Assessing the Crisis and the Dynamics (?) of the Future
SYRIZA’s retreat was justified through its having formed the view that through a line of compromise developed in the course of the negotiations it would induce the lenders to adopt a “milder” handling of the memorandum policy and a restructuring of the debt. But, this would not become feasible because the international economic elite did not wish to signal that it had compromised with a leftist government and because the Tsipras government did not utilize any powerful means of pressuring lenders (such as cessation of payments). Given that, the prospect that opened for the country was one of a sluggish return to low growth rates, with a continuation of austerity policies and significant consensus between the main political parties on this point. On the part of the Greek ruling class no elaboration of a strategy is visible that might contribute to averting a reappearance of the pathogens of the past.
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