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Stability and the Anti-corruption Agenda

  • Roberto BelloniEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies book series (RCS)

Abstract

In the first post-war phase, corruption constituted the cost international actors were ready to accept in the name of stability. Later, with corruption engrained in the social fabric, governance reforms were devised by international officials and more or less openly accepted by local ones, but corruption continued to prosper under the surface of formal institutions. Rather than being a pathological manifestation of the peacebuilding process, corruption is the hallmark of a distinctive form of state where informal/illegal rules and norms co-exist with formal ones, often trumping them. After a brief discussion of the meanings of corruption, this chapter examines the politics of transition that contributed to make it endemic, identifies corruption dynamics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and shows how international actors have contributed directly and indirectly to the phenomenon.

Keywords

Corruption Informal actors/institutions Clientelism Bosnia-Herzegovina Kosovo 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Sociology and Social ResearchUniversity of TrentoTrentoItaly

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