Abstract
The theories that guided the research are drawn from the literature on corruption, accountability, and parliamentary oversight from the institutionalist school of thought, especially the rational choice, historical, and sociological sub-schools. The research design utilized a mixed methodology, involving both quantitative and qualitative elements, and a mixed fixed/flexible research design; this approach follows Lieberman (Am Political Sci Rev 99(3):435–52, 2005). Data was collected through literature review and document search complemented by key informant interviews which included closed and open-ended questions.
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Notes
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Parliamentary oversight comprises the oversight tools that a legislature adopts (e.g., specialized committees and supreme audit institutions (SAIs)) and the governance context (e.g., form of government and type of electoral system). Process is the glue binds these two concepts—oversight tools and governance context.
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However, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the exact meaning of neo-institutionalism. According to Scott (2001, p. 33), there are “…two quite distinct groups: the historical and the rational choice theorists.” In this regard, Scott is implicitly supported by North (1990), Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Sanders (2006). However, Hall and Taylor (1996) add a third school, that of sociological institutionalism. We drew on all three institutionalist schools.
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However, as Mulgan (1997) stresses, people of equal status may be accountable to one another as part of a mutual authority relationship as long as each accepts the authority of the other.
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Other scholars, such as Uzzi and Dunlap (2005), emphasize the benefit to individuals from a web of social relationships and ties to individual actors.
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(1) simple correlations, using Ordinal (Spearman’s rank) rather than Pearson correlations, because it is difficult to quantify corruption precisely—the CPI is not a precise measure of corruption but rather an interval measure of perceived corruption; (2) a maximum likelihood Ordered Probit specification; and (3) a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification. The latter two, used when running the regression models, are commonly applied in studies of the determinants of corruption (e.g., Lederman et al. 2001, 2005).
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Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Theory and Research Design. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_1
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