Subsequent note by Husserl, “I actually abandoned the theory that sets forth a form of the particular judgment ‘Socrates is something’ as a form of an existential sentence in 1917. It is seriously open to doubt”. (Editor’s note)
- 14.
Compare Appendix XIV, The Nominalizing Transformation of Matter. “Existence” as a Predicate. (Editor’s note)
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Husserl, E. (2019). Propositionally Simple Judgments>. In: Logic and General Theory of Science. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Works, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14529-3_6
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