Abstract
Effectively exploited by President Wilson’s Republican critics, the Shandong decision was critical in turning American opinion against the Treaty of Versailles and saw a heightening of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States.
With a view to normalising relations with Japan with which the United States was engaged in naval rivalry, the United States invited Japan, China and certain European powers to a conference in Washington on the subject of limitation of armament and on Pacific and Far Eastern questions to begin sitting in November 1921. Japan and China reached an agreement over Shandong outside of but concurrent with the conference.
The détente between the United States and Japan that followed the Washington Conference was interrupted in May 1924 with the coming into effect of an immigration act which for the first time authorised, with a few exceptions, the exclusion of Japanese immigrants as a national group from the United States.
The founders of the IPR were greatly troubled by rising racial tension in the Pacific, fearing that any future war among Pacific nations would be embittered by racial antagonism. Hence, the main items on the agenda of the IPR’s first conference in 1925 were immigration restrictions and interracial relations in the Pacific.
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Notes
- 1.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 2, 224. See also Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, 266–7.
- 2.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 2, 227. Lansing stated immediately after the decision was taken: ‘China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic territory has been given over to an autocratic government …. The result was that China was offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of Japan.’ Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, 261–2.
- 3.
Reinsch further warned that should Japan ‘be given a freer hand’ in East Asia and ‘should anything be done which could be interpreted as a recognition of a special position of Japan,’ then ‘forces will be set in action which make a huge armed conflict absolutely inevitable within one generation.’ ‘Appendix F: Letter of Resignation to President Woodrow Wilson by Paul S. Reinsch as Ambassador to China, 7 June 1919,’ in Fulton Lewis, China’s Great Convulsion 1994–1924, 207. See also Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001), 331.
- 4.
Edward M. House, 1919, quoted in Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001), 330.
- 5.
Bliss to Wilson, 19 April 1919, in Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, 260.
- 6.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics. 180–1.
- 7.
Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 90–1.
- 8.
Ibid., 91–2.
- 9.
Ibid., 92.
- 10.
Ibid., 92–3.
- 11.
Ibid., 93–4.
- 12.
Ibid., 99.
- 13.
Thomas F. Millard, ‘Confidential Memorandum: Conjectural Bases of the Alleged British-French-Japanese Entente Regarding Asia, May 1919,’ ibid., 100–2.
- 14.
Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 99, 106.
- 15.
Ibid., 107.
- 16.
Ibid., 99, 106–7.
- 17.
Ibid., 91, 106.
- 18.
Ibid., 107.
- 19.
Ibid., 95–6. See also Zhang, China in the International System, 1918–1920, 89.
- 20.
Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 96.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Ibid., 93.
- 23.
Ibid., 94.
- 24.
Ibid., 93.
- 25.
Ibid., 97–8.
- 26.
Ibid., 99–100.
- 27.
Ibid., 108 and Thomas F. Millard to Charles R. Miller, 18 July 1919, ibid., 109–10.
- 28.
Ibid., 110.
- 29.
Ibid., 107–8, 111.
- 30.
Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 108. Millard observed that at the time of Wilson’s return from France on July 8, senators remained ‘obsessed with the belief that the American people could not be detached from support of a league of nations’ (ibid., 116).
- 31.
Ibid., 98.
- 32.
Ibid., 108.
- 33.
Ibid., 99.
- 34.
Thomas F. Millard, ‘“Regional Understandings” and the Shantung Decision,’ ibid., 112–5.
- 35.
‘Stenographic Report of the Testimony of Hon. Robert Lansing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 6 August 1919,’ in Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 117–8.
- 36.
Wood, The Shantung Question, 165.
- 37.
Ibid., 166.
- 38.
The reservation as originally drafted by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge read as follows: ‘The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.’ Wood noted that it was alleged at the time that the phrase ‘between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan’ was omitted from the final reservation ‘due to the desire to avoid anything that would reflect upon the good faith of the Japanese Government’ (ibid., 167–9). See also George A. Finch, ‘The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate,’ American Journal of International Law 14, no. 1–2 (1920): 155–206, 180.
- 39.
Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 426.
- 40.
The Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles meant that the United States would not participate in the LON and, therefore, would not be able to help China in its endeavours to obtain satisfaction in that forum. This would have been of little concern to Millard as he was deeply sceptical of the idea that China could obtain justice from the LON. He called Wilson’s intimation in this regard a ‘crumb of consolation.’ Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, 79,160.
- 41.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 2, 223. See also Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 179.
- 42.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 179–81.
- 43.
Ibid., 195 and Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 282.
- 44.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 289. ‘A document drawn up at the request of the premier in March 1920, for presentation to the legations in Peking, clearly explains the motives beneath the Chinese policy of refusing to negotiate with Japan concerning Shantung, but it was suppressed by the [Chinese] military group. According to this statement, China insisted upon the evacuation and the restoration of Tsingtau and the Shantung Railway before any negotiations with Japan alone could be considered, but it expressed willingness to arrange an international loan to buy the railway stock, to institute customs control under the direction of the Inspectorate of Maritime Customs, and to internationalise the port of Tsingtau. Unless Japan would accede to these proposals the only adjustment which would be acceptable would be by an International tribunal’ (ibid., 282). See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 386, and Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 196.
- 45.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 283. See also Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, 265.
- 46.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 283 and Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 193.
- 47.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 284.
- 48.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 188–9, 193.
- 49.
Ibid., 190–1.
- 50.
Ibid., 191–2.
- 51.
Ibid., 197.
- 52.
Senator Borah introduced a resolution on April 3, ‘requesting President Harding to take this step,’ and this resolution was adopted by the United States Congress, on May 25, 1921. Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 287.
- 53.
‘The Japanese government delayed several days, while secret conferences were held to determine its course of action before replying. On July 14 Japan expressed her willingness to accept the invitation, but first wished to be advised as the scope and nature of the subjects to be discussed. It was semiofficially stated in Tokyo that Japan would not discuss subjects already settled or which solely concerned a given nation. The United States government chose to regard the Japanese note as an acceptance in principle and effect and expressed the hope that Japan would leave the nature and scope of the problems to be discussed open for adjustment by the conference itself. The Japanese government was thus placed in an awkward position To refuse to participate would sacrifice the position as a world power which Japan had attained and would concede that world problems could be adjusted without Japan’s approval.’ Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 287–8. For the stated purpose of the conference, see ‘Appendix 14: China’s Invitation to the Washington Conference,’ ibid., 506–7. See also Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 199.
- 54.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 288 and ‘Appendix 14: China’s Invitation to the Washington Conference,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 507.
- 55.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 288–9.
- 56.
Bau, The Shantung Question, 35, 36–44. Bau discusses each of the nine proposals in detail. See also Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 289.
- 57.
Bau, The Shantung Question, 45.
- 58.
Copy of Chinese reply of October 5, 1921, furnished by the Chinese Legation, Washington D.C., quoted in quoted ibid., 46.
- 59.
Chinese Delegation to the Washington Conference, Official Statement, 1922, quoted in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 290 and Bau, The Shantung Question, 47.
- 60.
Chinese Delegation to the Washington Conference, Official Statement, 1922, quoted in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 291.
- 61.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 199–200. The formal agenda of the conference was published on September 21, 1921. The Nine-Power treaty concerning China was published and signed on February 4 and 6 respectively. This treaty provided for Chinese customs administration. ‘In advance of the meeting of the Conference the State Department prepared a tentative statement of agenda which was submitted to the invited Powers.’ Quincy Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ American Political Science Review 16, no. 2 (1922): 285–97, 285, 289. See also ‘Appendix 15: The Agenda of the Washington Conference, 1921,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 508–9.
- 62.
Shidehara Kijūrō, 1922, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 391.
- 63.
After accepting Shidehara’s assurances, Hughes stated that the ‘assurances were taken to mean that Japan does not seek rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation of either of the resources of Sakhalin or of Maritime Province.’ Charles Evans Hughes, 1922, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 391.
- 64.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 200.
- 65.
Ibid., 200–1. See also Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 287.
- 66.
Ibid., 201.
- 67.
Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923, 489–90.
- 68.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 311.
- 69.
Ibid., 290, 311. ‘[N]one of the ex-Allied signatories could question the clauses dealing with Shantung without making a breach in the sacrosanct Versailles system. There could be no diplomatic support for revision from England and France, and Washington was not likely to make a direct attack on the Paris settlement in spite of American public sympathy for China’s case’ (ibid., 320). See also Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 196.
- 70.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 311, 319.
- 71.
Ibid., 319.
- 72.
Ibid., 422, 425. See also ‘Appendix 17: Agreed Terms of Understanding Recorded in the Minutes of the Japanese and Chinese Delegations Concerning the Conclusion of the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung, 4 February 1922’ (ibid., 516–8).
- 73.
Japanese Delegation, Minutes of the Conversations Between the Chinese and Japanese Representatives in Regard to the Shantung Question, Washington, 1922, quoted in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 422.
- 74.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 422 and Wood, The Shantung Question, 265.
- 75.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 422.
- 76.
Ibid., 422–3.
- 77.
Wood, The Shantung Question, 264–5.
- 78.
‘Appendix 16: Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung, 4 February 1922,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 508–16. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 387–8.
- 79.
‘Appendix 16: Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 514.
- 80.
Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 196.
- 81.
‘Appendix 16: Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 512–14 and Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 387–8.
- 82.
Iyenaga, Toyokichi, ‘How Japan Views the Arms Conference,’ Current History Magazine 16, no. 1 (1922), 24.
- 83.
Ibid., 22, 24.
- 84.
Ibid., 23, 25.
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 427.
- 87.
Blakeslee, ‘The Mandates of the Pacific,’ 98.
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 265 and Charles Noble Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ American Journal of International Law 15, no. 3 (1921), 419–27, 419. See also Document 64: ‘Letter of Walter S. Rogers, communications expert of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, to President Wilson discussing the disposition of the captured German oceanic cables, 2 May 1919,’ in Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 3, 443–6.
- 90.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 422.
- 91.
Ibid.
- 92.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 422. Japanese delegates were absent from this meeting and from a meeting of the Council of Ten on the following day. See also Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 272 and Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 422.
- 93.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 421–2. Emphasis in the original. Charles Noble Gregory noted the following in relation to an appendix to the minutes of the meeting of May 7, the day on which the completed Treaty of Versailles was presented to the German minister for foreign affairs: ‘[The appendix], purporting obviously to be a codification of the agreement reached on the 6th as to the North Pacific Islands … is understood to be the basis of the claim of Japan [to these islands]. This does not expressly include all the islands in this category, though the word “certain” is omitted; but the Acting Secretary of State held that the erroneous publication of such a decision, of which this government was not aware, would not validate it, and he stated that the President recollects no proposal at this meeting to change the decision of the 6th, and he agreed to no change’ (ibid., 422).
- 94.
Ibid., 421. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 388–9.
- 95.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 420. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 388.
- 96.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 421–2. See also Blakeslee, ‘The Mandates of the Pacific,’ 103.
- 97.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 420.
- 98.
Ibid.
- 99.
Blakeslee, ‘The Mandates of the Pacific,’ 100. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 389.
- 100.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 420 and Gregory, ‘The Treaty as to Yap and the Mandated North Pacific Islands,’ 250–1.
- 101.
Gregory, ‘The Mandate Over Yap,’ 420.
- 102.
Ibid., 424–5. ‘The rule spoken of applies much more widely and absolutely in all international transactions than in matters of private property. It is universally agreed, it is believed, that a sovereign nation by joining in an international congress or conference in no way submits to be bound by a majority, unless she has so expressly agreed …. The Supreme Council, which is in the nature of an international conference, plainly cannot, by a majority vote, deprive any nation even if there represented, of rights or territory unless that nation acquiesce’ (ibid., 426–7).
- 103.
‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace 83, no. 12 (1921): 424–5, 424.
- 104.
Henry Cabot Lodge, 1921, quoted in Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 287.
- 105.
‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace, 424.
- 106.
Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 293; ‘The Four Power Treaty,’ 424; and Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 313.
- 107.
LON, Treaty Series 1, no. 1 (1920), 24.
- 108.
Bartlet Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ Political Science Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1935): 45–58, 46, 48, 51. See also ‘Appendix 5: Great Britain and Japan,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 489–90.
- 109.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 283–4 and Bartlet Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 48, 51. See also ‘Appendix 5: Great Britain and Japan,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 489–90.
- 110.
Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 47, 54n. See also Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 295.
- 111.
Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 47.
- 112.
Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 293 and ‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace, 424.
- 113.
Arthur Balfour, n. d., quoted in Iyenaga, ‘How Japan views the Arms Conference,’ 423.
- 114.
Article 4 of the revised agreement of 1911 qualified the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the following fashion: ‘Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.’ Iyenaga, ‘How Japan views the Arms Conference,’ 423. See also ‘Appendix 5: Great Britain and Japan,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 490. The significance of Article 4 of the revised agreement is that it precluded British assistance to Japan in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. See further ‘The Revised Anglo-Japanese Treaty,’ The Spectator, July 22, 1911, 6–7. The provision precluding an Anglo-American conflict came into effect in September 1914 ‘in spite of the earlier defeat in the Senate of [Sir Edward] Grey’s arbitration treaty, by reason of Bryan’s Anglo-American “cooling off” treaty, and American attention had been repeatedly and pointedly drawn to it by Japanese and British public utterances.’ Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 48.
- 115.
Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 48.
- 116.
Ibid., 49.
- 117.
Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 284. See also, 130 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series), 10 June 1920, 584–5 and 130 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th series), 24 June 1920, 2365–6.
- 118.
Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 55.
- 119.
Ibid., 53.
- 120.
Ibid., 54.
- 121.
Ibid.
- 122.
Ibid., 51–2. See also Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 284.
- 123.
Brebner, ‘Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,’ 55–6.
- 124.
Ibid., 56.
- 125.
Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 295.
- 126.
Iyenaga, ‘How Japan Views the Arms Conference,’ 23.
- 127.
Ibid.
- 128.
Ibid.
- 129.
Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 293.
- 130.
‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace, 424–5.
- 131.
Henry Cabot Lodge, 1921, quoted ibid., 425.
- 132.
‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace, 424.
- 133.
Henry Cabot Lodge, 1922, quoted in Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 293.
- 134.
Wright, ‘The Washington Conference,’ 293.
- 135.
Ibid., 290.
- 136.
Iyenaga, ‘How Japan Views the Arms Conference,’ 22–4.
- 137.
‘The Four Power Treaty,’ Advocate of Peace, 424–5.
- 138.
Ibid., 424. Emphasis in the original.
- 139.
‘Appendix 15: The Agenda of the Washington Conference, 1921,’ in Godshall, Tsingtau Under Three Flags, 508. See also Charles Noble Gregory, ‘The Treaty as to Yap and the Mandated North Pacific Islands,’ American Journal of International Law 16, no. 2 (1922): 248–5, 249.
- 140.
Blakeslee, ‘The Mandates of the Pacific,’ 113.
- 141.
Ibid., 104. See also Gregory, ‘The Treaty as to Yap and the Mandated North Pacific Islands,’ 249–50. Akagi noted that the United States obtained from Japan ‘all the rights and privileges [in respect to the mandated islands] granted to the members of the League of Nations. The United States also secured free access for American citizens to the island of Yap on an equal footing with Japanese subjects or any other nationals “in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or of any other cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals in connection with the island of Yap.” The same rights and privileges were secured with respect to the radio-telegraphic communications, the same to be suspended so long as Japan maintained an adequate station.’ Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 389.
- 142.
Gregory, ‘The Treaty as to Yap and the Mandated North Pacific Islands,’ 248–5, 251 and Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, 202.
- 143.
Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 432–3.
- 144.
Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration Laws and Regulations of July 1, 1907, 11th ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), 5.
- 145.
Ibid., 41. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 434.
- 146.
Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration Laws and Regulations of July 1, 1907, 21.
- 147.
Theodore Roosevelt, 1907, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 434.
- 148.
Akagi observed that although the agreement ‘was not applicable to Hawaii, Japan applied substantially the same restrictive measures to Japanese emigrants who were destined to the Hawaiian islands; she also similarly limited the Japanese emigration to Mexico.’ Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 434–5.
- 149.
Ibid., 436.
- 150.
Chinda Sutemi, 1913, quoted ibid. Article 1 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan stated the following: ‘The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established.’ This treaty superseded a treaty of the same name signed in Washington on November 22, 1894. Article 1 of the 1894 provided that ‘the citizens or subject of the two High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the territories of the other Contracting Party.’ ‘Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan,’ supplement, American Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (1911): 100–6, 100. See also Charles I. Bevans, ed., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America: 1776–1949, vol. 9 (Washington: Department of States, 1972), 387–8.
- 151.
‘The new Alien Land Law … provided that all “aliens ineligible to citizenship” could not own or lease agricultural land nor could they become members or acquire shares in any corporation owning agricultural land nor could they become guardians of a minor owning agricultural land, and that any real estate acquired by such aliens after 1920 in violation of this Law should escheat to the State of California. In 1923, the series was completed when an additional legislative enactment deprived all “aliens ineligible to citizenship” of the right to enjoy the use of cropping contracts.’ Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 439.
- 152.
Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 US 178 (1922).
- 153.
Ibid.
- 154.
Ibid.
- 155.
Ibid. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 440.
- 156.
Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 441.
- 157.
Immigration. Act of 1924, United States Statutes at Large, 68th Cong. Sess. I, Ch. 190, 153–62. Among the exceptions were persons previously lawfully admitted to the United States who were returning from a temporary visit abroad, ministers of any religious denomination who were coming to the United States solely to carry out their vocation, professors appointed to institutions of higher learning and bona fide students.
- 158.
Masayo Umezawa Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), 305. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 442.
- 159.
Hanihara Masanao, 1924, quoted in Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 305. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 442.
- 160.
Hanihara Masanao, 1924, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 442.
- 161.
Henry Cabot Lodge, 1924, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 443. On the adoption of Hughs’s suggestion by the Senate Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, see Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 442–3.
- 162.
Hanihara, 1930, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 447. Hanihara further observed that ‘the resentment is felt now as it was then, nor will it ever die out so long as the wound inflicted remains unhealed’ (ibid., 447).
- 163.
Hanihara, 1924, quoted in Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 306. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 445–6.
- 164.
Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 443–4. In his note to Secretary of State Hughes on April 17, Hanihara ‘expressed his inability “to understand how the two words read in their context could be construed as meaning anything like a threat” as he had “no thought of being in any way disagreeable or discourteous and still less conveying ‘a veiled threat,’” and explained that he “simply tried to emphasize the most unfortunate and deplorable effect upon our traditional friendship which might result from the adoption of a particular clause in the proposed measure.”’ See also Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 306. The vote was 308 to 58 in the House of Representatives and 69 to 9 in the Senate.
- 165.
On resigning as ambassador, Cyrus E. Woods stated the following: ‘I consider that in this crisis, the government and people of Japan have acted with dignity and self-restraint which, promises well, better indeed than might have been expected, for the continuation of friendship between Japan and America.’ ‘News in Brief,’ Advocate of Peace, 86, no. 66 (1924), 373.
- 166.
Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 444–6. President Coolidge ‘affixed his signature upon the Immigration Act, accompanying it, however, with a statement in which he criticized the method used by Congress to obtain Japanese exclusion, but recognizing “that the enactment of this provision does not imply any change in our sentiment of admiration and cordial friendship for the Japanese people”’ (ibid. 444). Masayo Umezawa Duus writes that the Japanese had expected that Coolidge would veto the legislation. However, having ‘been thrust unexpectedly into the presidency … his power base was not yet solid. Yielding to strong pressures from West Coast congressmen, President Coolidge, despite Hughes’s urging, was unable to come up with a compromise plan. The prospect of a national election … was the backdrop for the passage of the new immigration law that took effect on July 1, 1924.’ Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 306–7.
- 167.
Memorandum of the Japanese Government, 1924, quoted in Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 444–5.
- 168.
Ibid., 445.
- 169.
Virgil S. McClatchy, the first witness to appear before the Senate Committee on Immigration and Naturalization during its hearings on the Senate’s immigration bill between March 11 and 15, stated the following: ‘I have a very high regard for the character and ability of the Japanese nation and the Japanese people. And I realize that it is in effect their strong racial characteristics which make them so dangerous a factor if admitted to this country as permanent residents. With great pride of race, they have no idea of assimilating in the sense of amalgamation. They never cease to be Japanese. They do not come to this country with any desire or any intent to lose their racial or national identity. They come here specifically and professedly for the purpose of colonizing and establishing here permanently the proud Yamato race.’ Virgil S. McClatchy, 1924, quoted in Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 303–4. See also Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 445.
- 170.
Arnold J. Toynbee, ‘Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in the International Crisis,’ International Affairs 15, no. 1 (1936): 26–56, 56. See also Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 309–10.
- 171.
Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific 1927, 169. See also Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 167; Akagi, Japan’s Foreign Relations 1542–1936, 447; and Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy, 302.
- 172.
Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1–2. On the impact of the Immigration Act, see also Nicholas Murray Butler, preface to International Conciliation 11, no. 228 (1926), 123–4.
- 173.
Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 35.
- 174.
Paul Hooper, ‘History,’ Pan-Pacific Union Records, http://manoa.hawaii.edu/library/research/collections/archives/manuscript-collections/other-manuscript-collections/pan-pacific-union-records/.
- 175.
Ibid., and Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 35–6.
- 176.
‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 430.
- 177.
J. Merle Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ International Conciliation 11, no. 228 (1926): 125–146, 125.
- 178.
Institute of Pacific Relations [hereafter IPR], Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses (Honolulu: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925), 7.
- 179.
John C. Mott, 1921, quoted ibid.
- 180.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 8.
- 181.
Ibid.
- 182.
Ibid.
- 183.
Honolulu YMCA, 1922, quoted ibid.
- 184.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 9 and ‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 430–1.
- 185.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 9.
- 186.
Ibid., 9–10.
- 187.
Ibid., 10–11.
- 188.
‘Appendix 6: Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 521 and Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations: History and Proceedings,’ 125.
- 189.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 125.
- 190.
‘Appendix 6: Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 521, 529.
- 191.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 126.
- 192.
Ibid., 125.
- 193.
‘Appendix 6: Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 521. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 125–6.
- 194.
Third Biennial Conference of the IPR, Kyoto, 28 October-9 November 1929, Second Announcement, 1 July 1929, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2, UA. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127.
- 195.
‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 431.
- 196.
Ibid., 431–2.
- 197.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 11.
- 198.
Ibid., 12.
- 199.
Ibid., 12–13 and Paul Hooper, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,’ Pacific Affairs 61, no. 1 (1988), 98–121, 99.
- 200.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 13.
- 201.
Ibid.
- 202.
Ibid., 14.
- 203.
Ibid.
- 204.
Ibid., 14–15. The Hawaiian planners of the conference chose the YMCA as its host organisation because of the YMCA’s character as a ‘homogenous international organization.’ Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 126.
- 205.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 15. See also Hooper, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,’ 99.
- 206.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 19.
- 207.
On Davis’s missionary background and post-IPR role, see ‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 184, 224, and Charles W. Forman, ‘Davis, J(ohn) Merle,’ in Gerald H. Anderson ed., Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 171.
- 208.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 20; Hooper, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,’ 100; and ‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 431. See also Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 50, 136, 287. Davis had previously been general secretary of the international committee of the YMCA before becoming the administrative director in 1923 of what was named ‘The Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast.’ This survey was jointly undertaken and organised by five Pacific Coast regional committees and the Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York City. Institute of Social and Religious Research. A Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast [US] (publisher not identified: 1924).
- 209.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 19; Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 126; and ‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 431.
- 210.
Davis,’ The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 125, and ‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 432.
- 211.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127, and IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 19.
- 212.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128, and IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 19.
- 213.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 19–20.
- 214.
Ibid., 19–21.
- 215.
Ibid. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127. On the relation between the original Inquiry and the programme of which Carter was executive secretary, see ‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 205.
- 216.
‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 203–4. Condliffe observed that the YMCA believed in ‘the sort of discussion methods associated at that time with Professor James Kilpatrick of Teachers’ College, Columbia, all discussion, on the simplest and most repetitive basis, with little content.’ ‘Appendix 3: John Condliffe’s Reminiscences,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 433. Akami notes that Edward C. Carter’s Inquiry was originally called the ‘National Inquiry into the Christian Way of Life.’ She adds that with ‘good [Rockefeller] funding, Carter ran his Inquiry,’ which lasted until 1932, ‘from 129 East Street, an annex of the YMCA building at number 135, facing Lexington Avenue.’ Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 50.
- 217.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 17. See also Hooper, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific Studies,’ 99.
- 218.
Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1.
- 219.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 15–16.
- 220.
Ibid., 16.
- 221.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127 and IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 21.
- 222.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 131.
- 223.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 21–2. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127. The modifications mentioned were accepted.
- 224.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 22 and Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128.
- 225.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 22. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128.
- 226.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 23.
- 227.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128. See also IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 23.
- 228.
IPRs, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 23. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128.
- 229.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128.
- 230.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 23.
- 231.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 127.
- 232.
Ibid. See also IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 77.
- 233.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 24.
- 234.
Ibid., 23–4.
- 235.
Ibid., 24.
- 236.
‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 202.
- 237.
Ibid., 202.
- 238.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 125, 128. On the membership of the first institute, see IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 35–40. The figure of 143 is based on the list of members, associate members and secretariat staff included in the official conference proceedings. It excludes three participants who are described as being at large and who did not reside in a Pacific Basin country. Note that reports of the numbers in attendance vary slightly. See also Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific 1927, vii. Condliffe reported that 111 people attended the first IPR conference; however, this calculation would largely seem to be based on a restrictive interpretation of participation in the conference. Elsewhere, that is, in his article entitled ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ Davis mentioned a participation figure of 147.
- 239.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 128–9. See also IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 25. According to the conference proceedings, the original budget was US$75,000. The conference proceedings noted that the Japanese group contributed $11,500 to the conference costs but added that at the time of writing, the names of individual donors were not available.
- 240.
On the location of the conference, see IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 25 and Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 93.
- 241.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 130.
- 242.
Ibid.
- 243.
Ibid., 129.
- 244.
Ibid., 129–30. See also Raymond Leslie Buell, ‘Problems of the Pacific: A Bibliography,’ International Conciliation 11, no. 228 (1926): 147–71. International Conciliation ‘was the only periodical publication’ of the Division of Intercourse and Education...It was originally founded by the American Association for International Conciliation in 1907 and appeared under its imprint until July 1925, when that Association was dissolved and its activities assumed by the Endowment.’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Records, 1910–1954, www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/archives/rbml/CEIP/index.html?ceip?V.html&1.
- 245.
Kirk, The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities, 5–6. On the budget for the conference and the list of donors, see IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 25.
- 246.
Raymond Leslie Buell, ‘Problems of the Pacific: A Bibliography,’ 157. See also Raymond Leslie Buell, International Relations (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1925), vii.
- 247.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 156–205 and Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 136–7.
- 248.
Ibid., 137.
- 249.
Roger Morgan, ‘“To Advance the Sciences of International Politics …”: Chatham House’s Early Research,’ in Bocco and Navari eds., Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 130 and Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 138–9.
- 250.
‘Shanghai Riots,’ New York Times, June 3, 1925 and ‘Riots in Shanghai: Foreigners Denounced,’ Sydney Morning Herald June 1, 1925.
- 251.
Morgan, ‘“To Advance the Sciences of International Politics …”: Chatham House’s Early Research,’ 130.
- 252.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 139.
- 253.
Ibid.
- 254.
Ibid.
- 255.
Ibid.
- 256.
Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 18.
- 257.
David Z. T. Yui, ‘China and Pacific Relations During 1925–1927,’ in Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific 1927, 17.
- 258.
Third Biennial Conference of the IPR, Kyoto, 28 October-9 November 1929, Second Announcement, 1 July 1929, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2, UA. See also Condliffe, ‘An Experiment in Diagnosis,’ Pacific Affairs 2, no. 3 (1929), 103–115, 107 and Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 134.
- 259.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 139–140. Akami writes that for Davis, the ‘equal status of Japan and China, the new powers in Asia, was of prime importance’ and that he tried to promote this as general secretary of the IPR. Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 129. See also IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 30. The title of Y. C. James Yen’s address was as follows: ‘One of China’s Constructive Forces—The Mass Education Movement.’
- 260.
‘Chinese Mass Education Movement Progresses Strongly,’ News Bulletin: Institute of Pacific Relations, 16 October 1926, 1.
- 261.
Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 165.
- 262.
B. H. Fletcher, ‘Hall, Hessel Duncan (1891–1976),’ in Australian Dictionary of Biography Online (National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 2006–2019), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hall-hessel-duncan-10394/text18417. Originally published in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 14 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 1996). On Hall, see also Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 111.
- 263.
Hessel Duncan Hall, ‘Co-operation Among Pacific Countries,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 136.
- 264.
Ibid.
- 265.
Ibid., 138.
- 266.
Hessel Duncan Hall, 1925, quoted in Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 110.
- 267.
J. B. Condliffe, ‘Memorandum on the Relation of the British Commonwealth to Pacific Problems,’ News Bulletin: Institute of Pacific Relations 16 October 1926, 1–2, 12–16.
- 268.
Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 34.
- 269.
Ibid., 35.
- 270.
Ibid., 18–19.
- 271.
Ibid., 35–6.
- 272.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 140. See also John Nelson, ‘Canadian View of Pacific Relations’ and J. B. Condliffe, ‘New Zealand’s Outlook upon Pacific Problems,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 65–8, 90–1.
- 273.
Stephen H. Roberts, ‘Australian View of Pacific Relations,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 62. ‘The following particulars are given in view of an error which has crept into International Conciliation, no. 128 (March 1926), 140. It is there said that “the examination may be given in Latin, Greek, Sanscrit [sic] ….” I am informed by Mr. Merle Davis, the author of the paper referred to, that this statement is based on a passage in an address read at the Honolulu conference of the Institute in July 1925, by an Australian delegate, and reading as follows: “For instance, in two well-known cases (1906–1915) undesirable Germans were excluded by a test of 50 words in classical Greek, and it is conceivable that a person might be given a test either in the most technical botanical jargon or in ‘Amharic’ (Proceedings, p. 62). In the absence of the names of the Germans referred to, it has proved impossible to trace these cases in the records of the Ministry of Home and Territories. Nor is there any record that classical Greek has ever been used for the purpose of the dictation test. Moreover, the officer in charge of the administration of the act in 1906, of whom inquiry has been made, states that he would not have sanctioned the use of this language, had it been suggested. As regards the case in 1915, it is pointed out that a German national would have been excluded as an enemy alien under the War Precautions Act, 1914, without recourse to a dictation test under the immigration act. The second sentence in the passage quoted, is, as an interpretation of section 3 of the statute, doubtless correct: but, as stated before, a European language means in Australian official practice concerning immigration a living European language, and not a dead one. Both of the sentences quoted must, it is conceived, have been written under a misapprehension.’ A. H. Charteris, ‘Section 24: Australian Immigration Laws and their Working,’ in Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific 1927, 485n.
- 274.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 140. On the origins of the dictation test and the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ between Australia and Japan in 1904 and similar agreements of a subsequent date with other governments which involved concessions in regard to the liability of certain classes of foreigners (from Japan, India, China, Ceylon, Burma, Hong Kong and Straits Settlements, Annam, Egypt, the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands) to the test, see Charteris, ‘Section 24: Australian Immigration Laws and their Working,’ in Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific 1927, 483–4.
- 275.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 140 and Sawayanagi Masatarō, ‘A Japanese View of Pacific Relations,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 78.
- 276.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 140.
- 277.
Sawayanagi, ‘A Japanese View of Pacific Relations,’ 77–8.
- 278.
Takashi Komatsu, ‘Industrialization of Japan,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 128, 130.
- 279.
Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 35.
- 280.
Kenzō Takayanagi, ‘A Suggestion for more Enlightened Immigration and Emigration Policies,’ in IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 111.
- 281.
Judge Thomas Burke, 1925, quoted in Butler, preface to International Conciliation, no. 228 (1927–1927) 123–4.
- 282.
IPR: Summary of Activities, 1931–1932, Honolulu, 11 April 1932, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2, UA. On Loomis’s role in founding the IPR, see Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 48, 287.
- 283.
Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 140.
- 284.
‘Appendix 6: ‘Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 526.
- 285.
‘Appendix 6: Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 526. Hooper notes the following: ‘Further research indicates that Condliffe’s version is correct. The original plan was for a one-time institute, to be called the Institute of Pacific Relations, but the response to this gathering was so enthusiastic that the planners decided to create a permanent organization with the same name.’ ‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 203n.
- 286.
IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30 to July 14, 1925, 25–6 and Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 141.
- 287.
‘Appendix 6: Handbook of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 521.
- 288.
Third Biennial Conference of the IPR, Kyoto, 28 October-9 November 1929, Second Announcement, 1 July 1929, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2UA. See also Davis, ‘The Institute of Pacific Relations,’ 142–3, 146.
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Pemberton, JA. (2020). The Quest for a Machinery of Cooperation in the Pacific: The Covenant Rejected, the Washington Conference and the 1924 Exclusion Laws. In: The Story of International Relations, Part One. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14331-2_4
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