Abstract
In this chapter, the similarities and differences between direct and indirect reports are discussed, concluding that direct reports are more reliable and authoritative while indirect reports are more powerful to take into account subjective manipulations and pragmatic opacity. In this chapter, I applied Hall’s spatial model to direct and indirect reports, arguing that there are few chances of using direct or indirect reports in intimate and public spheres. Moreover, objectivity and subjectivity within direct and indirect reports are covered and it is concluded that there is no clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect reports with regard to subjectivity/objectivity. In other words, direct reports can be as subjective as indirect reports and indirect reports can be as objective as direct reports. The possible transformations in direct and indirect reports are also pointed out, using modal logic to justify that sentences such as ‘He said, My car is not new’ can be transformed to ‘He said that his car was old’ without creating confusion.
Utterances can be made the subject of other utterances. They can be criticized, questioned, commented on, or simply be reported. Language can be used to refer to language. We can talk about talk. This is true for all natural languages and is, indeed, a fundamental feature whose absence disqualifies any sign system as a human language. However, there are different ways of reporting the speech of another.
(Coulmas, 1986, p. 2)
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- 1.
Later, I discuss how individuals can manipulate direct reports by using several subtle strategies, in order to be manipulative.
- 2.
In line with Recanati (2004, p. 18), ‘free enrichment’ is “the process responsible for making the interpretation of an utterance more specific than its literal interpretation (as when ‘jumped’ is contextually understood as ‘jumped over the cliff’).”
- 3.
I argue later in this chapter that it is, of course, not a fixed rule, and that individuals change plugs based on sociocognitive factors.
- 4.
The use of ‘says’ is not sufficiently dealt with in the literature of (in)direct reporting. The default form of the verb used within the main clause in (in)direct reporting seems to be ‘said’, although I believe that in some situations, the reporter may use the verb ‘says’ instead of ‘said’ to show immediacy of action. One case in point is to refer to oral interpreters. In consonance with Peirce’s ‘triadic’ theory of the sign, interpreting is an interpretant of someone else’s words because the interpreted utterances refer to what the interpreter represents. Of course, the present form of the verb ‘say’ can be used in indirect reports as well, as if the reporter has just heard the original utterance.
- 5.
- 6.
In this regard, Partee (1973, p. 411) states that “it is not the meaning of the quoted sentence that is contributing to the meaning of the whole, but rather its surface form.”
- 7.
To provide a simple illustration of the formula, it is correct to assert that it is necessary that it will rain today if and only if it is not possible that it will not rain today, and it is possible that it will rain today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not rain today (Hughes & Cresswell, 1996). Likewise, Damian (1998, p. 352) argues that “it is not true that so long as something exists, it is possible for it not to exist. In like manner, for something that will happen, it is impossible for it not to happen.”
- 8.
As argued by Conee and Sider (2005, p. 32), “everything we ordinarily regard as being in the past is fixed and settled—accidentally necessary.”
- 9.
Possible worlds or propositions show the conditions under which utterances are true. For instance, 2 + 2 = 4 is always true irrespective of the kind of world we are referring to. However, the sentence ‘Alessandro is taller than himself’ seems an impossible proposition, since one cannot literally be taller than oneself in any possible world. That said, there is one possible world in which Alessandro can be taller than himself, and that is when he stands on a stool. In this case, it is possible to say ironically that ‘Alessandro is taller than himself’. Therefore, it is possible that Alessandro be taller than himself IFF he stands on a stool (referring to possible worlds). It is true (but weird) that Alessandro can be taller than himself at least in one possible world (a world with a stool). By possible worlds, it means that the meaning of a sentence is true where it is known that “in which of the possible cases it would be true and in which not” (Carnap, 1956, p. 10). The sentence ‘Alessandro is smarter than himself’ is an impossible proposition, since it cannot be true in any possible worlds.
- 10.
That is, of course, if the reporter exactly utters the original speaker’s words and based on situational necessity. Otherwise the reporter – even by adhering to verbatim report – should be held responsible for not being faithful to the reported speaker’s perspective.
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Morady Moghaddam, M. (2019). Direct and Indirect Reports. In: The Praxis of Indirect Reports. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_4
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