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Thinking About Joint Venture Agreements as the Result of a Decision-Making Process

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Joint Venture Agreements in the Qatari Gas Industry

Part of the book series: Advances in Science, Technology & Innovation ((ASTI))

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Abstract

Qatar holds the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world following Russia and Iran. Virtually, all of its proven reserves are located in the North Field, the largest non-associated natural gas (i.e. free-standing gas that is not mixed up with crude oil) field in the world. Until 2018, the Qatari gas industry was led by two operating companies—Qatargas and Rasgas (now merged as Qatargas)—each was a joint venture company consisting of the Qatari state-owned petroleum company, Qatar Petroleum, as the local partner and international oil companies, as the foreign partner.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Coll (2012: 196).

  2. 2.

    Oxford Business Group (2010: 135).

  3. 3.

    Yergin (2011: 313).

  4. 4.

    Cavet and Wasti “Qatar” (2012: 240).

  5. 5.

    Zagel (2008: 528).

  6. 6.

    Peng and Meyer (2011: 167).

  7. 7.

    Muchlinski (2007: 5).

  8. 8.

    Oman (1989: 9).

  9. 9.

    Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 397).

  10. 10.

    Brouthers and Hennart note 9 at 395–397.

  11. 11.

    For example, Oman does not recognise joint venture agreements as a foreign direct investment, but as new forms of investment. See Oman (1989: 9).

  12. 12.

    In general, see Dunning (1980, 1988, 2000, 2001) and Dunning and Lundan (2008).

  13. 13.

    Peng and Meyer (2011: 167).

  14. 14.

    For example, in general, see Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) and Agarwal (1994).

  15. 15.

    Beamish and Banks (1987: 13).

  16. 16.

    For example, in general, see Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Erramilli and Rao (1990) and Hill et al. (1990).

  17. 17.

    In general, see Beamish and Banks (1987).

  18. 18.

    In general, see Hennart (1988, 2000: 72–118).

  19. 19.

    Beamish and Banks note 17 at 2.

  20. 20.

    Hennart (2000), Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 398), Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007: 1013).

  21. 21.

    In general, see Giddens (1979, 1984).

  22. 22.

    See, for example, the criticisms of both Gregson and Stinchcombe regarding the implementation of structuration theory in empirical research and Giddens’ reply to such criticisms. In general, see Gregson (1989), Stinchcombe (1990: 56) and Giddens (1990: 310).

  23. 23.

    Giddens (1984: xvii).

  24. 24.

    Giddens 1984 note 23 at xxix.

  25. 25.

    Yates (1997: 162).

  26. 26.

    In general, see Gregson (1989), Whittington (1992: 694) and Stinchcombe (1990: 56).

  27. 27.

    Edwards (2000: 449).

  28. 28.

    Aharoni (1966: 46).

  29. 29.

    Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992: 1), Agarwal (1994: 75) and Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 395).

  30. 30.

    Anderson and Gatignon (1986: 2), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992: 1), Agarwal (1994: 75), Brouthers (2002) and Pedersen et al. (2002: 326).

  31. 31.

    According to Aharoni, the decision of investing abroad is considered a “top management problem”. Child agrees that “senior personnel” make strategic choices regarding the structure and the design of the firm. See Aharoni (1966: 17) and Child (1972: 12).

  32. 32.

    Root (1994: 126).

  33. 33.

    Levary and Wan (1999).

  34. 34.

    Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel (1981: 1).

  35. 35.

    Giddens (2009: 28).

  36. 36.

    Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel note 34 at 1; and Giddens 2009 note 35 at 28.

  37. 37.

    Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 419).

  38. 38.

    John and Gillies (1997: 155) and Zhang (2000: 4).

  39. 39.

    Buckley (1988: 182).

  40. 40.

    Hymer (1976: 33).

  41. 41.

    Dunning (2000: 166).

  42. 42.

    Buckley and Ghauri (1999: ix), Brouthers and Hennart (2007: 398) and Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007: 1013).

  43. 43.

    Beamish and Banks (1987: 4).

  44. 44.

    Williamson (1975: 23).

  45. 45.

    Williamson note 44 at 23.

  46. 46.

    Williamson note 44 at 8.

  47. 47.

    Aharoni (1966: 31–32).

  48. 48.

    Aharoni note 47 at 29.

  49. 49.

    Aharoni (1966: 18, 29 and 32).

  50. 50.

    Aharoni note 49 at 32.

  51. 51.

    Manning (1986: 1292).

  52. 52.

    Hawkins (2002: 31 and 47).

  53. 53.

    Hawkins note 52 at 31.

  54. 54.

    Hawkins note 52 at 31.

  55. 55.

    Although Hawkins describes a particular context in reference to a surround, a field and a frame, he notes that “a decision frame is central to a naturalistic perspective on decision-making”. Therefore, for the purpose of my book, only a decision frame, reflected in the organisational culture of the Qatari gas industry, will be used to describe the context of the decision-making process leading to the choice of Joint Venture Agreement, given that it is embedded within the wider decision surround (i.e. the external environment) and decision field (i.e. the organisation). See Hawkins (2002: 31, 47 and 52).

  56. 56.

    Hawkins (1986: 1242 and 1190).

  57. 57.

    In general, see Hawkins 2002 note 55, Hawkins 1986 note 56 at 1195 and Manning (1986: 1304).

  58. 58.

    Zweigert et al. (1998, 2).

  59. 59.

    Cotterrell (1997, 14).

  60. 60.

    Walsham (2002: 362).

  61. 61.

    Riley (1983: 415).

  62. 62.

    The idea of organisational culture as a structure of rules and resources fits with Riley’s concept of organisational culture as the structure that influences (and is influenced by) the interaction of different members of an organisation of a whole industry (e.g. the organisation of the Qatari gas industry). See Riley (1983: 415) and Giddens (1984: 25).

  63. 63.

    Giddens (1984: 23).

  64. 64.

    Giddens 1984 note 63 at xxxi and 18.

  65. 65.

    Edwards (2000: 449).

  66. 66.

    Macintosh and Quattrone (2009: 48).

  67. 67.

    Macintosh and Quattrone note 66 at 48.

  68. 68.

    Macintosh and Quattrone note 66 at 49.

  69. 69.

    Thompson (1989: 61).

  70. 70.

    Yin (2009: 26).

  71. 71.

    Marshall and Rossman (2011: 57).

  72. 72.

    Bryman (2012: 35).

  73. 73.

    Bryman note 72 at 35 and Marshall and Rossman note 71 at 7.

  74. 74.

    Banister et al. (1994: 2).

  75. 75.

    Bryman (2012, 35).

  76. 76.

    Silverman (2001: 25).

  77. 77.

    Marshall and Rossman (2011: 69).

  78. 78.

    De Vaus (2001: 2 and 19) and Marshall and Rossman note 77 at 68.

  79. 79.

    Marshall and Rossman (2011: 91–92).

  80. 80.

    Bryman (2012: 45).

  81. 81.

    Yin (2009: 18).

  82. 82.

    De Vaus (2001: 6).

  83. 83.

    Bryman (2012: 62).

  84. 84.

    Westbrook (1989: 3).

  85. 85.

    Bryman note 83 at 392.

  86. 86.

    Westbrook (1989: 3).

  87. 87.

    Bryman (2012: 543).

  88. 88.

    Documents in Arabic are translated by me.

  89. 89.

    MacDonald (2001: 208).

  90. 90.

    Bryman note 87 at 555.

  91. 91.

    Bryman note 87 at 551 and 555.

  92. 92.

    Fielding and Thomas (2001: 123).

  93. 93.

    Kvale (2007: 1).

  94. 94.

    Weiss (1994: 1–2).

  95. 95.

    McCracken (1988: 9).

  96. 96.

    Hakim (2000: 36) and Bryman (2012: 470).

  97. 97.

    Banister et al. (1997: 50); Bryman note 96 at 470; Stroh (2001: 197) and Hakim (2000: 36).

  98. 98.

    Marshall and Rossman (2011: 144); and Bryman note 96 at 471.

  99. 99.

    Bryman note 96 at 418.

  100. 100.

    Bryman note 96 at 416.

  101. 101.

    For example, in her study of Blue Collar Marriage, Kamarovsky thought her respondents would feel uncomfortable in the presence of a tape recorder. In general, see Kamarovsky and Philips (1987).

  102. 102.

    Weiss (1994: 53).

  103. 103.

    Walsham (1996: 323).

  104. 104.

    Robson recommends making notes during the interview even if it also being taped (“in part as a fail-safe in case of a taping problem”). See Robson (2010: 278).

  105. 105.

    Weiss (1994: 53).

  106. 106.

    These modes where only deployed after the face-to-face interviews were conducted. Accordingly, they were merely supplementary and did not substitute face-to-face interviewing.

  107. 107.

    Marshall and Rossman (2011: 145).

  108. 108.

    Patton (2002: 432).

  109. 109.

    Bryman (2012: 564) and Weiss (1994).

  110. 110.

    Banister et al. (1997: 57).

  111. 111.

    Hence, the coding approach (defined here as one that is based on “consistent and complete set of rules governing the assignment of codes to data, thereby eliminating error and of course allowing recovery of the original data simply by reversing the process (i.e. decoding)”) was not adopted for interpreting data for three reasons. First, coding seeks structured responses, whereas data generated from documentary research and semi-structured interviews are unstructured but whole. Second, coding is often accused of “fragmenting and decontextualizing [the] text”, because it risks losing the context of what is said or written by removing sections of the text within which data appeared. Third, it is difficult to establish answers to “why” questions, such as the one asked in this book, through coding. See Dey (1993: 60) and Bryman note 109 at 578.

  112. 112.

    Bryman note 109 at 578–459; and Marshall and Rossman (2011: 209–211).

  113. 113.

    Bryman note 109 at 574; and Marshall and Rossman note 112 at 213.

  114. 114.

    Bryman note 109 at 574.

  115. 115.

    Dunning (1973: 294).

  116. 116.

    Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, xvii) and Denzin and Lincoln (2008: 351).

  117. 117.

    Parboteeah et al. (2008: 389).

  118. 118.

    In general, see Orlikowski (1992).

  119. 119.

    Orlikowski note 118 at 405.

  120. 120.

    In general, see Hofstede (1984, 2003), Hofstede and Hofstede (2004), Friedman (1975, 1986, 1997).

  121. 121.

    Berry (1999: 167).

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Al-Emadi, T.A. (2019). Thinking About Joint Venture Agreements as the Result of a Decision-Making Process. In: Joint Venture Agreements in the Qatari Gas Industry. Advances in Science, Technology & Innovation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12623-0_1

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