Abstract
A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision-making and myopic behavior is developed.
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Kolokoltsov, V.N., Malafeyev, O.A. (2019). Three-State Model of Corruption and Inspection. In: Many Agent Games in Socio-economic Systems: Corruption, Inspection, Coalition Building, Network Growth, Security. Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12371-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12371-0_6
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12370-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12371-0
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