The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain
Responsiveness to electoral opinions is one of the hallmarks of democratic governance. We focus on a particularly strong type of unresponsiveness, viz., one where the complete inversion of all preferences in the electorate is accompanied with no change in the electoral outcome. It is known that the possibility of this extreme type of unresponsiveness, known as the Preference Inversion paradox or Reversal Bias, is associated with many voting rules. We set out to find out whether the paradox can be encountered when using various procedures under a restricted Condorcet domain, viz., one where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected by the procedure under study.
KeywordsResponsiveness of voting rules Preference inversion paradox Restricted Condorcet domain Reversal bias
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