Abstract
Independence and accountability, standards in information sharing, nature of supervisory sanctions, compliance with fair trial rights: Several are the profiles relevant under a criminal law perspective, that emerge as critical from the analysis carried out so far on the US and, above all, on the EU banking supervisory systems.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Moloney (2012a), p. 82 et seq., and Agarwal et al. (2014), referring also to the supervisory style and approaches, including the extent to which supervisors outsource their job to self-regulation); Black (2002), p. 22 et seq.; Black (2005), p. 101–108 et seq., and especially p. 117 et seq. in which the author drafts a parallel between democratization of financial regulation and models of restorative justice; Colliard (2014).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Analytically examining pro and cons in relation to safety and soundness of the banking systems, and costs to supervisory authorities, and market participants, Barth et al. (2002), p. 6 et seq.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Cf. Llewellyn (1999).
- 15.
In this sense, for instance, cf. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) (as reported by Barth et al. (2002), p. 12) which analyzed the data «for 104 bank failures in 24 countries during the 1980s and find that there were fewer bank failures in countries in which banking supervision and monetary policy were combined in the central bank»; cf. also Ioannidou (2002); Wymeersch (2007), p. 36 et seq.; and Ferran (2012a), p. 114 et seq., highlighting how before the financial crisis, many EU Member States located frontline responsibility for microprudential supervision of all sectors of financial market activity with a single regulatory authority that operated autonomously from the central bank (BE, DE, FI, DE, PL, SE, UK), others employed an integrated supervisor model in which all functions were performed by the central bank (CZ, SK), others, finally, divided responsibility between the central bank (banking supervision), securities market supervisory authority and one or more other authorities responsible for insurance and pensions (EL, IT, PT, ES). In some countries (such as FR, IE and UK), however, the financial crisis triggered in many counties a rearrangements and reappraisal of the role of central banks in financial supervision.
- 16.
- 17.
In this sense, for instance, cf. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) (as reported by Barth et al. (2002), p. 12) which analyzed the data “for 104 bank failures in 24 countries during the 1980s and find that there were fewer bank failures in countries in which banking supervision and monetary policy were combined in the central bank”; cf. also Ioannidou (2002).
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
Cf. Barth et al. (2002), p. 12.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Cf. Ter Kuile et al. (2015), p. 166.
- 26.
Cf. BCBS (2012), Principle 2 - Essential Criteria 1,2,3,4,5,6,9.
- 27.
The importance of independence and absence of conflict of interests has been reaffirmed also in the 2011 Financial Stability Oversight Council Annual Report, cf. FSOC (2011), p. 118.
- 28.
Cf. BCBS (2012), Core Principle 2, Essential Criterion 1.
- 29.
Cf. above, Chap. 5.
- 30.
Analysing the degree of independence of the SSM against the European Parliament, Masciandaro and Nieto (2014), p. 18 et seq.
- 31.
Cf. above, Sect. 4.4.
- 32.
- 33.
Cf. also Recital (75) SSM R.
- 34.
In light of the impact of the SSM decisions (also) at domestic level, national parliaments may address to the ECB reasoned observations on the annual report; request the ECB to reply in writing to their observations; invite the Chair of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of banks in that Member State together with an NCA representative, cf. Article 21 SSM R.
- 35.
Cf. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, (2013/694/EU), O.J. 2013, L 320/1, based on Article 20(8) SSM R. Cf. also Masciandaro and Nieto (2014), p. 21 et seq, highlighting also the fundamental role played by the Court of Justice in reviewing the ECB decisions.
- 36.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of the EU and the European Central Bank on the cooperation on procedures related to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) of 11.12.2013. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_eucouncil_ecb.pdf. Accessed 20 July 2018.
- 37.
Cf. Recital (82) SSM R. OLAF’s competence over the ECB has been affirmed by the ECJ in the notorious Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, 10.07.2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395. On the issue see Elderson and Weenink (2003), pp. 273–301, contra see Zilioli and Selmayr (2001), p. 213. See above Sect. 2.3.4.
- 38.
Affirming the overall compliance of the SSM legal framework with the principle of accountability is Ter Kuile et al. (2015), pp. 187–188, according to “It is submitted that, in establishing banking supervision at EU level and in constructing this new task of the ECB, the legislature has duly paid respect to the requirement of accountability”. On the same line, but more cautious, Wolfers and Voland (2014), pp. 1488–1489.
- 39.
Cf. Article 40 ESAs Regulation.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
Cf. Sect. 5.2 for the Fed. Res., and Sect. 4.4 for the legal basis of the SSM in the TFEU. On the issue of the ECB multiple functions, and of the consequences in terms of the supervisor’s liability, see D’Ambrosio (2015), especially p. 124 et seq.; D’Ambrosio (2016), p. 299 et seq.; also with respect to the NCAs Andenæs (2015), pp. 3–6.
- 43.
Cf. European Court of Auditors (2016), Executive Summary No. VII and VIII, and table at p. 31. Internal audit, IT resources and (the high-management of) the legal service are some of these shared service.
- 44.
“Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property” (https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html). They might result especially risky if interest rate on home loans decline, causing homeowners to refinance their mortgages and deprive the holder of the security from future interest payments. Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) are instead pooled assets—such as mortgages, bonds and loans (cf. https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/collateral-trust-bonds) that serve as collateral for the CDO—that their level of risk varies substantially, depending on their priority in the event of default.
- 45.
“Additional factors responsible for the inaccurate ratings include rating models that failed to include relevant mortgage performance data, unclear and subjective criteria used to produce ratings, a failure to apply updated rating models to existing rated transactions, and a failure to provide adequate staffing to perform rating and surveillance services, despite record revenues. Compounding these problems were federal regulations that required the purchase of investment grade securities by banks and others, thereby creating pressure on the credit rating agencies to issue investment grade ratings. Still another factor were the […] (SEC) regulations which required use of credit ratings by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) for various purposes but, until recently, resulted in only three NRSROs, thereby limiting competition”, cf. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), p. 244 et seq. On the role played by credit rating agencies during the crisis, see also Black (2012), p. 1049 et seq.
- 46.
Cf. Sect. 5.4.
- 47.
For the role of ESMA in the European financial market, see Sect. 4.2. For technical standards in force, see: https://www.esma.europa.eu/convergence/guidelines-and-technical-standards. Accessed 20 July 2018.
- 48.
While provisions on the avoidance of conflict of interest are rather common at staff level, cf. Barth et al. (2004), pp. 43–45.
- 49.
- 50.
Masciandaro and Nieto (2014), p. 20.
- 51.
Cf. supra, Sect. 2.2.
- 52.
Cf. Sect. 5.4.
- 53.
Cf. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), p. 162.
- 54.
Cf. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), pp. 164 and 230 et seq.: “When asked why OTS senior officials were not tougher on Washington Mutual Bank, several persons brought up the issue of fees—that WaMu supplied $30 million or nearly 15% of the fees per year that paid for OTS’ operating expenses”.
- 55.
James Vanasek testimony before the U.S. Senate, cf. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2010a), p. 10.
- 56.
- 57.
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), p. 209 et seq.: “It seemed as if the regulator was prepared to allow the bank to work through its problems and had a higher degree of tolerance that I had… seen with the other two regulators.… I would say that the OTS did believe in self- regulation […]”.
- 58.
Cf. Sect. 5.4.
- 59.
- 60.
- 61.
See, e.g., ECB Monthly Bulletin (2012), p. 95.
- 62.
Cf. Recitals (77)-(78) SSM R: “The costs of supervision should be borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed by annual fees charged to credit institutions established in the participating Member States”, and Recital (19) Regulation 806/2014, “The Fund should be financed by bank contributions raised at national level and should be pooled at Union level in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer and progressive mutualisation of those contributions”.
- 63.
The case did not end up with a decision on the criminal liability of the financial institution thanks to an out-of-court agreement before the competent supervisory authority, where J.P. Morgan consented to a settlement of overall $ 2.05 billion for wilful violations of the Bank Security Act, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (2014) and FinCEN (2014). On the structure and powers of the SEC, see also Sect. 5.3. Highlighting the SEC’s failure during the crisis also Moloney (2012b), p. 125 et seq.
- 64.
The extent of the budget cuts is clearly exemplified by the Senate interview of Lynn E. Turner, former Chief accountant of the SEC, which took place on 7.10.2008, reported in Ferguson (2010), p. 27: “Rep. Peter Welch: A hundred and forty six people were cut from the enforcement division of the e-, SEC; is that what you also testified to?
Lynn E. Turner: Yes. Yeah, I, I think there has been a, a, a systematic gutting, or whatever you want to call it, of the agency and its capability, through cutting back of staff. […]
Rep. Peter Welch: The SEC Office of, uh, Risk Management was reduced to a staff, did you say, of one?
Lynn E. Turner: Yeah. When that gentleman would go home at night, he could turn the lights out”.
On this topic, see also Stewart (2011).
- 65.
Cf. however Ferran (2012b), p. 78, highlighting the risk of undue influence on ESAs by the EU Commission.
- 66.
Concluding on an overall sufficient level of independence and accountability for the SSM, Masciandro et al. (2014), p. 24 et seq.
- 67.
Cf. also Core Principle 3 – Essential Criterion 3.
- 68.
Cf. Core Principle 3 – Essential Criteria 3-4.
- 69.
Cf. Core Principle 3 – Essential Criterion 4.
- 70.
Cf. Core Principle 3 – Essential Criteria 1-2.
- 71.
Cf. Core Principle 3 – Essential Criterion 1.
- 72.
For an overview on main critical issues in multi-disciplinary (administrative and criminal law) cooperation in the US and in the EU, see above Sect. 2.3.4.
- 73.
- 74.
In favour of a reduction of the number of regulators see, e.g., U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), p. 36; Myers (2011); on the opposite view a consistent part of the US scholars: Romano (2001), Kane (1984) and Kupiec and White (1996); also to avoid that a single regulator monopoly may be affected by excessive power, cf. Llewellyn (1999) and Briault (1999).
- 75.
Cf. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), pp. 177 and 198 et seq.: “Beginning in 2006, OTS management expressed increasing reluctance to allow FDIC examiners to participate in WaMu […] OTS officials employed a variety of tactics to limit the FDIC oversight of the bank, including restricting its physical access to office space at the bank, its participation in bank examinations, and its access to loan files. In July 2008, tensions between the FDIC and OTS flared after the FDIC sent a letter to OTS urging it to take additional enforcement action […] OTS not only rejected that advice, but also expressed the hope that the FDIC would refrain from future unexpected letter exchanges. In a separate email, Scott Polakoff, a senior OTS official called the FDIC letter inappropriate and disingenuous […] OTS even went so far as to limit the FDIC’s physical access to office space, as well as to needed information, at WaMu’s new headquarters. […] OTS also restricted the FDIC’s access to an important database that all examiners used to review WaMu documents […] from July until November 2006, a period of about four months, the FDIC examiners were denied access to both office space on the bank’s premises and the examiner’s library. At the same time OTS was withholding office space and database access from the FDIC examination team, it also, for the first time, refused an FDIC request to participate in an OTS examination of WaMu”; see also p. 208: “The WaMu case history demonstrates how important it is for our federal regulators to view each other as partners rather than adversaries in the effort to ensure the safety and soundness of U.S. financial institutions”.
- 76.
Cf. Lambrakopoulos et al. (2017), p. 11.
- 77.
All references may be checked in the result of the investigations carried on by U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011), p. 41.
- 78.
Cf. Sect. 5.4.
- 79.
- 80.
Cf. above Sect. 4.1.
- 81.
Besides for the possibility for States externals to the Eurozone to participate in the ECB centralized supervision, cf. Article 7 SSM R. Cf. above, Sect. 4.2.
- 82.
Cf. Sect. 4.4.1.
- 83.
- 84.
Even though cases already occurred in practice. The reference goes to the seizure of ECB documents and computer hardware, carried out by Slovenian authorities on July 6th 2016, as part of a national investigation against central bank officials, while the ECB had not given prior authorization for it. For that, in May 2017 the Commission has started an infringement procedure against Slovenia, cf. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-slovenia-ecb/eu-executive-acts-against-slovenia-over-ecb-data-incident-idUSKBN18117A. Accessed 20 July 2018.
- 85.
The issue of professional secrecy however is dealt with, in the analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination in SSM supervisory proceedings applying punitive administrative sanctions cf Sects. 6.3.5 and 6.3.6. Both the issues of professional secrecy and ECB staff immunity have been raised by Allegrezza and Rodopoulos (2017). On this issue, see also Athanassiou (2011); D’Ambrosio (2015); Arons (2015), p. 469 et seq. For the role of confidentiality in the exchange of information between FIUs, see above, Sect. 3.3.
- 86.
- 87.
Cf. also Article 21 SSM R.
- 88.
Cf. Article 54 CRD IV.
- 89.
Cf. Article 55 CRD IV/V and Article 3(6) SSM R. The ECB has signed MOUs with several third-parties, such as Banco Central do Brasil, or the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
- 90.
Cf. Article 55 CRD IV/V.
- 91.
Cf. note 29.
- 92.
Decision (EU) 2016/456 of the European Central Bank of 4.03.2016 concerning the terms and conditions for European Anti-Fraud Office investigations of the European Central Bank, in relation to the prevention of fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union (ECB/2016/3).
- 93.
Cf. Decision (EU) 2016/456, Article 3(1) and (3).
- 94.
Cf. Decision (EU) 2016/456, Article 3(4).
- 95.
Cf. Decision (EU) 2016/456, Article 4, and Recital (9).
- 96.
- 97.
Comparative analysis shows that in a majority of Eurozone countries, NCAs are under an obligation to report suspicions of a crime emerged during their supervisory activity to the competent judicial authorities (AT, BE, DE, FR, IE, LU, and de facto IT), while in a minority of countries NCAs retain margin of discretion in whether to inform the judicial authorities (EL, NL). Cf. Lasagni and Rodopoulos (2019).
- 98.
Decision (EU) 2016/1162 of the European Central Bank of 30.06.2016 on disclosure of confidential information in the context of criminal investigations (ECB/2016/19).
- 99.
Cf. Decision (EU) 2016/1162, Recitals (3) and (8).
- 100.
Cf. Allegrezza and Rodopoulos (2017), p. 246, according to which “it is noteworthy that no limitations of liability or immunities of the ECB and the SRB are provided for by the texts, despite similar provisions that are found in national legal systems with regard to national supervisory authorities. However, according to opinions expressed in the doctrine, limitations can be justified, either on the legal basis of ‘the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’, or the criterion of ‘sufficiently serious violation’, as this has been formed by the CJEU case law”.
- 101.
Including Articles 274 and 343 TFEU; Article 39 of the ECB Statute (Protocol no. 4 to the TFEU); Protocol No. 7 to the TFEU On the Privileges and Immunities of The European Union; Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (OLAF Regulation); and the Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Central Bank concerning the seat of the European Central Bank, of 18.09.1998 [SEC/GovC/4/98/07].
- 102.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 18.02.1999, Application No. 26083/94, § 63; and Greenpeace Nederland and Procurator General at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (intervening) v Euratom, Judgment on Appeal in Cassation, Decision No LJN: BA9173, RvdW (2007) No 992, NJ 2008, 147, ILDC 838 (NL 2007), 13.11.2007, (Netherlands Supreme Court), where the immunity was refused on the basis that functional immunity test requires it to assess “whether or not the acts in question are immediately connected to the tasks entrusted to the organisation”.
- 103.
J.J. Zwartveld and Others, Case C-2/88 Imm., Order of the Court of 6.12.1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:440.
- 104.
Id., § 11.
- 105.
Id., §§ 11-13.
- 106.
Cf. Decision (EU) 2016/1162, Article 3.
- 107.
As it is, for instance, the case of Banca d’Italia, according to Article 7(1)(2) of Legislative Decree no. 385, of 1.09.1993 (“Testo Unico Bancario”-TUB).
- 108.
For a general framework of critical issues on the matter, see above, Sect. 2.3.4.
- 109.
WebMindLicenses kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám Főigazgatóság, Case C-419/14, 17.12.2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832.
- 110.
Id., § 80, as highlighted by Tesoriero (2016), p. 1542 et seq. While the Court affirms this principle with regard to transversal cooperation (administrative and criminal trial), it remains open the question whether the same test shall be applied also within the same (administrative or criminal proceeding). In case of a positive answer, it should then be necessary to examine separately not only whether the investigative measure is in itself within the limits of Article 52(1) CFREU, but also if the admission of that evidence at trial is in compliance with the same parameters. Among the authors highlighting also the critical issues emerging from the lack of shared standards of defence rights see, e.g., Gless (2013), p. 90; Klip and Vervaele (2002); Ruggeri (2015), p. 147 et seq.; Caianiello and Di Pietro (2016); Mangiaracina (2004), p. 2194; Di Federico and Di Chiara (1994); Traverso (1997); Allegrezza (2008a); Kostoris (2017).
- 111.
Id., §§ 86-89.
- 112.
Id., §§ 75 and 82.
- 113.
Cf. Tesoriero (2016), p. 1540.
- 114.
In this sense, while all procedural rights provided for by Articles 6 ECHR and 47-48 CFREU are fundamental fair trial rights, “core” procedural fair trial rights are considered only those whose violation is never tolerated by the case-law of the European Courts (for the time being, especially by the ECtHR—although without that necessarily meaning the application of exclusionary rule, since the Court in Strasbourg has never recognized automatic exclusions besides for violations of Article 3 ECHR—on this see below Sect. 6.3.5). Lacking a shared notion of what exactly this “core” is composed of, in this work this expression is used to refer to those procedural rights which apply to every proceeding, regardless of its nature (Article 41 CFREU), plus those of Article 6 ECHR (and their correspondents in Articles 47-48 CFREU) that the ECtHR has selected as essential to be complied with also in case of administrative proceedings with substantive criminal nature according to the Engel criteria. This definition allows a general identification of the “core” rights, but critical issues still remain open concerning then the precise identification, within each of these rights, of the procedural rules that identify the “core” of each of these rights (e.g., in the privilege against self-incrimination, is it enough to be able to exercise the right, or also being informed of the possibility to remain silent is indispensable not to violate the “core” of this right?). This highly critical problem is not solved in general terms in this work, but a proposal of which are the “core” procedural rights, also in their more detailed application, shall be complied with in the sanctioning proceedings of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, is carried out below, in Sect. 6.3.
- 115.
Cf. below, Sect. 6.2.
- 116.
Cf., recently, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank, Case T-122/15, 16.05.2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:337 and also, although on different grounds, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v European Central Bank, Case T-712/15, 13.12.2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:900 currently appealed before the ECJ, see Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, Case C-152/18 P, 20.04.2018; and Crédit mutuel Arkéa v European Central Bank, Case T-52/16, 13.12.2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:902, currently appealed before the ECJ, see Crédit Mutuel Arkéa v ECB, Case C-153/18 P, 23.02.2018. Interestingly, however, the number of credit institutions subject to direct ECB supervision has decreased since the Mechanism entered into force in 2014.
- 117.
This option is provided for by Article 65 CRD IV, as described above in Sect. 4.3-–4.4. This limitation that, as previously discussed, may become critical in case Member States would decide to transpose the sanctioning provisions of CRD IV through criminal law provisions, as allowed by the Directive.
- 118.
- 119.
Hüls AG, Case C-199/92, § 150; Spector, Case C-45/08, § 42; Bonda, Case C-489/10, §§ 36; Fransson, Case C-617/10, §§ 35-37, as analysed in Sect. 2.3.
- 120.
As described in Sect. 4.3.
- 121.
- 122.
- 123.
Cf. for the CJEU, Spector, Case C-45/08, § 42; for the ECtHR see, e.g., Société Stenuit v. France, 27.02.1992, Application no. 11598/85, § 7, with regard to the Commission report of 30.05.1991; Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l., § 44; Lilly France S.A. v. France; Didier v. France (dec.), 27.08.2002, Application no. 58188/00; Dubus SA, § 36. See also Jones and Sufrin (2016), p. 895; Andreangeli (2008), pp. 17–18. For more on locus standi of legal persons under the Convention see Zwaak (2006), pp. 52–55 and with regard to the application of the Engel criteria, p. 552. See also Slater et al. (2008), p. 18. Analysing the privilege against self-incrimination for legal persons, Sect. 6.3.5.
- 124.
Cf. Sect. 2.3.
- 125.
Benham v. the United Kingdom, § 56.
- 126.
Bendenoun v. France, § 47.
- 127.
Öztürk v Germany, § 53; Grande Stevens, § 96.
- 128.
Cf. Sect. 2.3.
- 129.
Cf. Sect. 4.4.2.
- 130.
- 131.
Cf. D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 25.
- 132.
In this sense, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-203/12, Billerud Karlsborg AB, Billerud Skärblacka AB v. Naturvårdsverket, delivered on 16.05.2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:320, § 31.
- 133.
Cf. Id., Opinion in Case C-407/14, María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v. Securitas Seguridad España, SA, delivered on 3.09. 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:534, note 40, which includes “naming and shaming” provisions among the “range of penalties” available to Member States; at academic level, see, e.g., Doorenbos (2007), p. 88, referring to ECtHR decisions: O. v. Norway, 11.02.2003, Application no. 29327/95; Ringvold V. Norway, 11.02.2003, Application no. 34964/97; Hammern v. Norway, 11.02.2003, Application no. 30287/96; Pfaeltzer (2014), pp. 144–145, according to which “After all, in its decision to impose an administrative fine, the supervisor indicates that the sanction will be published. This indication implies that the decision to publish has been made together with the decision to impose the fine. As a result, the administrative fine and its publication each have a punitive character”.
- 134.
On the possibility of considering the sanction pénale depending on the “nature, as significant or less significant, of the bank concerned”, see D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 27; on the same line, in general terms, Trechsel (2005), p. 24, but see also p. 26. For a more detailed analysis of the third Engel criterion, see above, Sect. 2.3.
- 135.
Öztürk v. Germany, § 53; Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, § 26, according to which “la requérante n’encourait plus une peine d’emprisonnement à l’époque des faits. Cela n’est toutefois pas déterminant en soi aux fins de l’applicabilité du volet pénal de l’article 6 de la Convention car, comme la Cour l’a souligné à maintes reprises, la faiblesse relative de l’enjeu ne saurait ôter à une infraction son caractère pénal intrinsèque”.
- 136.
Cf., recently, for the ECtHR, A and B v. Norway, and Jóhannesson and others v Iceland; for the ECJ see e.g. Fransson, Case C-617/10, §§ 35-37; Bonda, Case C-489/10, §§ 36-46.
- 137.
Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l., § 44.
- 138.
Messier v. France (dec.), 19.05.2009, Application no. 25041/07, § 35.
- 139.
Lilly France S.A. v. France.
- 140.
Didier v. France.
- 141.
- 142.
Since 2010 joined with the Autorité de contrôle des assurances et des mutuelles, the Comité des établissements de crédit et des entreprises d’investissement, and the Comité des entreprises d’assurances in the new Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), cf. Ordonnance n° 2010-76 du 21.01.2010 portant fusion des autorités d’agrément et de contrôle de la banque et de l’assurance, NOR: ECEX0929065R, Version consolidée au 04 juillet 2017.
- 143.
Cf. former Article L. 613-3 “La Commission bancaire comprend le gouverneur de la Banque de France ou son représentant, président, le directeur du Trésor ou son représentant le président de l’Autorité de contrôle des assurances et des mutuelles ou son représentant et quatre membres ou leurs suppléants nommés par arrêté du ministre chargé de l’économie pour une durée de cinq ans dont le mandat est renouvelable une fois: 1. Un conseiller d’Etat proposé par le vice-président du Conseil d’Etat; 2. Un conseiller à la Cour de cassation proposé par le premier président de la Cour de cassation; 3. Deux membres choisis en raison de leur compétence en matière bancaire et financière (…)”.
- 144.
Such as “1. L’avertissement; 2. Le blâme; 3. L’interdiction d’effectuer certaines opérations et toutes autres limitations dans l’exercice de l’activité; (…) 6. La radiation (…) de l’entreprise d’investissement de la liste des (…) entreprises d’investissement [agréées] (…). Il en va de même s’il n’a pas été déféré à l’injonction prévue à l’article L. 613-16”, cf. former Article L. 613-21.
- 145.
CE, 29.11.1999, no 194721, Société Rivoli Exchange.
- 146.
Dubus S.A. v France, §§ 36-38: “La Cour est d’avis que la Commission bancaire, lorsqu’elle a infligé à la requérante la sanction du blâme, devait être regardée comme un “tribunal” au sens de l’article 6 § 1 de la Convention”.
- 147.
- 148.
Grande Stevens, § 96, and the cases there mentioned.
- 149.
Grande Stevens, § 97.
- 150.
Grande Stevens, §§ 98-99.
- 151.
- 152.
- 153.
- 154.
for a comparative analysis of banking supervisory enforcement systems in 10 of the 19 Eurozone Member States, see Allegrezza (2019).
- 155.
Cf., e.g., Joseph Kaplan v the UK, Report of 17.07.1980, Application no. 7598/76, §§ 168-170, contra Garyfallou, § 34, as reported by van Dijk (2006), p. 552.
- 156.
As described in Sect. 4.3.
- 157.
Cf. Sect. 4.4.1. Cf. however, Allegrezza and Voordeckers (2015), p. 155, according to “The wording of Art. 16(1) SSMR already suggests that these measures are not of a punitive, but rather of a preventive nature, since the purpose is to intervene at an early stage, to avoid that there will be a breach in the near future, or to ensure a sound management and risk coverage”.
- 158.
- 159.
- 160.
Pierre-Bloch v. France, § 56; Escoubet v Belgium, 28.10.1999, Application no. 26780/95, § 37.
- 161.
In the same sense, also D’Ambrosio (2013), pp. 25–26.
- 162.
Cf. van Dijk (2006), p. 556.
- 163.
Cf. Lamandini et al (2015), p. 97, noting however also how “the prospect that a single set of measures can receive different treatments, and be subject to different guarantees, depending on the use of it that is intended used by administrative authorities (and whether it is possible to prove such intention) is a bit disquieting”.
- 164.
- 165.
- 166.
Recently, on the non-punitive nature of pecuniary penalty payments (in environmental protection law), see Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 27.07.2017, in European Commission v Republic of Poland, Case C-441/17 R, ECLI:EU:C:2017:877, § 102.
- 167.
In this sense, it is worth to recall the attempt of several Member States, rejected by the Court in Strasbourg, to reduce the application of Engel criteria to the administrative (tax) matter in relation to the principle of ne bis in idem, carried out in A and B v. Norway, cf. Sect. 2.3.3.
- 168.
Cf., with regard to the ECB banking supervision, D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 85.
- 169.
For a first comparative analysis in this sense, see Allegrezza (2019).
- 170.
Articles 47-50 CFREU.
- 171.
Cf. especially to Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence, cit.; see below, Sect. 6.3.5.
- 172.
Recognized by the Court of Justice also as one of the general principles of EU law see, e.g., Detlef Nölle v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-167/94, 18.09.1995, ECLI:EU:T:1995:169.
- 173.
- 174.
Cf., e.g., G.J. Dokter, Maatschap Van den Top and W. Boekhout v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Case C-28/05, 15.06.2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:408, § 74. On this issue, see also De Moor Van Vugt (2012), pp. 40–41, according to which “the adoption of the Charter as part of the Lisbon Treaty has stimulated the further clarification and specification of safeguards in administrative sanctioning procedures for both measures (of a reparatory nature) and penalties (of a punishing nature). The difference in approach” between the two types of sanctions “is gradual, which makes the reluctance of the CJ to qualify a sanction as criminal even more questionable. Most procedural safeguards that have been implemented apply to both categories. The penalties demand a more restrictive approach in the sense that the authorities need to respect the guarantees that have been set by the ECHR and the Charter, when it comes to a criminal charge”.
- 175.
Requiring that “defence rights of the parties concerned shall be fully respected”, cf. also Article 32(1) SSM FR.
- 176.
Cf. Articles 41(1) and 47(2) CFREU, and Article 6(1) ECHR (reasonable length)—for a detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR on the matter, see Trechsel (2005), p. 134 et seq.; Harris et al. (2014), pp. 439–446; Sayers (2014), p. 1258 et seq.; Article 296 TFEU, Article 41(2), third point CFREU, and Article 6(1) ECHR (obligation to state reason)—for a detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR on the matter, see Trechsel (2005), p. 102 et seq.; Harris et al. (2014), p. 430; Craig (2014), p. 1084 et seq.; Article 6 ECHR, 48 CFREU and Articles 8 and 9 Directive 2016/343 (right to be present at trial)—for a detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR on the matter, and a comment on the directive, see, e.g., Trechsel (2005), pp. 252–261; Harris et al. (2014), p. 410 et seq.; Mosna (2017), p. 969 et seq.; Rafaraci (2007), p. 5 et seq. (especially with regard to Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, Case C-399/11, 26.02.2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107); Mangiaracina (2010), p. 135 et seq.; Negri (2015), p. 202 et seq.; and Article 47(3) CFREU, Article 6(3)(c) ECHR, and Directive 2016/1919 (legal aid)-for a detailed analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR see Trechsel (2005), pp. 270–277; Harris et al. (2014), p. 478 et seq.; Sayers (2014), p. 1315.
- 177.
Which presumably should be able to afford legal expenses of defence. A residual hypothesis may be that of natural persons indirectly involved in supervisory proceedings (e.g. shareholders), where in any case Article 47 CRFEU shall apply.
- 178.
- 179.
See Nehl (2014), p. 1290, and Sayers (2014), p. 1309, recalling that breaches of Article 48(2) may also constitute a breach of Article 47(2) CFREU.
- 180.
Cf., e.g., Deweer v. Belgium, 27.02.1980, Application no. 6903/75, §§ 42–46; Eckle v Germany, 15.07.1982, Application no. 8130/78, § 73; McFarlane v Ireland, 10.09.2010, Application no. 31333/06, § 143; Foti and others v Italy, 10.12.1982, Applications nos. 7604/76, 7719/76, 7781/77 and 7913/77, § 52; Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24.11.1993, Application no. 13972/88, § 36; Dvorski v Croatia, 20.10.2015, Application no. 25703/11, § 76. See Allegrezza (2017), p. 948; Nehl (2014), pp. 1282–1283.
- 181.
Cf. above Sect. 4.4.3 and, if you wish, Lasagni (2019).
- 182.
- 183.
- 184.
- 185.
Cf. Nehl (2014), p. 1290 et seq.
- 186.
- 187.
The issue is examined below, in Sect. 6.3.5.
- 188.
The issue is examined below, Sect. 6.3.7.
- 189.
Cf. Articles 23-24 SSM FR, according to which “The ECB and NCAs shall adopt arrangements for their communications within the SSM, including the language(s) to be used”, and that “Any document which a supervised entity or any other legal or natural person individually subject to ECB supervisory procedures sends to the ECB may be drafted in any one of the official languages of the Union, chosen by the supervised entity or person”. On the critical issues deriving from language rights in the EU legal framework regardless of Directive 2010/64/EU of 20.10.2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Vogler (2015), p. 95; Sayers (2014), p. 1325 et seq.; Gialuz (2014), p. 84 et seq.
- 190.
- 191.
- 192.
Cf. Sect. 4.4.2.
- 193.
- 194.
- 195.
Cf. Caianiello (2017), p. 47; according to Trechsel (2005), pp. 47–48, “It is thus quite obvious that the “definition” is to some extent superfluous in that properties which, according to the text of Article 6 § 1 are attached to the term, are here referred to as elements of its definition. The essential point is that the Court does not give much importance to the label which is attached to the institutions that function as a court”, on the same line, also Pech (2014), p. 1252. In any case, the features of “impartiality”, “independence”, and “established by law” are rather overlapping, and “can hardly be distinguished in a clear way”, Trechsel (2005), p. 49; Viering (2006), p. 612. According to the Court in Findlay v the United Kingdom, 25.02.1997, Application no. 22107/93, § 73, “The concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked and the Court will consider them together as they relate to the present case”.
- 196.
Belilos v Switzerland, 29.04.1988, Application no. 10328/83, § 64, recognizing judicial functions to a Swiss Police Board; see also H v Belgium, 30.11.1987, Application no. 8950/80, p. 34, § 50.
- 197.
Findlay v the United Kingdom, § 77; Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19.04.1994, Application no. 16034/90, § 45.
- 198.
Cf. Caianiello (2017), pp. 910–11, persuaded of the prevalence of the negative impact of this case-law.
- 199.
In this sense, see also Vervaele (2017), p. 169.
- 200.
Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23.06.1981, Application nos. 6878/75; 7238/75, § 55, and the case-law there mentioned. See also Harris et al. (2014), p. 447.
- 201.
Cf., e.g., Crociani and others v Italy, 18.12.1980, Applications nos. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79, and 8729/79, p. 180 et seq.; Demicoli v Malta, cit., § 40 et seq. For more details on the independence from the legislator, see Trechsel (2005), p. 53 et seq.
- 202.
Cf., e.g., Le Compte, § 55; Belilos, § 64; Campbell and Fell v UK, § 78; Kleyn and Others v The Netherlands, 6.05.2003, nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, § 190; Coëme and Others v Belgium, 22.06.2000, Applications nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, § 99; Richert v Poland, 25.10.2011, Application no. 54809/07, § 43. See also Harris et al. (2014), p. 448 et seq.
- 203.
For case-law referred to stricto sensu judicial systems, see Trechsel (2005), pp. 54–55.
- 204.
Pierre Corbiau v Administration des contributions, Case C-24/92, 30.03.1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993:118, § 15; see also Incal v Turkey, 9.06.1998, 41/1997/825/1031, § 65; François De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, Case C-17/00, 29.11.2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:651, § 10.
- 205.
G. Vaassen-Göbbels v Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf, Case 61/65, 30.06.1966, ECLI:EU:C:1966:39, p. 273.
- 206.
Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, Case C-54/96, 17.09.1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, § 23; for a more recent application of this case-law, cf., e.g., Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura (CCIAA) di Cosenza v Grillo Star Srl, Case C-443/09, 19.04.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:213, § 20, and case-law mentioned there (which, even if post-Lisbon Treaty, does not refer to Article 47 of the Charter). For an analysis of the parameters developed by the Court see, e.g., Pech (2014), p. 1253 et seq.
- 207.
Cf. Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, Case C-506/04, 19.09.2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:587, § 49; Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, delivered on 11.05.2006, in Wilson, Case C- C-506/04, § 45. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster, § 17; and Pech (2014), p. 12563 et seq.
- 208.
Cf. Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, Case C-506/04, §§ 51-52; Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, 6.07.2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:367, § 32.
- 209.
Cf., e.g., Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, § 36; Köllensperger and Atzwanger, Case C-103/97, 4.02.1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:52, § 21.
- 210.
As already discussed in the application of the Engel criteria, see above Sect. 2.3.
- 211.
Schneider Electric v Commission, Case T-351/03, 11.07.2007, ECLI:EU:T:2007:212, §§ 181–184.
- 212.
Cf. Van Landewyck v Commission, Case C-209/78 (Joined Cases C-209/78, C-210/78, C-211/78, C-212/78, C-213/78, C-214/78, C-215/78, C-218/78), 29.10.1980, ECLI:EU:C:1980:248, § 81; Musique Diffusion française v Commission, Case C-100/80 (Joined Cases C-100/80, C-101/80, C-102/80, C-103/80), 7.07.1983, ECLI:EU:C:1983:158, § 7, where the Court, briefly dismissed as “irrelevant” the arguments of the applicant, concluded that the Commission “cannot be classified as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights”.
- 213.
Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Case T-L/89, Rhône-Poulenc v Commission, delivered on 10.07.1991, II-885; Shell v Commission, § 39; Enso Española v Commission, Case T-348/94, 14.05.1998, ECLI:EU:T:1998:102, § 56; Cimenteries Cbr and Others v Commission, § 717; HFB and others v Commission, § 377; Dansk Rørindustri v Commission, Case T-21/99, 20.03.2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:74, §144; Bolloré and others v Commission, Joined Cases T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02, 26.04.2007, ECLI:EU:T:2007:115, § 86; Lafarge SA v Commission, Case T-54/03, 8.07.2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:255, § 38; Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P, Papierfabrik August Koehler AG (C-322/07 P), Bolloré SA (C-327/07 P), Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles, SL (C-338/07 P) v Commission, delivered on 2.04.2009, note 51; Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA and others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:634, delivered on 26.10.2010, § 44; Schindler Holding Ltd and others, Case T-138/07, § 54; Bolloré v European Commission, §§55-57; Coats Holdings Ltd v European Commission, § 169; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v European Commission, delivered on 13.12.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:800, § 140; Schindler Holding Ltd and others, Case C-501/11 P, 18.07.2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522, § 30 (also quoting the ECHR decision Minarini); Saint-Gobain Glass France SA and others v European Commission, Cases T-56/09 and T-73/09, 27.03.2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:160, §§75-79; Crown Equipment and others v Council of the European Union, Case T-643/11, 12.12.2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1076, § 45.
- 214.
The process will certainly be accelerated in case the EU will access to the European Convention. Moreover, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.3, it appears that the CJEU is starting to overrrule part of the special treatment reserved to competition law, at least with regard to the ne bis in idem.
- 215.
Cf. Article 7, Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of The European Central Bank: “when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks”; cf. also Sect. 4.4.
- 216.
Cf. above, Sect. 4.4.
- 217.
Cf. above Sect. 4.4.2.
- 218.
In this sense, the ECtHR seems to have adopted a more restrictive notion of “law”, where normally it refers “to any norm of general application” as “the Court does not usually examine whether it was passed by Parliament or whether it was adopted by the Government or any other body […] Still, not every detail must be regulated by the law in the formal sense, i.e. Acts of Parliament—details may be set out in delegated legislation […] However, these texts will have to satisfy the general requirements of precision and foreseeability”. These elements should include at least: The whole organizational set-up of the courts, jurisdiction, establishment of individual courts, determination of local jurisdiction, competence ratione loci and materiae, and the proceeding the tribunal is to follow, although the case-law of the Court is not clear on the matter, cf. Trechsel (2005), pp. 50–51, referring to Zand v. Austria, 16.05.1977, Application no. 7360/76, § 80; see also Harris et al. (2014), p. 458.
- 219.
See, e.g., Jorgic v Germany, 12.07.2007, Application no. 74613/01, § 64; Richert v Poland, § 41. As underlined by Trechsel, indeed, the notion is therefore defined in negative terms, cf. Trechsel (2005), p. 61 et seq.
- 220.
Piersack v Belgium, 10.10.1982, Application no. 8692/76, § 30. As underlined, the separation between these two tests is “quite convincing although the labels are not”, as it is “practically impossible to determine or not” whether judges have an impartial state of mind, cf. Trechsel (2005), p. 62; Harris et al. (2014), pp. 450–451.
- 221.
Cf., e.g., Hauschildt v Denmark, 24.05.1989, Application no. 10486/83, §§ 47-48, according to which “appearances may be of a certain importance”. The Court, however, has revealed itself reluctant to find deficits of impartiality under the subjective test, as shown in cases Remli v France, 23.04.1996, Application no. 16839/90; Gregory v the UK, 25.02.1997, Application no. 22299/93; Ferrantelli and Santangelo v Italy, 7.08.1996, Application no. 19874/92; Sander v The UK, 9.05.2000, Application no. 34129/96; cf. also Trechsel (2005), p. 64.
- 222.
Id. § 48; Sramek v Austria, 22.10.1984, Application no. 8790/79, § 42. It is not clear, however, whether the test should take into account the potential bias as perceivable “in the eyes of a reasonable person or an “ordinary citizen””, cf. Trechsel (2005), p. 62.
- 223.
- 224.
Cf. Umlauft v Austria, 23.10.1995, Application no. 15527/89, § 37; Öztürk v Germany, § 56; A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy, §§ 59-63-67; see also Schmautzer v Austria, 23.10.1995, Application no 15523/89, §36; Gradinger v Austria, 23.10.1995, Application no 15963/90, §44. The issue of judicial review is dealt with below in Sect 6.3.3.
- 225.
Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, Case C-506/04, §§ 52–53.
- 226.
Pech (2014), p. 1256; cf. Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, Case C-506/04, § 52. See also François De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, Case C-17/00, 29.11.2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:651, §§ 17–22; while the first ECJ case where impartiality has been mentioned was Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, § 32.
- 227.
Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, delivered on 11.05.2006, in Case C- C-506/04, Wilson, § 75.
- 228.
Article 123(2) SSM FR.
- 229.
Article 123(3) SSM FR.
- 230.
Article 123(1) SSM FR.
- 231.
At the European level, a similar investigating structure may be found with regard to the “independent investigating officer” appointed by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), cf. Article 64, Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 4.07.2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories. The same provisions, still referred to ESMA, may be found in Article 31 of the recent Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business, Brussels, 8.3.2018 COM(2018) 113 final.
- 232.
Cf. Article 24 SSM R.
- 233.
Cf. Article 4(1), Decision of the European Central Bank of 14.04.2014 concerning the establishment of the Administrative Board of Review and its Operating Rules (ECB/2014/16); cf. also above, Sect. 4.4.3.
- 234.
Cf. Sect. 4.4.3.
- 235.
Grande Stevens, § 136.
- 236.
Idem.
- 237.
Idem, §137.
- 238.
On the changes in the jurisprudence of the Court in Strasbourg concerning ne bis in idem after A and B v Norway, see above Sect. 2.3.2. On the 2018 CJEU decisions on CONSOB (Garlsson Real Estate SA, Case C-537/16 and Di Puma - Zecca, Joined Cases C-596/16 and C-597/16) still concerning the double jeopardy clause, see Sect. 2.3.3.
- 239.
ECB (2017), p. 39, Table 6.
- 240.
ECB (2018), p. 78, Table 5. “Of the 44 sanctioning proceedings handled in 2017, 28 related to suspected breaches of directly applicable EU law (ECB decisions and regulations included). These cases concerned 26 SIs and related to the areas of own funds, reporting, public disclosure, liquidity and large exposures […] Nine proceedings were closed in 2017 owing mainly to the nonmateriality of the suspected breaches or the absence of a legal basis for imposing sanctions. The remaining 16 out of the 44 sanctioning proceedings handled in 2017 related to suspected breaches of national law transposing CRD IV provisions and concern SIs or natural persons. These proceedings involve suspected breaches with regard to governance (including internal control mechanisms), management body functions and remuneration”.
- 241.
Cf. ECB (2019), § 3.2.
- 242.
Cf. above Sect. 4.4.
- 243.
Cf. below, Sect. 6.3.3.
- 244.
Cf. Kress v France, 7.06.2001, Application no. 39594/98, § 72.
- 245.
Cf., e.g., Dombo Beheer v Netherlands, 27.10.1993, Application no. 14448/88, § 33.
- 246.
- 247.
Cf. M. M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Others, Case C-277/11, 22.11.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:744; although the Court on the point seems to have changed its jurisprudence, as recognized by Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, delivered on 16.09.2015, in WebMindLicence, Case C-419/14, § 136. For a more detailed analysis of the theme, see Piva (2017), p. 756 et seq., underlining how, besides for the direct application of Article 41 on Member States, the same principles apply to the latter due to the case-law of the CJEU, upon which Article 41 CFREU has been built upon.
- 248.
Cf. e.g., on the right to be heard, Hoffmannn la Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, 13.02.1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, § 9; Musique Diffusion française v. Commission, Case 100/80, §10; Shell v. Commission, Case T-11/89, § 39; Compagnie maritime belge v. Commission, Case C-395/96, 16.03.2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, § 142, where the Court clarified that, even if Article 6(1) ECHR does not apply to antitrust proceedings, still the right to be heard and to access to files shall be respected. On access to files as part of the principle of equality of arms, see, e.g., Solvay SA v Commission of the European Communities, T-30/91, 29.06.1995, ECLI:EU:T:1995:115, § 83; Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-36/91, 29.06.1995, ECLI:EU:T:1995:118, § 93.
- 249.
As repeatedly affirmed by the Court of Justice cf., e.g., Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission of the European Communities, Case 17-74, 23.10.1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:106, § 15; Lisrestal and others v. Commission, Case T-450/93, 6.12.1994, ECLI:EU:T:1994:290; Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski, Case C-7/98, 28.03.2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, § 42; Sopropé - Organizações de Calçado Lda v Fazenda Pública, Case C-349/07, 18.12.2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, § 36.
- 250.
Cf., e.g. Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 10.07.1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:305, § 28; Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 10.07.1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:302, § 28.
- 251.
Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission of the European Communities, Case 17–74, § 15.
- 252.
Cf., e.g., Detlef Nölle, Case T-167/94, § 63, where the fact that the applicants were not charged with allegation was considered a cause for refusing the application of the right. This interpretation has been recovered in trademark cases; for a reconstruction of the case-law on the matter, see Rabinovici (2012), p. 170.
- 253.
As it emerges comparing the French version of Lisrestal v. Commission, § 42 which states: “Ce principe exige que toute personne à l’encontre de laquelle une décision faisant grief peut être prise soit mise en mesure de faire connaître utilement son point de vue au sujet des éléments retenus à sa charge par la Commission pour fonder la décision litigieuse” with the English version “That principle requires that any person who may be adversely affected by the adoption of a decision should be placed in a position in which he may effectively make known his views on the evidence against him which the Commission has taken as the basis for the decision at issue” where no reference is made to the fact that the measure shall be adopted against the party (emphasis added).
- 254.
Cf., e.g., M. M., §§ 85-87, according to which “The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his interests adversely”; Spain v Commission, Case C-287/02, 9.06.2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:368, § 37; Sopropé, § 37; Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardware v Council, Case C-141/08 P, 1.10.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:598, § 83; France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, Case C-27/09 P, 21.12.2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:853, §§ 64–65.
- 255.
According to which “the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken”. As reported by Rabinovici (2012), pp. 152–153, also this provision is differently translated within the EU, and a criterion similar of that of ‘à son encontre’ appears in other six versions (besides for the French one): “Dutch (‘jegems hem’); German (‘ihr gegenüber’); Swedish (‘mot honom eller henne’); Danish (‘over for ham/hende’); Spanish (‘en contra suya’); Italian (‘nei suoi confronti’). However, the Finnish, Portuguese, and Greek versions are similar to the English version, omitting the ‘initiated against’ criterion”.
- 256.
Rabinovici (2012), p. 172, noticing how most EU legislations (in the field of competition law) grant basic hearing rights to third parties having sufficient interest in a procedure, so that usually the Courts do not have to refer to Article 41(2) CFREU to extend its scope.
- 257.
Cf., e.g., LVM v Commission, Case T-84/89 (Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84/89, T-85/89, T-86/89, T- 89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89, T-104/89), 19.06.1990, ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, and Judgment in Dow Benelux NV v Commission of the European Communities, C-85/87, 17.10.1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:379. This review is not only subject to strict time limitations, as if no proceeding is instituted before the Court within the 2-month period from the publication of the measure, or of its notification, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the plaintiff, the challenged decision is held to be valid and cannot be contested anymore as far as its merit is concerned.
- 258.
Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic Community, Case 25-62, 15.07.1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, p. 107; Commission of the European Communities v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV, Case C-78/03 P, 13.12.2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:761, § 33.
- 259.
See, e.g., Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel and Comité d’Etablissement de Pierval and Fédération Générale Agroalimentaire v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-12/93, 27.04.1995, ECLI:EU:T:1995:78, § 59, where standing was denied to the employees of a company on the basis that the approval of a merger by the Commission would not be a direct cause of the loss of jobs in the merged company.
Highlighting this restrictive interpretation, e.g., see Witte (2015), p. 228; Mastroianni and Pezza (2014), p. 947; Lamandini (2015), p. 129.
- 260.
Fursin and Others [former Trasta Komercbanka and Others] v ECB, T-247/16 (Application of 08.07.2016) and T-698/16 (Application of 11.11.2016).
- 261.
Order of the General Court of 12.09.2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:623, in Fursin and Others, cit., currently appealed before the Court in Case C-663/17 P, 24.11.2017 and in case Trasta Komercbanka AS, Ivan Fursin, Igors Buimisters, C & R Invest SIA, Figon Co. Ltd, GCK Holding Netherlands BV, Rikam Holding SA v ECB, Case C-669/17 P, 28.11.2017; on which see also Opinion of AG Kokott, delivered on 11.04.2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:323), where she advices to set aside the Latvian rules on revoking a bank’s mandates in order to provide an effective remedy against the withdrawal of the authorisation (recognizing the standing of the bank) while finding that the shareholders have no right to challenge the withdrawal of the license of a bank.
- 262.
Idem, §§ 61–62.
- 263.
Idem; see also Markku Sahlstedt and Others v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-362/06 P, 23.04.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:243, § 36 and the case-law cited.
- 264.
Order of the General Court of 12.09.2017, § 65, and case-law cited there.
- 265.
Idem, §§ 67–69.
- 266.
- 267.
Solvay SA, Case T-30/91, § 59. See also Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI), §§ 69. See especially Article 7(2), Directive 2012/13/EU of 22.05.2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, which is essentially based on the ECtHR case-law, with few more elevated standards, such as the so-called Letter of rights, see in this sense Mosna (2017), pp. 957 and 961, highlighting also how the provision of Article 7 recalls Article 5(4) ECHR, but without providing for grounds for refusal; see also Sayers (2015), p. 1334 et seq.; Cape et al. (2010), p. 32 et seq.
- 268.
Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen, VBVB, and Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels, VBBB, v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases 43/82 and 63/82, 17.01.1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:9, § 25.
- 269.
The already mentioned Cement joined case: Aalborg Portland A/S (C-204/00 P) and others, § 68. For its relevance with regard to the principle of ne bis in idem, see also Sect. 2.3.3.
- 270.
Hoechst GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-410/03, 18.06.2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:211, § 152.
- 271.
Idem, § 73.
- 272.
Idem, §§ 74–75. This test was then slightly modified in 2011, when the CJEU in Solvay established that “where access to the file, and particularly to exculpatory documents, is granted at the stage of the judicial proceedings, the undertaking concerned has to show, not that if it had had access to the non-disclosed documents, the Commission decision would have been different in content, but only that those documents could have been useful for its defence”, cf. Solvay SA v European Commission, Case C-110/10 P, 25.10.2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:687.
- 273.
Hoechst GmbH v Commission, §§ 152–153.
- 274.
Aalborg Portland A/S (C-204/00 P) and others, §§ 76-77, and 129.
- 275.
Cf. Espírito Santo Financial (Portugal) v ECB, Case T-251/15, 26.04.2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:234, appealed in Case C-442/18 P of 23.11.2018, §§ 51–83, where the ECB decision refusing to grant access to files was annulled by the Court.
- 276.
Baumeister, Case C-15/16, 19.06.2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:464, § 34 et seq.
- 277.
UBS Europe and o., Case C-358/16, 13.09.2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:715, §§ 66–70.
- 278.
Cf., e.g., Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom, 16.02.2000, Application no. 28901/95, § 60; Užukauskas v. Lithuania, 6.07.2010, Application no. 16965/04, § 47. According to Trechsel (2005), p. 90, from a Conventional perspective, prosecution shall not be included in the definition.
- 279.
Borgers v Belgium, 30.10.1991, Application no. 12005/86.
- 280.
Cf., e.g., Edwards And Lewis v. The United Kingdom, 27.10.2004, Applications nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, § 46.
- 281.
Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom, § 61; Moiseyev v Russia, 9.10.2008, Application no 62936/00; Edwards and Lewis v UK; Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 23.04.1997, Applications nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93, § 58. Restricting provisions due to business secrecy protections or other confidential information have also been implemented by some EU legal acts, cf. Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission les in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004. See also Levitt (1997), p. 1424. According to the Directive, moreover, refusals to access to files shall be authorized by a judicial authority if strictly necessary “to safeguard an important public interest, such as in cases where access could prejudice an ongoing investigation or seriously harm the national security of the Member State in which the criminal proceedings are instituted”, see Ciampi (2012), p. 9.
- 282.
Cf. Articles 22 and 32(1) SSM FR.
- 283.
Cf. Caianiello (2019).
- 284.
In this sense, cf. Natunen v Finland, 31.03.2009, Application no. 21022/04, § 43; C.G.P. v The Netherlands (dec), 15.01.1997, Application no. 29835/96.
- 285.
Cf. Article 31(1)-(4)-(5) SSM FR.
- 286.
D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 55.
- 287.
Articles 22(1) and Article 24(7) SSM R.
- 288.
As underlined by D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 59.
- 289.
On the relative character of the right to be heard for the ECHR, see Trechsel (2005), pp. 90–92.
- 290.
Although mainly concerning witnesses, the Court has sometimes traced this guarantee back to evidence in general, interpreting it as a right that no evidence shall be used as the basis for a conviction unless the defendant has had the opportunity to challenge its validity, and comment upon its relevance; see, e.g., Perna v Italy, 6.05.2003, Application no. 48898/99, §§ 25–32. For a detailed case-law analysis of Article 6(3)(d) ECHR, see Trechsel (2005), pp. 292–326; Harris et al. (2014), p. 483 et seq.; Balsamo (2015), pp. 146–151.
- 291.
As it will be argued below, in Sect. 6.3.4.
- 292.
Döry v. Sweden, 12.11.2002, Application no. 28394/95, § 37.
- 293.
Jussila v. Finland, §§ 41–43.
- 294.
Idem, §§ 41–42, 47–48 (tax-surcharge proceedings); Suhadolc v. Slovenia (dec.), 17.05.2011, Application no. 57655/08 (summary procedure for road traffic offences).
- 295.
Cf. above, Sect. 4.4.3.
- 296.
Contrary for instance to what established in competition law, where “The Commission shall give the parties to whom it addresses an SO the opportunity to develop their arguments at an oral hearing if they so request in their reply to the SO (Article 12(1) of Reg. 773/2004)”, cf. European Commission (2012), p. 6/11—Right to be heard (3.1, § 28).
- 297.
Grande Stevens, § 121.
- 298.
Cf., e.g., Riepan v Austria, 14.11.2000, Application no. 35115/97, § 39; cf. below, Sect. 6.3.3.
- 299.
Kamasinski v. Austria, 19.12.1989, Application no. 9783/82, § 79; Pélissier and Sassi v. France, 25.03.1999, Application no. 25444/94, § 51; Mattoccia v. Italy, 25.07.2000, Application no. 23969/94, § 59; Penev v. Bulgaria, 7.01.2010, Application no. 20494/04, §§ 33 and 42. On the critical issues left unsolved by the ECtHR concerning the modalities in which communication of the charges shall be made, see Mosna (2017), p. 960; Quattrocolo (2015), p. 87 et seq.
- 300.
- 301.
Cf. European Commission (2012), pp. 5 and 6/15—Drafting of Statement of Objections (SO) (2.2.2), according to which “The SO must also clearly indicate whether the Commission intends to impose fines (Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003), a periodic penalty payment (Article 24) or other remedies (structural or behavioural), should the objections be upheld, referring to the evidence and facts supporting such measures.16 (16) In case of imposition of fines pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, the SO will refer to the relevant principles laid down in the Guidelines on setting fines […] The Best Practices Notice states that, although under no legal obligation in this respect, the SO will endeavour to include (using information available) further matters relevant to any subsequent calculation of fines, including the relevant sales figures to be taken into account and the year(s) that will be considered for the value of such sales. Such information may also be provided to the parties after the Statement of Objections. In both cases, the parties will be provided with an opportunity to comment”.
- 302.
Cf. above Sect. 6.2.
- 303.
Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, 10.02.1983, Application no. 7299/75; 7496/76, § 29; Segame SA v. France, 7.06.2012, Application no 4837/06, § 55; Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l., § 59; although this argument holds true for Article 6 ECHR also in its civil limb meaning, see Regner v. Czech Republic, 19.09.2017, Application no. 35289/11, §§ 130, 136, 150.
- 304.
Cf., e.g., Riepan v Austria, § 39.
- 305.
Cf., e.g., Albert and Le Compte, § 29; Tsfayo v UK, 14.11.2006, Application no. 60860/00, §§ 42–48; Janosevic v. Sweden, 23.07.2002, Application no. 34619/97, § 81; Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l., § 59. But see also, with specific regard to the banking matter under civil limb, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 24.11.2005, Application no. 49429/99, §§ 98–116, where a violation was found also in the unjustified self-restraint of a Court from exercising full jurisdiction.
- 306.
Cf. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l., §§ 64–67. See also Lamandini et al (2015), p. 92, highlighting how, in that case, “The ECtHR even opened the possibility for due process rights to be calibrated in the context of an administrative procedure with independent authorities”.
- 307.
Chalkor v. Commission, C-386/10 P, § 47; Schindler Holding Ltd and others, § 36.
- 308.
Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v European Commission, Case C-295/12 P, 10.07. 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062, §§ 51-52. Cf. also Jones and Sufrin (2016), p. 898.
- 309.
Cf. also, e.g., Henri de Compte v European Parliament, Case T-26/89, 17.10.1991, ECLI:EU:T:1991:54, § 220 and case-law there mentioned, according to which “The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the appointing authority except in the case of a manifest error or misuse of powers”; Henri de Compte v European Parliament, C-326/91 P, 2.06.1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:218, § 115. With a substantially similar view, on the ECtHR side, the dissenting opinion of Jusdges Villiger, Yudkivska and Pejchal in Delta Pekárny A.S. v Czech Republic, 2.10.2014, Application no. 97/11.
- 310.
Cf., e.g., Chalkor v. Commission, Case C-386/10 P, § 54; KME and Others v. Commission, Case C-272/09, 8.12.2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, § 94; Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, § 59; Telefónica SA, Case C-295/12 P, § 54; Commission v Tetra Laval, Case C-12/03 P, 15.02.2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, § 39. Affirming the relevance of this case-law in the ECB supervisory procedures Ligeti and Robinson (2017), p. 232.
- 311.
- 312.
Cf. Ter Kuile et al. (2015), p. 182 et seq.
- 313.
Cf. above, Sect. 4.4.3. and study there mentioned reporting that this occurs only in very few cases in the Eurozone.
- 314.
Delta Pekárny A.S. v Czech Republic, 2.10.2014, Application no. 97/11, §§ 87–91, concerning on site-inspections in competition law; cf. also Neruda and Barinka (2015), 412. Cf. also Ste Colas Est, 16.04.2002, Application no. 37971/97; Ravon, 21.02.2008, App. no 18497/03; Primagaz, 21.12.2010, Application no. 29613/08; Canal Plus, 21.12.2010, Application no. 29408/08; Vinci Construction and o. v France, 2.04.2015, Application nos. 63629/10 and 60567/10.
- 315.
D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 54.
- 316.
Similarly, in this sense, also the new supervisory powers conferred to ESMA with regard to equity and lending crowdfunding activities, cf. Article 24(9) to (11), Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business, Brussels, 8.3.2018 COM(2018) 113 final. Partially derogating to this approach is instead another case concerning down raids and specifically inspections (Deutsche Bahn AG and o., Case C‑583/13 P, 18.06.2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:404, §§ 34–37). There the CJEU argued that such a review carries out «an in-depth review of the law and of the facts on the basis of the evidence adduced by the applicant», so as to satify both what required by Articles 7 and 8 ECHR, and Article 7 CFREU. The scope of such a review, however, did not extend as to the power to return documents seized in the inspection or order the destruction of unlawfully seized material. Such allocation of competence appears more demanding compared to the aforementioned ECtHR case-law Delta Pekárny, as well as with other CJEU jurisprudence concerning dawn raids; cf. Steene (2016), p. 185 et seq.; Di Federico (2013), p. 31; and Neruda and Barinka (2015), p. 413. Relying more on the margin of appreciation doctrine, cf. e.g. Funke v. France, § 55; Camenzind v Switzerland, 16.12.1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, § 45; Société Colas Est and others v France, 16.04.2002, Application no. 37971/97, §§ 47.
- 317.
In this sense, see Funke v. France, § 55; Camenzind v Switzerland, 16.12.1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, § 45; Société Colas Est and others v France, 16.04.2002, Application no. 37971/97, §§ 47.
- 318.
Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities, Case C-94/00, 22.10.2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, §§ 39–40. Cf. also Lamandini et al (2015), p. 73 et seq.
- 319.
- 320.
- 321.
- 322.
In this sense, see Fernandez-Bollo (2015), p. 143.
- 323.
- 324.
Cf., e.g., Criminal proceedings against Rémy Schmit, Case C-240/95, 27.06.1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:259, § 14; European Commission v Slovak Republic, Case C-433/13, 16.09.2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:602, § 81.
- 325.
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Alpes Provence and Others v European Central Bank, Joined Cases T-133/16 to T-136/16, 24.04.2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:219, §§ 84-88. See Lamandini (2015), p. 130 et seq., according to: “Another possibility would be to read the provisions as meaning that, through the application of the ECB, national law becomes EU law. In such case the CJEU would be entitled to make the authoritative interpretation, and could well answer the preliminary reference without having to make the balancing act of all the superimposed layers of competences. However, this would strain the express language of the provision, which refers to “national law”; it would also put the CJEU in the extremely uncomfortable position of having to determine the authoritative interpretation of domestic law, something that the Court was extremely unlikely to do and careful in avoiding so far”.
- 326.
See also above Sect. 4.4.1.
- 327.
- 328.
Idem.
- 329.
Cf. Article 60(5) ESAs Regulations. Contrary to the ABoR, however, the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal cannot rule on the merit of the assessment, as it may only “confirm the decision taken by the competent body of the Authority, or remit the case to the competent body of the Authority”, cf. Looseveld (2013a), p. 9. See above, Sect. 4.4.3. Cf. also Chirulli and De Lucia (2015).
- 330.
Cf. Article 24(7) SSM R as discussed above in Sect. 4.4.3.
- 331.
The CJEU jurisdiction is also provided for by Article 35 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks. On this point see also Looseveld (2013b), p. 425.
- 332.
Cases identified by Magliari (2015), p. 1371 et seq. In the first case, in fact, a violation of national law would represent a violation of Article 4(3) SSM R, therefore challengeable before the ECJ according to Article 263 TFEU.
- 333.
- 334.
Cf. Article 24(1) let. e), Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement) of 19.02.2013, OJ EPO 2013, 287.
- 335.
Cf. Kornezov (2016), p. 270.
- 336.
- 337.
Cf. International Business Machines Corporation v Commission of the European Communities, Case 60/81, § 10, as discussed above in Sect. 4.4.1.
- 338.
See above, Sect. 6.3.2.
- 339.
Cf., e.g., Regulation 1/2003 in antitrust proceedings, that will be examined at the end of the paragraph. Unlimited jurisdiction for the CJEU may be found also in the Commission’s Proposal to reform the ESAs (Brussels, 20.9.2017 COM(2017) 536 final 2017/0230 (COD) cit., and in Article 33 of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Crowdfunding Service Providers, cit., according to which “The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby ESMA has imposed a fine or a periodic penalty payment or imposed any other sanction or administrative measure in accordance with this Regulation. It may annul, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”.
- 340.
In this sense, it is worth recalling that the 2017 Commission’s Proposal to reform the ESAs (Brussels, 20.9.2017 COM(2017) 536 final 2017/0230 (COD) cit.) provides for an explicit introduction of the clause of CJEU unlimited jurisdiction.
- 341.
D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 74.
- 342.
- 343.
- 344.
Cf. also Article 121 SSM FR, that seems to distinguish the relationship of the SSM FR with Regulation 2532/98 for the purpose of applying sanctions under Article 18(1) and 18(7) SSM R. Cf. also Lamandini et al. (2015), p. 92 highlighting how the ECB did not list among the conflicts between the SSM rules and Reg. 2532/98 the issue of judicial review, see ECB Proposal for amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, OJ C 144/6 15 April 2014.
- 345.
See, e.g., House of Lords (2013), following a first report in 2011 and still maintaining some concerns about the capability of the new structure to deal with its workload. In 2016, the average duration of review proceedings (direct action) was 19.3 months; of appeal proceedings was 12.9 months; of preliminary rulings proceedings was 15 months (2.7 in case of urgent procedures), source: CJEU (2016), p. 100. Questioning the lack of specialisation in the criminal matter within the CJEU, Manacorda (2013), p. 244.
- 346.
See Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of 16.12.2015 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of 6.06.2016 on the transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction at first instance in disputes between the European Union and its servants.
- 347.
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank, Case T-122/15; Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Alpes Provence and Others v European Central Bank, Joined Cases T-133/16 to T-136/16; Crédit mutuel Arkéa v European Central Bank, Case T-52/16, currently appealed before the Court in Crédit Mutuel Arkéa v ECB, Case C-153/18 P, 23.02.2018; Crédit mutuel Arkéa v European Central Bank, Case T-712/15, currently appealed before the Court in Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, Case C-152/18 P, 20.04.2018; and the following pending [information not yet available]: Fursin and Others v ECB, Case T-247/16, Order 12.09.2017, Application of 8.07.2016, ECLI:EU:T:2017:623, currently appealed before the Court in Case C-663/17 P, 24.11.2017 and in case Trasta Komercbanka AS, Ivan Fursin, Igors Buimisters, C & R Invest SIA, Figon Co. Ltd, GCK Holding Netherlands BV, Rikam Holding SA v ECB, Case C-669/17 P, 28.11.2017; Fursin and Others [former Trasta Komercbanka and Others] v ECB, T-247/16 (Application of 08/07/2016) and T-698/16 (Application of 11/11/2016); Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB, Case T-913/16, of 10.02.2017; Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções, Lda and Others v European Central Bank, Case T-22/16, Order of 9.03.2017, Application of 4.03.2016, ECLI:EU:T:2017:172; Berlusconi and Fininvest, Case C-219/17, of 11.08.2017.
- 348.
Cf. ECB, Imposition of administrative penalties on Permanent tsb Group Holdings plc, 13.07.2017 (published in August 2017). https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.170828_publication_template.en.pdf. Accessed 17 July 2018.
- 349.
In particular of Article 99(1)—referring to the own funds requirements of Article 92 CRR; 431 in connection with Article 437; and Article 395, cf. ECB, Imposition of administrative penalties on Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. in liquidazione coatta amministrativa, 24.08.2017 (published in September 2017). https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/shared/pdf/ssm.170911_publication_template.en.pdf. Accessed 17 July 2018.
- 350.
ECB, Press release of 15.09.2017. https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.pr170915.en.html. Accessed 17 July 2018.
- 351.
ECB, Imposition of administrative penalties on Banco de Sabadell, S.A., 14.03.2018 (published in May 2018). https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ssm.pr180508.en.html. Accessed 17 July 2018.
- 352.
For reference and a complete and update list of sanctions imposed, see https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/sanctions/html/index.en.html.
- 353.
Cf., e.g., Telefónica SA, Case C-295/12 P, § 54.
- 354.
Cf. Recital (33) and Article 31, Regulation 1/2003.
- 355.
- 356.
In this sense, it is worth reminding that one of the key issues that brought to the decision of non-compliance of the proceedings before the Commission bancaire with Article 6 ECHR was precisely the absence of full jurisdiction in the judicial review then established for imposed supervisory sanctions, cf. Dubus S.A. v France, §§ 65–71.
- 357.
Directive 2013/48/EU of 22.10.2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, Official Journal of the European Union, L 294/1. Highlighting how the Directive missed an opportunity in not extending its scope also to the administrative punitive matter, in light with the Engel case-law, Centamore (2016), p. 6.
- 358.
Salduz v. Turkey, 27.11.2008, Application no. 36391/02, §§ 53-54; Ibrahim and others v. The UK, 16.12.2014, Applications nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (hereinafter “Ibrahim 2014”), § 192. On this line, Trechsel (2005), p. 245 (calling them “the Technical Aspect” of the right to defence); with regard to the EU legal framework, Mosna (2017), p. 963; Symeonidou-Kastanidou (2015), p. 69; Ðurðević (2016), p. 19 et seq.; Granner and Raschauer (2014), p. 676.
- 359.
Cf., e.g., Salduz v. Turkey, § 50; Öcalan v Turkey, 12.05.2005, Application no. 46221/99, §§ 131-135; Dayanan v Turkey, 13.10.2009, Application no. 7377/03, §§ 30-31; Imbroscia v Switzerland, 24.11.1993, Application no. 13972/88, § 36; Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, § 99; Goddi v Italy, 9.04.1984, Application no. 8966/80, § 31. See also Article 2, Directive 2013/48, and Trechsel (2005), p. 282 et seq.
- 360.
Cf. Artico v Italy, 13.05.1980, Application no. 6694/74, § 33. Sayers (2014), p. 1340 et seq.; Mosna (2017), p. 965; Trechsel (2005), p. 286 which assesses the issue of quality of defence.
The crucial debate about the waivers to the right of legal assistance, both in the ECtHR case-law and in Directive 2013/48/EU of 22.10.2013, on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, which represents a fundamental issue in criminal proceedings, is not analysed in this work, as it does not appear relevant for the SSM sanctioning proceedings; for a recollection of the legal debate on the matter however, see, among others, Tomkin (2014), pp. 1377–1378; Centamore (2016); Mosna (2017), p. 965 et seq. The conditions from which the right to legal assistance attached represent a fundamental critical problem in the definition of this right; however this profile does not raise special problems in the field of banking supervision. For an analysis of the critical issues related to it in criminal proceedings, especially with regard to the suspect’s questioning when the defendant is deprived of its personal freedom, see, among others, Mosna (2017), p. 967 et seq.; Tomkin (2014), pp. 1377–1378; Bubula (2013).
- 361.
- 362.
Cf. Salduz v Turkey, § 50; John Murray v The UK, 28.10.1994, Application no. 18731/91, § 63; for a more recent application, in which the right was limited in the context of anti-terrorism investigations, see Ibrahim 2014, §§191 et seq. Among the many academic comments on the issue see, e.g., Mosna (2017), p. 964; Trechsel (2005), p. 345; Tomkin (2014), pp. 1377–1378. Limitations to the right of access to a lawyer are provided for also by Article 3 of Directive 2013/48. Critical on these provisions Anagnostopoulos (2014), p. 12 et seq.; Symeonidou-Kastanidou (2015), p. 76 et seq.; Mosna (2017), p. 968 et seq.
- 363.
Cf. Article 2(24) SSM FR; see also, however, Lamandini et al (2015), p. 75 et seq.
- 364.
Cf. above, Sect. 4.4.2.
- 365.
- 366.
Cf. Pretto and Others v Italy, 8.12.1983, Application no. 7984/77, § 21.
- 367.
Cf. Articles 24(2) and 126(3) SSM FR. Similarly also in Antitrust proceedings, see European Commission (2012), p. 7/11—Right to be heard (3.2 at 32), according to which “The oral hearing is not public”.
- 368.
See before, Sect. 6.3.3. Cf. also Diennet v France, 26.09.1995, Application no. 18160/91, § 34; Riepan v Austria, § 39.
- 369.
Critical on the reasoning of the ECtHR in defending the value of this rights, Trechsel (2005), p. 121, which underlines that “visitors are the exception, not the rule”, in judicial proceedings, and that the assumption that if the public is represented “this will contribute to the fairness of the proceedings is somewhat naive”.
- 370.
Taking inspiration from the limitations provided for by Articles 8-11 ECHR, see, e.g. Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 4.12.2015, Application no. 47143/06, § 228 et seq.; see also Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, § 86. For a detailed analysis of the ECtHR case-law on the exceptions and limitations to this right, see Trechsel (2005), pp. 129–131; Harris et al. (2014), p. 433 et seq.
- 371.
Such as the safety or privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange of information and opinion in the pursuit of justice, cf. B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, 24.04.2001, Applications nos. 36337/97 and 35974/97, § 37. See also Riepan v Austria, § 27; Krestovskiy v Russia, 28.10.2010, Application no. 14040/03, §24; Sutter v Switzerland, 22.02.1984, Application no. 8209/78, § 26; Jussila v. Finland, §§ 41–43.
- 372.
Belashev v. Russia, 4.12.2008, Application no. 28617/03, § 83; Welke and Białek v. Poland, 1.03.2011, Application no. 15924/05, § 77.
- 373.
Cf., e.g., Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden, 21.02.1990, Application no. 11855/85, § 66; Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland, 24.06.1993, Application no. 14518/89, § 58; Pauger v Austria, 28.05.1997, Application no. 16717/90, § 58.
- 374.
Cf. Trechsel (2005), pp. 121–123.
- 375.
Cf., e.g., Telfner v Austria, 20.03.2001, Application no. 33501/96, § 15; John Murray v. the UK, 08.02.1996, Application no. 18731/91, § 54; Melo Tadeu v Portugal, 23.10.2014, Application no. 27785/10, § 60; Vassilios Stavropoulos v Greece, 27.09.2007, Application no. 35522/04, § 39; Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo, § 77; Poletan e Azirovik v. Macedonia, 12.05.2016, Application nos. 26711/07, 32786/10 e 34278/10, § 64; Grande Stevens, § 159.
- 376.
- 377.
See, among others, Trechsel (2005), p. 166; Nehl (2014), p. 1277 et seq.; Sayers (2014), p. 1303 et seq.; Illuminati (1979), p. 191 et seq.; Chenal and Tamietti (2012), p. 222 et seq.; Balsamo (2015), p. 134 et seq. The inclusion of the privilege within the presumption of innocence is not universally shared in the EU legal context see, e.g., Stumer (2010); Allegrezza (2017), p. 952; Balsamo (2015), pp. 131–134.
- 378.
Cf., e.g., Saunders v the UK, 17.12.1996, Application no. 19187/91, § 68; O’Donnell v the UK, 7.07.2015, Application no. 16667/10, concurring opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, § 3; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, 21.12.2000, Application no. 34720/97, § 40; Quinn v. Ireland, 21.12.2000, Application no. 36887/97, § 40.
- 379.
Cf. Recital (25) and Article 7. For the first general comments on the Directive see, e.g., Sayers (2015); Cras and Erbežnik (2016), p. 25 et seq.; Lamberigts (2016a), p. 36 et seq.; Lamberigts (2016b); Camaldo (2016); Canestrini (2016), p. 2224 et seq.; Lippke (2016). Cf. also Commission Green Paper of 26 April 2006 on the presumption of innocence, COM (2006) 174 final.
- 380.
- 381.
Cf., e.g., Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16.12.1966; Principle 36, of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Article 14: Communication No 770/1997, Gridin v Russian Federation, § 3.5. and 8.3.
- 382.
Cf. Lupária (2017), pp. 919–920.
- 383.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). In a public statement following his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall concluded that with this decision, “the Supreme Court decided the presumption didn’t exist at all”, cf. Goldstein (1979), while traditionally the presumption of innocence was granted a fundamental rule of common law systems (see, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 1970).
- 384.
In this sense, Quintard-Morénas (2010), p. 141 et seq., highlighting how “Thirty years after Bell v. Wolfish, the distinction between accused persons and convicted offenders has become staggeringly blurred in the United States” (p. 147).
- 385.
This is, for instance, as reported by Lupária (2017), p. 919, the case of Germany (Weigend 2014, p. 286 et seq.; Bohlander 2012, p. 21 et seq.), and Belgium (Caterini 2015, p. 24 et seq.; Paulesu 2009, p. 7 et seq.). Similar consideration, although highly debated, has been recognized in Italy too, where Article 27(2) of the Constitution makes explicit reference not to the presumption of innocence but to the right not to be considered guilty until the conviction is definitive (Gialuz 2008, p. 273 et seq.; Dominioni 1991, p. 194 et seq). Supporting the deductibility of the presumption of innocence from Article 27(2) of the Italian Constitution, e.g., Garofoli (1998), p. 1195 et seq.; Illuminati (1979), p. 28 et seq.; Paulesu (2009), p. 57 et seq.; interpreting Article 27(1) more as a mere presumption of no guilt, instead, Amato (1967), p. 379 et seq.; Grevi (1976), p. 39 et seq. For a more neutral, or restrictive interpretation of the principle deductable from the Constitution, see Ferrua (2015), p. 52; Marzaduri (2010), p. 308 et seq.
- 386.
Criminal proceedings against Marcello Costa and Ugo Cifone, Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10, 16.02.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:80, § 86.
- 387.
As explicitly stated also under Article 48 in the Explanation relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit.; see also Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Note from the Praesidium, Brussels, 11.10.2000 (18.10) CHARTE 4473/00 CONVENT 49.
- 388.
For the numerous proposal to amend Article 48 during the negotiations see Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Note from the Praesidium, Brussels, 25.05.2000 CHARTE 4332/00 CONVENT 35, and in particular Amendments no. 164 (Michael O’Kennedy) and no. 167 (Piero Melograni) proposing the following wording “Everyone who has been charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.
- 389.
Hüls v Commission, Case C-199/92, § 150; Montecatini v Commission, Case C-235/92 P, §§ 175–176; Groupe Danone v Commission, Case T-38/02, §§ 215–216; Romana Tabacchi Srl v European Commission, Case T-11/06, §§ 129. See also above, Sect. 6.2.
- 390.
Cf. Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European Union, Case C-266/05 P, 1.02.2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, §§ 92-96, where the applicant indicated a violation of the presumption of innocence in the limitation of his right of access to documents which had led the Council to adopt a series of specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism. The Court declared this ground of appeal inadmissible, and therefore did not ruled on the application of the presumption in the specific case. See also Nehl (2014), p. 1278.
- 391.
Cf. Article 9(1), Regulation No 883/2013, according to which “In its investigations the Office shall seek evidence for and against the person concerned. Investigations shall be conducted objectively and impartially and in accordance with the principle of the presumption of innocence and with the procedural guarantees set out in this Article”.
- 392.
- 393.
The Court has only just recently started to deal with the presumption of innocence ex Article 48 CFREU as such outside the field of competition law, see, e.g., Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, Case C-439/16 PPU, 27.10.2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:818.
- 394.
Cf. Ubertis (2017), p. 227 et seq.
- 395.
Cf., e.g., Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, 6.12.1988, Application no. 10590/83, § 77; Cleve v. Germany, 15.01.2015, Application no. 48144/09, § 52, according to which the principle “in dubio pro reo” “constitutes a specific expression of the presumption of innocence”.
- 396.
Dresdner Bank AG and Others v Commission, Joined cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP, 27.09.2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:271, § 60; see also, among others, Toshiba Corp. v Commission, Case T-104/13, 9.09.2015, ECLI:EU:T:2015:610, § 50; Panasonic e MT Picture Display Co. Ltd v Commission, T-82/13, 9.09.2015, ECLI:EU:T:2015:612, § 7; Telefónica e Telefónica de España v. Commission, Case T-336/07, 29.03.2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172, §§ 67-72 and case-law there mentioned (hereinafter “Telefónica (2012)”); Franchet and Byk v. Commission, Case T-48/05, 8.07.2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257, § 310; Toshiba Corp. v. Commission, Case T-519/09, 21.05.2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:263, § 36. See also Nehl (2014), p. 1284 et seq.; Illuminati (1979), p. 164 et seq.
- 397.
Cf. Trechsel (2005), p. 164 et seq.
- 398.
Cf., e.g., Telfner v Austria, 20.03.2001, Application no. 33501/96, § 15; John Murray v. the UK, 28.10.1994, Application no. 18731/91, § 54; Melo Tadeu v Portugal, 23.10.2014, Application no. 27785/10, § 60; Vassilios Stavropoulos v Greece, 27.09.2007, Application no. 35522/04, § 39; Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo, § 77; Poletan e Azirovik v. Macedonia, 12.05.2016, Application nos. 26711/07, 32786/10 e 34278/10, § 64; Grande Stevens, § 159.
- 399.
Cf., e.g., Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-185/95 P, 17.12.1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, § 58; Telefónica (2012), § 67; GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and o. v Commission of the European Communities and o., Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, 6.10.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, §§ 82–83. For an application of presumption in another field (protection of specimens) see Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach, Case C-344/08, 16.07.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:482, §§ 31–34.
- 400.
- 401.
“1. Member States shall ensure that the burden of proof for establishing the guilt of suspects and accused persons is on the prosecution. This shall be without prejudice to any obligation on the judge or the competent court to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and to the right of the defence to submit evidence in accordance with the applicable national law. 2. Member States shall ensure that any doubt as to the question of guilt is to benefit the suspect or accused person, including where the court assesses whether the person concerned should be acquitted”.
- 402.
Cf. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings, Bruxelles, 27.11.2013 COM(2013) 821 final; see also Presidency note, Brussels, 13538/14, 30.09.2014.
- 403.
Salabiaku v France, 7.10.1988, Application no. 10519/83, § 28. See also Vos v. France, 5.12.2006, Application no. 10039/03; Radio France and others v France, 30.03.2004, Application no. 53984/00, § 24; Pham Hoang v. France, 25.09.1992, Application no. 13191/87, § 36. On this issue, see also Abbadessa (2011), p. 381 et seq; Chiavario (2001), p. 218.
- 404.
Salabiaku v France, § 28. On the point, see also Blum v Austria, 3.02.2005, Application no. 31655/02, § 27; Weh v Austria, 8.04.2004, Application no. 38544/97, § 46; Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 23.02.2016, Application nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, § 98; Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, 23.07.2002, Application no. 36985/97, § 113; Phillips v UK, 5.07.2001, Application no. 41087/98, § 40, and, among legal scholars, Castillo De La Torre (2009), p. 513; Abbadessa (2011), p. 381 et seq.; Caterini (2015), p. 36 et seq.
- 405.
Cf., e.g., Elf Aquitaine SA v European Commission, Case C-521/09 P, 29.09.2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:620, § 62, (with reference to Spector, § 43–44).
- 406.
Cf., e.g., ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs NV and others v. Commission, Joined cases T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 e T-154/07, 13.07.2011, ECLI:EU:T:2011:364, § 114; Spector, § 44; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 4.06.2009, in TMobile Netherlands and o., Case C-8/08, 4.06.2009, ECLI:EU:C: 2009:343, § 93.
- 407.
See, among others, the possibility to deduce anti-competitive consent from the participation in a cartel meeting (e.g. Commission of the European Communities v Anic Partecipazioni SpA, Case C-49/92 P, 8.07.1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, §§ 83-87); the existence of dominant position in market share above 50% (e.g. AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-62/86, 3.07.1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, § 60), or the control over subsidiary on the market from the 100% ownership of its parent company (e.g. Akzo Nobel NV and Others v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-97/08 P, 10.09.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:536, §§ 60–63; see also Bronckers and Vallery (2011), pp. 547–557. For more cases, see Nehl (2014), pp. 1285–1286.
- 408.
The provision appears in line with point 2.3 of the Green paper on the presumption of innocence.
- 409.
Cf. Recitals (16) to (19) Directive 2016/343. Among legal scholars, see e.g. Lamberigts (2016b); Lupária (2017), pp. 927–936; Trechsel (2005), p. 164; Ubertis (2017), p. 232 et seq. A main field of application of these rules in criminal proceedings concerns the delicate issue of pre-trial measures, which however is not relevant to sanctioning proceedings carried out in banking supervision, cf. especially requiring to treat inmates awaiting for trial, or whose sentence is not final yet, differently from convicted ones, for instance establishing different rules and spaces in the detention structures, see e.g., Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16.12.1966; Green paper on the presumption of innocence, § 2 and 2.2; Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention (COM (2011) 327 def.), § 4; Resolution of the European Parliament of 15 December 2011 on detention conditions in the EU 2011/2897/RSP. In this sense, also Fahas v Council, Case T-49/07, 7.12.2010, ECLI:EU:T:2010:499, § 64; El Morabit v Council, Joined cases T-37/07 and T-323/07, 2.09.2009, ECLI:EU:T:2009:296, § 40. Contra, in these terms, Trechsel (2005), p. 181 et seq., ECtHR, Peers v. Greece, 19.04.2001, Application no. 28524/95, § 78; Jiga v. Romania, 16.03.2010, Application no. 14352/04, § 100, although “il convient toutefois de s’assurer que les mesures prises à l’égard des détenus à titre provisoire ne sont pas de nature à porter atteinte au principe de la présomption d’innocence”; Iwańczuk v. Poland, 15.11.2001, Application no. 25196/94, § 53. Another important application of the presumption in this field concerns the prohibition to keep the defendant with handcuffs or jail uniform during the trial hearing cf., e.g., ECtHR, Jiga v. Romania, § 103, and Samoilă and Cionca v. Romania, 4.03.2008, Application no. 33065/03, §§ 98-101. See also Article 5(1) and Recitals (20)-(21) Directive 2016/343.
- 410.
Cf. CoE Recommendation Rec (2003) 13 on the Provision of Information through the Media, Principles 1 and 2; Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11.07.2002.
- 411.
Konstas v Greece, 24.05.2011, Application no. 53466/07, § 32; Pandy v. Belgium, 21.09.2006, Application no. 13583/02, § 43; Karaman v. Germany, 27.02.2014, Application no. 17103/10, § 63; Poncelet v. Belgium, 30.03.2010, Application no. 44418/07, § 51; Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10.02.1995, Application no. 15175/89, § 35; Minelli v Switzerland, 25.03.1983, Application no. 8660/79, § 37. Daktaras v. Lithuania, 10.10.2000, Application no. 42095/98, § 43; Konstas v Greece, § 33; Adolf v. Austria, 26.03.1982, Application no. 8269/78, §§ 36–41.
- 412.
In this sense, Illuminati (1991), p. 22 et seq. On the topic, see also Paulesu (2009), p. 82 et seq. El Kaada v. Germany, 12.11.2015, Application no. 2130/10, § 54; Iwańczuk v. Poland, § 53; Sekanina v. Austria, 25 August 1993, Application no. 13126/87, § 30; Rushiti v. Austria, 21.03.2000, Appication no. 28389/95, § 31.
- 413.
See, Trechsel (2005), p. 163 et seq., and, e.g., Konstas v. Greece, § 36; Perica Oreb v. Croatia, 31.10.2013, Application no. 20824/09, § 146; Iwańczuk v. Poland, § 53.
- 414.
Konstas v. Greece, § 34; Peša v. Croatia, 8.04.2010, Application no. 40523/08, § 139.
- 415.
ECtHR, Y.B. and others v. Turkey, 28.10.2004, Application nos. 48173/99 and 48319/99, § 48; Allenet de Ribemont v. France, § 38; ECJ, Franchet and Byk v. Commission, § 212. See also Recommendation Rec (2003) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings.
- 416.
Recital (17) of the Directive indicates ‘public statements made by public authorities’ should be understood broadly as covering all authorities involved in criminal proceedings, such as “judicial authorities, police and other law enforcement authorities, […] ministers and other public officials”.
- 417.
For the most recent cases, see the already mentioned Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, Case C-439/16 PPU, which however was issued after the approval of the Directive but before the expiration of the deadline for the transposition at national level.
- 418.
Cf. Nehl (2014), p. 1283 et seq. See, e.g., Franchet and Byk v. Commission, § 210; Nanopoulos v. Commission, Case F-30/08, 11.05.2010, ECLI:EU:F:2010:43, § 185; Nikolaou v. European Court of Auditors, Case C-220/13 P, 10.07.2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2057, § 34 et seq.
- 419.
- 420.
Cf., e.g., Hüls v Commission, Case C-199/92, § 150; JFE Engineering and others v Commission, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, 8.07.2004, ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, § 178; Sumitomo Chemical and Sumika Fine Chemicals v Commission, Joined cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P, 25.01.2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:52, §§ 104–105; BASF v Commission, Case T-15/02, 15.03.2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:74, § 604.
- 421.
Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, Case T-474/04, 12.10.2007, ECLI:EU:T:2007:306, §§ 75–77 and 80. See also Volkswagen AG v Commission, Case T-62/98, 6.07.2000, ECLI:EU:T:2000:180, § 281.
- 422.
Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-48/05, 8.07.2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257, § 215.
- 423.
See, e.g., Grevi (1972), pp. 2–4, and 47 et seq.; Illuminati (1979), p. 193. Contra Trechsel (2005), p. 342, according to which these two guarantees “must be seen as being represented by two partly overlapping circles”. However, differentiating in fact the scopes of the two expressions according to their reference to verbal or non-verbal expressions (such as documents), or on the fact that they cover all statements, or only those detrimental to the person concerned, seems a classification hardly applicable into practice, and a solution leaving the way open to possible restriction to the safeguarding impact of the principle. See e.g., Saunders v the UK, § 71: “the right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incriminating. Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature-such as exculpatory remarks or mere information on questions of fact-may later be deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility. Where the credibility of an accused must be assessed by a jury the use of such testimony may be especially harmful”.
- 424.
See, e.g., Illuminati (1979), p. 192.
- 425.
Cf. also Article 3(1) let. e), and Article 4(2), Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, to which Recital (32) of Directive 2016/343 refers to (directly to Article 4, indirectly to Article 3). Critical on this inclusion, since “it is not easy to imagine a case which could give the Court in Strasbourg the opportunity to find a violation of the right to a fair trial due to the absence of a proper warning”, Trechsel (2005), p. 352.
- 426.
Ibrahim 2016, § 266; see also Gäfgen v. Germany, 1.06.2010, Application no. 22978/05, § 168; John Murray v The UK, § 45; Jalloh v. Germany, 11.07.2006, Application no. 54810/00, § 100; and Bykov v Russia, 10.03.2009, Application no. 4378/02, § 92.
- 427.
Saunders v the UK, § 71; O’Donnell v the UK, concurring opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, § 3; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, § 40; Quinn v. Ireland, § 40.
- 428.
Cf. Recital (1), Directive 2016/343.
- 429.
- 430.
See, e.g., Ibrahim and others v. The UK, 13.09.2016, Applications nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 (hereinafter “Ibrahim 2016”), § 249.
- 431.
- 432.
- 433.
Cf., recently, Eturas and others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, Case C-74/14, 21.01.2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, § 38.
- 434.
During the negotiations, the European Parliament tried to broaden the scope of the Directive also to include legal persons, but the attempt failed, see Amendments no. 9, 10, 39, in European Parliament, I Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings (COM(2013)0821—C7-0427/2013—2013/0407(COD)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur: Nathalie Griesbeck), A8-0133/2015, 20 April 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2015-0133+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. Accessed 20 July 2018.
- 435.
- 436.
“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”.
- 437.
Resolution of the Council of 30.11.2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings (better known as the “Stockholm Programme”), O.J. C 295, 4.12.2009, p. 1; on the point see Lamberigts (2016a), p. 36. On a general brief recollection of the measures derived from the Programme see Sayers (2014), pp. 1311–1312.
- 438.
Cf. Eturas and others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, Case C-74/14.
- 439.
Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04 P, 29.06.2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:432, § 402; Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, Case T-112/98, 20.02.2001, ECLI:EU:T:2001:61, §§ 66 and 67. See also Nehl (2014), p. 1293.
- 440.
Jones (2012), pp. 301–331.
- 441.
See above, Sect. 6.2. Of this opinion, for instance, Nehl (2014), p. 1294 according to which the Court of Justice could even adopt a higher standard of protection, “as long as the ECtHR does not expressly extend the scope of protection under Article 6 of the ECHR to legal persons in competition proceedings”.
- 442.
Lamberigts (2016a), p. 37.
- 443.
Cf. Sect. 2.2.
- 444.
Cf. Article 2, Directive 2017/1371 (“PIF”).
- 445.
Article 8, Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions for market abuse, and Article 3(1), no. 13, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
- 446.
Lamberigts (2016a), p. 40, who notices also that none of the really critical profiles concerning the application of the right to remain silent to legal persons is addressed by the Directive, such as “the definition of persons who may exercise this right on behalf of the legal person. Is it limited to a very select group of employees or officials of the legal person, or can it be invoked on behalf of the legal person by a broad circle of individuals? Member States could have answered this question restrictively, thereby limiting the impact of the Directive in practice”.
- 447.
“Not only the ECtHR’s case law on the issue of documentary evidence, but also its case law on the right to silence in general is at times confusing”, Lamberigts (2016a), p. 39.
- 448.
Funke v France, 25.02.1993, Application no. 10828/84, § 44 “The Court notes that the customs secured Mr Funke’s conviction in order to obtain certain documents which they believed must exist, although they were not certain of the fact. Being unable or unwilling to procure them by some other means, they attempted to compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence of offences he had allegedly committed. The special features of customs law (see paragraphs 30–31 above) cannot justify such an infringement of the right of anyone “charged with a criminal offence”, within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6 (art. 6), to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating himself. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)”.
- 449.
Saunders v the UK, § 69; cf. Veenbrink (2015), p. 125 et seq.
- 450.
- 451.
J.B. v Switzerland, 3.05.2001, Application no. 31827/96, § 68.
- 452.
Jalloh v Germany, 11.07.2006, Application no. 54810/00, § 110.
- 453.
Chambaz v Switzerland, 5.04.2012, Application no. 11663/04, §§ 50-58, and in particular § 54 and 58: “La Cour observe, par ailleurs, que le requérant ne pouvait exclure que toute information relative à des revenus supplémentaires de sources non imposées l’exposait à être accusé d’avoir commis l’infraction de soustraction d’impôt (J.B. c. Suisse, précité, § 65) et était de nature à compromettre sa position dans l’enquête pour soustraction d’impôts […] Ces éléments suffisent à la Cour pour conclure que le droit de ne pas être contraint de s’incriminer soi-même, tel que garanti par l’article 6 § 1 de la Convention, a été violé en l’espèce”.
- 454.
Trechsel (2005), p. 354.
- 455.
Along the same line, overseas, SEC (2017), p. 73.
- 456.
Cf., e.g., John Murray v the UK, § 47; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, § 47; Weh v. Austria, 8.04.2004, Application no. 38544/97, § 46; O’Halloran and Francis v The UK, 29.06.2007, Applications nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, § 53; Adetoro v. the UK, 20.04.2010, Application no. 46834/06, § 47; O’Donnell v. the UK, § 48.
- 457.
See, e.g., Jalloh v Germany, §§ 97, 101 and 117.
- 458.
Cf., e.g., Marttinen v Finland, 21.04.2009, Application no. 19235/03, § 75; more recently see Ibrahim 2016, §§ 298-300, where the qualification of the offence as terrorism had indeed a relevant weight in the assessment of the Court.
- 459.
- 460.
As it not necessarily derives only by the use of physical force, cf. an oath to tell the truth (Brusco v. France, 14.10.2010, Application no. 1466/07); a rule permitting to draw adverse inferences from the exercise of the right to remain silent (Condron v the UK, 2.05.2000, Application no. 35718/97), or the use of an undercover agent (Allan v. the United Kingdom, 5.11.2002, Application no. 48539/99).
- 461.
The criteria have been summarized in Ibrahim 2016, § 274.
- 462.
Jalloh v Germany.
- 463.
Cf. Ibrahim 2016, § 267.
- 464.
See, for example, Saunders; Brusco v. France; Heaney and McGuinness.; Weh v. Austria.
- 465.
See, e.g., Jalloh v. Germany; Magee v The UK, 9.06.2000, Application no. 28135/95; and Gäfgen v. Germany, 1.06.2010, Application no. 22978/05.
- 466.
See Allan v. the UK.
- 467.
Cf., e.g., Saunders v The UK, § 65; Heaney and McGuinness, §§ 48–49; Brusco v. France, § 54.
- 468.
Sanders v The UK, §§ 71 and 74.
- 469.
On this point see also Lamberigts (2016a), p. 37.
- 470.
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) and others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, 15.10.2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, §§ 274 and 279.
- 471.
Société Générale v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-34/93, 8.03.1995, ECLI:EU:T:1995:46, §§ 74-76. See also Orkem v Commission, § 35 “Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove” (quoted also in the Green paper on the presumption of innocence, § 2.5); Solvay v Commission, Case 27/88, 18.10.1989, ECR 3355, summary publication; Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, Case T-112/98, § 66; Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01, 29.04.2004, ECLI:EU:T:2004:118, §§ 402-406; Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04 P, §§ 35-49; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) and others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases C-238/99 P, § 274; Dalmine SPA v. Commission, Case C-407/04 P, 25.01.2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:53, § 34. For a comparative analysis of the privilege in competition law, see Veenbrink (2015), p. 133 et seq.
- 472.
Cf. John Murray, § 47; O’Halloran and Francis, § 55; Bykov, § 104.
- 473.
Société Générale, § 75; cf. also Amann & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG and Cousin Filterie SAS v European Commission, Case T-446/05, 28.04.2010, ECLI:EU:T:2010:165, § 328 “the mere fact of being obliged to answer purely factual questions put by the Commission and to comply with its request for the production of documents already in existence cannot constitute a breach of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence or impair the right to fair legal process, which offer, in the specific field of competition law, protection equivalent to that guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR. There is nothing to prevent the addressee of a request for information from showing, whether later during the administrative procedure or in proceedings before the Community judicature, when exercising its rights of defence, that the facts set out in its replies or the documents produced by it have a different meaning from that ascribed to them by the Commission”.
- 474.
- 475.
Schenk v. Switzerland, 12.07.1998, Application no. 10862/84, §§ 50-51; see also Trechsel (2005), p. 162 et seq.
- 476.
With some few exceptions, see e.g. Telfner v Austria, § 17, where the Court considered “that the drawing of inferences from an accused’s silence may also be permissible in a system like the Austrian one where the courts freely evaluate the evidence before them, provided that the evidence adduced is such that the only common-sense inference to be drawn from the accused’s silence is that he had no answer to the case against him”.
- 477.
John Murray v the UK, § 47; Averill v. The UK, 6.06.2000, Application no. 36408/97, § 44.
- 478.
Gäfgen v. Germany, § 168. As recently reaffirmed in Ibrahim 2016, § 254 “As the Court has explained on numerous occasions, it is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence, including evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law, may be admissible. As explained above (see paragraph 250), the question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair […] However, an exception to this approach applies in the case of confessions obtained as a result of torture or of other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3”.
- 479.
Cf. with regard to Directive 2016/343, Lamberigts (2016a), p. 39. In general terms on the issue see, e.g., Illuminati (1979), p. 5; Amodio (1974); Pulitanò (1999). The dependence of other fair trial rights upon the correct exercise of the right to remain silent, in connection with the access to a lawyer, although without getting to the creation of exclusionary rules, has been recognized also by the same ECtHR in John Murray, § 66, according to which “at the beginning of police interrogation, an accused is confronted with a fundamental dilemma relating to his defence. If he chooses to remain silent, adverse inferences may be drawn against him in accordance with the provisions of the Order. On the other hand, if the accused opts to break his silence during the course of interrogation, he runs the risk of prejudicing his defence without necessarily removing the possibility of inferences being drawn against him. Under such conditions the concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 (art. 6) requires that the accused has the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. To deny access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of police questioning, in a situation where the rights of the defence may well be irretrievably prejudiced, is - whatever the justification for such denial - incompatible with the rights of the accused under Article 6”.
- 480.
As well as in all procedural Directives, due to their compromised origin, in this sense see Caianiello (2014b), p. 317 et seq.; Allegrezza (2017), pp. 970–971, which reminds that the process of EU integration has always developed with small steps, and that much of the effectiveness of the recent European rules will depend on their correct implementation at the national level, and on the will of the Court of Justice in providing a safeguarding interpretation of the texts of the directives.
- 481.
Cf. Article 7, Directive 2016/343 with Article 4, European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, cit.
- 482.
Lamberigts (2016a), p. 38.
- 483.
The fact that silent might represent an evidence, is also confirmed by Article 7(4) of the Directive, according to which “when sentencing, cooperative behaviour of suspects and accused persons” may be taken into account by judicial authorities, therefore seeming to imply, a contrario, that silent may have detrimental effects on the defendant. Lamberigts (2016a), p. 38; Mazza (2014), p. 1407
- 484.
Article 10 SSM R. For a complete illustration of the SSM investigative powers mentioned here, cf. above, Sect. 4.4.3.
- 485.
Article 11(1) (c)-(d) SSM R.
- 486.
Article 28(3) and Article 29(2) SSM FR.
- 487.
Article 10(1)-(2) SSM R.
- 488.
As it is the case in several Member States, cf. Lasagni and Rodopoulos (2019).
- 489.
Such as in Italy, cf. Article 7(1)(2) of Legislative Decree no. 385, of 1.09.1993 (TUB).
- 490.
Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04 P, § 402; Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, Case T-112/98, §§ 66-67. Cf. also Nehl (2014), p. 1293.
- 491.
Affirming that competition law represents a “privileged field” for reconstructing the framework of defence safeguards in the EU, Allegrezza (2017), p. 953.
- 492.
- 493.
Cf. above Sect. 6.3.
- 494.
Cf. Jones (2012).
- 495.
See above, Sect. 6.2, e.g., Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, § 44; Zegwaard & Segwaard B.V. v the Netherlands, 9.09.1998, Application no. 26493/95, §§ 34–51. The need for such a non-discriminatory approach also within the EU will certainly be accelerated in case the Union would finally access the European Convention, under which no apparent distinction is made between legal and natural persons, a process which, after the stop of the ECJ in 2012, might still be resumed.
- 496.
The differentiation between “quantitative” and “qualitative” requirements is used here only to understand the practical impact of the provisions under analysis, but it does not find a specific recognition in CRR or CRD IV.
- 497.
Cf. above Sect. 6.2.
- 498.
- 499.
Cf. WebMindLicence, Case C-419/14, §§ 75 and 82.
- 500.
See Tesoriero (2016), p. 1540.
- 501.
Cf. above, Sect. 6.1.3.
- 502.
Cf. above, Sect. 6.1.3.
- 503.
According to which in the right to good administration is included “the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy”.
- 504.
Since AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, Case 155/79, 18.05.1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:157, § 18 et seq. especially § 23.
- 505.
Cf. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd, Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission, Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Association européenne des juristes d’entreprise (AEJE), American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA), Case C-550/07 P, 14.09. 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:512, § 44.
- 506.
Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (x).
- 507.
In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 471 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Subpoena Served Upon Comptroller of Currency & Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Circ. 1992).
- 508.
Cf. Lambrakopoulos et al. (2017), p. 6 and 14 et seq.
- 509.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981).
- 510.
Cf. Lambrakopoulos et al. (2017), p. 9 et seq.
- 511.
Under the Article 8 ECHR, see, e.g., Brito Ferrinho Bexiga Villa-Nova v. Portugal, 1.12.2015, Application no. 69436/10, § 59; Niemietz v. Germany, §§ 30–33; André and Another v. France, 24.07.2008, Application no. 18603/03, § 41; Xavier Da Silveira v. France, 21.01.2010, Application no. 43757/05, §§ 37, 42 and 48 (requiring “special procedural guarantees”, and the possibility for the lawyer to have access to “effective scrutiny” to contest them). The issue has been pointed out by Allegrezza and Voordeckers (2015), p. 154. See also Nehl (2014), p. 1301.
- 512.
Cf. Ibrahim and others v. The UK, 16.12.2014, Applications nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09.
- 513.
Ibrahim 2016, § 271-273; Serves v France, 20.10.1997, 82/1996/671/893, § 42.
- 514.
Cf. Article 9, Regulation No 883/2013. Interestingly, this provision applies also when the person has given his or her consent to be interviewed, as interviews carried out by OLAF are voluntary (at least for external investigations, while for internal investigations this provision shall be interpreted also taking into account Article 16 of the OLAF Guidelines on Investigation Procedures for OLAF Staff (1 October 2013) according to which “officials or other servants should also be informed that they have a duty to cooperate with the OLAF investigation”. Cf. also Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF staff, referring to the leaflet wito be given to the investigated subject containing reference to his/her rights.
- 515.
- 516.
Cf. Article 3, Directive 2012/13/EU.
- 517.
- 518.
- 519.
Cf. Sect. 2.2. Another relevant profile, which goes beyond the remit of this work, as it may represent the subject of a whole separate analysis, could concern the potential implications of ne bis in idem in the application of supervisory punitive sanctions and precautionary punitive measures applied either by national judicial authorities or by national administrative authorities (if considered to be falling under Article 6 ECHR).
- 520.
Under this perspective, some author has affirmed that the role of supremacy of the EU law as established in Walt Wilhelm will apply, cf. Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt, C-14-68, 13.02.1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, in D’Ambrosio (2013), p. 81. A provision explicitly requiring to “shall refrain from imposing fines or periodic penalty payments where a prior acquittal or conviction arising from identical fact or facts which are substantially the same has already acquired the force of res judicata as the result of criminal proceedings under national law” has been explicitly introduced with regard to ESMA sanctioning powers in crowdfunding services by Article 31(11) of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Crowdfunding Service Providers, cit.
- 521.
See also D’Ambrosio (2017), pp. 1037–1038, underlying how the SSM Regulation does not provide for any safeguard clause to reduce the amount of the sanctions potentially imposable in light of the proportionality principle.
- 522.
Cf. Lasagni and Rodopoulos (2019).
- 523.
- 524.
The reference goes here to Article 23-sexies, § 8, Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of 11.05. 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, and to Article 6, Council Regulation (Ec, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18.12.1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests. Cf. on this issue, D’Ambrosio (2017), pp. 1038–1039; Tomkin (2014), pp. 1377–1378.
- 525.
Cf. Sect. 2.2.
- 526.
Cf. above, Sect. 6.2.
- 527.
Cf., e.g., Van Bockel (2015), p. 114, highlighting how “the concurrence of the withdrawal of a license and the imposition of a fine is not necessarily problematic as long as the withdrawal of the license (and therefore not the imposition of a fine, due to its necessarily punitive nature) forms the immediate and foreseeable consequence of a decision sanctioning certain conduct”.
- 528.
- 529.
Van Bockel (2015), p. 114.
- 530.
Van Bockel (2015), p. 120; see also p. 104, where the author concludes that “the SSMR appears rather ‘ne bis in idem proof’ compared to competition law as far as the penalties of Article 18(1) are concerned”.
- 531.
Cf. Lamandini et al (2015), p. 98, according to whom “The risk of falling within the ne bis in idem principle, however, can be further mitigated through the development not only of a coordinated investigatory practice, but also the coordinated imposition of penalties.”
- 532.
This hypothesis related to the NCAs is of course subject to the recognition of a criminal nature also to the penalties provided by the specific national law, applicable under Article 18(5) SSM R.
- 533.
Directive 2014/59/EU of 15.05.2014, cit.
- 534.
In this sense see, e.g., Van Bockel (2015), p. 120.
- 535.
E.g., A and B v Norway, § 132. On the proportionality principle, cf. Caianiello (2014a), p. 143.
- 536.
In this sense, see Van Bockel (2015), p. 109.
- 537.
See, e.g., Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15-74, 31.10.1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:114, § 41; Corinne Bodson v SA Pompes funèbres des régions libérées, Case 30/87, 4.05.1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225, § 39.
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Lasagni, G. (2019). The Hybrid Nature of Banking Supervision. In: Banking Supervision and Criminal Investigation. Comparative, European and International Criminal Justice, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12161-7_6
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