Abstract
The results of this chapter extend the results of Chapters 2 and 3 to the case of a countable state space of small players, and moreover, to the case of processes that allow for a change in the number of particles (thus going beyond the simple migrations that we have played with so far), where physical particles correspond in this setting to the coalitions (stable groups) of agents. This extension is carried out in order to include important models of evolutionary coalition-building, merging and splitting (banks, subsidiaries, etc.), strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many others. The mathematics of this chapter is more demanding than in the rest of our presentation, and its results are not used in other parts of the book. It is based on some elements of infinite-dimensional analysis, the analysis of functions on the Banach space of sequences \(l_1\) and of the ODEs in this space. We begin with brief description of the tools used.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kolokoltsov, V.N., Malafeyev, O.A. (2019). Models of Growth Under Pressure. In: Many Agent Games in Socio-economic Systems: Corruption, Inspection, Coalition Building, Network Growth, Security. Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12371-0_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12371-0_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12370-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12371-0
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)