Abstract
To date special interest legislation (SIL) is terra incognita to European legisprudence. While Public Choice Theory and North American studies of Law and Economics are largely recognized, their impact on the theory of legislation is very limited. In this chapter, I will argue in favour of an unbiased analysis of the input and output of legislation in terms of competing societal and economic interests and work towards establishing the legal foundations as well as the limitations to special interests in legislation. Critical attention for the issue of SIL does not necessarily stem from a populist bias. More on the converse, it is consistent with contemporary pluralism. Thus, opponents of SIL do not originate exclusively from the circles of believers in the neutral role of the state, but also from the neoliberal critics of the welfare state who emphasise the inseparable relationship between state intervention and vested interests. In the second part of my paper, I will suggest constitutional law arguments in defence of the articulation of interests on the one hand and constitutional law criteria setting limits to SIL on the other. Although there is no explicit ban on SIL, limitations arise from the restrictions on special, individualised legislation and the prohibition of arbitrary action. Moreover, the principles of proportionality and coherence contribute to a rationality control of legislation, which can help to reveal detrimental effects of special interest influence. Another focal point will be the relationship between state aid law and SIL. While substantive criteria are a way of combating excess, supplementary procedural provisions are in place to prevent legislative capture and dispel fears of post-democracy.
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Notes
- 1.
OECD (2012, p. 18).
- 2.
The US legislative package of 2007 bears the name “The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act” (121 Stat. 735).
- 3.
De Civitate Dei, IV.4.
- 4.
Krueger (1974, p. 302).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Even a praiseworthy recent handbook on legislation is almost silent on lobbyism and SIL, see Karpen and Xanthaki (2017). Some valuable, though short, remarks can be found in the contributions of Patricia Popelier, Wim Voermans and Felix Uhlmann.
- 8.
Definitions of lobbyism differ, but do not vary too strongly, cf. OECD (2012, pp. 22–26).
- 9.
Huefner (2017, p. 129).
- 10.
On Brussels see https://transparency.eu/lobbyistsinbrussels; on Berlin see https://www.lobbycontrol.de/wp-content/uploads/lobbyreport-lc-2017-web-1.pdf (both last accessed 3 January 2018).
- 11.
Even in the reputable newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung a recent headline (March 8, 2018) reads: “Lobbyisten öffnen Kleptomanen die Tür zum Weissen Haus” (Lobbyists open kleptomaniacs the door to the White House).
- 12.
See, most recently, Huefner (2017), dedicating almost 100 pages out of 573 to lobbying and related topics.
- 13.
Gay (2016, p. 162).
- 14.
- 15.
See, in detail, on regulatory capture Carpenter and Moss (2014a). The editors define regulatory capture as the following (p. 13): “Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” Although their focus is on agency regulation, which is even more prone to capture than legislation, many findings are applicable to legislative capture as well.
- 16.
Denzau and Munger (1986, p. 96).
- 17.
Both quotations are a century apart.
- 18.
- 19.
The empirical performance, however, is debated, see Farber and Frickey (1986/87, p. 895).
- 20.
The rational man of economic theory.
- 21.
This is especially the case because they are intensely interested and small, and thus suffer less from the free-rider problem. Another reason is rational ignorance of voters. On this topic see, among others, Denzau and Munger (1986, p. 99 ff.) with further references.
- 22.
- 23.
See Elhauge (1991/1992, pp. 101–109).
- 24.
See on games theory and contract theories of legislation, Nourse (2016, pp. 53–62).
- 25.
It is enough to compare the abundant American literature with the sizeable German literature.
- 26.
See Lege (1998) on Peirce. In Germany, the school of thought established by Rudolf von Ihering in the late nineteenth century emphasising the importance of interest conflicts and the struggle over rights (“Der Kampf ums Recht”) and so-called “Interessenjurisprudenz” could not prevail against positivism.
- 27.
- 28.
See, among others, Karpen (2009, pp. 108–110).
- 29.
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10: “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
Up until the 1990s it appears to be overriding. See Rubin (1975, p. 79).
- 34.
Farber and Frickey (1986/87, p. 875).
- 35.
- 36.
Rubin (2001), Kalt and Zupan (1990), Kalt and Zupan (1984), McArthur and Marks (1988), and Farber and Frickey (1986/87, pp. 897–901). It should be noted that whilst differing in some minor points this approach does not deviate fundamentally from the economic theory of policy. Although it rejects the view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers, it submits the role of ideology in political decision-making to economic analysis.
- 37.
German politics provides a wide range of examples.
- 38.
Surowiecky (2004, p. 268).
- 39.
Tullock (2008).
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
Kalt and Zupan (1984, p. 281).
- 43.
OECD (2012, p. 102).
- 44.
On the dichotomy ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ lobbying OECD (2012, pp. 27–29).
- 45.
In this respect, the Swiss, in particular, take a neutral stand, judging from the news in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the Grand Old Lady of Swiss liberal press, and contributions to legal theory and political science from Switzerland. This relaxed attitude may be explained by virtue of the unique system of direct democracy.
- 46.
This applies in particular to the Renewable Energy Resources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz—EEG) covering more than 100 pages of text, which contains dozens of extremely detailed regulations that primarily serve to organize financial flows. Further regulations can be found in statutory ordinances based on EEG.
- 47.
- 48.
As Carpenter and Moss (2014b, p. 16) state, “capture … can drive deregulation as readily as it drives regulation”.
- 49.
Huefner (2017, pp. 37–39).
- 50.
Therefore, there is no equation of motives and reasons. Special interest theories deal with the motives and effects of legislation. They thus adopt an empirical approach. Motives and reasons are clearly not the same thing, cf. Gert (1998) and Weinberger (1991). This report deals with normative reasons in legal terms (not as an issue of normative ethics) in its second part.
- 51.
Rawls’ influential theory of justice responds inter alia to the problem that wealthy groups are, in general, in a position to influence legislation and policies that advance their interests. See Rawls (2001, pp. 148–150).
- 52.
Xanthaki (2017, p. 279).
- 53.
Illegal behaviour, however, does not characterise lobbyism. “In fact, if regulatory capture were due solely to illegal behaviour, it would be simpler to fight” (Zingales 2014, p. 124).
- 54.
See, among others, Sunstein (1985, pp. 31–35).
- 55.
See as an exception Akkermans (1996, p. 306).
- 56.
See, on the link between privatisation and the growth of the lobbying industry, Gay (2016, p. 164). Carpenter and Moss (2014b, p. 10) point to the role of the World Bank: “Djankov and his World Bank colleagues established a highly structured, Bank-funded deregulatory initiative that recommended and tracked reforms worldwide with the intent of easing barriers to the creation or launch of a new business.”
- 57.
An overview of neoliberalism can be found in Steger and Roy (2016).
- 58.
I refer to the former EU Commissioner Mr. Bangemann who afterwards joined Spanish Telefonica.
- 59.
See, e.g., Nourse (2016, p. 28).
- 60.
Lobbyist information differs from knowledge sharing by its strategic use and selectivity. For the sake of continuous cooperation lobbyists, however, may be well advised to present reliable information.
- 61.
- 62.
I borrow this metaphor from Schulze-Fielitz (1993).
- 63.
For references, see Meßerschmidt (2015, pp. 61–63).
- 64.
Mr. Riester, a former trade union leader, initiated in 2000/2001 as Minister of Labor an additional capital-based pension provision. After the end of his term, he worked for the financial industry and lectured on the Riester pension. See https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Walter_Riester (last accessed 4 February 2018).
- 65.
- 66.
Huefner (2017, p. 71). The latter is also known as “grassroots lobbying”.
- 67.
Another example provides US hedge funds Cerberus known for its aggressive business practices by recruiting former German Ministers of Defence Rühe and Scharping as advisors. See https://www.cicero.de/wirtschaft/die-helfer-der-heuschrecken/38163 (last accessed 3 March 2018).
- 68.
See Bennett (2002, p. 44). In Germany Bertelsmann-Stiftung plays a major role in setting the political agenda. For further information see https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Bertelsmann_Stiftung (last accessed 4 February 2018).
- 69.
- 70.
Vorwerk (2008).
- 71.
In the same vein, Lord Wallace remarked “that a lot of those consulted regard themselves as a legitimate part of the political process but regard everyone else as lobbyists” (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, Introducing a Statutory Register of Lobbyists [HC 2012–13, 153]).
- 72.
On the lobbying versus advocacy debate see, e.g., the Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series published by Palgrave and www.cltnetwork.org/wp.../Advocacy-vs-Lobbying-1-28-14-final.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2018). I have supplemented this clarification in response to an interesting discussion at the Conference on Legisprudence held in Zaragoza (Faculty of Law) on 22/24 February 2018.
- 73.
See, e.g., Héritier (1999).
- 74.
- 75.
This is true both of nature conservation associations that support the expansion of wind energy and, e.g., the advocacy group “Deutsche Umwelthilfe” which successfully fights against the Diesel engine being sponsored by Toyota and the German government. See http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/diesel-affaere/deutsche-umwelthilfe-bekommt-geld-von-toyota-14256098.html (last accessed 3 March 2018).
- 76.
- 77.
See on the ‘cash for access’ scandal www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22754297 (last accessed 18 February 2018): “Three peers and a MP have been accused of agreeing to do parliamentary work for payment after undercover reporters for the Sunday Times, BBC Panorama and the Daily Telegraph posed as lobbyists”. I do not wish to reproduce the scene in Buñuel’s “The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie” where Fernando Rey insults the ambassador of a fictitious Latin-American state by pointing to grievances in a tone becoming increasingly aggressive. Therefore, it is with no pleasure at all that I drop the name of Francisco Correa aka Don Vito. Meanwhile, Spanish courts have sentenced the ringleaders to several decades in prison. See https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/24/inenglish/1527154734_539755.html (last accessed 6 September 2018). There are contradictory explanations for the fact that politicians in Germany hardly stand in court.
- 78.
- 79.
On the ‘lawyer problem’ OECD (2012, p. 25) and Meßerschmidt (2012a). Legislative outsourcing got into the public debate in 2009 when part of the rescue package and the bail-out draft for the German banking industry (Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Kreditwesengesetzes) was printed on official stationery of Linklaters who operated as draft writers even though they have close contacts with the finance industry. See for details in English https://www.thelocal.de/20090812/21191 (last accessed 1 March 2018).
- 80.
OECD (2012, pp. 30–32) with further references.
- 81.
For a thorough analysis of impact assessment in general, see Meuwese (2008).
- 82.
See Meßerschmidt (2015, pp. 78–79).
- 83.
See Voermans (2009, pp. 200–202).
- 84.
Gay (2016).
- 85.
- 86.
On the democracy-reinforcing role of judicial review see, among others, Almendares and Le Bihan (2015).
- 87.
Sunstein (1985, pp. 49–55) and Elhauge (1991/1992, p. 33), with a list of the prominent scholars making this argument (Chemerinsky, Epstein, Mashaw, Shapiro, Siegan, and Sunstein) and a summary of their arguments for a more intrusive judicial review at p. 44. These arguments cannot be discussed here because most of them are rooted in US Constitutional Law. For the opposite view, see Farber and Frickey (1986/87, pp. 908–924).
- 88.
Lack of time has prevented a complete survey however.
- 89.
- 90.
For references see Huefner (2017, pp. 139–158). Sunstein (1985, p. 55) has (once) stated, “It would be foolish to suggest that … the Court has been engaged in a serious or sustained effort to police the operation of interest-group politics. On the other hand, it would be equally foolish to attempt to explain current law as a system in which interest-group politics is accepted as an ordinary and permissible element of the political process.” This assessment, however, has proven to be over-optimistic.
- 91.
5 BVerfGE 85 at 232. The case giving rise to this obiter dictum concerned the banning of the German Communist Party. Paradoxically, it reads like a manifesto of pluralism. Although it took place more than five decades ago, it is still used as precedent.
- 92.
See his famous speech to the electors of Bristol of 3rd of November, 1774, No. 4.1.25 (available at www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c1.html).
- 93.
Schmitt (1947) treats this question in a very particular historical context.
- 94.
- 95.
- 96.
- 97.
The weird example of the only Frenchman paying the new tax on luxury yachts simply results from the fact that owners are fleeing the French Riviera. See https://www.france24.com/en/20170812-france-yacht-owners-flee-riviera-tax-changes-regulation-macron-france-saint-tropez-antibes (last accessed 6 Sept 2018) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 166 from July 20, 2018, p. 19.
- 98.
- 99.
See 7 BVerfGE 377 (pharmacy case) and 39 BVerfGE 210 (Mühlenstrukturgesetz). These decisions as well as many others, are however debatable because, in fact, they only privilege one special interest over another. For the more express rationality cases of the US Supreme Court see Sunstein (1985, pp. 49–50).
- 100.
See Farber and Frickey (1986/87, pp. 909–912).
- 101.
Oliver-Lalana and Meßerschmidt (2016, p. 9).
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
For references see Elhauge (1991/1992, pp. 45–46).
- 105.
Direct payments from the national budget and tax reduction.
- 106.
Schön (2016, p. 404) no. 13-026 with further references.
- 107.
See Schön (2016, pp. 405–406) no. 13-028 with further references.
- 108.
Belgium v Commission (C-75/99) [1999] E.C.R. I-3671, para 23; Banks (C-380/98) [2001] E.C.R. I-6117, para 30; France v Commission (C-251/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-6639, para 35; Piaggio (C-295/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-3735, para 34; Germany v Commission (C-156/98) [2000] E.C.R. I-6857, para 25; Adria-Wien-Pipeline (C-143/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, para 38; Ferring (C-53/00) [2001] E.C.R I-9067, para 15; GIL Insurance (C-308/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-4717, para 69; Belgium v Commission (C-5/01) [2002] E.C.R. I-11991, para 32; Italy v Commission (C-66/02) [2005] E.C.R. I-10801, para 77; Spain v Commission (C-276/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-8091, para 24; AEM Spa (Joined Cases C-128/03 and C-129/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-2861, para 38; Air Liquide (Joined Cases C-393/04 and C-41/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-5293, paras 29–30; RENV British Aggregates v Commission (T-210/02).
- 109.
- 110.
For details, see Arhold (2016, pp. 154–188).
- 111.
PreussenElektra (C-379/98) [2001] E.C.R. I-2099, paras 54–67.
- 112.
Sloman Neptun (Joined Cases 72/91 and 73/91) [1993], E.C.R. I-887.
- 113.
Quigley (2015, p. 112) with further references.
- 114.
- 115.
Holman (2009).
- 116.
I would rather compare it to a construction site with mostly unwilling workers.
- 117.
After all, German law submits secondary professional activities of deputies to a notification and publication obligation. The German Federal Constitutional Court approves this not only because of Parliament’s ability to function properly, but also in terms of restricting special interest influence, cf. 118 BVerfGE 277 at 324–326 and 330–331 in particular.
- 118.
See, as an example, European Union, Commission Staff Working Document: Better Regulation Guidelines COM(2015) 215 final, pp. 63–85. The Chairman of the Better Regulation Commission commented: “Good consultations gives business and other stakeholders a real stake in the EU’s decision-making process. For us, good consultation means to consult the right people at the right time and in the right way” (Haythornthwaite [2007, p. 24]). See on the discussion, Chabanet (2011), Coen (1997), Greenwood (2007), Moessing and Honer (2014), and Chari et al. (2007). On the lobbyist regulatory regimes in Europe OECD (2012, pp. 59–87). EU documents and working papers are manifold, ranging from Lehmann et al. (2003) to the recent Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission (13 April 2016). Renda (2006, p. 22) rightly points out, “Opening the door to mandatory public consultation is a double-edged sword, as it enables increased participation by the general public in the early stages of the regulatory process but at the same time exposes regulators to risks of lobbying and capture.”
- 119.
Coen (1997, p. 105).
- 120.
In response to the Barroso–Goldman Sachs affair, the moratorium will be prolonged only from 18 months to 2 years for Members of the Commission and to 3 years for the President. See Neue Zürcher Zeitung of September 19, 2017, p. 4.
- 121.
Germany only recently resisted Council proposals to extend the Transparency Register, see Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesregierung-torpediert-schaerfere-lobbyismus-regeln-in-bruessel-a-1167818.html (last accessed 4 February 2018). The UK has adopted a more strict attitude, see Gay (2016, pp. 170–172).
- 122.
OECD (2009, p. 28).
- 123.
For references see Farber and Frickey (1986/87, p. 915).
- 124.
For references see Farber and Frickey (1986/87, p. 917).
- 125.
- 126.
On the free-rider effects inherent in collective decisions, see Baumol (1952); for further references https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/ (last accessed 3 January 2018).
- 127.
Veljanovski (2010, pp. 34–35).
- 128.
In this vein, the OECD has made a call to “avoid stigmatisation of the phenomenon of lobbying” (2009, p. 10).
- 129.
See Weatherill (2007); Voermans (2016), with further references. See also OECD (2011): “Better Regulation improves economic and social welfare prospects, underpins growth and strengthens resilience”. In the same vein, IMF: “Good governance is key to economic success” (IMF Factsheet March 14, 2016; http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-and-Good-Governance; accessed 4 April 2017).
- 130.
See EU Commission, EU Regulatory Fitness (Communication) COM(2012) 746 final, 3. For the context and further references, see Robinson (2017, p. 252).
- 131.
See Karpen (2009, pp. 109–110).
- 132.
See Duprat (2005, pp. 162–163).
- 133.
For an affirmative approach to the deliberative model and further references see Fredman (2015, pp. 450–454).
- 134.
See Waldron (1999).
- 135.
Headline of a somewhat superficial report of Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 245 of October 24, 2017, p. 26.
- 136.
Like Berlusconi, Trump and Babis.
- 137.
See Richard Ford’s article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 251 from October 28, 2017, p. 11.
- 138.
- 139.
OECD (2009, p. 24). It is significant that the US legislative package of 2007 bears the name “The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act”.
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Meßerschmidt, K. (2019). Special Interest Legislation and Legislative Capture. In: Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12068-9_10
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