Abstract
This chapter absolves Hume from the charge of moral scepticism, but not from the charge of epistemological scepticism. David Hume consciously followed the tradition of essay writing. He did it to play by dropping arguments through the Discourse so as to let the reader get to sceptical conclusions on his own instead of providing him with those conclusions. Besides, he was trying to counteract the poor reception of his previously published philosophical theory. The History of England was also ill-received as it was a fierce critique of the authority of the moment. This was key with regard to Hume’s inability to be nominated for a university chair, despite Adam Smith’s support. Hume was convinced that opposition to him was due to religious fanaticism, but it was also due to a real disagreement with his philosophy. Finally, the chapter makes it evident that the undeniable feature of Hume’s theory is his defence of the doctrine of utility. It accommodates Hume’s reading as a conservative to his explicit interest in progress and social reform.
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Notes
- 1.
Mossner (1980, 99–104).
- 2.
Rasmussen (2017, 28).
- 3.
David Hume to James Edmonstoune, April 1764, in NHL, 83. See Shklar and Cowles (1984, 72).
- 4.
Mazza (2012).
- 5.
David Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, March/April 1751, in JL, I, 158.
- 6.
Ross (2007).
- 7.
Rasmussen (2017, 34).
- 8.
Hume (1980 [1776], 614).
- 9.
Bolingbroke (1735).
- 10.
Rasmussen (2017, 244).
- 11.
Mossner (1980, 533).
- 12.
Smith (1941).
- 13.
Bermudo (1983, 82, 264).
- 14.
Reid (1970).
- 15.
Hume (1964a).
- 16.
Beattie (1770).
- 17.
Norton (1982).
- 18.
- 19.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: Section VI.
- 20.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: 11: 11: 338.
- 21.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: 111: XIV: 464.
- 22.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: 111: XII: 436.
- 23.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: IV: VI: 54.
- 24.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: 1 11: IX: 407–408.
- 25.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: III: III: 382.
- 26.
Hume (1964c), Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations: XI: 381.
- 27.
Barnes (1992, 590).
- 28.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: VIII: 426.
- 29.
Hume (1964d), Academical or Sceptical Philosophy: 11: 131.
- 30.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: 1: 382.
- 31.
Sturgeon (2001).
- 32.
- 33.
See Trincado (2004).
- 34.
Trabal (1995).
- 35.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: X: 434.
- 36.
Hume (1964d), Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State: 113.
- 37.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: XII: 462–463.
- 38.
Tasset (1999).
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: XI I: 455.
- 42.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: X: 440.
- 43.
Milton, Paradise Lost 11.
- 44.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: X: 438.
- 45.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: 1: 338.
- 46.
De Salas Urtuesta (1967, 18).
- 47.
Smith (1941).
- 48.
The study of the different interpretations of Hume’s intentions is in Dow (2002).
- 49.
Passmore (1980, 6).
- 50.
Penelhum (1975).
- 51.
- 52.
Macintyre (1959).
- 53.
Soghoian (1979).
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
Cohon (1997, 107).
- 58.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues XII: 462–463.
- 59.
Letter to Meneceo, Herder (1982, 93–97).
- 60.
Lucretio (1990, 233).
- 61.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: IV: VI: 534.
- 62.
Hume (1964a), Treatise: 1: IV: VII: 548, ed. Green and Grose.
- 63.
ENPL, 55, 53, cited in Rasmussen (2017, 26).
- 64.
Miller (1981, 5).
- 65.
See Gill (2000).
- 66.
Hume (1758), “From the Original Contract ”, in Political Essays, 107.
- 67.
- 68.
Schwartz (1987).
- 69.
Norton (1965).
- 70.
Hume (1964d), Of the Study of History: VI: 388.
- 71.
Stewart (1963, 145).
- 72.
Stewart (1992, 4).
- 73.
Rosales Rodríguez (2005).
- 74.
See Harrison (1976).
- 75.
Rotenstreich (1971, 197).
- 76.
Rosales Rodríguez (2005).
- 77.
Phillipson (1979, 140).
- 78.
See also Norton (1993).
- 79.
McRae (1991, 31).
- 80.
Mossner (1980, 543).
- 81.
Berry (1997, 70–71).
- 82.
See Cuaqui (1988).
- 83.
Hume (1985, Vol. 1).
- 84.
Hume (1985, 342).
- 85.
Hume (1964c), Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth: XVI: 481.
- 86.
Hume (1964d), Liberty of Press: II, Foot: 97.
- 87.
Haakonssen (1996, 112–113).
- 88.
Hume (1964d), Of Love and Marriage: V: 385.
- 89.
Hume (1964d), Enquiry: 1: 9–10.
- 90.
Hume (1964d), Enquiry: 1: 9–10.
- 91.
Hutcheson ( 1742).
- 92.
Mandeville (1988).
- 93.
Penelhum (1975, 98).
- 94.
Tasset (1999, 56).
- 95.
Clotet (1994, 17–28).
- 96.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: 1: VI: 91–92.
- 97.
Garrett (1997).
- 98.
Botros (2006).
- 99.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: I: VI: 89.
- 100.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: I: VIII: 99.
- 101.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: I: VIII: 99.
- 102.
See McIntyre (1990).
- 103.
An explanation of the sense of duty in Hume is in Radcliffe (1996).
- 104.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: II: IV: 141.
- 105.
Bergson (1963).
- 106.
Helvétius (1759).
- 107.
EPM 5.44.45.
- 108.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: III: X: 226–227.
- 109.
Stroud (1993, 268).
- 110.
See Árdal (1966).
- 111.
See Immerwahr (1989).
- 112.
Hume (1964d), Dialogues: 442.
- 113.
Hume (1964b), Treatise II: II: IV: 141.
- 114.
See Gauthier (1992).
- 115.
See Harrison (1981).
- 116.
- 117.
- 118.
Cohon (2008).
- 119.
Trincado (2004).
- 120.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: 11: 11: V: 150.
- 121.
See Jones (1982).
- 122.
Hutcheson (1725).
- 123.
McGilvary (1903).
- 124.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: II: 1: 256.
- 125.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: II: VIII: 160–161.
- 126.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: II: VIII: 160–161.
- 127.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: 11: IX: 169–171.
- 128.
See Korsgaard (1999).
- 129.
See Hudson (1996).
- 130.
Hume (1758, Vol. 1, 125n).
- 131.
Plinio, Natural History, 2.5.27.
- 132.
Hume (1964d), Of Suicide , Note.
- 133.
Persson (1997).
- 134.
Hume (1964b), Treatise: II: III: I: 185.
- 135.
Aranguren (1993).
- 136.
Bagolini (1966).
- 137.
Haakonssen (1981, 7).
- 138.
Hume (1964d), Of Justice : III: I: 179.
- 139.
Forbes (1975, 59–90).
- 140.
Buckle (1991).
- 141.
- 142.
San Emeterio (2001, 288).
- 143.
- 144.
Fassó (1982, 217).
- 145.
Garret (2007, 276).
- 146.
Miller (1981).
- 147.
Tasset (1999, 236).
- 148.
- 149.
Against what Schlatter says.
- 150.
Locke (1690).
- 151.
Haakonssen (1981, 41).
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Trincado, E. (2019). David Hume. In: The Birth of Economic Rhetoric. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14306-0_3
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