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Conceptual Framework Compliance and Compliance Mechanism

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Paris Climate Agreement: A Deal for Better Compliance?

Part of the book series: The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science ((APESS,volume 11))

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Abstract

As indicated above by Kant and Confucius’s words, first of all, it is necessary to clarify what is really said. Unless the meaning is understood correctly, a regulation might be applied wrongly or incompletely in practice due to substantial divergence in the ways in which it has been understood. Therefore, due to the fact that, “thinking, judging and carrying knowledge require both concepts and intuitions to which the concepts are applied” (Dicker 2004: 17), as stressed in Kant’s words, in order “to relate concepts to practice,” it is necessary to give the concepts practical meaning, content and direction (Schachter 1991: 2). Doing this also makes it possible to show the direction of the perspective pursued in the study and constrain it to the frames of these definitions.

If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires, is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.

Confucius, The Analects-13

(cited by Lao-Tse 1901)

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

Immanuel Kant

(cited by Dicker 2004: 17)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/enforcement.

  2. 2.

    https://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/implementation.

  3. 3.

    https://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/effectiveness.

  4. 4.

    https://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/compliance.

  5. 5.

    To understand the concept of effectiveness better, see also Maljean-Dubois/Richard (2004) on two tests of efficacité and effectivité (referring to De Visscher [1967]. Les effectivités du droit international public).

  6. 6.

    Najam et al. (2006) also raise another concept, ‘performance,’ as their study’s main concern, defining it as “the sum of implementation, compliance, enforcement and effectiveness.”

  7. 7.

    For a detailed information on MEAs, see Özer (2009: 49–88).

  8. 8.

    See infra Chap. 4 for elaboration.

  9. 9.

    The formal status of IOPs was established through Resolution VII.3 of 1999, and four organizations (namely, Bird Life International, IUCN – The World Conservation Union, Wetlands International and the World Wide Fund for Nature) were granted the status of IOP (COP 7, Resolution VII.3, 1999). Subsequently, through Resolution IX.16, the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) also became an IOP of the Convention (COP 9, Resolution IX.16, 2005). In line with Resolution VII.3, it was also decided that other relevant and interested international non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations meeting the criteria for formal recognition as Partners of the Convention should present an application to the Ramsar Secretariat for its consideration (for Memoranda of Understanding/Cooperation concluded with diverse IOs/NGOs under the Ramsar Convention, see:

    http://archive.ramsar.org/cda/es/ramsar-documents-mous/main/ramsar/1-31-115_4000_2__).

  10. 10.

    See https://www.thinglink.com/scene/846020646906363905 for visual storytelling of key multilateral environmental agreements with interactive media.

  11. 11.

    See infra Chap. 4.

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Savaşan, Z. (2019). Conceptual Framework Compliance and Compliance Mechanism. In: Paris Climate Agreement: A Deal for Better Compliance?. The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14313-8_2

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