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Ignorant Cognition pp 115–138Cite as

Ignorance-Based Mental Models: Thought Experiments, Metaphors, and Abduction

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Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 46))

Abstract

In this chapter I will call attention to the role of ignorance in the processes of discovery by taking into account a model-based structure that exploits its tenacity: Thought Experiments (hereafter TEs). Presenting an account of TEs in relation to the ignorance-preservation feature, I will explain both their proficiency in boosting scientific and philosophical reasoning and their tendency to become objects of puzzlement and amazement for philosophers of science. In few words, I will claim that TEs reproduce extended conceptual metaphors, which instantiate forms of abductive reasoning. Therefore, they partially preserve the ignorance of the authors who produce them (even if they also enhance their knowledge), since TEs embed both forms of fallacious reasoning and limited structure-mapping scenarios.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Within the experimentalist current, I need to mention an original take that partially defies the intents of other experimentalists: the Neo-Kantian view of Buzzoni (2013). He proposes to consider a dialectical unity of thought experiment and empirical ones, which depends on their identical “technological-operational” dimension. In brief, he considers how co-dependent are experiments and thought experiments in the scientific progress.

  2. 2.

    Actually, the reactions of appraisal and wonder are so common that who does not comprehends nor approves the definition of TEs as an extraordinary tool—as Gooding (1992), for one—has to extensively justify his lack of enthusiasm.

  3. 3.

    On the history of metaphors, see cf. Ortony (1993).

  4. 4.

    Initially, philosophers of science began investigating the importance of models, analogies, and metaphors in scientific works in order to grasp the structure and dynamics of scientific reasoning, cf. Black (1962), Achinstein (1964), Cartwright (1983).

  5. 5.

    Of course, the terms that canalize the metaphorical reasoning are not random, but the authors of the metaphors choose them because they structurally fit in the domains connection. The functional adequacy of the metaphorical terms will be further discussed in the next subsection where I will analyze the construction of TEs scenario as a metaphorical construction.

  6. 6.

    Structure-mapping mechanisms are present in the so-called analogical metaphors, that share the relational and inferential structure of analogical reasoning. As already reported by Gentner (1982), analogical relationships do not support all metaphorical reasonings: metaphors can range from mere relational to attributional comparisons and even elude the definition of domains relationship as alignment. In this article I focus on conceptual analogical metaphors because I claim that this particular type of metaphorical reasoning is at the core of scenario creation of TEs and can shed some lights on their specific functionality.

  7. 7.

    See Schrödinger (1983) and Wittgenstein (1958, p. 100).

  8. 8.

    For the original version of Maxwell’s Demon firstly discussed in the letter to Peter Guthrie Tait in 1867 see Maxwell (1995, pp. 331–332) and the extended version in Maxwell (1872, pp. 308–309); for the references to Einstein’s Clock in a Box see Bohr (1949); for Newton’s Rotating Bucket, considered in 1687 Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, see the recent translation of Bernard Cohen, Anne Whitman and Julia Budenz, Newton (1999).

  9. 9.

    For the reference of Lucretius’ Spear Through the Universe, see De Rerum Natura 1.951–987, translated by Lucretius (1910, pp. 58–59) and for an extended and commented version of Stevinus’ Chain see Mach and Hiebert (1976).

  10. 10.

    For the reference of Galileo’s Falling Bodies see the translation of the 1638 text Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze attinenti alla mecanica ed i movimenti locali by Galilei (1914); for Bohr argument against Einstein’s Clock in a Box see Bohr (1949); and for Gettier’s Problem, see Gettier (1963).

  11. 11.

    A thorough examination of the role of TEs in Galileo’s discoveries is provided in Magnani (2011). The article aims at criticizing fictionalism and re-discussing the abstractness and ideality of models with the help of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition and abductive cognition. In this perspective, TEs (as scientific models) represent pivotal tools for scientific creativity and development.

  12. 12.

    For more reference on Einstein and Bohr’s argument on the clock in a box TE, cf. Bohr (1949).

  13. 13.

    Also Brown (1991a) highlighted the reframing power of TEs.

  14. 14.

    The difference between Craik’s examination of mental models and the “mental model account” of TEs proposed by Bishop, Nersessian and Gendler is extensively displayed in Johnson-Laird (2004).

  15. 15.

    Specifically, for its final definition, Galili considers the claim of Reiner and Gilbert (2000) that a “thought experiment is a design of thought that is intended to test and/or convince others of the validity of a claim”, judging it too inclusive. He evaluates Brown’s point of view too general, as it defined a TE “a special type of mental window through which the mind can grasp universal understandings” (Brown 1991a). Finally examining the modelist account “to perform a scientific thought experiment is to reason about an imaginary scenario with the aim of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory about the physical world” (Gendler 2004), Brown well exposes the fact that Gendler (as others who shared the mental models view, like Bishop and Nersessian), usually pays more attention to the creation of the imagined scenario in the TEs than to the features of their inferential structure.

  16. 16.

    Notwithstanding the fact that many standard perspectives on abduction demand two properties, relevance and plausibility, which are presented as possessed by every kind of solution for an abductive problem, I should point out the context- and time- dependent character of these requirements, which is defined by Magnani’s Eco-Cognitive model of abduction (Magnani 2015). This results in the affirmation that irrelevance and implausibility are not always offensive to the performance of a good abductive reasoning. Magnani claims that, in general, one cannot be sure that one’s guessed hypotheses are plausible (even if we know that looking for plausibility is a human good and wise heuristic); indeed an implausible hypothesis can, later on, result plausible. Eventually, the plausibility of a guessed hypothesis results a trivial requirement and something similar can be said in the case of relevance. In the case of TEs, the agent performing an abduction selects or generates what she thinks is the most plausible hypothesis, which depends on her knowledge and her beliefs at her time. Therefore, plausibility and relevance are considered strict requirements for the consideration of the guessed hypothesis primarily (and sometimes only) from the author’s point of view.

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  1. Computational Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, Pavia, Italy

    Selene Arfini

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Arfini, S. (2019). Ignorance-Based Mental Models: Thought Experiments, Metaphors, and Abduction. In: Ignorant Cognition. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14362-6_8

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