Abstract
Consequentialism (C) is probably the most discussed of all philosophical moral theories. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, its core idea—that you should maximize the good and minimize the bad—has a very strong intuitive appeal. For, as Samuel Scheffler formulates it:On the other hand, some of the implications of C conflict with CSM and thus with some of our deeply held moral convictions. (Consider, for example, the doctor’s choice, introduced in Sect. 1.1.) Small wonder, then, that deontologists are readily provoked by such an alluring and morally dangerous rival and try their best to reduce its appeal.
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- 1.
“Introduction” to Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 1. (The assumption underlying this principle is criticized by Philippa Foot. I discuss her objection in the next section.)
- 2.
The formulations of (objective and subjective) C that I gave in the foregoing chapter, and called C*, are rather cumbrous. When the exact wording of the theory is unimportant, I will therefore often use short (and not wholly adequate) formulations, such as this one, instead.
- 3.
Philippa Foot, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues”, in Samuel Scheffler (ed.), op. cit.: 224–42; originally published in Mind, 94 (1985): 196–209.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 230.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 230.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 235.
- 7.
“The sentiment to which he [the utilitarian] appeals is generalized benevolence, that is, the disposition to seek happiness, or at any rate, in some sense or other, good consequences, for all mankind, or perhaps for all sentient beings.” (J. J. C. Smart, “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics”, p. 7.) “The most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism […] is to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man. […] [I]t is by the conception of the impartial spectator and the use of sympathetic identification in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is applied to society.” (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 26 f.)
- 8.
As for the distinction between the morally and the non-morally good, see Chap. 1, n. 23.
- 9.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right and the Good”, The Journal of Philosophy, 94 (1997): 273–98.
- 10.
Peter Geach, “Good and Evil”, Analysis, 17 (1956): 33–42. That “good” is an attributive adjective means that “X is a good so-and-so” is not equivalent to “X is a good, and X is so-and-so”.
- 11.
Thomson, op. cit., p. 276.
- 12.
In a note Thomson says of Foot’s above discussed article that it can be interpreted as making this claim. But, she adds, “Foot has recently said that she did not mean to do so, and she must be allowed final say as to her intentions” (ibid., p. 275, n. 4). Unfortunately, Foot does not seem to have disclosed to Thomson what she meant.
- 13.
Thomson says that, if someone asserts, “That’s a good book”, when the question is which book to read, he probably means “that the thing is a book that it is good to read” (ibid., p. 278). I hope that, at least in the case of belles-lettres, it is not such philistine thoughts that people usually mean to communicate when they praise a book.
- 14.
Lars Bergström, “Reflections on Consequentialism”, Theoria, 62 (1996): 74–94; p. 80.
- 15.
Thomas Green, An Examination of the Leading Principle in the New System of Morals; quoted from D. H. Monro, A Guide to the British Moralists, p. 202. The same objection appears in, e.g., Adam Sedgwick, Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1832.)
- 16.
If instead D 1 would give R 2 four units of value, everything else being the same, many consequentialists would hold that it is a matter of indifference which of these outcomes is realized. Here Sidgwick is an exception: he holds that if there is no (cognizable) difference between the total amounts of value of two distributions, but one of them distributes value more equally, this distribution is to be preferred. (See The Methods of Ethics, p. 416 f.)
- 17.
See, e.g., J. J. C. Smart, op. cit., p. 36.
- 18.
See G. E. Moore, Ethics, Ch. 7. For an extensive discussion of different ways of reconciling utilitarianism with distributive justice, see Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
- 19.
W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 25.
- 20.
This is also Rawls’s view. “[I]f the distribution of goods is also counted as a good […], we no longer have a teleological view in the classical sense. The problem of distribution falls under the concept of right as one intuitively understands it […].” (John Rawls, op. cit., p. 25.)
There is, however, a problem with the view that C can only recognize non-moral (intrinsic) value as what makes an action right or wrong. Consider a world whose inhabitants are all very happy, and another world whose inhabitants are much less happy. Since, however, there are many more people in the second world than in the first, the amount of happiness is greater in the second world. Assume now that happiness is the only (positive) intrinsic value. Then it follows that the second world contains more good than the first world. Yet nearly all eudaimonistic consequentialists, I think, hold that it would be better that the first world existed. (Those who hold the opposite view are sometimes said to care more about the good than about people: they view people just as receptacles of the good.) But in that case they must by “better” mean morally better, and would not, therefore, be bona fide consequentialists. Since the same holds for any version of intrinsic goodness, it seems that few alleged versions of consequentialism are bona fide versions of C. So perhaps we should allow consequentialist theories to admit (some) morally good things into the utility network.
- 21.
Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 4 vols., (Edinburgh: Tait, 1820); Vol. IV, p. 38ff.; I owe this reference to J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 147.
- 22.
J. J. C. Smart, op. cit., p. 48.
- 23.
Another weak point in Smart’s proposal is the suggestion that the criteria of moral goodness and badness refer to “the average person”. Since no reference group is indicated, the criteria are, consequently, wholly indeterminate. But there is no reason to presuppose, as does Bernard Williams in a comment on Smart’s proposal, that Smart intends the average person to be defined with reference to some small local group that he belongs to. Williams says that Smart’s proposal “does seem to represent a rather relaxed standard: thus the well-known difficulty of finding ten good men in Sodom (Genesis 18–19) should perhaps not have arisen, unless Sodom had an exceedingly small population.” (Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, p. 128, note.)
- 24.
Thus a good consequentialist agent is one who generally satisfies the principle of subjective C (SC) suggested in Sect. 4.3.
- 25.
For an account of the von Neumann-Morgenstern way of doing this, see Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, p. 21 ff.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 33 f.
- 27.
Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day and Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1970), p. 99 ff. and p. 102 ff.
- 28.
Ibid., p. 99.
- 29.
A similar defence of the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons has been given by John Harsanyi in several works, e.g., Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 51 ff.
- 30.
Frank Jackson has argued that, nevertheless, C prescribes that we actually ought to care more for our near and dear than for other people. I discuss Jackson’s argument at the end of Sect. 6.1.
- 31.
Thomas Green, op. cit.; quoted from D. H. Monro, op. cit., p. 199.
- 32.
See, e.g., John Grote, An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1870), Ch. V.
- 33.
Henry Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 430–9.
- 34.
Ibid., p. 439.
- 35.
Neera Kapur, “Why Is It Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship”, Ethics, 101 (1991): 483–504.
- 36.
Ibid., p. 489.
- 37.
Ibid., p. 485.
- 38.
Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality”, in Samuel Scheffler (ed.), op. cit.: 93–133; originally published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984): 134–71.
- 39.
Kapur, op. cit., p. 493.
- 40.
The argument from too heavy demands is not directed to cases such as the one described by J. O. Urmson, where a soldier by throwing himself on a hand grenade ready to explode will save the lives of his comrades. Since his comrades are paralyzed and will not act, the agent will lose his life whether or not he saves the lives of other people. See J. O. Urmson, “Saints and Heroes”, in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts: 60–73; p. 63; originally published in A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (Washington: Washington University Press, 1958): 198–216.
- 41.
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, p. 116 f.
- 42.
This is pointed out by Jeremy Waldron in “Kagan on Requirements: Mill on Sanctions”, Ethics, 104 (1994): 310–24; p. 317.
- 43.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 2, Par. 19; p. 66. Similar views are expressed by Jeremy Bentham in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 1, n. 1, and by Henry Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 434. (For these references I am indebted to Jonathan Bennet, The Act Itself, p. 147ff.)
- 44.
A more detailed version of this defense has been offered by Frank Jackson. I discuss (and reject) his proposal in Sect. 6.3.
- 45.
This is the strategy chosen by, e.g., Björn Eriksson in Heavy Duty: On the Demands of Consequentialism (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994) and by Shelly Kagan in The Limits of Morality.
- 46.
There is a certain overlap between the argument from special relationships (see Sect. 5.1), the argument from too heavy demands (see Sect. 5.2), and the argument from horrendous actions: in some cases C prescribes (or permits) an action condemned by all three or some two of these objections. Thus, for example, C’s verdict that, in the case described in Sect. 1.1 above, you should save Fénelon rather than your father or your brother runs counter to all three. But, for each of these objections, there are possible versions where the action prescribed or permitted by C runs counter to only one of these objections. Thus, for example, the doctor’s choice could be utilized only by the argument from horrendous actions if we stipulated that the doctor is so constituted that he does not find it difficult to do what C here prescribes.
- 47.
See several of the articles collected in H. B. Acton (ed.), The Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan, 1969).
- 48.
H. J. McCloskey, “A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment”, Inquiry, 8 (1965): 249–63.
- 49.
See, e.g., J. J. C. Smart, “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics”, p. 69 ff.
- 50.
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, p. 99 ff.
- 51.
The last three of the examples discussed in the following are of my own invention. The others are invented by other authors and much discussed in the literature. Except for some small alterations, the formulations of them used here are taken from the “Introduction” in John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.), Ethics: Problems and Principles (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992). Many other similar examples figure in the literature. See, e.g., the papers collected in the above mentioned book and Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). But, as far as I can see, they add nothing essential to the present discussion.
- 52.
The ceteris paribus clause is meant to take care of, for example, cases where the agent himself, or his near and dear, belong to the smaller group.
- 53.
Since in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter principle is supported by the former, it is not surprising that it takes on an authority of its own in our moral thinking, giving it a normative force that it keeps even in those rare cases where it is not thus supported.
- 54.
I introduced the doctrine (sometimes termed “principle” or “law”) in Sect. 2.5, where I quoted Charles Fried’s formulation of it.
- 55.
Fisher and Ravizza, op. cit. p. 6. The most thoroughgoing (and scathing) treatment of the doctrine that I know of is the one by Jonathan Bennett in The Act Itself, Ch. 11.
- 56.
This is also confirmed by a psychological experiment dealing with practical dilemmas. As reported, most of the nine participants thought that in both cases it was permissible to kill the one man. See Joshua D. Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment”, Science, 293 (2001): 2105–8.
- 57.
This is pointed out by Fischer and Ravizza, ibid., p. 7.
- 58.
The same is true of the thesis that our negative duty not to harm other people is stronger than our positive duty to benefit them. I think that this thesis too rests on the acts and omissions doctrine, thus ultimately on contractualism.
- 59.
See Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Trolley Problem”, The Yale Law Journal, 94 (1985), pp. 1395–1415; repr. in Fischer and Ravizza, op. cit.: 279–92.
- 60.
Peter Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions”, The Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005): 331–52. Needless to say, Singer does not think that this explanation justifies the different reactions to the two cases.
- 61.
Ibid., p. 347f.
- 62.
The term “action” here includes omissions.
- 63.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 75ff.
- 64.
Ibid., p. 76. As it stands, this is, of course, not an example of an CD-situation according to my above definition, since the condition stated in the second clause of the definition is not here satisfied: there is no mention of any value that we realize by not pouring our pints into the water-cart. (Parfit concentrates on what is the really problematic aspect of CD-situations.) But we could easily remedy this lack, turning the example into a bona fide CD-situation. Let us assume, for example, that we know that this is the only water we have and that we will not get any more water during the next 24 h. This means that the water we have is valuable for us as a means of quenching our own foreseeable thirst. (There is a similar lack, similarly remediable, in the next example cited from Parfit.)
- 65.
Ibid., p. 76.
- 66.
Ibid., p. 77f.
- 67.
The most natural reading of clause (2) is to read its “if” as “if and only if”. That this reading is most probably the intended one is shown by the fact that some pages later, viz. on p. 81, Parfit understands a relevantly similar phrase in this way.
- 68.
Ibid., p. 80.
- 69.
Ibid., p. 80.
- 70.
Ibid., p. 53. For reasons mentioned above, Parfit himself thinks that C is not thus self-defeating. He claims that egoism (what he calls “the Self-Interest Theory”) is thus self-defeating, but does not consider this a fault: the theory, being a theory about individual rationality, does not claim success at the collective level. I disagree. At least as traditionally conceived, this theory is taken to be a moral theory, or at least a full-blown competitor to moral theories, and (as Parfit himself admits) success at the collective level is a sine qua non of such theories. (I discuss the issue at greater length in my Self and Others, p. 131f.)
- 71.
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Ch. 6. Unlike my adaptation of it, Gauthier’s proposal is couched in terms of individual agents and their choice of a conception of rationality, given their initial conception of rationality.
- 72.
The term was coined by Parfit. If C were self-effacing, “[i]t would tell us that we should try to believe, not itself, but some other theory. We should try to believe the theory which is such that, if we believed it, the outcome would be best.” (Parfit, op. cit., p. 40.) Whether it would be consequentially justified to make consequentialism into a self-effacing theory depends on many circumstances, among others, the prevalence of CD-situations. I will not take a stand on that issue.
- 73.
A moral theory T, Parfit says, is “directly individually self-defeating when it is certain that, if someone successfully follows T, he will thereby cause his own T-given aims to be worse achieved than they would have been if he had not successfully followed T” (ibid., p. 55). (Indirectly individual self-defeatingness is introduced in Appendix, Sect. 6.) Now if C prescribes that people adopt and act on D* (CSM), then, I take it, people successfully follow C when they successfully follow D* (CSM). But anyone who successfully follows D* (CSM), hence C, in a CD-situation causes his C-given aims to be worse achieved than they would otherwise have been. (The notion of being directly individually self-defeating utilized in this argument is, of course, an extension of Parfit’s notion.)
- 74.
It goes without saying that I here use “benefit” in such a way that to make someone else do what morality requires is not eo ipso to benefit oneself or the other person.
- 75.
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggests that avoiding wrong-doing could be a substantive aim according to C. Parfit mentions Cardinal Newman as being of the opinion that avoiding wrong-doing is a paramount substantive aim: “Newman believed that pain and sin were both bad but that sin was infinitely worse. If all mankind suffered ‘extremest agony’, this would be less bad than if one venial sin was committed.” (Ibid., p. 49.) I cannot see that this shows that Newman thought that avoiding wrong-doing, as distinguished from not committing sin, is a substantive aim. In the theological sense, sin is “[d]eliberate disobedience to the known will of God” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000). So in the here relevant sense of “sin”, being a sin may conceivably make the action wrong, but “being a sin” does not mean (as Parfit evidently presupposes) being (highly) wrong.
- 76.
D. H. Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism: A Study in Normative Ethics and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- 77.
Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism; repr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 (1982)), p. 45f. A similar objection is raised by N. G. E. Harris in “Nondeliberative Utilitarianism”, Ethics, 82 (1972): 344–8.
- 78.
Ibid.
- 79.
As far as I know, the first to launch this idea, applied to utilitarianism, was B. C. Postow in “Generalized Act Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 37 (1977): 49–52.
- 80.
Would this mean that generalized C* is self-effacing for people in the C* society, telling them not to believe itself? Perhaps. But another alternative is that they should adopt a two-level theory of the kind that, e.g., Hare proposes. (See Sect. 6.2 below.)
- 81.
The most ambitious attempt to combine the individualistic and the collective norms of generalized C is the one presented by Donald Regan in Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
- 82.
See my discussion in Sect. 6.1 of the claim that CSM is unconsciously utilitarian (consequentialist).
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Österberg, J. (2019). Consequentialism: Assessment. In: Towards Reunion in Ethics. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12410-6_5
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