What Underlies the Rhetoric in the Public Duel?

Eliasson, Leif Johan; Huet, Patricia Garcia-Duran

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-13366-5_6

Leif Johan Eliasson³ &
Patricia Garcia-Duran Huet⁴

151 Accesses

Abstract

In the rhetorical duel over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement, supporters emphasized its prospective economic and geostrategic benefits; opponents emphasized the negative effect of TTIP on health and safety standards and public policies. Arguments are based on premises, which rest on assumptions and/or presuppositions. Eliasson and Garcia-Duran show that opponents’ and supporters’ premises emerged from different assumptions and presuppositions. By identifying the foundations of the arguments, the authors assess their possibility and probability of occurring. They find greater evidence for supporters’ arguments, leaving them with a higher probability, though both sides’ arguments are found theoretically possible. The two sides’ premises were not mutually exclusive or contradictory: TTIP could simultaneously lower standards, endanger public policies, generate economic benefits, and serve geostrategic aims.

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Notes

1.
De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015). As discussed in Chap. 2, a distinction can be made between reformists (e.g. European Consumer Agency), who would accept TTIP if certain extensive changes were made, for example, omitting Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures and investor protection, and rejectionists (e.g. Corporate Observatory Europe), who opposed any TTIP agreement beyond tariff reductions. Yet with regard to the general debate and underlying assumptions, there were at most only nuanced differences between the groups.
2.
Dempsey (2015) and Hamilton (2014).
3.
“The validity of an inference is established on the basis of preservation of knowability, and therefore we are here dealing with the epistemic value expressed by the known judgements contained in the premises.” Primiero (2004, 13). A premise produces the actual instantiation of an epistemic assumption; premises are judgements (actually) known, transmitting knowability to new judgement(s). Primiero (2004, 15).
4.
Primiero (2004, 10).
5.
Primiero (2004, 12).
6.
Plumer (2017).
7.
Plumer (2017).
8.
Primiero (2004, 11).
9.
Plumer (2017) and Ericson, Murphy and Zeuschner (2011); cf. Rhode’s (2017) discussion of how presumptions are not required in persuasive dialogues.
10.
Echols (1998), Ujj (2016) and Friends of the Earth (October 1, 2013).
11.
Echolds (1998) and Eurobarometer (2012, 389).
12.
Faiola (2014).
13.
Pew (2014) and Sparding (2014, 9ff).
14.
McEntire (2014). They use EFSA and USFDA data.
15.
European Food Safety Agency (2005, 2008) and Spiegel Online (2014). It was a natural choice for CSOs to connect an appealing food (chicken) with chemicals (chlorine procedures). As one CSO representative confided, we “needed something to raise fears and capture attention.” Interview Brussels, May 9, 2016.
16.
Gil et al. (2009) and United Kingdom Food Standards Agency (2007, 6).
17.
Wiener et al. (2010).
18.
Wiener et al. (2010).
19.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 28).
20.
Young and Peterson (2014) and Young (2015, 10).
21.
Pelkmans and de Brito (March 2015, 13). Some mutual recognition, if agreed in negotiations, may require legislative changes in the authorizing language for regulators, but this would be decided through the domestic legislative process, not in negotiations.
22.
Goetz (2016, 19) argues that “Regulators will defend the maintenance of a regulatory measure or process as changes would negatively affect its preferences.”
23.
Pelkmans and de Brito (2015).
24.
For example, Council of the European Union (2004).
25.
Even here, there is a negative list of sectors that limits the scope of MR between Australia and New Zealand.
26.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 28).
27.
Swedish snus is one such example.
28.
Young (2015, 1241).
29.
Conceiçao-Heldt (2014), Dür and Gemma (2010) and Damro (2012).
30.
Deville and Siles-Brügge (2015).
31.
Cf. Buonanno (2017).
32.
Kleinheisterkamp (2014).
33.
Franck (2014); Investors won 50% in 2016, United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (2016).
34.
Franck (2014).
35.
Eliasson (2015).
36.
Eliasson (2015).
37.
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12; UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12; Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of March 30, 2015, on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Romania—Arbitral award Micula v Romania of December 11, 2013.
38.
Fabry and Garbasso (2015).
39.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (2015, 7–8).
40.
European Commission (2013, 5) and United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (2016).
41.
Authors’ own calculations using Goggle Trends 2013–2016, see also Chap. 4.
42.
Personal communication, Brussels, May, 2016.
43.
The US had applied most of the same proposals, short of a permanent investment court, in the Transpacific Partnership Agreement; the US Congress showed no appetite for approving an new international court. CSOs expressed opposition to the ICS, and both law scholars and the German magistrates’ association argued that a permanent court violated EU law by usurping power from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Yet the existing ISDS system was not deemed illegal (reminiscent of when the CJEU said the EU could not join the European Court of Human Rights for the same reason). Ankersmi (2016) and Deutscher Richterbund (2016).
44.
Erixon (2014) and Tietje and Baetens (2014). Hans Stråberg, Europe Co-Chair for the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, Chairman Atlas Copco, said at the Utrikespolitiska Institutet October 13, 2014 “If you have sat in a courtroom in Alabama….you start to wonder.” The experience of Raytheon’s subsidiary with the Italian judiciary (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy, ICJ Judgment, July 20, 1989)) is an often referenced case showing the problems in Europe, and there are weak judicial systems in newer EU states Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, as well as Italy.
45.
Quick (2015).
46.
BEUC and the European Trade Union Confederation opposed ISDS in TTIP but not for agreements with Vietnam and China.
47.
Public policy safeguards in the European Commission’s 2015 proposed revisions would strengthen governments’ rights to regulate, limit investors’ rights to sue, and erect a new investor court system (ICS). The EU gained legal authority over investments with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and TTIP would incrementally replace all BITs. European Union, 2012. US BITs with nine EU states signed prior to December 2, 2012 would remain valid unless either side chose to cancel, which would allow the BIT to expire after the number of years stipulated in the agreement.
48.
Cf. Van Loon (2018, 170). De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015), agree that some economic benefits would ensue, but criticize EU officials and supportive policy makers for creating “fictional expectations” by touting an overly rosy best-case scenario for jobs and economic growth from TTIP based on economic computable general equilibrium models, where output is highly dependent on the assumptions used for the computations. Freund and Oliver (2015) find that regulatory convergence is not trade diverting, and it is precisely because of the difficulties of predicting expanded demand and income that the same authors find that most studies underestimate macro-economic and sectoral gains.
49.
Mega-regionals are “deep integration partnerships in the form of RTAs between countries or regions with a major share of world trade and FDI [foreign direct investment] and in which two or more of the parties are in a paramount driver position, or serve as hubs, in global value chains (i.e., the US, the EU, Japan, China)” (World Economic Forum 2014, 13).
50.
Studies on the economic impact of RTAs developed on the bases of Viner’s (1950) theory show that the lower the partner costs relative to the outside world, the greater the trade creation effects vis-à-vis trade diversion (e.g. Pugel 2012; van der Mensbrugghe 2005).
51.
Baccini and Dür (2011).
52.
Tariffs preferences lead to “hard discrimination” while non-tariffs preferences may have soft or even non-discriminatory effects. See World Economic Forum (2014).
53.
World Trade Organization (2011, 14).
54.
World Economic Forum (2014), Francois et al. (2013), Baldwin (2011) and Freund and Oliver (2015).
55.
Cf. Antimiani and Salvatici (2015).
56.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 35).
57.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 36).
58.
There is also empirical evidence from another agreement. Opponents of the EU-South Korea Agreement predicted worsening conditions for EU exporters and yet the results of the first four years of the EU-South Korea PTA showed greater than predicted economic benefits for the EU. European Commission (2016).
59.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 36).
60.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 36).
61.
De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015, 40).
62.
Hamilton (2014, ix).
63.
Garcia-Duran, Kienzle, and Millet (2014).
64.
Garcia-Duran, Kienzle, and Millet (2014) and Zangl et al. (2016).
65.
World Economic Forum (2015) and Barbé, Costa and Kissack (2016).
66.
Newman and Posner (2015) argue that “regulatory capacity is a relational concept” so that the strategies employed by the EU (or the US) to shape global rules vary depending on the context. Their analysis (p. 1325) implies that TTIP would allow for regulatory export and first mover regulatory strategies vis-à-vis third countries and for mutual recognition agreements and coalition building between the EU and the US.
67.
Newman and Posner (2015, 1321), cf. Young (2015).
68.
See Damro (2012). See also Strange (2015).
69.
However, having a market power identity “does not mean that it will always get other actors to adhere to or behave in a way that generally satisfies its market-power related policies and regulatory measures.” Damro (2015, 1345).
70.
Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015).
71.
Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 39). The very demanding option of mutual recognition was feasible for automotive safety regulations, which then could become globally dominant. Kommerskollegium (2014).
72.
Young (2015). “TTIP member firms exporting to emerging markets constitute a second level of external pressure on public authorities to adopt those standards.” Garcia-Duran and Eliasson (2017, 38), referencing Song and Yuan (2012) and Layne (2014).
73.
World Economic Forum (2014, 2015).
74.
Zhu, Feng, and He (2015).
75.
For example, Daily Sabah (2016).

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East Stroudsburg University, East Stroudsburg, PA, USA
Leif Johan Eliasson
University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Patricia Garcia-Duran Huet

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Eliasson, L.J., Huet, P.GD. (2019). What Underlies the Rhetoric in the Public Duel?. In: Civil Society, Rhetoric of Resistance, and Transatlantic Trade . Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13366-5_6

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