Abstract
This chapter provides three case studies analysing the role of EU institutions in crisis management. The first case study examines how and why the European Commission did not emerge as a leader in handling the controversial issue of Eurobonds. The second case study sheds light on the role of the European Parliament by analysing how it emerged, but ultimately failed as a leader in promoting Eurobonds. The third case study focuses on the European Central Bank’s successful leadership in announcing Outright Monetary Transactions. It explains why the ECB emerged as a “leader by default” and which strategies it used to make the announcement a success. The case studies draw on interviews with officials working at the EU institutions in Brussels and the European Central Bank.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Debt issuance without joint guarantees is excluded from this analysis, as it would not contribute to a common goal . In the simple version, Eurobonds without joint guarantees would not obtain an AAA rating, but at best the weighted average of the member state ratings and at worst that of the lowest-rated member state. In both cases they would not contribute to a common goal. In the enhanced version, Eurobonds without joint guarantees could be granted seniority over national bonds and collateral to obtain an AAA rating. However, given that this would allow only for a partial issuance alongside national bonds, it would have detrimental effects on the credit quality of “weaker” member states’ government bonds. Thus, also in this latter case, Eurobonds without joint guarantees could at best be a short-term solution and would thus not contribute to a common goal.
- 3.
Eurobonds could either be set up intergovernmentally through the simplified revision procedure (Art. 48.6 TFEU) or under EU law using the ordinary treaty change procedure in conjunction with the so-called “flexibility clause” (Art. 352 TFEU). Both the simplified revision procedure and the use of the flexibility clause require the EP’s consent.
- 4.
Common debt based on joint and several liability would not only imply risk-sharing in the sense that fiscally solid countries would guarantee for the debt of “fiscal sinners”. It would also redistribute the interest burden since those with supposedly sound budgets would lose their low interest rates in favour of those paying high interests.
- 5.
Of course, any damage to the project of Eurobonds would indirectly also be to the disadvantage of the Commission.
- 6.
Yet, while the loss in power would occur with or without the eventual introduction of Eurobonds , the gain would only materialize in the unlikely case of leadership success. Hence, from an ex-ante perspective, the costs would in any case exceed the benefits of leading.
- 7.
For the purpose of the analysis, the EP is treated as a unitary institutional actor, which is able to adopt a coherent external position despite internal divides and disagreements (see O’Keeffe et al. 2016).
- 8.
European Parliament (2011a: Amendment 37).
- 9.
The data are weighted by party group and region to be representative of the entire EP (ComRes 2013: 8).
- 10.
Translated by the author from the original: “Keine Euro-Bonds, solange ich lebe”.
- 11.
The following elaboration on the EP’s institutional resources is largely based on Héritier et al. (2019, forthcoming), Chapter 7.
- 12.
As regards monetary policy, Art. 284.3 makes the ECB accountable to the EP. First, the ECB must present an annual report on its activities and monetary policy to the EP. Second, the President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive Board may be heard by the competent committees of the EP.
- 13.
Translated by the author from the original: “Keine Euro-Bonds, solange ich lebe”.
- 14.
An consolidation programme under the ESM is a condition for the activation of OMT .
- 15.
Like all other actors examined by this work, also the ECB is a heterogeneous organization whose decisions at the European level are always the result of prior internal decision-making rounds. In the case of the OMT , this regards the strategic interaction of the national central banks governors and the members of the Executive Board (including the ECB President) in the Governing Council. However, given that this takes place at a different analytical level, the question of who initiated the OMT within the ECB is irrelevant for this analysis.
- 16.
More precisely, a more lenient fiscal adjustment path was agreed.
- 17.
In the case of OMT , one may object that no demand is needed for the ECB’s emergence as a leader as it could have announced and even launched OMT without any other actor perceiving a need for it. In practice, however, it is not only highly improbable that the ECB would do so; there would also be strong objections by the negatively affected member states which would most probably bring actions against the ECB in front of the European Court of Justice and—most importantly—the ECB could not rely on its mandate to secure price stability in the eurozone and would thus lack the legal basis for its measures.
- 18.
Of the 18 interviewees who comprehensively answered the question concerning the most critical moment during the crisis, 10 named summer 2012. Even 14 out of 18 respondents (77.8%) stated that in summer 2012, the perceived pressure for action was very high (10) or rather high (4) as compared to other periods of crisis management.
- 19.
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/html/irish-letters.en.html, rev. 2016–01–29.
- 20.
The outline of the ECB’s institutional resources is largely based on Beukers (2013).
- 21.
The European System of Central Banks is composed of the ECB and the national central banks of all EU member states.
- 22.
These are the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG).
- 23.
Based on the interview material, only Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria were clearly against OMT . Finland and Estonia usually belong to the group of “creditor ” states (fiscally “conservative” or “hawkish) surrounding Germany as well, but no information could be obtained that they were explicitly against the ECB’s announcement. Vice versa, there has been no indication that they were in favour of the announcement either.
- 24.
The alternating sequence of action between the member states’ moves in fiscal and economic policy and the ECB’s moves in monetary policy (Beukers 2013: 1601) does not qualify as evidence for strategic action as the member states’ actions modified the functional constraints on the ECB and thus increased its leeway in monetary decision-making (instead of constraining it). If this sequence of measures were an actual indicator for strategic interaction, there should be evidence that the ECB made respective commitments or threats vis-à-vis the member states (e.g. tit-for-tat: “if you member states decide on direct bank recapitalization, we will launch OMT ”). However, no such evidence could be found.
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Interviews
Interview 1. 2014. Council of the European Union, Senior Official and Administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 6.
Interview 2. 2014. European Commission, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 7.
Interview 3. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 12.
Interview 4. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 13.
Interview 5. 2014. Permanent Representation of France. Brussels, Belgium, November 13.
Interview 6. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 14.
Interview 7. 2014. European Council, senior official/assistant. Brussels, Belgium, November 17.
Interview 8. 2014. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 18.
Interview 9. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, two administrators. Brussels, Belgium, November 20.
Interview 10. 2014. Senior EU official. Brussels, Belgium, November 20.
Interview 11. 2014. Permanent Representation of the Netherlands. Brussels, Belgium, November 24.
Interview 13. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 25.
Interview 14. 2014. ECB official. Brussels, Belgium, November 26.
Interview 15. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27.
Interview 16. 2014. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27.
Interview 17. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 28.
Interview 18. 2015. European Central Bank, official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 9.
Interview 19. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 10.
Interview 20. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 11.
Interview 21. 2015. European Central Bank, official/official/administrator. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Interview 22. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Interview 23. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Interview 24. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 13.
Interview 25. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 17.
Interview 26. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 19.
Interview 27. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, senior official. Berlin, Germany, March 23.
Interview 28. 2015. European Parliament, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, February 2.
Interview 29. 2015. European Parliament, Member of the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, February 4.
Interview 31. 2015. Council of the European Union, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, February 9.
Interview 32. 2015. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 10.
Interview 33. 2015. European Commission, DG ECFIN, two officials. Brussels, Belgium, February 11.
Interview 34. 2015. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 11.
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Schoeller, M.G. (2019). Analysing Leadership II: The EU Institutions in the Eurozone Crisis. In: Leadership in the Eurozone. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12704-6_5
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