Why Do International Oil Companies Engage in Joint Venture Agreements in the Qatari Gas Industry? – Dunning’s Ownership, Location and Joint Internalisation Advantages Perspective

Al-Emadi, Talal Abdulla

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12623-0_3

Talal Abdulla Al-Emadi²⁰

Part of the book series: Advances in Science, Technology & Innovation ((ASTI))

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Abstract

Building on Chap. 2, which offered a rationale for choosing Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) advantages for explaining international oil companies’ preference for joint venture agreements, this chapter explains how international oil companies think they can best realise these three advantages through the choice of a joint venture agreement.

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Notes

1.
In general, see Dunning (1980, 1988, 2000, 2001), Dunning and Lundan (2008).
2.
Dunning (1977), Cantwell and Narula (2001).
3.
Peng and Meyer (2011).
4.
For example, in general see Erdener and Shapiro (2005), Cole et al. (2007).
5.
For example, in general see Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Agarwal (1994).
6.
In general, see Beamish and Banks (1987).
7.
In general, see Hennart (1988) and Hennart (2000, 72–118).
8.
Dunning and Lundan (2008, 271).
9.
Buckley and Ghauri (1999, ix), Brouthers and Hennart (2007, 398) and Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007).
10.
Beamish and Banks (1987: 1, 4).
11.
Williamson (1975: 23).
12.
Beamish and Banks note 10 at 2.
13.
Dunning (1988: 4).
14.
Madhok and Phene (2001: 243).
15.
North (1990: 3).
16.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 96).
17.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 580–583, 2008: 100–101), and Lundan (2010: 60).
18.
In general, see Hymer (1976).
19.
Hymer (1976) and Dunning and Lundan (2008: 83–84).
20.
Carlos (2011, 68).
21.
Hymer note 19 at 33; Kindleberger (1969: 11–12).
22.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 100) and Lopes (2010: 75).
23.
The level of technological development is considered to be a critical determinant of foreign direct investment. See Baranson et al. (1991: 827), Tihanyi and Roath (2002: 190), Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007: 1018), and Dunning and Lundan (2008: 742).
24.
Mills and Karim (2001: 59), Stevens (2008: 27) and Philip (1982: 472).
25.
Wright and Gallun (2008: 1).
26.
Coll (2012: 196).
27.
Wright and Gallun note 26 at 1.
28.
Coll (2012: 196).
29.
Tusiani and Shearer (2007: 12–13).
30.
Coll note 29 at 196.
31.
Yergin (2011: 313).
32.
Yergin note 32 at 313.
33.
Dunning (1988: 2), Lundan (2010: 55).
34.
In general, see Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Agarwal (1994) and Lopes (2010).
35.
Baumol and Blinder (2012: 142).
36.
Horst (1972: 259).
37.
Tusiani and Shearer (2007: 15).
38.
Coll (2012: 198).
39.
Agarwal (1994: 70).
40.
Stopford and Wells (1972: 32), and Anderson and Gatignon (1986: 16).
41.
Davidson (1980: 13).
42.
Gatignon and Anderson (1988: 311).
43.
Tusiani and Shearer (2007: 15).
44.
In general, see North (1990) and North (2005: 67).
45.
North (1990: 3).
46.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 582, 2008: 134).
47.
See Footnote 46.
48.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 134).
49.
Dunning and Lundan 2008 note 49 at 134.
50.
Sims (2002: 2–3).
51.
Jackson et al. (2012: 1–2).
52.
Jackson et al. note 52 at 1–2.
53.
Price (2011: 26).
54.
Dunning (1980: 9).
55.
See Footnote 54.
56.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 137–140); in general, see Dunning and Lundan (2008), North (1990) and North (2005).
57.
Kang and Jiang (2010: 46).
58.
Dunning (2000: 164).
59.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 68–69).
60.
Dunning and Lundan 2008 note 61 at 134.
61.
Kang and Jiang (2010: 47), and Erdener and Shapiro (2005: 419).
62.
Yergin (2009: 205 and 610) and Coll (2012: 196).
63.
Coll note 64 at 196.
64.
Oxford Business Group (2010: 135).
65.
Coll (2012: 195).
66.
Kang and Jiang (2010: 47).
67.
Golberman and Shapiro (2005: 77).
68.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 134).
69.
Stein and Daude (2001: 19), Globerman and Shapiro (2002: 1899), Bevan et al. (2004: 45), Golberman and Shapiro (2005: 77), Grosse and Trevino (2005: 128), and Pajunen (2008: 652).
70.
It is worth mentioning here that a mechanism introduced by international oil companies to reduce risk and prevent the host state from using its sovereign power to take any action that might affect the agreement is a clause known as a “stabilisation clause”. However, discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of my book, but see Cameron (2006) and Al-Emadi (2010). For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of stability in long-term energy contracts between investors and states, see Cameron (2010).
71.
Kaufmann et al. (2009: 6).
72.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002: 1899), Pajunen (2008: 652), and Luiz and Charalambous (2009: 308).
73.
Li and Resnick (2003: 176, 203), and Schumpeter (1943: 269).
74.
Li and Resnick note 75 at 180.
75.
Schneider and Frey (1985: 161); Li and Resnick note 75 at 180.
76.
Feierabend and Feierabend (1966: 249).
77.
Schneider and Frey note 77 at 161; Li and Resnick note 75 at 180; and Pajunen (2008: 666).
78.
Oxford Business Group (2010: 12).
79.
In general, see Miller et al. (2010) and Branine (2011: 442).
80.
Branine (2011: 442).
81.
North (1990: 36).
82.
Bevan et al. (2004: 47).
83.
Kaufmann et al. (2000: 10).
84.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 140).
85.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002: 1901).
86.
See Footnote 85.
87.
Globerman and Shapiro note 88 at 1900.
88.
General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP) “Qatar National Vision” (GSDP July 2008) <http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/GSDP_Vision_Root/GSDP_EN/What.%20We%20Do/QNV_2030> accessed 13 January 2012.
89.
General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP) note 90.
90.
Ibrahim and Harrigan (2012: 3), and Oxford Business Group (2010: 12). Examples of universities already opened in this Education City are Cornel (medicine), George Town (foreign service), University College London (museum studies) and École des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC), Paris (management). Education City is one arm of the Qatar Foundation. Other arms are world-class research facilities such as Qatar Science and Technology Park. Qatar Foundation invests in education distinctively from Qatar University, the sole national university in Qatar. Qatar Foundation is chaired by Her Highness, the wife of the Amir while Qatar University is headed by a Board of Regents chaired by His Highness, the Heir Apparent.
91.
General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP) note 90.
92.
Oxford Business Group (2010: 233).
93.
Dunning (1980: 11).
94.
Dunning (2001: 176) and Dunning (1980: 11).
95.
Dunning (1980: 11), Bourlakis (2003: 10) and Vincze (2007: 69).
96.
Dunning 1980 note 97 at 11.
97.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 271).
98.
Dunning and Lundan 2008 note 100 at 272.
99.
Dunning (2001: 175), Dunning (1980: 11), and Dunning and Lundan (2008: 98, 95).
100.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 140–142); in general, see Dunning and Lundan (2008: 573), North (1990, 2005).
101.
Muchlinski defines foreign direct investment as an investment that “gives the enterprise not only a financial stake in the foreign venture but also managerial control”. See Muchlinski (2007: 5).
102.
Beamish and Banks (1987: 13).
103.
Beamish and Banks note 105 at 13.
104.
Beamish and Banks note 105 at 2.
105.
Beamish and Banks note 105 at 5.
106.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 142).
107.
Beamish and Banks (1987: 4).
108.
Buckley and Casson (2002: 35).
109.
Buckley and Casson (2002: 34).
110.
Beamish and Banks (1987: 4).
111.
Beamish and Banks note 113 at 4.
112.
Dunning (2000: 180).
113.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 142).
114.
Ozawa and Castello (2001: 212), and Chang and Rosenzweig (2001: 751).
115.
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 142).
116.
Williamson (1975: 23).
117.
Dunning and Lundan note 118 at 142.
118.
Zaheer (1995: 342).
119.
Child and Rodrigues (2005: 384).
120.
Beamish and Banks (1987: 5).
121.
For example, see Gullander (1976: 105), Belderbos (2003: 240), Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007: 1019), and Demirbag et al. (2009: 450).
122.
Meynen et al. (1966: 20).
123.
In general, see Dunning and Lundan (2008: 573), Dunning and Lundan (2008: 123–137), North (1990) and North (2005: 67).
124.
Dunning and Lundan (2009: 93).
125.
Dunning and Lundan 2009 note 127 at 94.

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Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
Talal Abdulla Al-Emadi

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Al-Emadi, T.A. (2019). Why Do International Oil Companies Engage in Joint Venture Agreements in the Qatari Gas Industry? – Dunning’s Ownership, Location and Joint Internalisation Advantages Perspective. In: Joint Venture Agreements in the Qatari Gas Industry. Advances in Science, Technology & Innovation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12623-0_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12623-0_3
Published: 30 March 2019
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12622-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12623-0
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